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# AN INTRODUCTION TO THE *NYĀYACATURGRANTHIKĀ*: WITH ENGLISH TRANSLATIONS

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# ABSTRACT

## AN INTRODUCTION TO THE *NYĀYACATURGRANTHIKĀ*: WITH ENGLISH TRANSLATIONS

BRUCE M. PERRY

WILHELM HALBFASS

Nyāya, or 'reasoning', is one of the six, orthodox Hindu schools of philosophy. It is commonly identified with logic and epistemology, fields in which it made substantial contributions to Indian thought. The founding text of the early school, the *Nyāyasūtras* of Akṣapāda (ca. 150 AD), outlines fundamental doctrines, themes, and modes of argumentation. The development of the early school is documented in a series of four (super) commentaries, called the *Nyāyacaturgranthikā*, on the *sūtras*. These commentaries in order are: the *Bhāṣya* of Pakṣilasvāmin, the *Vārttika* of Uddyotakara, the *Tātparyaṭīkā* of Vācaspati Miśra, and the *Pariśuddhi* of Udayana. Since the last two commentaries have been wholly ignored by modern scholars, they are studied here, as part of the *Nyāyacaturgranthikā*, in a systematic way for the first time. More specifically, all four commentaries on the first *Nyāyasūtra* are translated and explored from several vantage points.

It is stated in the first *Nyāyasūtra* that, by knowing the true-nature of the sixteen Nyāya categories, one attains the highest good or liberation. The commentaries on this *sūtra* accordingly explore in what true knowledge consists and how Nyāya functions as soteriological science. After a review of the scholarship on early Nyāya in the first chapter, the nature of liberation and how Nyāya produces it are taken up in the second. In the third chapter, how Nyāya relates to other sciences and to the orthodox Hindu tradition in general is explored. Finally, the fourth chapter is devoted to an exploration of how Nyāya validates its means or instruments of knowledge and, in consequence, guarantees the validity of knowledge in general.

The commentators collectively argue that Nyāya alone, as analytics (*ānvīkṣikī*), validates the means of knowledge through which all true knowledge is derived. Since it also validates the authority of the *Vedas*, which are the basis of Hindu orthodoxy, and teaches soteriological doctrines consistent with them, it is at once the science of reasoning *par excellence* and orthodoxly soteriological in orientation.

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## ABBREVIATIONS

Works frequently cited in the translations and studies:

| | |
|---|---|
| NS | *Nyāyasūtras* of Akṣapāda |
| NCG | *Nyāyacaturgranthikā* (the collective title for the following four (super)commentaries on the *Nyāyasūtras*): |
| NB | *Nyāyabhāṣya* of Pakṣilasvāmin |
| NV | *Nyāyavārttika* of Uddyotakara |
| NVT | *Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā* of Vācaspati Miśra |
| NVTP | *Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkāpariśuddhi* of Udayana |

All citations of these four commentaries on the first book of the *Nyāyasūtras*, and of the *sūtras* themselves, are, if not otherwised noted, from Thakur's *Nyāyadarśana* edition; of the first three commentaries on subsequent books, and the *sūtras*, to Taranatha Nyaya-Tarkatirtha and Amarendramohan Tarkatirtha's *Nyāyadarśanam* edition (TNT).

| | |
|---|---|
| NVTPP | *Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkāpariśuddhiprakāśa* of Vardhamāna (Dvivedin and Dravid edition: only up through NS 1.1.5) |
| NVTP(P) | *Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkāpariśuddhi* in Dvivedin and Dravid edition |
| NBh | *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* of Bhāsarvajña (Yogīndrānanda edition) |
| NM | *Nyāyamañjarī* of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa (Śukla edition) |
| ŚṬ | *Śrīkaṇṭhaṭippaṇaka* of Śrīkaṇṭha (Thakur edition) |
| NA | *Nyāyālaṅkāra* of Abhayatilaka (Thakur/Jetly edition) |

# INTRODUCTION

> Who would not say that commentaries increase doubt and ignorance, since there is no book to be found, human or divine, with which the world has any business, in which the difficulties are cleared up by the interpretation? The hundredth commentator passes it on to his successors in a thornier and more crabbed state than that in which he first discovered it? When did we ever agree in saying: 'This book has had enough. There is nothing more to be said about it?' Montaigne "On Experience"[1]

Nyāya is one of the six, major orthodox schools of Hindu philosophy.[2] It champions a variegated set of categories, which can roughly be divided into two groups, the epistemological and the dialectical.[3] Associated especially with epistemology and logic, it is the science of reasoning *par excellence* and, in its final phase, evolves largely into formal analysis.[4] One frequently finds Nyāya described as 'pluralistic realism', in contradistinction to the monistic, idealistic, and nihilistic strands in Indian thought. Such a characterization is largely correct if somewhat misleading, since Nyāya is also fundamentally soteriological. Its logical and epistemological doctrines, while derived

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[1] *Michel de Montaigne: Essays*, p. 347.

[2] Nyāya, which literally means 'reasoning' or 'inference' – the means of knowledge with which it is most closely identified, later merges into a single school with Vaiśeṣika. The other four orthodox schools are: Mīmāṃsā, Vedānta, Sāṅkhya, and Yoga.

[3] The Nyāya categories (*padārtha*) are not, for the most part, ontological, but more of the nature of topics of enquiry. The epistemological group consists of the means or instruments of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) and the objects of knowledge (*prameya*), the latter of which are predominantly soteriological (see NS 1.1.9): soul (*ātman*), body (*śarīra*), sense organ (*indriya*), their objects (*artha*), intellect (*buddhi*), mind (*manas*), activity (*pravṛtti*), fault (*doṣa*), rebirth (*pretyabhāva*), result (*phala*), pain (*duḥkha*), and liberation (*apavarga*). There are no less than fourteen members of the dialectical group: doubt (*saṃśaya*), purpose (*prayojana*), familiar instance (*dṛṣṭānta*), established doctrine (*siddhānta*), member (*avayava*), hypothetical reasoning (*tarka*), ascertainment (*nirṇaya*), discussion (*vāda*), arguing (*jalpa*), wrangling (*vitaṇḍā*), false reason (*hetvābhāsa*), deceit (*chala*), futile answer (*jāti*), and grounds for defeat (*nigrahasthāna*). See the first chapter on the relation of Nyāya to the debate/dialectical tradition (*vāda*). The connections within and between the two groups are discussed at length in the commentaries on the first *sūtra*.

[4] The formal aspects and philosophical method of Navyanyāya 'new Nyāya' have received considerable attention by modern scholars: parallels with the Anglo-American analytical tradition are striking.

from the mundane or 'real' world and of eminently practical value, are motivated by the search for liberation. It would be more proper, if somewhat paradoxical, to describe it instead as pluralistic, realistic soteriology.[5] The harmonization of these seemingly opposed tendencies in early Nyāya is one of the central issues in this study.

The early school of Nyāya is represented principally by works on the *Nyāyasūtras*, which are attributed to Akṣapāda and date to approximately the second century AD.[6] A set of four (super) commentaries on the *Nyāyasūtras*, called the *Nyāyacaturgranthikā*, effectively forms the *Nyāyaśāstra* proper. These commentaries, in order, are: the *Bhāṣya* of Pakṣilasvāmin, the *Vārttika* of Uddyotakara, the *Tātparyaṭīkā* of Vācaspati Miśra, and the *Pariśuddhi* of Udayana.[7] Embodying some six centuries of philosophical activity (5th to 11th century AD), the *Nyāyacaturgranthikā* affords a unique and integral perspective on the development of early Nyāya and of Indian philosophical thought in general, since the various schools evolved in mutual contact. The *sūtras*, *Bhāṣya*, and *Vārttika* have received ample scrutiny: there are numerous editions of the texts, good translations, and extensive scholarship. Most studies of early Nyāya focus, quite properly, on these works: they contain the oldest material and document the formative stage of the school. The middle period, by contrast, is wholly ignored. There are several editions of Vācaspati's *Tātparyaṭīkā*, but no translation or anything like a systematic study of it. The *Pariśuddhi* has received, if possible, even less attention, since there is still no complete edition of the work, let alone studies or translations. The relative silence on these two commentaries is in part puzzling, in that both their authors are major figures in Indian philosophy. A true polymath, Vācaspati composed substantial works in nearly all the orthodox philosophical schools. Even though he is

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[5]The emergence of theism in Nyāya likewise seems to run counter to its thorough-going realism.

[6]The works of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa (*Nyāyamañjarī*, a synopsis of Nyāya) and Bhāsarvajña (*Nyāyabhūṣaṇa*, an autocommentary on his *Nyāyasāra*) are not commentaries proper on the *sūtras*. There was a considerable corpus of works on early Nyāya that has not survived. See the first chapter for a full treatment of the authors and works of early Nyāya.

[7]The commentatorial tradition continues on for two more levels on the *Pariśuddhi*, and there are even commentaries on the *Nyāyacaturgranthikā*: see the first chapter.

not widely recognized as a pivotal figure in Nyāya, he seems to have attained some prominence in the school.[8] Udayana, on the other hand, is easily the most important figure of the later stage of early Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika and a major author in Indian philosophy. He composed important works in both schools and reflects their fusion. His influence on Navyanyāya was decisive: all his major works were commented on, some repeatedly.[9]

This study is intended as a first step towards serious treatment of these two neglected commentaries. Given the length, difficulty, and complexity of both and the lack of an edition for the entire *Pariśuddhi*, a full-scale analysis is simply out of the question. From out of a number of possible, if less ambitious, approaches considered, the one finally adopted seemed both feasible and fruitful: a study of all four commentaries on the first *Nyāyasūtra*.[10] Aside from its being the obvious place from which to begin, there are compelling reasons for selecting this *sūtra*. In it Akṣapāda states that from the knowledge of the true-nature of the sixteen Nyāya categories there is attainment of the highest good. In the commentaries to it, each category is examined, lengthy discussions on them developed in subsequent *sūtras* are set out summarily, and their precise connection with the highest good is explored. What true knowledge is and what a 'true-nature' is are likewise examined at great length. In addition to providing this synoptic view of the *śāstra* proper, the commentators discuss other aspects of Nyāya, including its relation to other sciences. Finally, the commentaries on the first *sūtra* amount to more than a fifth of the total for the whole first book.[11] In every sense, it is a *sūtra* one

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[8]That Udayana wrote a commentary on his work is implicit confirmation of its value. See also A. Thakur, "Tātparyācārya."

[9]His importance may also be measured by the stature of his enemies. A classic work in Vedānta and even Navyanyāya, the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya* by Śrīharṣa, is a highly polemical attack against him.

[10]A purely thematic approach, namely an investigation into the concept of the validity of the means of knowledge (*prāmāṇya*) in the *Nyāyacaturgranthikā*, was briefly pondered but rejected for obvious reasons: it would have involved a large number of *sūtras*, each with its own specific constellation of difficulties, and many disjointed discussions or passing remarks, all of which would have to have been reconciled. Since the first *sūtra* does not, by and large, require the other *sūtras*, it provides a continuity of enquiry otherwise hard to locate.

cannot lightly dismiss.

Since the *Tātparyaṭīkā* is so close a commentary on the *Vārttika*, often down to individual words and even parts of words, it cannot responsibly be treated without the *Vārttika*. The same argument holds for the *Pariśuddhi* and *Tātparyaṭīkā*, and, to a lesser extent, the *Vārttika* and *Bhāṣya*. All four commentaries, in short, must be studied as a whole. In order to supplement the studies and to lay a foundation for future work on the *Tātparyaṭīkā* and *Pariśuddhi*, a close translation of all four commentaries on the first *sūtra* is provided in an appendix. Although the *Bhāṣya* and *Vārttika* have been ably translated, it proved impracticable to use these translations. Given that the interconnections among the commentaries force constant, even wholesale, readjusting of the translations, a borrowed translation would be so drastically rewritten as to assume a form unrecognizable from its original.[12] A uniform voice in the translations is also preferable for the sake of both readability and consistency. In light of these ends and of the nature of the texts themselves, the translations err somewhat on the side of literalness.

Mere translation can go only so far in explicating the NCG on the first *sūtra*: studies that provide a synthesis or serve as a frame for interpretation are clearly needed as well. For all the wealth of glosses, arguments, and digressions, two major issues or themes emerge in the commentaries on this *sūtra*. One concerns the nature of Nyāya in the broadest sense possible. As noted above, this includes a description of its subject matter, method, and end, but other facets of Nyāya, especially its relation to other sciences and to Vedic orthodoxy, are explored as well. The commentators hold that Nyāya is at once the science of reasoning or analytics (*ānvīkṣikī*) and a science of liberation. These are not mutually contradictory claims,[13] yet their reconciliation preoccupies the

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[11]In terms of pages (Thakur 149/686 = 22%); in TNT, which does not contain the *Pariśuddhi* (though it does contain Viśvanātha's *Vṛtti*), it is nearly 6% of the entire five books (68/1202): both numbers are disproportionately large in that there are some five hundred and thirty *Nyāyasūtras*. It might be noted that Śaṅkaramiśra wrote a commentary (*Trisūtrīvyākhyā*) on the NCG to the first three *Nyāyasūtras* only: these seemed to suffice for his purposes.

[12]Conversely, if renditions of terms in earlier texts are borrowed, one's hand is forced in so rendering them in later texts.

commentators. On their collective account, Nyāya is the most fundamental of all sciences since it establishes the means or instruments through which all valid knowledge must be derived. *A fortiori* it establishes the validity of the *Vedas*, which are the source of orthodoxy itself. Since the attainment of liberation as the highest human good is also taught in the *Vedas*, Nyāya can thus legitimately adopt and promote orthodox, soteriological doctrines. That it is fully consonant with the *Vedas* conversely proves that it is an orthodox science. It remains for the commentators to show how Nyāya is the preferred means by which liberation can be attained. This task, in turn, requires them to explore the nature of liberation, liberating knowledge, and their relation. This theme, or rather complex of themes, is studied at length in the second and third chapters.

The second, though closely related, theme is how Nyāya provides, or must provide, the criterion by which true can be distinguished from false knowledge. Strictly speaking, the commentators' concern is in what the validity of the means or sources of knowledge (*prāmāṇya*) consists, since they hold that all valid knowledge is derived only from valid means of knowledge. In the first sentence of the *Bhāṣya*, Pakṣilasvāmin succinctly states that this validity consists in the successfulness of an activity which the apprehension of an object through a means of knowledge produces. To paraphrase roughly, the validity of a means of knowledge is confirmed empirically through activity: there is no such thing as an intrinsically true or valid means of knowledge. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that the bulk of the succeeding commentaries on the first *sūtra* is an attempt to unpack this sentence and to restate it in its fullest and most rigorous generality. The fourth chapter is devoted to an examination of this theme.

The method adopted in these studies is avowedly hybrid. Since their principal aim is to examine the commentaries as an organic whole, with emphasis on the *Tātparyaṭīkā* and *Pariśuddhi*, the dominant strand is narrative. That is not to say that they are mere paraphrase, though some paraphrase is unavoidable: to make sense of the later

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[13]That is, there is no antinomy between reasoning and faith in scripture in the commentators' view.

commentaries, it is often necessary to present summarized or suppleted arguments from their predecessors. Udayana's harrowingly laconic comments particularly demand a context. In addition, a narrative framework is required in order to trace and properly to assess the contributions, innovations, and even missteps in each layer of commentary. Such a narrative, then, chronicles the development of early Nyāya as revealed in the commentaries.[14] These studies are in part commentary as well, in that some passages require painstaking exegesis or parallels. Finally, the studies are also critical or analytical: an attempt is made throughout to assess what is being argued, for coherence, cogency, and the like. The criticism serves to evaluate the commentaries both individually and collectively. Each chapter typically consists of a detailed analysis of the *Bhāṣya*,[15] followed by examination of significant additions, corrections, and elucidations in each subsequent commentary. Consolidations and criticisms are interspersed throughout, and a summary for each study is essayed. These studies are, as it were, an *explication de texte* for the passages in the NCG to the first *sūtra* that treat of the two general themes discussed above.

Apart from their importance to the history of Nyāya, the two themes addressed in the studies should be of interest to a wider audience. First, what a *śāstra* is and how to justify its existence and present it cogently figure large in the commentators' remarks. Again, the commentators are richly reflective on what the role and function of a commentary are: the interplay among these four commentaries forms an intriguing case history in the commentatorial tradition in India. The claims of reasoning and a revealed, orthodox tradition are, as the commentators hold, fully harmonized in Nyāya. Their arguments, some of which are quite extraordinary, will be of interest to students

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[14]Ideally, a careful consideration of external factors on this development should also be provided. Competition with other systems, especially with their arch-rivals, the Buddhists, clearly influenced the authors of the NCG. Since this competition forced them to look inward and to reinforce Nyāya proper, not to abandon nor make wholesale changes to it, it is narrowly the effects of such competition that are of concern here. Some stock, however, is taken of these external factors.

[15]Udayana argues that the *sūtras* and *Bhāṣya* are inseparable and properly constitute the *śāstra*, NVTP 71.18-20.

of Indian philosophy. Finally, the ambitious project of the commentators universally to establish the validity of knowledge through empirically confirmable means bears directly on a central question of epistemology.

Now it remains to consider, with Montaigne, what real clarity on the *Nyāyasūtras* is to be gained by examining third and fourth order commentaries, which are long and complex at that.[16] His remarks may, at first sight, seem inapt, since the status, form, and purpose of philosophical commentary in India are radically different from those which he censures. While such commentaries abound in literal exegesis and concern with preserving the intent of the original text, these are but part of their larger aim. The original is not merely a museum piece of antiquarian interest, but rather the source or basis for a living tradition, which has to be upheld and revitalized through commentaries.[17] Further, since they are regularly in the form of aphoristic *sūtras*, original texts are seldom self-luminous. At best, they present the system of a school in bare outline. Also, the words of the original author, normally an inspired sage (*muni*), assume an almost numinous suggestiveness which commentatorial activity can never exhaust. Lastly, the overwhelming majority of works in the Indian philosophical tradition are commentaries: the writing of commentaries is clearly the *modus operandi* of philosophical activity.[18]

These considerations aside, it must still be asked to what extent, or at what point, later commentaries such as the *Pariśuddhi* only occasionally elucidate the original and instead concentrate on an antecedent commentary or commentaries or even take

[16]Part of their neglect in recent times can simply be ascribed to their length and difficulty.

[17]Uddyotakara (NV 6.1-2; cf. NVT 22.14-18) and Vācaspati (NVT 22.1-10; cf. NVTP 70.13-20) describe their commentaries in terms of a renewal or restoration of the *śāstra*. In one passage, Udayana uses language that seems to suggest that he sees his task as akin to reinstalling an image, NVTP 131.3.

[18]There are, to be sure, numerous independent works, some of which are seminal. Also, commentaries can supplant an original text in a school, as is the case with Praśastapāda's *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* and the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras*. On the other hand, there are cases of an author's composing an auto-commentary on his own 'original': e.g., the *Nyāyasāra* and *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* of Bhāsarvajña, and the *Tarkasaṃgraha* and *Dīpikā* of Annambhaṭṭa. Sometimes, an author will compose a fresh commentary on a text, sidestepping a long tradition: for example, Udayana's independent commentary on the fifth book of the *Nyāyasūtras* (the *Nyāyapariśiṣṭa*), which he also he treats in his *Pariśuddhi*.

on a life of their own. There may be some, if only sporadic, benefit to be gained in consulting later commentaries if they are more than nominally about the original, provided that they do not actually leave it in a 'more crabbed state'. While both the *Tātparyaṭīkā* and *Pariśuddhi* show a marked increase in difficulty or rather sophistication, both linguistically and conceptually, they are not uniformly obscure, convoluted, or crabbed. On the other hand, there are two tendencies in them that are worrisome. One might be termed overreaching: a straining to say something new at any cost or providing exegesis so intricate as to pass credulity.[19] At times, both Vācaspati and Udayana seem to comment for comment's sake alone. The other ranges from innocuous distortions to overt revisionism: in short, a proclivity towards reinterpretation.[20] Even overlooking these tendencies, one may simply reach a point of diminishing returns in studying them. It may be that the original has, in fact, 'had enough' and is lost sight of or worse by successive layers of commentary. Montaigne's complaint holds some force after all.

A closer examination of the relation of an original text to its commentary may provide a satisfactory answer.[21] As noted above, an original or founding text of a philosophical school is more of an outline than a definitive statement of a *śāstra*, and it is often in a highly crabbed state. Early commentators, at any rate, provide a much needed, coherent statement of the *śāstra*. Far from remaining fixed, the *śāstra*, through the vehicle of commentary, continues to evolve in response to challenges from within and without the school. In terms of documenting the history of the *śāstra*, these later commentaries are evidently indispensable. It might seem unavoidable that the original text gradually receives little more than lip-service, and there is some truth in this supposition. However, for the later commentators the original text still constitutes a valid formulation of the *śāstra*. Subsequent commentaries do not supplant or replace it but subsume it in a more complete formulation. The development of the *śāstra* in new, un-

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[19]See, for example, NVT 25.5ff and NVTP 83.22ff.
[20]See, for example, NVT 31.25ff and NVTP 102.20ff.
[21]These remarks apply narrowly to the Nyāya tradition.

foreseen directions is thought further to reveal – even to be corroborated by – the intent of the original and not its obsolence. The original is more of a score to be interpreted than a puzzle, once solved, to be ignored. None of the commentators envisages his work as the definitive and final statement of the *śāstra*, but rather as explicating the *śāstra* as revealed by the *sūtras* and *Bhāṣya*.

The last two commentaries of the NCG do not increase doubt nor ignorance about the *Nyāyasūtras*, but they do introduce new levels of complexity into the *śāstra*. Continuities in the tradition, the status of an original text versus commentary or metacommentary, and the role and awareness of a commentator's place in the tradition have now to be considered. The present study is a first step towards sorting out these complexities and of rewriting the history of the early school of Nyāya.

# CHAPTER I

## THE HISTORY AND BIBLIOGRAPHY OF EARLY NYĀYA

The dating of the authors and works of early Nyāya remains an inexact science, despite a wealth of texts and the continued labor of scholars.[1] Relative chronologies, however, among many of these authors are beyond doubt and, when supplemented by the handful of known dates and notices in sources, yield a reliable if provisional historical framework for the study of the school. Appeal is sometimes also made to the stage of development reflected in a Nyāya work — whether of Nyāya proper or of another

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[1]Information on the extant works of early Nyāya is provided in this chapter. These are: the *Nyāyasūtras*, the *Nyāyacaturgranthikā*, (with the ancillary works, *Śrīkaṇṭhaṭippaṇaka*, *Nyāyālaṅkāra*, and *Vivaraṇapañjikā*), the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha*, the *Nyāyamañjarī*, the *Nyāyasāra* and *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa*, the *Lakṣaṇamālā*, the *Ātmatattvaviveka*, *Nyāyakusumāñjali*, and the *Nyāyapariśiṣṭa*. A number of these works have subcommentaries. There are also several doxographical works that contain material of interest for Nyāya: *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha*, *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya* (two separate works go by this name, one by Rājaśekhara the other by Guṇaratna), and *Sarvasiddhāntasaṃgraha* (ascribed to Śaṅkara). In time, handbooks of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, normally syncretic in nature, were composed, but they are of scant value in tracing the historical development of the school. The most important of these are: *Nyāyakārikāvalī* (also called *Nyāyabhāṣāpariccheda*) with *Nyāyamuktāvalī* of Viśvanātha, *Tarkabhāṣā* of Keśavabhaṭṭa, and *Tarkasaṃgraha* with *Dīpikā* of Annambhaṭṭa. See the bibliography for full citations.

The secondary literature on early Nyāya is extensive for the early figures and works of the school, but scanty for many of the later representatives. Collectively, the work of A. Thakur (especially his introductions to editions) is a reliable source of information on early Nyāya. The first chapter of D. C. Bhattacarya's *The History of Navya-Nyāya in Mithilā* (*HNNM*), "Udayana and his Predecessors," is still a significant contribution to the history of Nyāya, especially for the later philosophers of the early school. Among the histories of or handbooks on Indian philosophy, U. Mishra's *History of Indian Philosophy II* (*HIP*) contains a complete historical treatment of Nyāya, though it is quirky and somewhat dated. The second volume of the *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies* (*EIP*) edited by K. H. Potter, *Indian Metaphysics and Epistemology: The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Tradition up to Gaṅgeśa*, contains summaries of virtually all the extant works of early Nyāya and provides brief historical résumés of each author and work. The quality of the summaries, however, varies widely. The first volume, *Bibliography*[2], is a useful tool for research in Indian philosophy. B. K. Matilal's *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* (*NV*) is rather disappointing in its historical treatment. Two older works deserve passing mention: S. C. Vidyābhūṣaṇa's *A History of Indian Logic* (*Ancient, Medieval and Modern Schools*) (*HIL*), and G. Kaviraj's *History and Bibliography of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* (*HBNV*). Though antiquated, they contain some valuable source material.

school — as a criterion for dating.[2] In light of the general dearth of reliable historical data available for and a pervasive ahistoricity manifested in many works of ancient and medieval India, the chronological uncertainties in Nyāya are by no means unique. Concerning the prehistory of Nyāya there is much ambiguous evidence and no lack of theories. Yet there seem to be two points on which all can agree: that Nyāya as an independent school of philosophy is attested rather late and that the *Nyāyasūtras* reflect *Vāda-śāstra* influence.[3] The earliest references to *nyāya*, in both the technical sense of 'five-membered inference' and the broader sense of 'Nyāya system', are found in the *Mahābhārata*.[4] A few of these passages merit brief mention.

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[2]For an illustration of the limitations of this approach, see P. Hacker, "Jayantabhaṭṭa und Vācaspatimiśra, ihre Zeit und ihre Bedeutung für die Chronologie des Vedānta," who argued that Jayanta Bhaṭṭa was to be dated before Vācaspati because he reflected an earlier stage of development of Vedānta than that found in Vācaspati. L. Schmithausen, "Some remarks on the problem of the date of Vācaspatimiśra," showed, however, that they do not reflect different stages of development. W. Slaje, "Untersuchungen zur Chronologie einiger Nyāya-Philosophen," has adopted a *prima facie* better strategy: multiple developmental criteria. See footnote 44 *infra*.

[3]As the *Nyāyasūtras* are the culmination of the development of Nyāya philosophy, the present form of the *sūtras* need not be an accurate guide to a or the proto-Nyāya. In addition to the *Vāda-Śāstra*, Nyāya has also been heavily influenced by Yoga and Vaiśeṣika. The Yogic element is reflected in NS.4.2.38-49; see also G. Kaviraj, *HBNV*, pp.5-7, and G. Oberhammer, *Wahrheit und Transzendenz*, especially pp. 1-65. For Vaiśeṣika influences, see H. Ui, *The Vaiśeṣika Philosophy according to the Daśapadārtha-śāstra*, p.16 and A. Thakur, "Vātsyāyana and the Vaiśeṣika System," and "Uddyotakara as a Vaiśeṣika." Nyāya also evolved in bitter conflict with and was decisively influenced by various Buddhist authors, especially Nāgārjuna and Dignāga and his school. See J. Bronkhorst, "Nāgārjuna and Nyāya," V. A. Van Bijlert, *Epistemology and Spiritual Authority: The Development of Epistemology and Logic in the Old Nyāya and the Buddhist School of Epistemology*, K. Bhattacharya, "On the Relationship Between the Vigrahavyāvartanī and the Nyāyasūtra-s," and D. N. Shastri, *The Philosophy of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and its Conflict with the Buddhist Dignāga School (Critique of Indian Realism)*. On the Vāda-śāstra see especially G. Oberhammer, "Ein Beitrag zu den Vāda-Traditionen Indiens," who argued that the 1st and 5th Books of the Nyāyaśāstra were once an independent handbook of teachings on *vāda*, which formed the core of the *Nyāyasūtras*, to which the remaining books were attached (pp. 63, 73, 75, 102-103). He has since abandoned this position: "Man kann nicht annehmen, dass die Wurzel des Nyāya-Systems eine Vāda-Lehre gewesen wäre, in die sekundär eine Naturphilosophie Eingang gefunden hat, wie man dies vielleicht aufgrund der philologischen Analyse der Nyāyasūtren vermuten könnte. Keine Vāda-Lehre könnte einem System seine philosophische Identität verleihen, da sei ihrer Natur nach gerade über die jeweilige philosophische Position hinaus auch für andere Systeme Geltung haben muss.", *Wahrheit und Transzendenz*, p. 1 note 3. See also G. Tucci, *Pre-Diṅnāga Buddhist Texts on Logic from Chinese Sources (PDBTLCS)*, Introduction, p.xxv: "...when the systems had begun to assume a definite individuality and disputes among the various schools of thought increased, the practical importance of the Vāda-rules came to be recognized by various sects, so that we may logically assume that different Vāda-śāstras, a kind of *vademecum* for philosophical discussion always in vogue in India and well attested by Brahmanical as well as Buddhistic sources, were in circulation quite independently among the various schools."

> O king, those who know the means of knowledge base themselves on the Nyāya-system.[5]

Here the first of the sixteen Nyāya categories, means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*), is underscored as the basis of *Nyāyaśāstra*.

> Numerous systems of reasoning are related by various proponents: one should follow that one which is conjoined with reasons, scripture, and the conduct of the good.[6]

> <Nārada> who knows the strengths and weaknesses of the five-member <syllogism> statement.[7]

A passage in which one might expect Nyāya to appear is Kauṭilya's list of the

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[4]See further A. Thakur, "The Mahābhārata and the Nyāyaśāstra": a number of these passages will be treated in the sections on *ānvīkṣikī* and *adhyātmavidyā*. A large number of the references cited by Thakur are considered later interpolations by the editors of the critical edition of the *Mahābhārata*. There are denunciations of *tarkavidyā*, *hetuśāstra*, and *ānvīkṣikī* in the *Mahābhārata* (12.173.45-48, 13.37.12), the *Rāmāyaṇa* (2.94.33), and *Manusmṛti* (2.11).

The term *nyāyavistara* (cf. NM I.4.8-9) is known to a Chinese commentator on the *Śataśāstra*: see G. Tucci *PDBTLCS*, Introduction, p. xxix. The terms *tarkaśāstra*, *hetuvidyā*, *yuktiśāstra*, and *ānvīkṣikī* are used almost interchangeably.

*nyāya* is derived by Pāṇini (A.3.3.122 *ādhyānanyāyodyāvasaṃhārādhārāvāsyāśca*) from the root √*nī* 'to lead' with the affix *ghañ*: 'that by which <a decision/conclusion> is reached' (cf. Kāśikā *nīyate 'nena*). See further A.3.3.37 *parinyornīṇordyūtābhreṣayoḥ*. An adjectival form *nyāyya* 'proper' is derived in A.4.4.92 *dharmapathyarthanyāyādanapete* (*yat* A.4.4.75). *nyāya* occurs also in two *gaṇas* A.4.2.60 (*ukthādi* 23) [> *naiyāyika*] and A.4.3.73 (*ṛgayanādi*) [> *naiyāya*], but as Patañjali does not mention *nyāya* in his treatment of *ukthādi* nor treat of A.4.3.73 at all, the authenticity of *nyāya* as an original member of either *gaṇa* is open to question.

Bhāsa in his *Pratimānāṭaka* (V.8.6-8) ascribes the Nyāyaśāstra to Medhātithi:

*bhoḥ ! kāśyapagotro 'smi | sāṅgopāṅgaṃ vedamādhīye mānavīyaṃ*
*dharmaśāstraṃ māheśvaraṃ yogaśāstraṃ, bārhaspatyamarthaśāstraṃ,*
*medhātithernyāyaśāstraṃ, prācetasaṃ śrāddhakalpaṃ ca |*

Assuming that the plays ascribed to Bhāsa are authentic, a date of sometime in the 2nd century AD is in order; see A. K. Warder, *Indian Kāvya Literature* (*IKL*) *II*, pp.262-264.

[5]*pramāṇajñā mahīpāla nyāyaśāstrāvalambinaḥ* | 12.25.17 [32*.1]. The balance of the passage runs:

*mantre ca vyavahāre ca niyoktavyo vijñātā*
*tarkaśāstrakṛtā buddhirdharmaśāstrakṛtā ca yā*
*daṇḍanītikṛtā caiva trailokyamapi sādhayet*
*niyojyā vedatattvajñā yajñakarmasu pārthiva*
*vedajñā ye ca śāstrajñāste ca rājansubuddhayaḥ*
*ānvīkṣikītrayīvārtādaṇḍanītiṣu pāragāḥ*
*te tu sarvatra yoktavyāste ca buddheḥ parāṃ gatāḥ*

*Tarkaśāstra* here is apparently equated with *ānvīkṣikī*.

[6] *nyāyatantrāṇy anekāni tais tair uktāni vādibhiḥ |*
*hetvāgamasadācāraiḥ yad yuktam tat upāsyatām* || 2.203.20 || Nyāya here presumably means 'reasoning' in the general sense, and not 'school of Nyāya' as Thakur takes it, "Mahābhārata and the Nyāyaśāstra," p. 404. The passage is, all the same, redolent of what Pakṣilasvāmin asserts for Nyāya at NB 3.8.

sciences in the *Arthaśāstra*, where *Sāṃkhya*, *Yoga*, and *Lokāyata* are given as instances of *ānvīkṣikī*.[8] Its absence is all the more striking, since Pakṣilasvāmin equates *nyāya* with *ānvīkṣikī* and adapts a verse found in the *Arthaśāstra*.[9] To reconcile this inconsistency, A. Thakur, among others, argues that in the *Arthaśāstra*, *Yoga* is a synonym for Nyāya; his case is not compelling.[10]

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7 *pañcāvayavayuktasya vākyasya guṇadoṣavit* 2.5.1 [Appendix 2.7].
(A few lines above this, he is also described as 'knowing Nyāya' *nyāyavid*). This is but a small part of a sweeping encomium of Nārada, which manages to ascribe to him the knowledge of every known science (in philosophy alone he is credited with Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya, and Yoga); it is almost certainly a later interpolation. A. Thakur, "Mahābhārata and the Nyāyaśāstra," p.404, thinks that in the phrase *nyāya-tattvārthavijñāna-sampannaḥ* (*Mahābhārata* 1.64.35) there is a reference to Nyāya. The context, however, demands the sense, 'principle of Vedic interpretation'. In *Mahābhārata* 1.64.37, there is clearly a reference to a Vāda-tradition.

8 If the extant *Arthaśāstra* is by Kauṭilya, the minister to Aśoka, then a date in the third century BC is in order. The dating of this *Arthaśāstra*, however, is not definitively settled. While it is true that Kauṭilya does not offer an exhaustive list of what qualifies as *ānvīkṣikī* and hence his non-mention of Nyāya need not be telling, one would be hard pressed to find a system which, had it been known to Kauṭilya as an independent system and under the name Nyāya, would have better qualified as *ānvīkṣikī*. See Chapter 3, pp. 87ff.

9 *imāstu catasro vidyāḥ pṛthakprasthānāḥ prāṇabhṛtāmanugrāhayopadiśyante, yāsāṃ caturthīyamānvīkṣikī nyāyavidyā* I NBh 2.15-16
*kaḥ punarayaṃ nyāyaḥ ? pramāṇairarthaparīkṣaṇam* I *pratyakṣāgamāśritaṃ cānumanam* I *sānvīkṣā* I *pratyakṣāgamābhyāmīkṣitasyārthasyānvīkṣaṇamanvīkṣā* I *tayā pravartata ityānvīkṣikī nyāyavidyā nyāyaśāstram* I NBh 3.5-8
*seyamānvīkṣikī pramāṇādibhiḥ padārthairvibhājyamānā* —
*pradīpaḥ sarvavidyānām upāyaḥ sarvakarmaṇām* I
*āśrayaḥ sarvadharmāṇāṃ* ***vidyoddeśe prakīrtitā*** II NBh 5.13-15
Cf.
*pradīpaḥ sarvavidyānām upāyaḥ sarvakarmaṇām* I
*āśrayaḥ sarvadharmāṇāṃ* ***śaśvad ānvīkṣikī matā*** II *Arthaśāstra* 1.2.12 [Kangle edition]

10 "The Yoga of Kauṭilya must have been identical with Nyāya. Our grounds for this assumption are that the Jaina authors use the term 'Yoga' or 'Yauga' for the Naiyāyikas or Vaiśeṣikas or both. Again Vātsyāyana in his Nyāyabhāṣya ascribes a Nyāya view to the 'Yoga' which is quite opposite to the view of the Pātañjaladarśana (vide Nyāyabhāṣya I.i.29).," *Nyāyālaṅkāra*, Introduction, p. xvi. He offers two possible explanations for this use of the term 'Yoga', both of which are forced; either because Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika hold that contact is required for composite substances to come into being or that they are associated with the Pāśupatuyoga system. He is also compelled to hold that, "His [Kauṭilya's] Sāṃkhya includes both seśvarasāṃkhya of Patañjali and nirīśvara Sāṃkhya of Kapila. It is to be noted that the epistemology of both of them is almost the same and Pātañjala works are still called sāṃkhya [sic].", *loc.-cit*. Sāṃkhya and Yoga, however, are well known as distinct philosophies in the *Mahābhārata* (see, e.g., 12.231.3, 12.306.42, 12.304.1-4, 12.355.74-75, 12.336.76, and 6.24.39, 6.27.4-5), though the two are often said to be the essentially one. Similarly, G Chattopadhyaya, *What is Living and What is Dead in Indian Philosophy*, pp. 249-250, and B. K. Matilal *NV* p.77, think that 'yoga' here means *yukti* 'reasoning', a synonym for Nyāya(-Vaiśeṣika). This synonymy is not without basis: *yukti* 'reasoning' is derived from the same root, √*yuj* 'to join', as is 'yoga'. That it holds here in the *Arthaśāstra*, however, is implausible.

As for the origins of Nyāya, there is no consensus. The prevailing views are: that it arose from a debate tradition;[11] that it arose from a reasoning tradition;[12] that it is a fusion of Vaiśeṣika with a debate tradition;[13] that is was originally part of Mīmāṃsā;[14] or that it was a fusion of a nature-philosophy with a debate tradition.[15]

The earliest work of the Nyāya school is the *Nyāyasūtras*, ascribed to Akṣadpāda; his gotra name is apparently Gautama or Gotama.[16] This work was critically edited in the late tenth century by Vācaspati Miśra (who also provided topical arrangements which were widely followed), in his *Nyāyasūcīnibandha*, and again in the fifteenth century by Vācaspati Miśra II, in his *Nyāyasūtrodhāra*.[17] It consists of five books each

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[11]S . N. Das Gupta, *History of Indian Philosophy I*, pp. 276-277; B. K. Matilal *NV*: "This proto-Nyāya was a kind of vāda-śāstra a scientific treatise on disputation." (p.76), and "It is probable that the system of Vāda categories became more refined and methodical in the hands of the followers of a realistic philosophy (such as Vaiśeṣika). And from the Vāda rules they eventually developed a full-fledged philosophical system by adding the doctrine of the soul, of final release, as well as a doctrine of the pramāṇas (means of knowledge)." (p. 77).

[12]That is, from a tradition variously called *hetuśāstra*, *hetuvidyā*, *tarkavidyā*, even *ānvīkṣikī*: U. Mishra, *HIP* II, p.20, A. Thakur, "Mahābhārata and the Nyāyaśāstra," pp. 403-404, and *Nyāyālaṅkāra*, Introduction, p.xv.

[13]H. Randle, *Indian Logic in the Early Schools*, pp.6-7, 9-11, 17-18, thinks that Nyāya adopted its philosophical doctrines from Vaiśeṣika. One may add that Pakṣilasvāmin and Uddyotakara quote Vaiśeṣika *sūtras* and accept Vaiśeṣika doctrines: see A. Thakur, "Vātsyāyana and the Vaiśeṣika System," and "Uddyotakara as a Vaiśeṣika."

[14]A. B. Keith, *Indian Logic and Atomism: An Exposition of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika Systems*, p.10-11. The lack of an early attestation of Nyāya in its technical sense, the use of the word *nyāya* as 'conclusion, argument' in the *Dharmasūtras*, and its use in the sense of 'principal of interpretation' in Āpastamba lead Keith to maintain that Nyāya originated from Mīmāṃsā.

[15]E. Frauwallner, *History of Indian Philosophy II*: "Of both systems, the Nyāya originated through the mixing of a dialectic with a simple natural-philosophical doctrine. It, no doubt, stands near the development of the Vaiśeṣika but did not participate in its later development....Later on, the Nyāya developed unilaterally the Theory of Knowledge and Logic and completely neglected Nature-Philosophy." (p. 5) The essential characteristics of this nature-philosophy are: "...the heightened interest in the external world and the assumption of numerous individual souls." (p. 47) "The interest in Deliverance completely dominates the old nature-philosophy of the Nyāya..." (p. 13).

[16]Akṣapāda is consistently referred to as the author of the Nyāyasūtras by Naiyāyikas (cf., eg., NV 6.1, NVT 22.11, NVTP 70.21, NM I.1.5, NBh 75.10). The *sūtra*s or *śāstra*, however, are also ascribed to Gautama; identifications with various Gautamas have been made by both ancients and moderns. One such proposed Gautama, the *ṛṣi* and husband of Ahalyā, was also called Medhātithi (See *Rāmāyaṇa* I.47.15-48.22): there are ascriptions of the Nyāyasūtras and Nyāyaśāstra to Medhātithi as well as to Gautama and Akṣapāda; see footnote 3 *supra*. Potter best describes the matter: "One may sum up the situation pretty safely by saying that we have not the vaguest idea who wrote the Nyāyasūtras or when he lived.", *EIP* II, p. 221.

containing two chapters; the *sūtras* number five hundred and thirty.[18] The *sūtras* remained the foundation of philosophical activity in the Nyāya school throughout the early period and were even studied in the Navya-Nyāya school.[19] The dating of the *sūtras* is unsettled. Until G. Tucci's work with Chinese sources,[20] the view of H. Jacobi,[21] that they were post-Nāgārjuna and pre-Vijñānavāda, was widely held; this set the limits for the work between 200 and 450 AD. Tucci argued that Nāgārjuna's *Vyagrahavyāvartanī* 31-51 and Book II of the *Nyāyasūtras* are interdependent.[22] J. Bronkhorst, however, has shown that, "The Nyāya Sūtra existed before Nāgārjuna and was known to him."[23] A date in the 2nd Century AD, prior to Nāgārjuna, seems probable.[24]

The *Nyāyasūtras* are available in numerous editions and translations, usually together with the *Bhāṣya*.[25]

The first extant commentary on the *Nyāyasūtras* is the *Bhāṣya* of Pakṣilasvāmin, whose gotra name is Vātsyāyana. There is good reason to suspect that Pakṣilasvāmin was not the first commentator. He offers different interpretations of *sūtras*, and notes that some Naiyāyika's hold that there are ten and not five elements in an inference.[26] As for his date, there is an upper limit: the Buddhist logician Diṅnāga, of ap-

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[17]Of this work, A. Thakur states: "Vācaspati Miśra II prepared another Nyāyasūtra text called *Nyāyasūtrodhāra* which counts two more sūtras while the list of Keśavamiśra Tarkāchārya in his *Gautamīyasūtraprakāśa* accepts five hundred and twenty one *sūtras* only.", *NA* Introduction XVII-XVIII.

[18]This is according to Vācaspati Miśra I's *Nyāyasūcinibandha*. See H. P. Shastri "An Examination of the Nyāya-sūtra's," W. Ruben, *Die Nyāyasūtras*, and V. G. Paranjpe, "The Text of the Nyāya-Sūtras according to Vācaspatimiśra" on the *sūtra*-text.

[19]In addition to the *Nyāyacaturgranthikā* and allied texts, there were many commentaries on the *sūtras*: see T. Śarma, *Darśanamañjarī I*, pp 31- 39. In Vaiśeṣika, Praśastapāda's *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* effectively supplanted Kaṇāda's *sūtras* as the vehicle for commentary.

[20]*PDBTLCS* and "Buddhist logic before Diṅnāga (Asaṅga, Vasubandhu, Tarkaśāstra)." His principal discovery was that Buddhist logic developed independently from the same *tarka-śāstra* tradition as did Nyāya logic.

[21]"On the Date of the Philosophical Sūtras of the Brahmans."

[22]*PDBTL* Introduction, p. xxvii. K. Bhattacharya, "On the Relationship Between the Vigrahavyāvartanī and the Nyāyasūtra-s," vindicates Tucci contra Oberhammer.

[23]"Nāgārjuna and Nyāya," p. 126.

[24]Tucci notes that the systematization of Nyāya doctrines and the redaction of the *sūtras* have to be differentiated, *PDBTLCS*, Introduction, p. xxiv.

proximately 450 AD, criticized him and was answered by Uddyotakara.[27] As for his native place, there is one late piece of evidence in favor of his being from the South.[28]

His commentary has been extensively studied, though there has been no full-scale philosophical analysis or study of his thought in itself.[29] His work was comment-

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[25]There is still no truly critical edition of the *sūtra*-text, based upon on all commentaries to the *sūtras*, quotations, and the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* and *Nyāyasūtrodhāra*. The more important editions, translations, and the like are listed in what follows: for a more exhaustive treatment, see Potter *EIP I*², pp. 43-47.

Editions: G. Jha and D. Sastri, *Nyāyasūtra with Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya, Raghūttama's Candra and Ambādāsa Sāstri's Ṭippaṇi*; Walter Ruben, *Die Nyāyasūtra's: Text, Übersetzung, Erläuterung und Glossar*; G. Jha *Nyāyasūtra's with Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya and Vācaspati Miśra I's Nyāyasūcinibandha*; A. Thakur *Nyāyadarśana of Gautama with the Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana, the Vārttika of Uddyotakara, the Tātparyaṭīkā of Vācaspati, the Pariśuddhi of Udyana [Volume I Chapter I]*; T. Nyaya-Tarkatirtha and A. Tarkatirtha *Nyāyadarśana with Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya, Uddyotakara's Vārttika, Vācaspati Miśra's Tātparyaṭīkā, Viśvanātha's Vṛtti;* S. N. Śukla *Nyāyasūtrodhāra of Vācaspati Miśra* (*Pariśiṣṭa* to his *Nyāyamañjarī* I: Śukla wrongly ascribes this to Vācaspati Miśra I, *sarvatantrasvatantra-śrīvācaspatimiśrapraṇita...*, Part I p. 393).

Translations: G. Jha *The Nyāya-Sūtras of Gauṭama with the Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana and the Vārtika of Uddyotakara: Translated into English with notes from Vācaspati Miśra's 'Nyāyavārtika-Ṭīkā', Udayana's 'Pariśuddhi' and Raghūttama's Bhāṣyacandra*; S. C. Vidyābhuṣaṇa *The Nyāya Sūtra's of Gotama*; M. Gangopadhyaya *Nyāya: Nyāya-Sūtra with Vātsyāyana's Commentary: Complete English Translation.*

Summaries: S. C. Vidyabhusana, *HIL*, pp. 54-104, K. H. Potter, *EIP II*, pp. 221-238.

Studies: N. S. Junankar, *Gautama: The Nyāya Philosophy.* (The title of this work is somewhat misleading. Junankar is more interested in the early Nyāya-system as a coherent philosophy than in Gautama's achievements per se, and devotes considerable attention to Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara's interpretations and innovations. No historical information at all is provided and Junankar is more oriented towards comparisons: "As I have said elsewhere, Gautama was an Indian version of Mill in a scriptural and social environment.", p. 478; cf. p. 516. (He also draws on Karl Popper, Bertrand Russel, Gilbert Ryle, and Thomas Kuhn.) The concluding chapter, "Reflections on the Nyāya System," pp. 475 -575, while extolling Gautama's contributions, focuses upon a rather abstract 'the Naiyāyika': "The Naiyāyika does not believe in a contrast between sense and intellect.", p. 479; "According to the Naiyāyika the universe contains an indefinite number of distinct objects which have certain properties in common and other properties which distinguish one object from another...Consequently, Gautama has selected, so the justification runs, a few of these objects for special treatment.", p. 539.)

[26]Notably NB 291.14-292.3 [NS 1.1.5] for the first, and NB 520.3 [NS.1.1.32] for the second. G. Oberhammer, *BVTI*, pp. 97-103, argues that there were at least two commentaries on the *sūtras* before Pakṣilasvāmin's *Bhāṣya*. A. Thakur maintains that such alternative explanations represent an attempt by Pakṣilvasvāmin to provide both the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika views, when they differ, on a subject: NA Introduction, p. XVIII, and "Vātsyāyana and the Vaiśeṣika System," p.86.

[27] See NVT 23.2-3.

[28] *vātsyāyane mallanāgaḥ, kauṭilyaścaṇakātmajo* ||
*drāmilaḥ pakṣilasvāmī, viṣṇugupto 'ṅgulaśca saḥ* || Hemacandra, *Abhidhānacintāmaṇi* 3.516 (p. 211, Śāstrī edition). Hemacandra is dated to the 12th Century AD: M. Winternitz, *A History of Indian Literature* II.482. This passage seems to be the source for the identification of Kauṭilya with Pakṣilasvāmin (both Vātsyāyanas) that is occasionally encountered.

[29] For editions and translations, see footnote 25 *supra*.

Studies: G. Oberhammer, "Pakṣilasvāmin's Introduction to his Nyāyabhāṣya."

ed on by a number of early Naiyāyika's whose names, titles of their works, and brief excerpts alone have survived.[30]

The only complete extant commentary on the *Bhāṣya* of Pakṣilasvāmin is the *Nyāyavārttika* of Uddyotakara. In the colophon to the *Vārttika*, he is stated to be a Pāśupatācārya (a teacher of Pāśupata, a Śaivite sect) and named Bhāradvāja.[31] In his commentary to NS 1.1.33, Uddyotakara mentions the name of a city:

> This path leads to *Śrughṇa*.[32]

Some have taken this as proof for his native place.[33] Uddyotakara's date is not certain. In the novel *Vāsavadattā* by Subandhu, Uddyotakara is mentioned; the *Vāsavadattā*, in turn, is mentioned by Bāṇa in his *Harṣacarita*.[34] An upper limit of 650 AD is thus established. Moreover, Uddyotakara attacks Diṅnāga, who is dated to 480 AD, and is in turned attacked by Dharmakīrti, who is dated to ca. 650 AD. A date in the second half of the 6th century seems a reasonable compromise.[35]

There is no comprehensive study of his *Vārttika*. K. H. Potter has noted a hostile attitude by some modern scholars towards Uddyotakara.[36]

Between Uddyotakara and Vācaspati Miśra there was considerable activity in

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[30] See A. Thakur "Some Lost Nyāya Works and Authors," and T. Sharma, *Darśanamañjarī I*, p. 30.

[31] *yadakṣapādapratimo bhāṣyaṃ vātsyāyano jagau* |
*akāri mahatastasya bhāradvājena vārttikam* || TNT 1200.12-13 ||
It is generally assumed that Bhāradvāja was his gotra name.

[32] *eṣa panthāḥ śrughṇaṃ gacchati* NV 514.24.

[33] S. C. Vidyābhūṣaṇa *HIL*, p. 124 and K. H. Potter *EIP II*, p. 303. Śrughṇa is located near Thāneśvara in the Punjab. Vidyābhūṣaṇa speculates that Uddyotakara may have received patronage at the court of Thāneśvara (where Harṣa ruled in the first half of the 7th century), *HIL* pp. 124-125. This speculation is unfounded, since the sentence is not autobiographical: it is found, in a slightly variant form, in Patañjali (MBh 1.281.13 [A.2.3.25] *ayaṃ panthāḥ srughnamupatiṣṭhate*), and Ratnakīrti, *Apohasiddhi* 60.11-12 [*Ratnakīrtinibandhāvalī*], argues that this sentence (*upatiṣṭhate* for *gacchati*) validates the doctrine of *apoha*. In addition to Śrughṇa, T. Sharma has noted references to Pāṇḍyamathurā and Takṣaśilā (TNT 481.24 [NS 2.1.33]), and Nārikeladvīpa (TNT 300.23-24 [NS 1.1.5], and TNT 570.15 [NS 2.1.68]) in the *Vārttika*, *Darśanamañjarī I*, p. 20.

[34] *nyāyasthitimivoddyotakarasvarūpāṃ baudhasaṃgatimivālaṅkārabhūṣitāṃ*, *Vāsavadattā* (p. 235, Hall edition). *kavīnāmagalladdarpo nūnaṃ vāsavadattayā* | *śaktyeva pāṇḍuputrāṇāṃ gatayā karṇagocaram*, Bāṇa's *Harṣacarita*, Ucchvāsa 1.11 (p.1, Kane edition). A. K. Warder dates Subandhu to the 6th century AD, Bāṇa to the early 7th century AD, *IKL III*, p. 234.

[35] So E. Steinkellner, "Die Literature des älteren Nyāya," who proposes 550-610 as his life-span.

early Nyāya, but little has survived outside of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa's works.[37] On the other hand, Vācaspati's claim in his introductory verse that he deserves some merit for rescuing Uddyotakara's very old work from the morass of shoddy works undercuts any mourning of their passing.[38] Jayanta Bhaṭṭa is the only figure in early Nyāya about whom both his date and locality are precisely known. That is, he was a native of Kashmir and lived in the last part of the 9th Century AD.[39] His major work, the *Nyāyamañjarī*, is less a commentary on the *Nyāyasūtras* than an independent treatise. It is famous for its wit and its rich quotations: he is the major source of our knowledge on Nyāya from Uddyotakara to the 9th century.[40] On his *Nyāyamañjarī* a commentary has survived, the *Granthibhaṅga* of Cakradhara. He also wrote a brief summary of the sixteen Nyāya categories, the *Nyāyakalikā*. A *Nyāyapallava*, a metrical gloss on the *Nyāyasūtras*, has also been ascribed to him.[41] In addition, he wrote a philosophical play, the *Āgamaḍambara*.[42]

The dating of Bhāsarvajña, Trilocana, and Vācaspati Miśra in relation to Jayanta Bhaṭṭa is far from conclusively resolved. Only one date is preserved, the interpretation of which is itself debated,[43] and there are no explicit references in Bhāsarvajña to

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[36]"Uddyotakara has for some reason been the target of somewhat abusive criticism on the part of modern scholars.", *EIP II*, p 303.

Editions/Translations: V. P. Dvivedin *Nyāya-Vārttikam: A Gloss on Vātsyāyana's Commentary of the Nyāya-Aphorisms*. See under Akṣapāda and Pakṣilasvāmin for other editions and translations.

Summaries: K. H. Potter, *EIP II*, 304-337. N. S. Junankar, pp. 1-472, *passim*.

[37]See U. Mishra *HIP II*, pp. 55-99, E. Steinkellner, "Die Literatur des älteren Nyāya," p. 153-157, and A. Thakur, "Some Lost and Nyāya Works and Authors," 385-394. Udayana (NVTP 70.13-19 [NS 1.1.1]) states that although there were many works on the *Sūtra-Bhāṣya* (see also NVTP 71.5-6 for the claim that the *sūtras* and *Bhāṣya* constitute the *śāstra*), Uddyotakara's work was the youth among them, and that the teachings of Trilocana is given as an elixir by Vācaspati to restore the *Vārttika* to its vigor.

[38]Vācaspati does, however, acknowledge his debt to his guru, Trilocana: NVT 226.6-7 [NS.1.1.4]; cf. *Pariśuddhi* 70.16-19 [NS 1.1.1]. See also A. Thakur "Nyāyamañjarī of Guru Trilocana — A Forgotten Work," and "The Naiyāyika Trilocana as Teacher of Vācaspati."

[39]See W. Slaje, "Untersuchungen zur Chronologie einiger Nyāya-Philosophen," p. 245, Matilal *NV* pp. 92-93, and V. Raghavan, *Āgamaḍambara*, Introduction, p. vi-vii.

[40] See G. Oberhammer, "On the Sources of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa and Uddyotakara."

[41]V. Raghavan, *Āgamaḍambara*, Introduction, p. v. He reports that there are quotations of this work in the *Syādvādaratnākara* of Vādi Devasūri. Jayanta also wrote a *Vṛtti* on the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, *op.cit.* p. v.

Trilocana and Vācaspati and *vice versa*. W. Slaje has recently examined this question and suggested, on the basis of four developmental criteria, the following relative chronology: Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, Trilocana, Vācaspati, and Bhāsarvajña (a younger contemporary of Vācaspati).[44] Two additional references deserve mention. Bhaṭṭa Rāghava, a commentator on Bhāsarvajña's *Nyāyasāra*, states that Bhāsarvajña adopted a doctrine of Trilocana as his own.[45] Bhāsarvajña may accordingly be placed after Trilocana, although his relationship to Vācaspati remains undecided. Secondly, Udayana considers Jayanta to be a representative of the 'ancient school' of Nyāya in contradistinction to Vācaspati.[46] One might reasonably infer that Jayanta antedates Vācaspati by a consid-

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42 Editions: *Nyāyamañjarī of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa*, edited with notes by S. N. Śukla; *Nyāyamañjarī of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa with Ṭippaṇi — Nyāyasaurabha by the editor*, critically edited by K. S. Varadacharya; *Nyāyamañjarī of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa with the Commentary of 'Granthibhaṅga' by Cakradhara*, edited by G. Sastri; *Nyāyakalikā*, edited by G. Jha; *Āgamaḍadambara otherwise called Ṣaṇmatanāṭaka of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa*, edited by V. Raghavan and A. Thakur; *Cakradhara's Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhaṅga*, edited by N. J. Shah

Translations: *Jayanta Bhaṭṭa's Nyāya-Mañjarī [The Compendium of Indian Speculative Logic]*, translated into English by J. V. Bhattacharyya.

Summaries: (*Nyāyamañjarī*) J. Bhattacharya, U. Arya, and K. H. Potter, *EIP II*, pp. 343-394; see K. H. Potter and J. Bhattacharya, *EIP II*, pp.394-395, for the *Nyāyakalikā*.

43 898 is given in the colophon to Vācaspati's *Nyāyasūcīnibandha*. The era is not indicated. If the Vikrama-era is meant, the date would be 841 AD; according to the Śāka-era, it is 976 AD. On the Vikrama date, Trilocana and Vācaspati would antedate Jayanta Bhaṭṭa. S. Srinivasan, *Vācaspatimiśra's Tattvakaumudī: Ein Beitrag zur Textkritik bei kontamanierter Überlieferung*, pp. 60-63, has called into question the ascription of the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* to Vācaspati on several grounds: it is not listed in the *Bhāmatī* passage (quoted below) nor referred to anywhere in Vācaspati's works; it is not mentioned by Aniruddha nor Amalānanda; it is found in only a handful of manuscripts; and the text of many *sūtras* in the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* differs from that Vācaspati comments on in the *Tātparyaṭīkā*. He suggests that it was either not yet written or else not yet ascribed to Vācaspati by the time of Amalānanda, ca. 1250 AD, p. 62. This whole issue deserves careful scrutiny. It may be noted in passing that Udayana (NVTP 84.13-24) names all of the *prakaraṇas* in the first *adhyāya*, which tally almost exactly with those set forth in the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha*.

44 "Untersuchungen zur Chronologie einiger Nyāya-Philosophen," p. 274. For an absolute chronology he suggests that Trilocana was a younger contemporary of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa (whom he dates to 840-900, p. 245) and that Vācaspati and Bhāsarvajña can be dated no earlier than the middle of the 10th century AD, p. 274. These criteria are: *mokṣa*, *anadhyavasāya*, *pratyakṣa*, and *svābhāvika-saṃbandha*, p. 251. It should be noted that Bhattacharya, *HNNM*, pp. 25-30, drawing on an impressive command of texts, had established essentially the same chronology in 1958 (he does not mention Jayanta, whose date is known independently, and he makes Bhāsarvajña a senior contemporary to Vācaspati).

45 *atrādyāḥ ṣaṭ sādharmyodāharaṇābhāsāḥ, itare*
*ṣaḍvaidharmyodāharaṇābhāsāḥ* || 91 ||

*atrādyāḥ ṣaḍiti yetu dṛṣṭāntadoṣadvāreṇābhāsā abhihitāḥ te cayāt niścitāstathā taddoṣasadehāt saṃdigdhā iti yatsvamataṃ tat**trilocanācārya**sammatamityāha* (2.91): *Nyāyasāravicāra of Bhaṭṭa Rāghava on Nyāyasāra of Bhāsarvajña*, p. 59 (see also *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa*, p.323.6-7).

erable span of time.[47] Udayana's statement is consonant with Jayanta's living in the second half of the ninth century and Vācaspati's in the second half of the tenth.

Vācasapati is a remarkable figure in Indian philosophy, in that he composed commentaries on five of the six orthodox schools. With the possible exception of the *Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī*, these works are significant contributions in their respective fields, although Vācaspati's lack of originality has been noted.[48] There has been no systematic study of his work in Nyāya, let alone an attempt to evaluate his thought in light of all his works.

D. C. Bhattacharya has marshalled evidence to show that he was from Mithilā.[49] There is also a reference to a king Nṛga, apparently his patron, in the concluding verse of his *Bhāmatī*;[50] no convincing identification has been made.

His works are for the most part commentaries. At the end of the *Bhāmatī*, he lists his own works, apparently in chronological order[51]:

> *yannyāyakaṇikātattvasamīkṣātattvabindubhiḥ* |
> *yannyāyasāṃkhyayogānāṃ vedāntānāṃ nibandhanaiḥ* || 3 ||
> *samacaiṣaṃ mahatpuṇyaṃ tatphalaṃ puṣkalaṃ mayā* |

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[46]*atropamānasya phale vipratipadyamānān prati sāśaṅkaṃ* ***jarannaiyāyikajayantaprabhṛtīnāṃ*** *parihāramāha – yadyapīti* (NVTP 362.3-4 [NS.1.1.6]). The lemma is NVT 357.6-8 (cf. also NVT 357.15 ff. and NVTP 362.22-23, NVT 358.20 ff and NVTP 364.12). A close examination of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa's treatment of *upamāna* might corroborate the accuracy of Udayana's presentation; cf., e.g. NM I.127-136. Abhayatilaka identifies *apare* (and *te*) as *Jayantabhṛtaya*, and *eke* (*prācyām*, *te*) as *Bhūṣaṇakārā*, NA (pp. 133-134) to NVTP 372.15-23 [NS 1.1.7].

[47]Udayana might conceivably have meant by *jarannaiyāyika*, 'old-fashioned Naiyāyika'.

[48]B. K. Matilal, quoted by Potter, *EIP II*, p. 705 note 10: "I also suspect Vācaspati's originality in many places as far as the Nyāya school is concerned. Besides, Vācaspati appears to have a somewhat clumsy way of putting even a subtle point which is apt to be missed at first sight." See also his remarks in *NV*, "Vācaspati was not highly original as a Nyāya author, but as a commentator he certainly held a very high place.", p. 95. A. Thakur holds that Vācaspati was considered an important figure in Nyāya; he identifies him with the *Tātparyācārya*, who is mentioned by later Naiyāyika's: see his "Tātparyācārya." U. Mishra, however, argues against this identification, *HIP II*, pp. 91-92.

[49]*HNNM*, pp. 23-25. U. Mishra, *HIP* II, pp. 100-102, provides additional evidence.

[50] *nareśvarā yaccaritānukāramicchanti kartuṃ na ca pārayanti* |
*tasminmahīpe mahanīyakīrtau śrīmannṛge 'kāri mayā nibandhaḥ* || 6 || (p. 1020 Nirṇaya Sāgar edition.)

[51]This is the order proposed by U. Mishra, *HIP* II, pp. 105-115, based on internal references (with the exception of the *Nyāyasūcībandha*, pp. 107-108, which he assumes Vācaspati wrote before beginning the *Tātparyaṭīkā*).

*samarpitamathaitena prīyatāṃ parameśvaraḥ* || 4 ||

These are: the *Nyāyakaṇika* on the *Vidhiviveka* of Maṇḍana Miśra, a *Mīmāṃsā* work; the *(Brahma)Tattvasamīkṣā*, which is not extant; the *Tattvabindu*, an independent, *Mīmāṃsā* work on the meaning of words (*śābdabodha*); the *Tātparyaṭīkā* on Uddyotakara's *Nyāyavārttika*, and possibly the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha*;[52] the *Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī* on the *Sāṃkhyakārikās* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa; the *Vaiśaradī*, a commentary on Vyāsa's *Bhāṣya* on the *Yogasūtras*; and the *Bhāmatī* on Śaṅkara's *Bhāṣya* on the *Vedāntasūtras* of Bādārayaṇa.[53]

The date of Bhāsarvajña was touched on above; his precise relationship to Vācaspati is variously explained.[54] It is frequently stated, on slim evidence, that Bhāsarvajña was a native of Kashmir.[55] He is the author of the *Nyāyasāra*, a synopsis of Nyāya doctrines, and an autocommentary on the same, the *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa*, which has come to light only recently and is widely acknowledged as a major work on Nyāya.

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[52]Vācaspati merely speaks of work(s) on Nyāya (*nyāya° nibandhanaiḥ*): the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* need not be intended.

[53] Editions: *The Vidhiviveka of Maṇḍana Miśra with the Nyāyakaṇika of Vācaspati Miśra*, edited by R. S. Tailanga; *The Vidhiviveka of Śrī Maṇḍana Miśra with the Commentary Nyāyakaṇikā of Vāchaspati Miśra*, edited by M. L. Goswami; *Vidhiviveka of Maṇḍanamiśra, with commentary. Nyāyakaṇikā of Vācaspatimiśraḥ, and supercommentaries, Juṣadhvaṅkaraṇī and Svaditaṅkaraṇī of Parameśvara, critical and annotated edition: the pūrvapakṣaḥ*, E. Stern; *Le Tattvabindu de Vācaspatimiśra*, edited with French translation by M. Biardeau; *Tattvabindu by Vachaspati Mishra*, edited by A. S. Sastri; *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* see under *Nyāyasūtra; Tātparyaṭīkā* see under *Nyāyasūtra*, A. Thakur and T. Nyaya-Tarkatirtha and A. Tarkatirtha (note 25 *supra*); *The Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā of Vācaspati Miśra*, edited by G. Ś. Tailaṅga; *The Nyāyabhāṣyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā of Vācaspati Miśra*, edited by R. Ś. Dravid; *Vācaspatimiśra's Tattva Kaumudī. Ein Beitrag Textkritik bei kontaminierter Überlieferung*, S. A. Srinivasan; *The Yogasūtra's of Patañjali with Vyāsa's Bhāṣya, Vācaspati Miśra's Tattvavaiśāradī, and Nageśa Bhaṭṭa's Vṛtti*, edited by R. S. Bodas and V. S. Abhyankar; *Brahmasūtraśāṅkarabhāṣya with the Commentaries, Bhāmatī, Kalpataru, and Parimala and with Index etc.*, edited by A. Śāstrī and V. L. Ś. Paṇsīkar.

Translations: *Tātparyaṭīkā* (sections only) T. Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic II*, "Appendices" (pp. 255-308, 401-432), D. N. Shastri, *The Philosophy of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and its Conflict with the Buddhist Dignāga School (Critique of Indian Realism)*, *The Sāṃkhyākārika's with Vācaspati Miśra I's Tattvakaumudī*, edited and translated by G. Jha; *The Yoga-System of Patañjali: or the Ancient Hindu Doctrine of Concentration of Mind embracing the Mnemonic Rules, called Yoga-Sūtra's, of Patañjali and the Comment, called Yoga-Bhāṣya, attributed to Veda-Vyāsa and the Explanation, called Tattva-Vaiśāradī, of Vācaspati-Miśra*, translated by J. H. Woods.

Summaries: (*Tātparyaṭīkā*) B. K. Matilal, *EIP* II, pp. 455-483; (*Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī*) G. J. Larson, *EIP IV*, pp. 301-312.

Several of his doctrines differ sharply from those of mainstream Nyāya, and he is sometimes labelled an *ekadeśin*, a 'schismatic'. The *Nyāyasāra* was evidently influential, since it was commented on by seventeen other authors.[56]There is a commentary, the *Nyāyabhāṣyavārttikaṭīkāvivaraṇapañjikā* of Aniruddha, on the first three works of the *Nyāyacaturgranthikā*.[57] Aniruddha is to be placed after Vācaspati and before Udayana, who mentions his work.[58] Aniruddha mentions Trilocana, but does not mention either Jayanta Bhaṭṭa or Bhāsarvajña.[59]

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[54]Rāghava Bhaṭṭa's testimony only confirms that Bhāsarvajña follows Trilocana, but by how much is unclear, see footnote 44 *supra*. D. C. Bhattacharya, *HNNM*, p. 28, has noted that Śrīvallabha ascribes a view that Vācaspati refutes (in *Tātparyaṭīkā* to NS 2.1.39) to Bhūṣaṇa and makes Bhāsarvajña an older contemporary of Vācaspati. W. Slaje suggests that he was a younger contemporary of Vācaspati, "Untersuchungen zur Chronologie einiger Nyāya-Philosophen," p. 274. S. Yogīndrānanda, an editor of the *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa*, thinks that Bhāsarvajña examines several of Vācaspati's doctrines without mentioning him by name, Preface, pp. 10-11. The parallels he notes are striking but not exact; they could as well be explained by assuming that it is Trilocana's doctrines that are at issue. In one passage in the *Pariśuddhi* (505.12-17 [NS.1.1.30]), Udayana states that Vācaspati, who takes the *Bhāṣya* to the *sūtra* to be a pun (*śliṣṭa*), does not follow the interpretation of *Bhūṣaṇabhṛtayaḥ*, who articulate two distinct interpretations.

[55]See, e.g., S. C. Vidyābhūṣana *HIL*, p. 357, A. B. Keith, *Indian Logic and Atomism*, pp. 30-31, Mishra, *HIP* II, 90-91, Matilal *NV* 94, and Potter, *EIP* II, p. 399). The grounds, when offered, are that the name Bhā-sarvajña is reputedly Kashmiri, and that the clear influences of Śaivism and Yoga on Bhāsarvajña's are easily accounted for by placing him in Kashmir. S. Yogīndrānanda, *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* Preface, p. 7, holds that there is nothing in the *Bhūṣaṇa* to warrant making Bhāsarvajña a Kashmiri: *kaśmīrābhijano 'yamityapi puretivṛttavitsu jāgarti carcā | kintu nyāyabhūṣaṇato 'smin viṣaye kaścana viśeṣo nādhigamyate*.

[56]This is reported by Guṇaratna in his *Tarkarahasyadīpikā* to Haribhadra's *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya*, (p. 94.6-7 Suali edition): *bhāsarvajñapraṇīte nyāyasāre 'ṣṭādaśa ṭīkāḥ || tāsu mukhyā ṭīkā nyāyabhūṣaṇākhyā...*
See T. Sharma for information on the commentaries on both the *Nyāyasāra* and *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa*, *Darśanamañjarī* I, pp. 73-75. A Pāśupata work, the *Gaṇakārikā*, is also ascribed to Bhāsarvajña.

Editions: *Nyāyasāra with Jayasiṃhasūri's Nyāyatātparyadīpikā*, edited by S. Vidyābhūṣaṇa; *Nyāyasāra of Bhāsarvajña with the Commentary Padapañcikā of Vāsudeva Sūri*, edited by K. S. Śāstri; *Nyāyasāra with Ānandānubhava's Nyāyakalānidhi and Aparārkadeva's Nyāyamuktāvalī*, edited by S. S. Sastri and V. S. Sastri; *Nyāyasāra with Bhaṭṭa Rāghava's Vicāra*, edited by U. R. Jha; *The Autocommentary Nyāyabhūṣaṇa on the Nyāyasāra of Bhāsarvajña with editors Pādaṭippaṇa*, edited by S. Yogīndrānanda; *Gaṇakārikā* [*with Ratnaṭīkā*], edited by C. D. Dalal.

Summaries: (*Nyāyasāra*) S. C. Vidyābhūṣana *HIL*, 358-371; K. H. Potter, *EIP II*, 400-410; (*Nyāyabhūṣaṇa*) B. K. Matilal, *EIP II*, 410-424.

[57]Thakur dates Aniruddha to 976-1025, but admits, "As regards the place of Aniruddha's birth nothing positive is known.", *Nyāyabhāṣyavārttikaṭīkāvivaraṇapañjikā*, Introduction, p.iv.

[58]*ata eva* ***vivaraṇakārāṇāṃ*** *saṃkulāni vacāṃsīti tadatra nipuṇena pratipatrā bhavitavyam* NVTP 88.23-24 [NS 1.1.41].

[59] Edition: *Nyāyabhāṣyavārttikaṭīkāvivaraṇapañjikā [II-V] of Aniruddhācārya*, edited by A. Thakur.

Udayana is the last major representative of the early Nyāya school. He is also regarded by some as the father of the Navya-Nyāya school, which is traditionally said to begin with Gaṅgeśa.[60] Both his date and place have not been indisputably established. There are well known lower and upper limits for his date: he is to be placed after Vācaspati, presumably by at least one generation, and before Śrīharṣa.[61] It is also agreed that in his *Kiraṇāvalī* he refutes several doctrines of Śrīdhara's *Nyāyakandalī*, which is dated to 991AD.[62] A date in the middle of the eleventh century would *prima facie* be a reasonable solution to the question. In one colophon of his *Lakṣaṇāvalī*, however, the date of 906 (Śāka = 984AD) is given.[63] If this is valid, Udayana would be contemporaneous with Vācaspati,[64] on the assumption that the date of 976AD for Vācaspati is valid. There is yet another factor to consider. The Buddhist philosophers Jñānaśrīmitra and his pupil Ratnakīrti mention Trilocana, Vācaspati, and Bhāsarvajña, but do not mention Udayana.[65] Udayana, however, quotes a verse of Jñānaśrī in his

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[60]D. C. Bhattacharya, "This modern school is commonly believed to have been founded by Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya, who only consolidated it. The real founder is the great Udayanācārya, who had the supreme privilege of occupying the threshold to ring out the old and usher the new age by his monumental works.", *HNNM*, p 1. See also U. Mishra, *HIP* II, p. 150. Much of the discussion that follows is indebted to D. C. Bhattacharya, pp. 1-54.

[61]D. C. Bhattacharya, *HNNM*, pp. 20-21, has noted five references to Śrīvatsa in the *Pariśuddhi*: in several of these passages, it is clear that Udayana defends Vācaspati against Śrīvatsa. Bhattacharya thought that Śrīvatsa was Udayana's professor (p. 20); see also U. Mishra *HIP II*, pp. 144-147. A. Thakur, however, thinks that this is incorrect as is the statement of Abhayatilaka: *śrīvatsaḥ udanayanśiṣyaḥ*, p. 339; *Nyāyālaṅkāra*, Introduction, p.x, and see also *Nyāyabhāṣyavārttikaṭīkāvivaraṇapañjikā*, p. iii. (He does not state what the relation is, however.) V. Varadachari, "Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Writers—Śrīvatsa and Sānātani," makes him an elder contemporary of Udayana and denies (without offering any arguments) that this Śrīvatsa is the author of a *Līlāvatī* on Praśastapāda's *Bhāṣya*; in *Bibliography*[2] (*EIP* 1), p. 228, a *Līlāvatī* is ascribed to him. On Śrīharṣa's attacks against Udayana, see P. E. Granoff, *Philosophy and Argument in Late Vedānta: Śrīharṣa's Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya*, pp.3-53. Granoff dates Śrīharṣa to 1125-1200 AD, p. 2.

[62]This date is provided by Śrīdhara himself at the end of his *Kandalī*, *Praśastapādabhāṣya (Padārthadharmasaṅgraha) with Commentary Nyāyakandalī by Śrīdhara Bhaṭṭa along with Hindi Translation*, by D. Jhā (concluding verse 9, p. 788): *tryadhikadaśottaranavaśataśākābde nyāyakandalī racitā*. On Udayana's attacks against him, see D. C. Bhattacharya, *HNNM*, pp. 8-11. G. Kaviraj, *HBNVL*, p. 24, thought that Śrīdhara and Udayana attack one another.

[63]This was universally accepted as valid until D. C. Bhattacharya addressed the issue.

[64]Thakur provides a good argument against this contemporaneity: "We may add here that had Udayana been contemporary to Vācaspati, he would not have recorded variants in the Tātparyaṭīkā as he actually does in a number of cases.", *Vivaraṇapañjikā*, Preface, p. ii-iii,

*Pariśuddhi* and attacks both him and Ratnakīrti in the *Ātmatattvaviveka*.[66] One would expect Ratnakīrti to have vindicated himself as well as his *guru*, had he known of Udayana's attacks. Jñānaśrīmitra is probably to be dated to the first half of the 11th century.[67] Bhattacarya concluded that the date given in the colophon could not be correct and proposed 1025-1100AD as the limits for Udayana's date.[68] While many scholars have followed Bhattacharya, Chemparathy has questioned Bhattacharya's arguments and holds that the Lakṣaṇāvalī date is to be accepted.[69] It is widely believed that Udayana was a native of Mithilā, but the evidence cited is based largely on legends and traditions.[70]

Udayana's works, his independent treatises and commentaries alike, deal exclusively with Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika. His two most important works are the *Ātmatattvaviveka*, a polemic against central Buddhist doctrines, and the *Nyāyakusumāñjali*, a set of proofs for the existence of god (*īśvara*). The vast commentatorial literature on the

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[65]See *Jñānaśrīmitranibandhāvalī*, pp. 479-582: Trilocana is mentioned 17 times, Vācaspati 19 times, and Bhāsarvajña 5 times. In the *Ratnakīrtinibandhāvalī*, pp.151-2, Trilocana is mentioned 13 times, Vācaspati 20 times, and Bhāsarvajña 6 times.

[66]NVTP 340.5-9 [NS.1.1.5]; see *Kṣaṇabhaṅga* p. 89, *Jñānaśrīmitranibandhāvalī*. This same verse is parodied in his *Ātmatattvaviveka*, p. 423. Commentators on the *Ātmatattvaviveka* identify Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti as *pūrvapakṣins* in a number of passages; see V. Varadachari, *EIP* II, p. 709, note 44.4.

[67]Basing their claims on Tibetan sources, A. Thakur (*Jñānaśrīmitranibandhāvalī*, Introduction, pp. 1-3, *Ratnakīrtinibandhāvalī*, Introdution, pp. 13-15) and D. C. Bhattacarya, *HNNM*, pp. 52-54) date Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti to the first half of the 11th century. G. Chemparathy, however, has noted that the date of Jñāśrīmitra is debated, *An Indian Rational Theology*, p. 21 note 9.

[68]D. C. Bhattacharya, *HNNM*, pp. 52-54. In his article, "Date of Vācaspatimiśra and Udayanācārya," he proposed emending the colophon so as to yield the date 1054AD. V. Varadachari, "A Note on the date of Udayana," offers some additional evidence in support of Bhattacharya's thesis.

[69]G. Chemparathy, *An Indian Rational Theology*, pp. 19-21. He takes the Lakṣaṇāvalī to be Udayana's earliest work, his major works being written in the first half of the 11th century. B. K. Matilal would like to move Udayana's date twenty years earlier than that proposed by D. C. Bhattacharya, *NV* p. 71. K. H. Potter allows 984 to stand as Udayana's *floruit* in *Bibliography*[2] (p. 210), while Jñānaśrī's is given as 1025 (p. 223), and Ratnakīrti's as 1070 (p. 230).

[70]See D. C. Bhattacharya, *HNNM*, pp. 5-7, and U. Mishra, *HIP* II, pp. 150-151. V. Amma, *Udayana and his Philosophy*, pp. 3-4, has noted that Cāritravardhana, in his commentary to Kālidāsa's *Meghadhūta* 1.30, associates Udayana with Āvantī:

*prāpyāvantīnudayanakathākovidagrāmavṛddhān*

*Cāritravardhinī* : *udayanasya udayanācāryasya*

*Sañjīvanī* : *udayanasya vatsarājasya*(pp. 36-37 Śāstri edition)

(One wonders what tales might have been in circulation in Āvantī concerning the Naiyāyika Udayana.)

*Kusumāñjali* testifies to its status as a philosophical classic in India. His other two independent works, the *Lakṣaṇamālā* and *Lakṣaṇāvalī*, consist of precise definitions of the categories and key concepts of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika respectively. Ascription of the *Lakṣaṇamālā* to Udayana was questioned, but has been vindicated by A. Thakur.[71] The *Kiraṇāvalī* is a commentary on Praśastapāda's *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha*, a 'commentary' on the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras*.[72] The *Nyāyapariśiṣṭa*, also called the *Prabodhasiddhi*, is an independent commentary on Book V of the *Nyāyasūtras*, which deals with the two dialectical categories of 'futile answer' (*jāti*) and 'grounds for defeat' (*nigrahasthāna*). It is somewhat surprising that Udayana devoted a separate commentary to this book.[73] The *Pariśuddhi* is a commentary on Vācaspati Miśra's *Tātparyaṭīkā* and forms the last member of the *Nyāyacaturgranthikā*.[74] Of Udayana's major works, it is unquestionably the most neglected.[75] There is still no complete edition of the text, and there are only passing references to the work in modern authors.[76]

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[71]"The Lakṣaṇamālā of Udayanācārya." He sets out in considerable detail the arguments adumbrated by D. C. Bhattacharya (*HNNM*, p. 2-3), "Professor Bhattacharya's arguments are very sound but they are brief in character.", p. 175. The issue arose because a *Lakṣaṇamālā* is also ascribed to the Nyāya author Śivāditya. See G. Kaviraj, *HBNVL* p. 131, note 130.

[72]Since, in previous printed editions, the work breaks off in the section on *buddhi* (§211), some surmised that Udayana did not live to see the *Kiraṇāvalī* finished: e.g., G. Kaviraj, *HBNVL* p. 24, and U. Mishra, *HIP* II, p. 206. In Jetly's more recent edition, the *Kiraṇāvalī* breaks off midway through the section on *saṃskāra* (§302, p. 259). In the *Dīpikā* to his *Tarkasaṃgraha*, Annambhaṭṭa cites the *Kiraṇāvalī* as an example of a work that was not completed despite the presence of a benedictory verse: *maṅgale kṛte 'pi kiraṇāvalyādau samāptyadarśanāt* (1.12-13 Athalye edition). The benedictory verse, it seems, was not enough to overcome the sheer number of obstacles to the completion of the work: *kiraṇāvalyādau vighnabāhulyāt samāptyabhāvaḥ* (1.14).

[73]Udayana may have been dissatisfied with the earlier treatment of this book, though he nowhere explicitly says so in the *Nyāyarpariśiṣṭa*. Book V of the *Nyāyasūtras* is universally ignored by modern scholars. K. H. Potter, *EIP* II, p. 588, says of the *Pariśiṣṭa*: "We have been unable to find anyone to summarize this work." The *Pariśuddhi*, which mentions the *Pariśiṣṭa* (see D. C. Bhattacharya *HNNM*, p. 4), covers Vācaspati's *Tātparyaṭīkā* on Book V. When a complete edition of the *Pariśuddhi* emerges, it will be instructive to compare Udayana's remarks on *jāti* and *nigrahasthāna* in both works.

[74] This term is employed by Vācaspati Miśra II and Śaṃkara Miśra; see D. C. Bhattacharya *HNNM*, p. 2, note 1. The *Pariśuddhi*, in turn, has been frequently commented on: the *Nyāyadarpaṇa* (of Vaṭeśvara), the *Uddyota* (of Divākara), the *Trisūtrīnibandhavyākhyā* (of Śaṃkaramiśra, only on the first three *Nyāyasūtras*), and the *Prakāśa* (of Vardhamāna). There are also two more commentaries on the *Prakāśa*, the *Vardhamānendu* (of Padmanābhamiśra) and (possibly) the *Tātparyamaṇḍana* (on the first three *sūtras* only, of Śaṃkaramiśra). Several of these works are known only by name. See T. Sharma, *Darśanamañjarī* I, pp. 24-27, 30.

Based on internal references, Bhattacharya offers the following chronology of Udayana's works:[77]

*Ātmatattvaviveka*
*Nyāyakusumāñjali*
*Pariśiṣṭa*
*Pariśuddhi*
*Kiraṇāvalī*

Udayana does not refer to either the *Lakṣaṇāvalī* or the *Lakṣaṇamālā* in his other works, and Bhattacharya gives conflicting statements on where they fit into this scheme.[78] With the exception of the *Lakṣaṇamālā*, his works were commented on by later Naiyāyika's, most notably Vardhamāna.[79]

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[75] Even the *Lakṣaṇāvalī* and *Lakṣaṇamālā* merit summaries in *EIP* II (pp. 523-526), while the *Pariśuddhi* is dispatched in one brief paragraph: "This great commentary continues the tradition of commenting on subcommentaries on the Nyāyasūtras. It is only partially available in published form. It is a very long work and extremely difficult. Various writers have dropped comments about its contents in certain of their writings, most notably Ganganatha Jha in his translations of the *Nyāyasūtras*, *Bhāṣya*, and *Vārttika*." EIP II 588.

[76] Outside of G. Jha, U. Mishra (*HIP* II, pp. 198-204) and D. C. Bhattacharya (*HNNM*, p. 4, 15), are unique in that they consulted manuscripts of the *Pariśuddhi*. A. Thakur, who edited the first book of the *Pariśuddhi*, gives brief quotations and notices from the work in many of his articles.

[77] *HNNM*, pp. 4.

[78] "The chronological order of Udayana's works (including Nos. 1-2 [= *Lakṣaṇāvalī* and *Lakṣaṇamālā*], which may be taken as preparatory manuals) is probably what we have given above [pp. 2-4]," p. 4. "It is clear that Udayana wrote the independent treatises before the commentaries. We have left out Nos. 1-2 from this investigation, as they are to be taken as mere appendices to Nos.6-7 [= *Pariśuddhi* and *Kiraṇāvalī*]; both of them borrow benedictory verses from No.6, which was composed evidently before them.", p. 5. That the *Kiraṇāvalī* postdates the *Pariśuddhi* he suggests on the basis of an *argumentum ex silentio*, p.5.

[79] For diagrammatic synopses of these commentaries, see T. Sharma, *Darśanamañjarī* I, p. 30 (*Pariśuddhi*), p.104 (*Kiraṇāvalī*), p. 127 (*Lakṣaṇāvalī*), 248 (*Kusumāñjali*).

[80] Editions: (*Ātmatattvaviveka*): *Udayanācārya: Ātmatattvaviveka with the commentaries of Śaṅkara Miśra, Bhagīratha Thakkura and Raghunātha Tārkiśiromaṇī*, edited by V. P. Dvivedin and L. Ś. Dravida; (*Nyāyakusumāñjali*) Nyāyakusumāñjalī of Udayanācārya, edited with Hindi Translation by D. Jhā; *The Nyāyakusumāñjalī by Udayanācārya with a commentary Nyāyavāsanā* by A. D. Tatacharya: see G. Chemparathy, *An Indian Rational Theology*, (pp. 187-193) for earlier editions, commentaries, and translations of the *Kusumāñjali*; (*Nyāyapariśiṣṭa*) *Udayana's Nyāyapariśiṣṭa with Pañcikā of Vāmeśvaradhvaja*, edited by S. N. S. Desikan; *The Nyāyapariśiṣṭa of Udayana with Prakāśa of Vardhamāna*, edited by N. C. Vedantatirtha; (*Pariśuddhi*) *Nyāyavārttikatātparyapariśuddhi by Udayanācārya with a gloss called Nyāyanibandhaprakāśa*, edited by V. P. Dvivedin and L. Ś. Dravida [this edition breaks off before the end of the commentaries on NS 1.1.5]; *Nyāyadarśana of Gautama with the Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana, the Vārttika of Uddyotakara, the Tātparyaṭīkā of Vācaspati, the Pariśuddhi of Udayana* [*Volume I Chapter I*], edited by A. Thakur; (*Kiraṇāvalī*) *Praśastapādabhāṣyam with the Commentary Kiraṇāvalī of Udayanācārya*, edited by J. S. Jetly

The great majority of scholarship on Udayana centers on his *Nyāyakusumāñjali*. Of all his works, only the *Lakṣaṇāvalī* has been translated in its entirety into a European language.[80]

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[80]J. S. Jetly, pp. 276-283; *Lakṣaṇāvalī of Udayanācārya with the Prakāśa of Bhaṭṭakeśava*, edited.by Ś. Ś. Jha; (*Lakṣaṇamālā*) *Lakṣaṇamālā of Udayanācārya*, edited with editor's gloss by Ś. Ś. Jha.

A. Thakur's edition of the *Nyāyacaturgranthikā*, the *Nyāyadarśana of Gautama*, conveniently contains the texts of all four commentaries on the first book of the *Nyāyasūtras*. Since he had access to some manuscripts unavailable to the editors of the *Bibliotheca Indica* edition and to the commentaries of Śrīkaṇṭha and Abhayatilaka, his is the best edition available, if incomplete, of the *Pariśuddhi*. Likewise, he also had the benefit of the labors of previous editors of the *Bhāṣya*, *Vārttika*, and *Tātparyaṭīkā* and, on balance, presents the best edition of these works, if only for the first book. While his edition has been adopted here as authoritative, it is not everything one could wish for: it is hardly a full variorum edition, is replete with errata, lacks references to all but the most obvious quotations, and misidentifies many *lemmata*.

Translations: *The Structure of the World in Udayana's Realism: A Study of the Lakṣaṇāvalī and the Kiraṇāvalī*, M. Tachikawa (translation of the *Lakṣaṇāvalī* only). The verses only of the *Nyāyakusumāñjali* have been translated by E. B. Cowell into English: *the Kusumāñjali; or, Hindu Proof of the existence of a supreme being*.

Summaries: (*Ātmatattvaviveka*) V. Varadachari, *EIP II*, pp. 526-556; (*Nyāyakusumāñjali*) G. C. Chemparathy, *An Indian Rational Theology*, pp. 45-73, K. H. Potter and S. Bhattacharya, *EIP* II, pp.557-588; (*Kiraṇāvalī*) B. K. Matilal, *EIP*, 589-603; (*Lakṣaṇāvalī*) K. H. Potter, *EIP* II, pp. 523-525. (*Lakṣaṇamālā*) S. Sastri, *EIP* II, pp. 525-526.

Studies: G. Chemparathy, *An Indian Rational Theology: Introduction to Udayana's Nyāyakusumāñjali*; M. Tachikawa, *The Structure of the World in Udayana's Realism: A Study of the Lakṣaṇāvalī and the Kiraṇāvalī*; V. Amma, *Udayana and his Philosophy*. (As announced in the Preface, p. xi, "The present attempt is to highlight some of the salient features of Udayana's philosophy." Amma's book consists largely of summaries of arguments, often without explicit indication of the source, in Udayana's works, and almost without exception from the *Nyāyakusumāñjali*, *Ātmatattvaviveka*, and *Kiraṇāvalī* alone. A few examples are in order. Amma summarizes Udayana's numerous criticisms of the theory of momentariness in the *Ātmatattvaviveka* with only a single citation, pp.48-59. In a section of the chapter, "Udayana's Concepts: I Ontology," entitled "Validity and Invalidity of Cognition," the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* and an article by Varadachari are the only sources cited, pp. 122-126. Finally, in the chapter entitled "Liberation," there is not a single citation from any of Udayana's works, pp. 173-180. There is no serious attempt at synthesizing the various strands of Udayana's thought that are laid out, and few insights into his work. There are also some glaring errors of fact. Of the *Pariśuddhi* the following is reported: "It forms one of the last specimen of the surviving classics of Nyāya known as the *Caturgranthī* which consists of the *Bhāṣya-Vārttika-Tātparyaṭīkā-Pariśuddhi*. It is believed that the *Nyāyapariśiṣṭa* of Udayana is an extension of this *Pariśuddhi* under a different name. The work extends only up to the commentary on the fifth sūtra in the first chapter of the *Nyāya Sūtras*.", p. 17.)

There are two commentaries on the *Nyāyacaturgranthikā*, the *Śrīkaṇṭhaṭippaṇaka* of Śrīkaṇṭha, and the *Nyāyālaṅkāra* of Abhayatilaka. Both are mentioned by Guṇaratna in his commentary to *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya*, and have recently been edited. The *Nyāyālaṅkāra* is the later of the two; it speaks of obscurities in Śrīkaṇṭha's work.[81] Its author, Abhayatilaka, was a Jaina of the Kharataragaccha sect in Gujarat and lived in the middle of the 13th century.[82] Of Śrīkaṇṭha little is known.[83] The *Śrīkaṇṭhaṭippaṇaka*, the sole manuscript for which breaks off after NS.1.1.4, must have been enormous: it devotes sixty six pages to the commentaries on the first *Nyāyasūtra*. Both commentaries concentrate on the *Pariśuddhi*.[84]

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81 ***śrīśrīkaṇṭhenāhitā durgamārthavykhyāsmābhiryāvatīkṣāṃbabhūve*** |
*pañcaprasthanyāyatarkasya tasyāstāvatyāḥ sānyā vidheyeti bodhyam* ||
(NA 1.17-18)

82 A. Thakur, *Nyāyālaṅkāra*, Introduction, pp. xxx-xxi.

83 A. Thakur, *Śrīkaṇṭhācāryaṭippaṇaka*, Introduction, p. xiii, suggests that he was from Western India, possibly a Jaina; he is to be dated between Udayanācārya and Abhayatilaka (1263).

84 Editions: *Śrikaṇṭhācāryaṭippaṇaka [A Commentary on the Major Nyāya-texts] by Śrīkaṇṭhācārya*, edited by A. Thakur; *Nyāyālaṅkāra (Pañcaprasthānanyāyamahātarkaviṣamapada-vyākhyā): A Commentary on the five classical texts of the Nyāya Philosophy of Abhayatilaka Upādhyāya*, edited by A. Thakur and J. S. Jetly.

# CHAPTER II

## *NIḤŚREYASA* AND LIBERATION

The first *Nyāyasūtra* relates that by knowing the true-nature of the sixteen Nyāya categories one attains *niḥśreyasa*.[1] Within the Nyāya tradition, there is unanimity that by *niḥśreyasa* Akṣapāda means 'liberation' (*apavarga*), which he defines in NS 1.1.22 as the absolute release from suffering.[2] Nyāya, the commentators of the *Nyāya-caturgranthikā* constantly maintain, is soteriological science (*adhyātmavidyā*); by utilizing the inferential reasoning (*nyāya*) it uniquely espouses, one attains the highest human end or liberation. Since *niḥśreyasa* is the stated goal of Nyāya, the commentators marshall and refute numerous arguments to establish these claims. A study of *niḥśreyasa* and, more generally, of liberation in the NCG to NS 1.1.1 will serve to illumine how Nyāya defines and justifies itself as soteriological science. In addition, the identification of *niḥśreyasa* with liberation has recently been challenged by Walter Slaje.[3] The argument he advances merits scrutiny; if it is found cogent, the implications

[1] *pramāṇa-prameya-saṃśaya-prayojana-dṛṣṭānta-siddhāntāvayava-tarka-nirṇaya-vāda-jalpa-vitaṇḍā-hetvābhāsa-cchala-jāti-nigrahasthānānāṃ tattvajñānān niḥśreyasādhigamaḥ* NS 1.1.1. *niḥśreyasa* here is normally translated by '*summum bonum*' or 'supreme felicity'. Patañjali (*Mahābhāṣya* to A.5.4.77 [II.440.16-17]: see also *Nyāyakandalī* p. 16) first treats the word as a *karmadhāraya* compound, 'definite or certain good', then states that it should be taken as a *tatpuruṣa*: e.g., 'that which is definitely known to be excellent'. In NB 5.17-19, Pakṣilasvāmin notes that the translation of *niḥśreyasa* depends upon the context: in the *Nyāyaśāstra* it means liberation. In this chapter, *niḥśreyasa* is accordingly left untranslated, though it is argued against Slaje that it does, in fact, mean liberation. It is regularly translated by 'the highest good' in the translations in the appendix. See footnote 14 *infra* for a survey of its usage in Sanskrit.

[2] <*duḥkham* NS 1.1.21> *tadatyantavimokṣo 'pavargaḥ* NS 1.1.22.

[3] "niḥśreyasam im alten Nyāya" WZKS(O)A 30 (1986) 163-178. An argument against the synonymy of *niḥśreyasa* and *apavarga* was previously made by Mrinalkanti Gangopadhyaya (quoted by Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya in *Nyāya: Gautama's Nyāya-sūtra with Vātsyāyana's Commentary*, pp. lxvii-lxv), but Slaje's article is more substantive and detailed.

for Nyāya are significant. The soteriological claims of Nyāya that form a crucial part of the entire commentatorial tradition would be undermined. A critique of Slaje's article will accordingly be presented after a comprehensive study of *niḥśreyasa* and liberation in the *Nyāyacaturgranthikā* to NS 1.1.1 is set forth.[4]

In order to frame the following analysis, it will prove convenient to treat the larger problems, questions, and objections directed towards Nyāya liberation in the NCG to NS 1.1.1 as constituting three basic questions or sets of interrelated questions.[5] The first group, then, centers on whether liberation exists at all or, alternatively, what valid proof can be adduced for it. Thus, it is urged that liberation is a purely imaginary construct, and that no prudent person would strive to attain it.[6] Further, Vācaspati himself asserts that liberation is 'otherworldly': what could plausibly constitute proof for something that cannot be known by anyone in this world?[7]

The nature of Nyāya liberation itself and its status as a human end is the focus of the second group. Akṣapāda characterizes liberation as the absolute release from suffering.[8] This is a purely negative, liminal notion. How could such a state qualify as a human end? How would this be different from being in a coma? Why would any prudent person undertake any steps, let alone the study of Nyāya, to attain it? A verse quoted by Udayana pointedly poses these questions:

> Gautama would sooner be reborn as a jackal in the
> Vṛndāvan forest than attain Vaiśeṣika liberation.[9]

Finally, Nyāya's status as soteriological science and how it uniquely or better

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[4]In NVT 27.8-16, Vācaspati eloquently describes the process whereby one attains liberation through knowledge of the Nyāya categories.

[5]A number of less substantive objections are omitted here, though they are fully documented in the following section. The various responses set forth by the commentators, combined as three coherent sets of answers to these questions, will be presented at the conclusion of the analysis.

[6]NVTP 85.6ff (cf NVT 25.24ff).

[7]NVT 28.5-6.

[8]NS 1.1.22 (quoted in footnote 2 *supra*).

[9]NVTP 90.22-23.

than any other soteriological science produces liberation are called into question. Since Nyāya is fundamentally concerned with knowing things, but liberation is directly produced from certain types of activity or non-activity, it is soteriological only indirectly. Why should one not directly pursue Yogic means?[10] Again, if one can learn about the nature of the soul, rebirth, liberation and the like directly from scripture, then Nyāya is an unnecessary even unwieldy intermediary.[11] Even if it is allowed that Nyāya is directly soteriological, questions about its fitness as the best means to liberation remain. Why are its categories, out of all possible categories, singularly appropriate?[12] Some of its categories, namely the dialectical ones, have nothing at all to do with liberation but are instead obstacles to its attainment.[13] Why, in short, is Nyāya the best soteriological science?

## A. Analysis of Passages

To bring order into the numerous, disparate discussions of or references to *niḥśreyasa*[14] and liberation in NCG to NS 1.1.1, each passage in the *Bhāṣya* together with successive glosses and comments in the *Vārttika*, *Tātparyaṭīkā*, and *Pariśuddhi* will first be treated, then independent passages together with relevant comments where available in succeeding works will be examined.[15] A synthesis of the whole will be presented at the conclusion of the chapter.

The four passages in the *Bhāṣya* to NS 1.1.1, with respective comments, in which liberation is treated, are:

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[10]NVT 30.24ff.

[11]This question is not directly addressed in the NCG to NS 1.1.1, although the primacy of Nyāya over all sciences provides the beginning of an answer. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa forcefully asserts that the Mīmāṃsakas do not properly establish the validity of scripture which they are to interpret (NM I.4.27-5.6).

[12]At NVT 42.25ff (see NP 121.5ff), Vācaspati entertains the possibility that there any other number of existent things that can be truly known, and lists the 'categories' of Sāṅkhya and so forth as examples.

[13]NVT 68.15.

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|---|---|---|---|
| 1) | NB 2.5-7 | | compound analyses |
| | | NV 12.20-13.11 | |
| | | cf. NVT 45.3-5 | |
| | | cf. NVTP 76.2-4, 123.14-17 | |
| 2) | NB 2.9-10 | | *prameyas* and *niḥśreyasa* |
| | | NV 13.14-14.1 | |
| | | NVT 46.7-47.4 | |
| | | NVTP 124.21-126.4 | |
| 3) | NB 2.10-12 | | *arthapadas* and *niḥśreyasa* |
| | | NV 14.1-4 | |
| | | NVT 47.5-11 | |
| | | NVTP 126.5-12 | |
| 4) | NB 5.18-20 | | *niḥśreyasa* is *apavarga* |
| | | NV 21.9-17 | |
| | | NVT 68.6-14 | |

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[14]A review of the use of *niḥśreyasa* in (early) Sanskrit suggests that the word is neutral: 'the good/supremacy' it denotes ranges from earthly pleasure to liberation. It occurs first in the *Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad* (2.14) in the sense of 'pre-eminence' (said of the *prāṇās* in relation to the other organs of sensation). It is also found in Pāṇini A.5.4.77, in a long list of items that take the affix *ac*. The *dharmaśāstra* and *sūtra* literatures offer a few instances: *idaṃ svastyayanaṃ śreṣṭhamidaṃ buddhivivardhanam* | *idaṃ yaśasyaṃ satatamidaṃ niḥśreyasaṃ param Manusmṛti* 1.106 (See Medhātithi): see 12.82, 12.83; *puruṣaniḥśreyasārtham Vaśiṣṭa Dharma Sūtra* 2.1; *pūrvasmin pūrvasmin varṇe niḥśreyasaṃ bhūyas Āpastambha Śrauta Sūtra* 1.1.8: see 1.3.13 and 2.7.16; *Gautama Dharma Sūtra* 2.2.26 (see *Mitākṣarā*); *karmabhir niḥśreyasaṃ tāni śabdalakṣaṇāni dhāryante Hiraṇyakeśī Śrauta Sūtra* 3.1.1: see 3.1.5 (*niḥśreyasabuddhis*) and *Hiraṇyakeśī Dharma Sūtra* 1.1.8. In the epics it exhibits the full range of meanings: *so 'haṃ jaye caiva parājaye ca niḥśreyasaṃ nādhigacchāmi kiṃcit* MBh 5.25.12; *damaṃ niḥśreyasaṃ prāhur* MBh12.154.7, *prajñā naiḥśreyasī loke* 12.173.2, 12.296.43 (= *brahman*): *Rāmāyaṇa* 2.94.17, 4.18.26, 4.20.12, 5.20.19, 6.64.8. Śabara uses it in the sense of *svarga*, *Bhāṣya* to JMS 1.1.2 (p. 13.3, 21.6 Ānandāśrama ed., part 1).

Aside from *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 1.1.2 (see page 71 *infra*), there are two instances in the *Mahābhārata* in which *niḥśreyasa* clearly means 'liberation', and one instance in Kālidāsa in which *niḥśreyasa* denotes, *inter alia*, liberation:

*saṃnyāsaḥ karmayogaśca niḥśreyasakarāv ubhau* |
*tayos tu karmasaṃnyāsāt karmayogo viśiṣyate* || *Bhagavadgītā* 5.2

*atrāpyudāharantīmimam itihāsaṃ purātanam* |
*saṃvādaṃ mokṣasaṃyuktaṃ śiṣyasya guruṇā saha* || (cf. NS 4.2.38, note 13 *infra*)
........................
*bhagavantaṃ prapanno 'haṃ niḥśreyasaparāyaṇaḥ* |
*yāce tvāṃ śirasā vipra yadbrūyāṃ tadvicakṣva* || *MBh* 14.35.2, 4: see 14.35.18

*vedānteṣu yamāhurekapuruṣaṃ vyāpya sthitaṃ rodasī*
*yasminnīśvare ityananyaviṣayaḥ śabdo yathārthākṣaraḥ* |
*antaryaśca mumukṣubhirniyamitaprāṇādibhirmṛgyate*
*sa sthāṇuḥ sthirabhaktiyogasulabho niḥśreyasāyāstu vaḥ* || *Vikramorvaśīya* I.1

[15]The passages will be closely followed in order to capture the full context of statements. 'Independent' is somewhat too strong a term: all that is meant is that certain passages are relatively independent of an antecedent text or texts.

NVTP 149.6-12

1) Pakṣilasvāmin identifies the long compound in first *Nyāyasūtra*, which lists all sixteen Nyāya categories, as a coordinating compound.[16] Uddyotakara notes that, since the meanings of all its words have equal importance, they must all be known.[17] Pakṣilasvāmin next analyzes '*niḥśreyasa*-attainment' as a dependent compound in which the resolved sixth case affix denotes the object.[18] Accordingly, the proper translation is, 'the attainment of *niḥśreyasa*': he does not here further identify *niḥśreyasa*. Uddyotakara expands slightly on this explanation: *niḥśreyasa* is the object in that it is what is being attained.[19] Pakṣilasvāmin's remarks taken together imply that by knowing all sixteen categories equally well one attains *niḥśreyasa*.

2) Immediately afterwards, however, he notes:

> The attainment of *niḥśreyasa* results, to be sure, from the knowledge of the *prameyas*, soul etc. – and this is restated in the next *sūtra*.[20]

Pakṣilasvāmin is evidently aware of the seeming inconsistency between his claims: the balance of his *Bhāṣya*, and the succeeding commentaries, on the first *sūtra* only makes sense on the supposition that he is at pains to show what constructive function the other Nyāya categories play. Moreover, in the next paragraph he poses an objection to this same effect, that the separate mention of doubt etc. has no purpose, since they are subsumable either under the means of knowledge or object of knowledge.[21] He

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[16] *cārthe dvandvaḥ samāsaḥ* NB 2.5. Cf. Pāṇini A.2.2.29 *cārthe dvandvaḥ*. Udayana has an objector say that this compound is as 'long as a stick' (*daṇḍakasūtrasya*) NVTP 75.4-5; so Vardhamāna, *daṇḍa iva daṇḍakaṃ dīrgham*...NVTPP 28.6-29.1.

[17] *sarvapadārthapradhānaḥ samāso dvandvaḥ | kimuktaṃ bhavati ? sarva ete pramāṇādayo vijñeyā iti* NV 12.20-21. He argues that this is the only reasonable way formally to analyze the compound (NV 12.21-22; see NVT 45.3-5 and NVTP 123.14-17 for a fuller treatment).

[18] *karmaṇi ṣaṣṭhī* NB 2.6-7.

[19] *adhigamyamānam* NV 13.11: neither Vācaspati nor Udayana comments substantively on either this passage or its antecedent in the *Bhāṣya*.

[20] *ātmādeḥ khalu prameyasya tattvajñānānniḥśreyasādhigamaḥ taccaitad uttarasūtreṇānūdyate* NB 2.9-10. See also NB 5.18-19.

admits that the point is partially valid, but insists that doubt etc., which are categories of Nyāya, serve to differentiate Nyāya both from the other three branches of knowledge and from other soteriological systems.[22] In the balance of the *Bhāṣya* to NS 1.1.1, he demonstrates why these other categories deserve separate mention in the first *sūtra*.[23] In stark contrast to the lengthy discussions of *tarka* and *dṛṣṭānta*, the *prameyas* receive only passing notice here.

Uddyotakara distinguishes between two varieties of *niḥśreyasa*, the seen and the unseen.[24] The seen type is attained by knowing the true nature of the categories of means of knowledge etc., since every entity.[25] when known produces an idea of aversion, desire, or indifference. On such a view, however, all entities without exception are indicated as things to be known. In fact, it is the true-knowledge of the *prameyas* that produces the higher kind of *niḥśreyasa*. An objection is urged that he has no proof for the claim that the unseen type results from knowledge of the *prameyas*. Uddyotakara replies that this simply how things are: one cannot transcend *saṃsāra* without correctly

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[21]Pakṣilasvāmin presumably has the general sense of 'means of knowledge' (*pramāṇa*) and 'object of knowledge' (*prameya*) in mind. In NB 1.1-21, he details the crucial role the *pramāṇas* play in producing valid knowledge; see also NB 4.9-10 on the correlation of the members of a syllogism (*nyāya*) with the means of knowledge. Pakṣilasvāmin thinks that it is the analytical method (*ānvīkṣikī*) that identifies Nyāya. Uddyotakara, Vācaspati, and Udayana will single out the *pramāṇas* as the special province of Nyāya — that all other branches of knowledge are dependent upon knowledge as derived through the Nyāya *pramāṇas*.

[22]*tatra saṃśayādīnāṃ pṛthagvacanamanarthakaṃ, saṃśayādayo hi yathāsaṃbhavaṃeṣu prameyeṣu cāntarbhavanto na vyatiricyanta iti* | *satyamevametat* | *imāstu catasro vidyāḥ pṛthaksthānāḥ...tasyā* <*nyāyavidyayā*> *pṛthaksthānāḥyaḥ padārthāḥ* | *teṣām pṛthagvacanam antareṇādhyātmavidyāmātramiyaṃ syāt, yathopaniṣadaḥ* | *tasmāt saṃśayādibhiḥ padārthaiḥ pṛthak prasthāpyate* NB 2.13-18.

[23]NB 3.2 (*saṃśaya*), 3.5 (*prayojana*), 3.21-23 (*dṛṣṭānta*) 4.6-7 (*siddhānta*), 4.13-14 (*avayava*), 4.24-25 (*tarka*), 5.3 (*nirṇaya*), 5.5 (*vāda*), 5.7 (*jalpa, vitaṇḍā*) 5.8-9 (*hetvābhāsa*), 5.10 (*chala, jāti, nigrahasthāna*). These categories either play ancillary roles in the acquisition or preservation of true knowledge (*tattvajñāna*) 4.12-13, 4.23, 5.5-6, 5.7, support the *pramāṇas* 3.20, or promote the proper operation of other Nyāya categories 4.6-7, 5.1-2, 5.8-9, 5.10-12.

He alludes to *tattvādhyavasāyasaṃrakṣaṇārthaṃ jalpavitaṇḍe bījaprarohasaṃrakṣaṇārthaṃākhāvaraṇavat* NS 4.2.50 (NB 5.7) and NS 1.1.40 *avijñātatattve 'rthe kāraṇopapattitas tattvajñānārthamūhastarkaḥ* (NB 4.17-18).

Note also that the *hetvābhāsās* are subsumed within the category of *nigrahasthāna* (NS 5.2.1).

[24]See footnote 70 *infra*.

[25]The meaning of *padārtha* is somewhat ambiguous in this passage as between 'entity' and 'category' (NV 13.14ff.) Uddyotakara's argument turns on the question of whether the category of *prameya* (object of knowledge) itself subsumes all entities that can be known.

knowing the objects of knowledge, soul etc. He defers a more complete answer until the second *sūtra*.[26] However, he here provides two arguments to show that it is the higher form that is intended by the first *sūtra*. Seekers of liberation would not strive for *niḥśreyasa*, since they would have to attain the true-knowledge of everything in every respect if the *prameyas* were not limited.[27] Secondly, the objects of knowledge are separately mentioned by Akṣapāda. If the objects of knowledge were nothing other than the categories of means of knowledge etc. and if *niḥśreyasa* resulted from knowing them, then the objects of knowledge, namely soul through liberation (*apavarga*), would not have been separately mentioned. Akṣapāda would thus have been inept to have provided a separate *sūtra* to define them, if the objects of knowledge had already set forth in the first *sūtra*.[28] Finally, he quotes without comment Pakṣilasvāmin's assertion that this matter is restated in the next *sūtra*.

Vācaspati introduces his commentary on this passage by stating that Uddyotakara differentiates these two kinds of *niḥśreyasa* in order that the one intended by Akṣapāda be understood. Uddyotakara, he holds, first objects to taking the seen kind as being intended on the grounds of 'over-extension', namely, the inclusion of all entities as objects of knowledge, then states that the intended, higher type results from the knowledge of the true-nature of the objects of knowledge, soul etc. Vācaspati insists that, despite this distinction, it is the higher form of *niḥśreyasa* that Akṣapāda had in mind when composing the first *sūtra*. While the word *niḥśreyasa* denotes no more than

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[26]NV 13.20-21, cf. NV 151.20-152.10. In NV 152.6-9, Uddyotakara equates the lower form of *niḥśreyasa* with *jīvanmukti*.

[27]*na hi kasyacit kvacicca tattvajñānaṃ nāstīti* (NV 13.23) is ambiguous. The literal meaning is, 'for there is a true-knowledge of/for anything/anyone in any respect'. In his *Vārttika* to NS 4.2.1, Uddyotakara says that there cannot be *tattvajñāna* of all objects because there are infinitely many objects, *viṣayamātre tāvadaśakyaṃ tattvajñānena bhavitum | kutaḥ ? viṣayāṇāmānantyāt* NV 1035.8-9 (TNT). In light of this passage, one interpretation of Uddyotakara's argument is that seekers of liberation would not even strive for liberation, since they could never truly know everything; see also NV 13.15-16. Another possible interpretation is that since anyone can acquire true knowledge of any entity and if the true knowledge of the Nyāya categories leads to liberation, then those seeking liberation would not have to exert themselves in order to achieve liberation. Vācaspati's commentary (NVT 46.18-19) favors this second interpretation.

[28]The same argument is repeated almost verbatim at NV 383.19-21 [NS 1.1.9].

'what is desired' and visible happiness can result for the true-knowledge of means of knowledge etc., since the objects of knowledge, the soul etc., are co-mentioned with the means of knowledge etc., the unseen kind of *niḥśreyasa* alone was intended by Akṣapāda. He adds that the true-knowledge of the other categories is not otiose, since it indirectly causes the unseen kind.

The objection Uddyotakara addressed is put more forcefully: experience itself is proof for the existence of seen *niḥśreyasa*, but the unseen kind lacks any valid proof because there can be no experience of it. Vācaspati's interpretation of Uddyotakara's reply is terse to a fault:

> The only proof (*pramāṇa*) for this matter is inference of the absence of the effect through absence of its cause – accompanied by verbal testimony and inference for this.[29]

A rephrasing of Uddyotakara's reply in light of this interpretation might run: the absence of the unseen *niḥśreyasa*, which is equivalent to *saṃsāra*, as effect is inferred through the absence of the true-knowledge of the objects of knowledge, soul etc., as cause.[30] Udayana, as will be seen shortly, devotes considerable attention to this sentence in the *Tātparyaṭīkā*, especially the phrase, 'accompanied by verbal testimony and inference'.

Vācaspati treats the next section in the *Vārttika* as a refutation of those who mis-

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[29]NVT 46.15-16; cf. 44.16-17.

[30]Śrīkaṇṭha takes the 'absence of pain' to be the 'absence of effect': "Inference of the absence of effect alone is the means of knowledge for determining that unseen *niḥśreyasa* which arises from the true-knowledge of the twelve *prameyas*, soul etc. But through what does the inference of absence of effect arise? Through the absence of cause (*kāraka*). The inference of the absence of the effect is of what kind? This is stated: 'that which is assisted by verbal testimony and inference'. The idea is: the absence of effect, namely pain, arises for the soul through the absence of its cause, namely rebirth. Verbal testimony and inference assist in this inference, 'because they elicit the subject (*pakṣa*) etc.'" ŚṬ 37.26-38.3 [NVT 46.14-15, NVTP 125.1]. Abhayatilaka sets out the inference precisely: "The soul possesses absence of pain because it possesses absence of rebirth, which is the cause of pain. Anything that possesses the absence of effect possesses the absence of its cause: for example, a weaver who possesses the absence of effect, cloth etc., possesses the absence of its cause, threads etc. The soul is such; therefore, the soul has absence of pain." (NA 31.3-5).

takenly think that the higher *niḥśreyasa* is caused simply by knowledge of the true-nature of the categories. The quotation that represents their view,

> He who has seen one entity (*bhāva*) in its true-nature, has seen all entities in their true-nature.

is of unknown provenance.[31] Vācaspati's interpretation of Uddyotakara's first argument amounts to the following: the true-nature of things is nothing different than the form in which they are presented to direct perception, and no special effort would be required to attain such true-knowledge.[32]

Vācaspati next paraphrases the second argument, that the separate mention of the objects of knowledge from the means of knowledge etc. indicates Akṣapāda's intent that the objects of knowledge alone directly lead to *niḥśreyasa*. He concludes that the assertion that the true-knowledge of the objects of knowledge causes the higher form of *niḥśreyasa* is thus based both on reasoning and the intent of Akṣapāda.

Vācaspati takes up the clause in the *Bhāṣya*, "And this is restated in the next *sūtra*," which Uddyotakara quotes without further comment. Vācaspati frames the clause as an answer to the following question: does the true-knowledge of the soul etc. have some unseen, great power to produce the higher *niḥśreyasa*? On the contrary, knowledge of the true-nature of the soul etc. produces the higher *niḥśreyasa* by a visible means, "and this is restated in the next *sūtra*". Vācaspati analyzes the form "is restated" and explains its clause: for it is restated in the second *sūtra* that liberation arises through the series of cessation of false knowledge concerning the objects of knowledge etc., directly upon the origination of true-knowledge.[33]

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[31] *eko bhāvas tattvato yena dṛṣṭaḥ, sarve bhāvās tattvatas tena dṛṣṭāḥ* NVT 46.17: cf. *Syādvādamañjarī* p. 92 (Dhruva edition).

[32] He here offers an analysis of the form 'desiring liberation': *mokṣamāṇā iti sani muco 'karmakasya guṇo vā iti guṇābhyāsalopau* NVT 46.19-21. 'The form *mokṣamāṇa* shows (optional) guṇation, and deletion of the reduplicative syllable according to <the Pāṇinian *sūtras* A.7.4.54> *sani* <*mīmāghurabhalabhaśakapatapadāmaca is*, A.7.4.57> *muco 'karmakasya guṇo vā* <and A.7.4.58 *atra lopo 'bhyāsasya*>.'

Udayana frames Vācaspati's interpretation of Uddyotakara's rejection of seen *niḥśreyasa* as an answer to the objection that seen happiness does in fact result from the true-knowledge of the categories of the means of knowledge etc.[34] He then gives the point of Vācaspati's explanation: if the unseen *niḥśreyasa* were not intended to be the end of the *śāstra*, then Akṣapāda would not have taught the specific objects of knowledge, soul etc., because seen *niḥśreyasa* is obtained without any true-knowledge at all.

It is the question of what proof can be advanced for the existence of the unseen *niḥśreyasa*, and especially how verbal testimony and inference assist in proving its existence, that chiefly concerns Udayana in this passage. He first restates the objection addressed by Uddyotakara and Vācaspati, that any proof of its existence can only be derived from direct experience, but that there can be no direct experience of it at all. He takes up part of Vācaspati's reply, that verbal testimony and inference concerning the *prameyas* of soul etc. assist in the inference of absence of cause from absence of effect. Verbal testimony and inference assist, he argues, insofar as they elicit the subject of the inference[35] etc. Udayana illustrates this assistance in great detail, quoting freely from the *Upaniṣads* and *Gītā*; he evidently attempts to corroborate the validity of each link in the causal chain set forth in NS 1.1.2 at the same time.[36]

Both verbal testimony and inference assist in establishing the existence of the soul. To establish that its distinctive feature is the absence of birth there is verbal testimony and the inference from absence of activity. To establish the absence of activity,

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[33]*anūdyate*: this is stated 'after' (*anu* = *paścāt*) the statement that true-knowledge causes *niḥśreyasa* <in NS 1.1.1>. Why Vācaspati deigns to state the obvious here is puzzling, though he may be alluding to the fact that a restatement/reformulation (*anuvāda*) is not a flaw, as is mere repetition (*punarukta*): cf. NS 2.1.58, 2.1.67, 5.2.1, 5.2.14-15.

[34]To the phrase 'only the unseen *niḥśreyasa* is intended' in the *Tātparyaṭīkā*, Udayana thinks one should supply 'as the end of the *śāstra*', NVTP 124.21-22.

[35]This is an important point. Since the soul and liberation are mentioned in various scriptural passages, both their existence and their fitness for use as subjects in inference are vouched for. Further, Pakṣilasvāmin holds that an inference which contradicts perception or scripture (*āgama*) is pseudo-reasoning (*nyāyābhāsa*) NB 3.8.

[36]This also indirectly serves to strengthen Pakṣilasvāmin's original contention that the *Nyāyasūtras* have clear soteriological presuppositions.

there is verbal testimony and the inference from the absence of faults. To establish the absence of faults, there is verbal testimony and the inference from the absence of false knowledge. To establish the absence of false knowledge, there is verbal testimony and the inference from the actual existence of true-knowledge. Even to establish the true-knowledge of the soul there is verbal testimony; the inference is from excellence in practicing the means and the like.[37]

He adds that the explicit mention of verbal testimony and inference by Vācaspati is not exhaustive, since direct perception is also available. The other objects of knowledge, body etc., are to be treated analogously with soul.[38]

Udayana qualifies Vācaspati's claim that inference alone is proof by supplying 'for those who desire to teach one who is ignorant': there are both scriptural statements and such inferences as that from continuity, which constitute valid proof for those who are not ignorant.[39]

The statement in the *Bhāṣya* that, "this matter is restated in the next *sūtra*," is next taken up. Udayana frames Vācaspati's explanation of this 'restatement' as the answer to an objection: since the substance of the second *sūtra* is not stated in this *sūtra*,

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[37]The last phrase, *anumānaṃ tūpāyābhyāsaprakarṣa ityevamādi* (NVTP 125.16), is not clear. Abhayatilaka's gloss (NA 31.11-12) is only slightly less opaque: "The excellence in practising the means in regard to the soul/on the part of the soul is the logical mark (*hetu*) for the knowledge of the true-nature: <i.e.> 'because of excellence in practising the means, like the excellence in practicing the means in architecture and so forth'." One would like to know what 'means' are at issue here and how their practice is a sign for the true-knowledge of the soul.

[38]A synergy is thus possible and desirable for these liberationally important doctrines.

[39]*Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* 3.8. *santānānumānasya ca* NVTP 125.21. Thakur's punctuation is misleading in NVTP 125.17-21. These lines should read:

*pratyakṣamapi draṣṭavyam* I *evaṃ śarīrādiṣvapyūhyam* I *anumānamevātrārthe pramāṇamiti vipratipannaṃ pratipipādayiṣyatāmiti śeṣaḥ, upaniṣadāmapi*

*tameva viditvātimṛtyumeti* I

[*śvet* 3.7] *ityādināṃ prāmāṇyāt, santānānumānasya ca* I *pṛthagupadeśācca prameyasya pramāṇādibhyaḥ prathamasūtre*...

This inference is clearly meant for those who already understand the existence of the unseen *niḥśreyasa*, but Udayana does not explain in what this 'continuity' consists. Śrīkaṇṭha says: "Because there actually are other inferences for this matter, such as: the continuity of the nine special qualities of the soul are absolutely destroyed because they form a continuity, like the continuity of a lamp." (ŚṬ 38.19-20; cf. NA 31.13-14). Śrīkaṇṭha also thinks that by perception (*pratyakṣa*) is meant internal perception (*mānasapratyakṣa*), ŚṬ 38.13-14.

The balance of this paragraph is not directly relevant to *niḥśreyasa* (NVTP 125.20-23).

it cannot be restated there. He discusses the absence of any discussion on this statement in the *Vārttika*, and ascribes it either to a scribal error or to the fact that Uddyotakara simply restated the intent of Pakṣilasvāmin.

3) Pakṣilasvāmin introduces with no explanation four cardinal entities (*arthapadas*) of what is to be eliminated, its elimination, the means to elimination, and what is to be attained, and states that by correctly knowing them one attains *niḥśreyasa*.[40] It stands to reason, however, that the *prameyas* have somehow to be correlated with these *arthapadas*, since he states that the proper knowledge of either produces the attainment of *niḥśreyasa*.

After paraphrasing this sentence, Uddyotakara makes the following identifications:[41]

| | |
|---|---|
| what is to be eliminated (*heya*) | pain (*duḥkha*) |
| the eliminating (*hāna*) | true-knowledge (*tattvajñāna*) |
| the means (*upāya*) | the *śāstra* |
| what is to be attained (*adhigantavya*) | liberation (*mokṣa*) |

He adds that these four entities are described by all professors in all soteriological sciences.

Vācaspati expands somewhat upon Uddyotakara's identifications, in part to reconcile them with Pakṣilasvāmin's formulation, with which they do not precisely tally. False knowledge concerning the objects of knowledge, soul etc., is ignorance, whose

[40]In NB 1037.9 (TNT) [NS 4.2.1], Pakṣilasvāmin equates *duḥkha* with *heya*, *adhigantavya* with *apavarga*, and *upāya* with *tattvajñāna*. The *Vārttika* gives a slightly different but fuller explanation: *heyahānopāyādhi-gantavyabhedāc catvāry arthapadāni samyag buddhvā niḥśreyasam adhigacchatīti | heyam iti | heyaṃ duḥkham | tasya nirvartakam avidyātṛṣṇe dharmādharmāv iti | hānaṃ tattvajñānam | upāyaḥ śāstram | adhigantavyo mokṣaḥ | etāni catvāry arthapadāni sarvāsvadhyātmavidyāsu sarvācāryair varṇyanta iti* NV 14.1-4 (see further NVT 47.5-8). The last sentence is especially revealing: 'These four cardinal entities are described by all doctors in all soteriological sciences'; see also NVT 47.9-12.

Following Pakṣilasvāmin's lead (TNT 1037.9 [NS 4.2.1]), Uddyotakara, Vācaspati, and Udayana attempt to correlate these four *arthapada* with the four components of valid knowledge (*pramātṛ*, *prameya*, *pramāṇa*, and *pramiti* NB 1.1-8).

[41]NV 14.1-4: see NV 8.1-4. Uddyotakara also adds the cause of what has to be eliminated or pain: ignorance and desire, or merit and demerit (*avidyātṛṣṇe* / *dharmādharamau*): cf. NVTP 87.15-17.

root cause is desire; 'aversion' may also be supplied by synecdoche. True-knowledge constitutes their elimination because they are eliminated through it.[42] He next frames Uddyotakara's assertion that these cardinal entities are universally accepted in soteriology as explaining Pakṣilasvāmin's intention in invoking them: that Akṣapāda was fully consonant with other soteriologists in revealing the twelve objects of knowledge, according to the distinction between what has to be eliminated and what has to be acquired, and the *śāstra*, which leads to their true-knowledge.[43]

Udayana frames Vācaspati's invocation of the principle of synecdoche to justify the inclusion of 'aversion' along with 'desire' as the answer to the objection that, aversion would then not be something to be eliminated. Similarly, Vācaspati's next sentence, that true-knowledge constitutes the elimination, is framed as the answer to the following objection: the word 'elimination' has the sense 'liberation' because it is co-mentioned with the word 'absolute'; how then can this be called 'true-knowledge'? The meaning of Vācaspati's explanation he sets forth as follows: on the analysis of elimination as instrument, true-knowledge is meant, whereas according to the analysis of elimination as action, because the word 'absolute' is co-mentioned with it, it has the meaning of liberation. Of his gloss of the word of 'this' by 'means of knowledge', Udayana says that Vācaspati thus dispels any doubt as to the analysis of the word 'true-knowledge'. By this, he further notes, the contradiction with the original sentence <in the *Bhāṣya*> is eliminated.[44] To forestall the objection that the meaning of the word cardinal entity (*arthapada*) in the *Bhāṣya* is in fact different than that understood by Uddyotakara, Vācaspati says that the meaning of cardinal entity is 'basis of human end' (*puruṣārthasthāna*). Finally, to Vācaspati's mention of the 'intention' of the *Bhāṣya*,

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[42]He thus takes *hāna*, on Uddyotakara's interpretation, 'instrumentally', or as the means of eliminating. Since Uddyotakara also identifies the *śāstra* as the means, the 'eliminating' (*hāna*) as action or process gets left by the wayside. He explains 'of this' (*tasya*) by 'means of knowledge', presumably a synonym for eliminating. That is, *hāna* = *tattvajñāna* = *pramāṇa*. This seems to make reasonable sense for the *Bhāṣya* (NB 2.10) but not for the *Vārttika* (NV 14.2-3), where it must mean 'what has to be eliminated'.

[43]Vācaspati here invokes Pakṣilasvāmin's formulation in TNT 1037.8-11 [NS 4.2.1].

should be added the phrase, 'according to the *Vārttika*'.[45]

4) Pakṣilasvāmin asserts that every science has a 'true-knowledge' and an 'attainment of *niḥśreyasa*'.[46] In Nyāya, which is soteriological science, the true-knowledge relates to the <category of object of knowledge> soul etc. and the attainment of *niḥśreyasa* is the gaining of liberation.

Uddyotakara supplies the true-knowledge and attainment of *niḥśreyasa* in the other three sciences to yield the full scheme:

| *vidyā* | *tattvajñāna* of | *niḥśreyasādhigama* |
|---|---|---|
| *ānvīkṣikī* | the objects of knowledge | gaining of liberation |
| *trayī* | pure ritual materials | heaven |
| *daṇḍanīti* | policy implementation | acquisition of territory |
| *vārtā* | good land | crops |

Vācaspati frames the *Bhāṣya* passage as a reply to the following objection: the categories of means of knowledge etc., which this *śāstra* will teach, are beneficial to all the sciences;[47] therefore the absolute cessation of pain is not understood as the end of Nyāya from the word *niḥśreyasa*, because of the possibility of mixing or contamination of the *niḥśreyasa* to be attained in other sciences. Vācaspati takes recourse to the argument from co-mention of the objects of knowledge urged earlier by Uddyotakara.

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[44]The *Bhāṣya* reads *hānamātyantikaṃ tasya* NB 2.10. Udayana explains that Uddyotakara's identification of *hāna* with *tattvajñāna* does not sit well with *ātyantika* and especially *tasya* in the *Bhāṣya*. (NB 2.10-12). According to Udayana, Vācaspati justifies the meaning 'means of elimination' by taking the affix *lyuṭ* in *hāna* as expressing the idea of instrument rather than merely the action expressed by the verb, 'elimination'; see *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 3.3.115, 117. Thus the identification of '(means of) elimination' with 'true-knowledge' is facilitated, and by taking *tasya* to mean 'the means of knowledge' (*pramāṇa*), the *Bhāṣya* and *Vārttika* can, he claims, be reconciled: but, as noted above, the *tasya* in the *Vārttika* can hardly bear this meaning.

[45]Udayana here underscores the problems Vācaspati encounters in reconciling the *Bhāṣya* and *Vārttika* passages.

[46]The reading adopted by Thakur in NB 5.18 is clearly correct: *tadidaṃ tattvajñānaṃ niḥśreyasādhigamaśca yathāvidyaṃ veditavyam*. See NV 21.9 (TNT 65.8). TNT 65.2 and NVTP(P) 6.2 have *niḥśreyasādhigamārtham* for *niḥśreyasādhigamaśca*, which is hard to construe: thus Slaje (note 41, p. 171), "Der Zweck dieser richtigen Erkenntnis ist der Gewinn des niḥśreyasam, wobei der Begriff der richtigen Erkenntnis gemäss der betreffenden Wissenschaft zu verschieden ist..."

[47]As related in the verse quoted by Pakṣilasvāmin (NB 5.15-16), *<ānvīkṣikī> pradīpas sarvavidyānām*, 'the light of all sciences'. Udayana continues the metaphor by speaking of the 'heat' (*ūṣman*) of *ānvīkṣikī* in NVTP 149.11; cf. also NVTP 92.17 *nirastatamaskatayā sugamo mārga upadiśyata iti*.

While the means of knowledge etc. may be shared with other sciences, since the objects of knowledge are not so shared and as each science strives for its unique *niḥśreyasa*, the means of knowledge etc. can only apply to its appropriate *niḥśreyasa*. He briefly expands on what guarantees purity of the ritual materials and what constitutes good land.

Udayana explains the point of Vācaspati's reply to the objection based on mixing of the ends of the sciences. That the ends of all the sciences depend upon *ānvīkṣikī* establishes its 'heat' but the principal end of *ānvīkṣikī* is not mixed with their ends, because that is impossible.[48]

Independent Passages in the *Vārttika*

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|---|---|---|
| 1) | NV 6.3-5 | relation of the *śāstra* to *niḥśreyasa* |
| | NVT 23.8-25.9 | |
| | NVTP 75.4-77.17 | |
| 2) | NV 6.14-20 | on the nature of liberation |
| | NVT 26.20-28.2 | |
| | NVTP 86.8-93.6 | |
| 3) | NV 12.23-13.2 | objection to construal of *tattva(jñāna)* in NS 1.1.1 (cf. NB 2.5-6) |
| 4) | NV 21.18-26 | *niḥśreyasa* and *vāda* etc. |
| | NVT 68.14-21 | |
| | NVTP 149.20-25 | |

1) Immediately after his *maṅgala* verse, Uddyotakara asserts that the first *Nyāyasūtra* relates the relation[49] the *śāstra* has. The first sentence in the *Bhāṣya*, in turn, is corroboration[50] of this relation, because the *śāstra* teaches human good. In the ensuing

[48]Udayana does not explain wherein the impossibility resides. Uddyotakara claims that the other sciences lack the proper qualifications (*adhikāra*) for propounding the Nyāya categories, but can employ them once expounded by Nyāya (NV 2.2-5). Earlier he had argued that the sciences should not be mixed (*saṅkara*), because the familiar four-fold ordering of the sciences would then collapse (NV 14.6-11). It is unclear which or either of these Udayana may have in mind here. The elimination of a *saṅkara* of sciences (*vidyā-saṅkara*) seems to be an appropriation of the notion of *varṇa-saṅkara*, 'mixing of caste', which is vehemently prohibited in, e.g., the *dharmaśāstra* literature. Udayana also provides a lengthy discussion of the matter, quality, and action (*dravya, guṇa, karman*) of the other three *vidyās* in NVTP 147.22-148.14.

[49]*abhisambandha* NV 6.3-4.

discussion, Uddyotakara indicates for which persons the *śāstra* is intended, what good (*śreyas*) it relates, and which type of successful activity is indicated, but does not explicitly state, at any rate, what relation is in fact stated in the first *Nyāyasūtra* nor how that is corroborated by the first sentence in the *Bhāṣya*.[51]

Vācaspati analyzes the word 'relation' as 'intended relation', namely that of cause and effect between the *śāstra* and *niḥśreyasa*.[52] His argument for this relation is involved. Since the first *sūtra* states that *niḥśreyasa* is attained from the knowledge of the true-nature of the means of knowledge etc., and not from the *śāstra*, Vācaspati appeals to an analysis of the word *tattvajñāna* by Pakṣilasvāmin[53] in order to justify its synonymy with *śāstra*. That is, knowledge can be analyzed as 'means of knowledge', and the *śāstra* is the means by which the true-nature of the Nyāya categories is known. Further, the fifth case affix in 'from knowledge of the true-nature' (*tattvajñānāt*) in the *sūtra* shows that it is the cause. The *śāstra* is, accordingly, indicated as the cause of *niḥśreyasa* insofar as it is the instrumental cause of the understanding of the true-nature of the categories, and not the cause merely by its own nature.[54] Therefore, Vācaspati concludes, what is meant is: the understanding of the true-nature of the means of knowledge etc. is in fact the intermediate or mediating operation towards the effecting of *niḥśreyasa* by the *śāstra*. Accordingly, two relations are indicated: that the *śāstra* and the true-nature of the categories of means of knowledge etc. stand in the relation of what

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[50]*anusandhānavākya*. This word normally means 'investigation', 'enquiry'; the translation proposed here is based on Vācaspati's explanation.

[51]NV 6.5-7.7.

[52]*abhisambandhaḥ* = *abhimataḥ sambandhaḥ* NVT 23.10.

[53]TNT 1079.2 [NS 4.2.27] *jñāyate 'neneti jñānamātmavidyāśāstram.*

[54]*na hi viṣaghnamantravat svarūpamātreṇa tadavivakṣitārthaṃ niḥśreyasaheturiti padārtha-tattvāvagamakaraṇatayā śāstramapadiśati, na tu svarūpeṇa* (NVT 23.12-14). This sentence, especially its first part, is elliptical to the point of unintelligibility. It may awkwardly be construed: 'Since by the statement that <*tattvajñāna* is> the cause of *niḥśreyasa* it is intended to be expressed <that *tattvajñāna* is the cause of *niḥśreyasa*> by virtue solely of its own nature, like an incantation that counteracts poison, hence <Akṣapāda> indicates that the *śāstra* is the cause of *niḥśreyasa* insofar as it is the instrumental cause for the understanding of the true-nature of the categories, but not by its own nature'. TNT 2.22 has a different reading: *svānvayamātreṇa* 'solely by virtue of its own positive concomitance' for *svarūpamātreṇa*.

makes known and what is made known, and that the knowledge of the true-nature of the categories of means of knowledge etc. and *niḥśreyasa* stand in the relation of cause and effect. The first *sūtra* thus serves to convey the content, relation, and purpose.[55] He defers treatment of what the categories are and how they are useful towards *niḥśreyasa*.[56] He adds that once men have ascertained the credibility of the sage Akṣapāda, they will ascertain the purpose etc. from his statements and act on them.[57]

Vācaspati sets out in great detail an objection against the proposed relation of true-knowledge of the categories with *niḥśreyasa*. This objection may be summarized briefly. Let it be granted that the true-knowledge of the categories of object of knowledge etc. produces *niḥśreyasa*. However, the validity of this true-knowledge is based on the means of knowledge, but there is no way in which the validity of the means of knowledge can themselves be established. If the validity of the *pramāṇas* cannot be established and if the objects of knowledge cannot thereby be validly known, then *niḥśreyasa* is not connected with the *śāstra*, since the *śāstra* is a means whose accomplishment is impossible. This objection, Vācaspati asserts, is refuted by the first sentence in the *Bhāṣya*, which relates the means to establishing the validity of the means of knowledge. This means consists in confirming the invariant connection between a means of knowledge and its object through successful activity based on the apprehension of the object through its means of knowledge

Vācaspati frames the phrase, "because the *śāstra* relates human-good," as an an-

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[55]'of the *śāstra*' is evidently to be supplied. *abhidheyaprayojanasambandhaprakaraṇa* is the rubric given to the first two *Nyāyasūtras* in Vācaspati's *Nyāyasūcīnibandha.*

[56]Thakur's reading *pat* (23.28), which he takes in the unparalleled meaning of *padārtha* 'category' (note 7), is highly suspect: *yat* is adopted by all other editors and is confirmed by the *Pariśuddhi* (NVTP 76.15).

[57]NVT 23.19-20 This addition is significant: not only does the *śāstra* state human good and the means to achieve it, but since it consists of statements by the trustworthy sage Akṣapāda, prudent men will be prompted to act upon it as the means to achieve their end.

Vācaspati thinks that 'this' in the statement *tasya anusandhānavākyam* (NV6.4) refers to the *śāstra*, which was connected with *niḥśreyasa* through the first *sūtra*. He glosses *sandhāna* by *ghaṭana* 'relating, connecting'; thus the first sentence in the *Bhāṣya* 'reconnects' (*anusandhāna*) the *śāstra* with *niḥśreyasa*, which were previously connected by the first *sūtra* (NVT 23.26-24.2). *tasya* would perhaps more naturally refer to (*tasya*) *saṃbandhavākyam* (NV 3.3-4).

swer to the objection that, although the categories of *pramāṇa* etc. might be known, since the *śāstra* does not relate them, it is not connected with *niḥśreyasa*.

Udayana attempts to explain Vācaspati's line of reasoning by formulating the following concern a reader might have.[58] In the first *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*, *dharma* is posited as what has to be explained, yet is not the content of the *Vaiśeṣikaśāstra*. Similarly in the first *Nyāyasūtra*, the means of knowledge etc. may be what have to be explained but are not the content of the *Nyāyaśāstra*. To meet this concern, Vācaspati introduces the *Vārttika* passage, "because the *śāstra* teaches human good," according to Akṣapāda's intent.

Vācaspati next introduces a crucial qualification to Uddyotakara's statement.[59] The 'good' that the *śāstra* states is not merely the absolute cessation of pain, but the absolute cessation of pain together with the means of achieve it. Now as for the charge that this good, together with its means, cannot be accomplished, the first sentence in the *Bhāṣya* stands as refutation.[60] Therefore, the *śāstra* is connected with *niḥśreyasa* through the first sentence in the *Bhāṣya*.

Udayana devotes some space to Vācaspati's explanation of 'relation' in the *Vārttika* as 'intended relation'.[61] The *śāstra* and *niḥśreyasa* stand in the relation of what states and what is to be stated, but that relation is not intended, since it does not prompt prudent men to activity. One does not attain what is to be stated simply by un-

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[58]Vācaspati here, as elsewhere, seeks to explain this statement in the *Vārttika* as the answer to an implicit objection (namely, that the *śāstra* does not relate human good): Udayana's explanation seems even more contrived. Udayana does, however, base this explanation on the claim that Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika are the same system (*samāntantra*), and voices disenchantment with the first *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* as a formulation of *Vaiśeṣika* doctrine.

[59]NVT 25.6-9.

[60]*aśakyānuṣṭhānatā* NVT 25.7-8; cf. NVT 24.3-4 *yadaśakyānuṣṭhānopāyopadeśakaṃ tadanarthakam, yathā jvaharatakṣakacūḍāratnāpadeśakaṃ vacanam* I *tāddṛśaṃ cedaṃ śāstramiti*. This passage (and more) is directly quoted, without attribution, from Dharmottara's *Nyāyabinduṭīkā*, pp. 4.9-5.8.

[61]NVTP 7-11. He treats this explanation first as a literal answer to the question, 'what is the purpose of '*abhi*' <in *abhisambandha*>? (NVTP 75.7-8). He also glosses *tatra* (= *śāstre vyākhyātavye*) and frames both the expression 'briefly' (*saṃkṣepatas*) and 'mention of the word 'etc.'' (*ādigrahaṇa*) as answers to objections (NVTP 75.4-6): none of this is relevant to the ensuing discussion.

derstanding that which states it, such that a person seeking liberation would act upon that which states it. Rather, one seeking an end acts upon the means. Therefore, the relation of cause and effect is intended to be expressed.

Udayana frames Vācaspati's next statement, a justification of the equation of knowledge of the true nature (*tattvajñāna*) with the *śāstra*, as the answer to the objection that the *śāstra* does not have the sense of *tattvajñāna*, otherwise the first *sūtra* would say that the *śāstra* and not *tattvajñāna* is the cause of *niḥśreyasa*.[62] Similarly, this statement answers the question of what purpose is served in the *sūtra* by not employing the normal word, *śāstra*.[63] Udayana's expands on the statement. Even though on the analysis of *śāstra* as 'that by which the means of knowledge etc. are taught' the notion of causality is conveyed, nevertheless that causality applies in respect of the *śāstra* being the effective element in an operation related to the teacher, and not to an operation related to the pupil. Yet the latter is intended; otherwise, even though one were to know the means of knowledge etc. according to their true-nature, he could not attain liberation until he taught. Vācaspati, he claims, explicitly states this in the balance of the passage.

Vācaspati's conclusion is framed as the answer to the objection that the *śāstra* cannot be both a cause and the instrumental cause, since it is related to different things. The *śāstra* is the cause and instrumental cause of two things: it is the cause of the true-nature of the categories insofar as it makes them known, and the instrumental cause insofar as it is the effective element in the operation <of the knowledge of the true-nature> towards *niḥśreyasa*.[64] Vācaspati, he asserts, explicitly states this in his next sentence.

Not content with the two relations that Vācaspati has stated, Udayana invokes

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[62]NVT 23.12: NVTP 75.12-15-16.

[63]See Śrīkaṇṭha *śāstrānniḥśreyasādhigama iti rūḍhaṃ mārgaṃ tyaktvā tattvajñānāditi am ityarthaḥ* ŚṬ 4.1-3.

[64]Śrīkaṇṭha and several MSS of the *Pariśuddhi* have *kārakatayā* for *karaṇatayā*.

the principle of synecdoche to justify three more:[65]

1) the *śāstra*, which is the effective element of the operation (*vyāpārin*), and the knowledge of the true-nature (*tattvajñāna*), which is the operation (*vyāpāra*), stand in the relation of cause and effect (*kāraṇa /kārya*).

2) the *śāstra*, which serves to convey (*pratipādaka*), and the categories (*padārtha*), which are what are to be conveyed (*pratipādya*), stand in the relation of effective element of an operation and the content of the operation (*vyāpāravat / vyāpāraviṣaya*).

3) the <categories of> means of knowledge etc. which are the content of the operation (*vyāpāraviṣaya*), and the knowledge of the true-nature (*tattvajñāna*), which is the operation (*vyāpāra*), stand in the relation of 'object and subject' (*viṣaya / viṣayin*).

4) the knowledge of the true-nature (*tattvajñāna*), which is the operation (*vyāpāra*), and *niḥśreyasa*, which is the end of the operation (*vyāpāraphala*), stand in the relation of cause and effect (*kāraṇa / kārya*).

5) the categories (*padārtha*), which are the content of the operation (*vyāpāraviṣaya*), and *niḥśreyasa*, which is the end of the operation (*vyāpāraphala*), stand in the relation of cause and effect (*hetu / hetumat*).[66]

He concludes that the 'instrumental' analysis of *tattvajñāna*, 'the means of knowing the true-nature', is not contradicted by Pakṣilasvāmin's explicit statement that in the compound *tattvajñāna*, *tattva* 'true-nature' is the object;[67] because he had this same operation, which is understood by etymology, in mind.

Udayana frames Vācaspati's next statement, that the first *sūtra* serves to make

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[65]The 'operation' (*vyāpāra*) and its constituents generate these possibilities. In early Nyāya, the terms *vyāpārin / vyāpāravat*, 'what possesses the activity' or 'what is acted upon', are characterizations of 'instrumental cause' (*karaṇam / nimittam*). In latter Nyāya, the normal characterization of *nimittam* is *asādhāraṇaṃ kāraṇam* 'the unique cause' (note that Uddyotakara uses this expression in NV 10.9-11): see *Tarkasaṃgraha* c.41.

[66]Śrīkaṇṭha offers help in sorting out these relations (ŚṬ 4.11-22). Udayana argues at some length for the fifth relation (NVTP 75.23-76.2).

[67]NB 2.6-7. He thus denies that *tattva* is a *śeṣe ṣaṣṭhī* form, which merely explains the *jñāna*, and is not its object.

known the content, purpose, and relation, as an answer to the question: other Vaiśeṣikas have revealed yet other relations, namely those of the pupil and teacher and the *śāstra* and its commentaries;[68] why are they not revealed here? His explanation of this statement may be summarized. There are in fact other relations, but they are not revealed because they do not prompt prudent men to act; the content, purpose, and their relation, which are related by the first *sūtra*, have this purpose. Similarly, Vācaspati's promise to discuss how the categories contribute to *niḥśreyasa* at a later time is also framed as the answer to an objection: true-knowledge of that thing alone, the false knowledge of which protracts *saṃsāra*, is the cause of *niḥśreyasa*. The soul is such; but the other categories, though the content of the *śāstra*, are not causes of *niḥśreyasa*.

In order to introduce the next section in the *Tātparyaṭīkā*, Udayana sets forth a lengthy objection and its reply concerning the purpose served by stating the end etc. of the *śāstra* in the first *sūtra*. His explanation of Vācaspati's assertion that people act upon ascertaining the purpose etc. is noteworthy. This ascertainment takes the form 'the *śāstra* alone is the means to *niḥśreyasa*', and not the form 'its purpose is inevitable', because there is the possibility of failure. Hence, the purpose serves to prompt one to activity insofar as it what is aimed at, but not insofar as it is what is being acted on. Therefore, there is no contradiction insofar as the *śāstra* is the means to what is desired.[69]

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[68]Udayana seems to be directly referring to *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* 4.4-5.7.

[69]Udayana does not comment on the balance of Vācaspati's treatment of the *Vārttika* passage.

2) Uddyotakara locates liberation in the following scheme:[70]




The absolute cessation of what is harmful, which arises from the elimination of the twenty-one causes of pain,[71] is the highest good or liberation. Uddyotakara is thus restating NS 1.1.22:

> Liberation is the absolute release from pain.[72]

His claim that pleasure is one of these causes, since it is inseparable from pain, is crucial for all its brevity: his successors devote no little space to it. Finally, he states that the removal of this manifold pain is achieved through the elimination of merit and demerit as causes: both by not producing any new merit and demerit and also by using up through consuming such as have arisen.

Vācaspati radically recasts this scheme, by supplying an 'and' and taking the

[70]By *dṛṣṭa / adṛṣṭa* Uddyotakara clearly intends a contrast between 'direct / indirect' or the like: he cites as an instance of temporary cessation of what is painful the removal of a hindrance (*kaṇṭhaka*). That is, one does not feel the removal of something painful immediately or directly as pleasure. It is not 'transcendental' or 'otherworldly' versus 'empirical' or 'mundane'. Vācaspati, however, takes the contrast in this way. See Udayana's explanation for Vācaspati's treatment, NVTP 86.8 ff.

[71]Uddyotakara attempts to recast or recorrelate ten of the *prameyas* as twenty-one divisions or species of pain (*duḥkha*) or its causes. There are some striking inconsistencies in his admittedly sketchy outline.

[72]<*duḥkham* NS 1.1.21> *tadatyantavimokṣo 'pavargaḥ* NS 1.1.22

distinction between 'seen / unseen' distributively:[73]




That he takes 'seen / unseen' to mean 'of this world / of the next world'[74] is clear from his examples of 1, namely that it consists of flowers, garlands, women and the like, and of 3, that it consists of heaven. None of the new species he has generated is directly commented on; this is striking in that there are now four theoretical 'absolute' goods. The two absolute species of pleasure (2, 4), however, are implicitly rejected according to the axiom that pleasure is necessarily accompanied by pain.[75] Vācaspati notes that Uddyotakara is here speaking figuratively: strictly speaking, pleasure is the necessary concomitant of the causes of pain. He adds that the causes of pain are three: dependency on a cause, momentariness, and desire. After relating in detail the twenty-one kinds of pain, and noting that the claim that pleasure is a cause of pain is only figurative, Vā-

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[73]NVT 26.20 ff.
[74]Udayana so understands the distinction: see footnote 80 *infra*.
[75]This is enunciated by Uddyotakara: *sukhaṃ duḥkhānuṣaṅgād* <*duḥkham*> NV 6.19.

caspati floridly expands on Uddyotakara's simple claim that the elimination of pain results through the rejection of all merit and demerit.[76] This passage is an eloquent formulation of the actual mechanism of attaining liberation through Nyāya.[77] He then turns to a substantive objection. If the good is the absolute cessation of pain, which is what prompts men to act upon the *śāstra*,[78] then this requires that there be as well an absolute cessation of pleasure. How can this really be the good? Uddyotakara's division of men into those who are subject to desire and those who lack desire provides the answer. Those who act to attain pleasure are not the audience of the *śāstra*, since any pleasure they might obtain will have pain mixed with it. The dispassionate, or discriminative, will shun any pleasure-motivated end, including heaven, and will, instead, act upon the *śāstra* towards the cessation of pain only.[79]

Udayana deals at considerable length with these passages in the *Vārttika* and *Tātparyaṭīkā*. He first provides an ingenious account of why Vācaspati has completely recast Uddyotakara's scheme of the good, and particularly of why he takes 'seen/unseen' in the sense of 'of this world/of the next world'.[80]

Udayana coherently explains the claim advanced by Uddyotakara that pleasure, as the necessary concomitant of pain, is a cause of pain. Since both are effects of the

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[76]See also NVTP 89.9-14.
[77]NVT 27.8-16. Most notable in his description is that Nyāya is a path that has to purified by true-knowledge of the categories of doubt etc. Udayana dwells at some length on this description (NVTP 89.21-90.6), and adds a darkness/light contrast to the path metaphor slightly later (NVTP 892.16-18).
[78]Cf. NVT 68.6-7.
[79]NVT 27.20 ff.
[80]NVTP 86.8. ff. A brief outline of his argument will suffice. Udayana notes that by *dṛṣṭa* / *adṛṣṭa* what might be meant is that there are underlying positive or negative means of knowledge for the cognitions. However, since the context requires that the highest good intended by Akṣapāda be ascertained, the means of knowledge associated with it is not now relevant. Hence, Vācaspati's scheme makes better sense contextually. This interpretation is not especially convincing, since the epistemological distinction drawn by Uddyotakara, in fact, makes excellent sense. That is, seen (*dṛṣṭa*) pleasure is a good which one knows or experiences positively or non-mediately, whereas the unseen (*adṛṣṭa*) cessation of what is harmful is a good experienced or known 'negatively', or through an intermediary, presumably of inference but possibly of verbal testimony or comparison also. That is, one 'feels' the absence of pain in the same way that one 'sees' the absence of an object, through a complex cognition involving inference.

same causes, the body and so forth, and while both cannot simultaneously occur, both are simultaneously eliminated by eliminating their causes. Pain, then, cannot be divorced from pleasure, since the same causal conditions underlie both. Udayana notes that Vācaspati's rectification of what Uddyotakara means by pleasure's being the necessary concomitant of pain is also consistent with his subsequent claim that this necessary concomitance is one of invariable relation.[81] Udayana expands on the three causes of pain mentioned in passing by Vācaspati, and constructs a long *reductio* of desire as a cause of pleasure.[82]

After commenting extensively on Vācaspati's florid description of how one attains liberation through Nyāya, Udayana takes up at length two objections to the Nyāya conception of liberation. While he subsequently dismisses both as being so weak that Vācaspati did not deign to deal with them, his treatment of them speaks to the nature of liberation in Nyāya.

The first, or Mīmāṃsā objection,[83] is that the cessation of pain is not intrinsically a human end[84] but only a limiting or adjunctive condition for such an end. Since pleasure occurs only when there is no pain, the absence of pain is sought by men only as another cause of pleasure, but not in itself. Udayana presents an ingenious refutation: the argument can work the other way around. That is, sometimes even in the absence of pleasure the cessation of pain is sought. Therefore, even if there is pleasure upon the cessation of pain, and the cessation of pain is necessary when there is pleasure, nevertheless, both are independent human ends because they have different domains.[85]

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[81]NV 154.18 [NS 1.1.2]. Uddyotakara here provides three alternative grounds for this invariable concomitance, which he clearly does not intend to qualify as one of causality: the two have the same causes, or the same substrates, or are apprehensible by the same thing. Udayana here shows that none of these grounds even establishes invariable concomitance (NVTP 88.11-15): his argument is framed as the motivation for Vācaspati's figurative interpretation.

[82]NVTP 88.16-89.14.

[83]See ŚṬ 15.21-33.

[84] *puruṣārtha*. Udayana seems to play on this word.

[85]The argument is here considerably abbreviated. Udayana is claiming that pleasure is not equivalent to the absence of pain or *vice versa*, rather they are distinct though necessarily related.

The second objection, or 'coma' argument, ascribed to Maṇḍana,[86] is: the cessation of pain is actually a human end, but only as a thing one consciously experiences. Prudent men do not consume poison or the like to achieve a stupor-like absence of pain. Therefore, because the cessation of pain intended by Nyāya is not consciously experienced in liberation, it is not a human end.

Udayana answers this in three ways. First, some people do commit suicide simply to be rid of pain. Hence the cessation of pain with no further qualification is a human end. That prudent men do not act upon a given human end does not mitigate against its being a human end. Thus while prudent men do not commit adultery, the consummation of sexual desire is no less a human end; it is from the *śāstras* that one determines when to desist from acting towards such ends. Secondly, no one ever acts in order consciously to experience the absence of pain but rather to be quit of pain. Thirdly though in the same vein, absurdities result if by the cessation of pain what is intended is the absence of pain only as consciously experienced.[87]

Vācaspati, he asserts, dismisses both views as weak and instead considers a third, more telling objection: does not the cessation of pain necessitate the cessation of all pleasure as well? Udayana quotes in support of this view a verse, which urges that, among other things, a man of understanding should not undertake things in which the outcome and effort to achieve it cancel one another. Udayana adds some interesting asides to Vācaspati's explanation of how the distinction between men of passion and dispassion formulated in the *Vārttika* serves to answer the objection. Thus he mentions that, whereas in the example of food tainted with poison there is little good to be derived

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[86]ŚṬ 16.1.

[87]Udayana sets forth a dilemma here: would such a cessation of pain only as consciously experienced consist of the actual existence of the cessation of pain or a limitation? On the first, a wicked man would delight: by Yogic concentration he would experience the cessation of pain only in his last rebirth and then only briefly. On the second, the cessation of pain would not be a human end, because the cessation of pain from incidental hindrances is constantly experienced. Or, if it were an end, then one would never move on to another object. Consequently, the cessation of pain due to incidental hindrances, even though it is not consciously experienced constantly, and that found in the *śāstras* prompt men to act as human ends.

but much pain, in liberation this is not the case. He does not, however, elaborate either in what this good (*artha*) consists or on what his claim is based.[88] In a related vein, he subsequently notes that a readily accessible path devoid of darkness is taught for one who dreads the pitch darkness of another round of rebirth, despite the fireflies of pleasure.[89]

Udayana considers a final objection tacitly addressed by Vācaspati: it is clearly circular to hold that dispassion arises from true-knowledge though the *śāstra* and that one acts upon the *śāstra* out of dispassion. The answer implicit in Vācaspati's reply is that by dispassion is not meant the absence of passion but rather an aversion to enjoyment out of dread of pain.[90]

3) Uddyotakara presents an objection based on Pakṣilasvāmin's claim that the relationship between 'means of knowledge etc.' and 'true-nature' indicated by the sixth case in the first *sūtra* is one of 'remainder'.[91] There is a defect whether the 'true-nature' is the same or different from the means of knowledge etc. If the true-nature is distinct from the means of knowledge etc., one would not attain *niḥśreyasa* from the true-knowledge of the means of knowledge etc., because one would understand the 'means of knowledge etc.' as qualifying 'true-nature', as in the action of bringing the king's man.[92] If they are the same, then no purpose is served in mentioning the 'true-nature'. Uddyotakara cites the views of some *ekadeśins* on both horns of the dilemma and appears to accept their answer to the first.[93]

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[88]Presumably the *arthavāda* passages in scripture are intended.

[89]He accordingly considers an objection that the *śāstra* then is only intended for the limited audience of the discriminating who dread rebirth and is not, as Uddyotakara's opening verse asserts, for the tranquility of the world. The answer he gives is that the good taught by the *śāstra* is the end for all and does not cease to be such because anyone fails to act upon it. Cf. NVTP 73.8-9.

[90]NVTP 92.22-93.1.

[91]NB 2.5-6: see Pāṇini A 2.3.50 *ṣaṣṭhī śeṣe*. Uddyotakara defines remainder (*śeṣa*) as the absence of a desire to express a *kāraka*-relation, NV 12.4-25. Cf. *Mahābhāṣya* II.463.13 *evaṃ tarhi karmādīnāmavivakṣā śeṣaḥ*.

[92]*rājapuruṣānayakriyāvad*. That is: one does not bring the king, but the man who belongs to the king, i.e the minister.

4) Uddyotakara cites the view of some who say that the first *sūtra* does not mean to state that *niḥśreyasa* results from the true-knowledge of the means of knowledge etc.: since the knowledge of discussion etc. produce pride, delusion, etc., it has no relation with *niḥśreyasa*. Akṣapāda does not teach what is not connected; therefore it is inappropriate to say that *niḥśreyasa* results from the true-knowledge of the means of knowledge etc. His answer is purely *ad hominem*:

> You did not understand the meaning of the *sūtra* to have understood it thus. For who explains its meaning thus: that *niḥśreyasa* results from the knowledge of the categories of the means of knowledge etc.?[94]

He defers discussion of that by knowing which one attains *niḥśreyasa* until the second *sūtra*; Pakṣilasvāmin, however, says that it is by knowing the objects of knowledge that one attains *niḥśreyasa*.

He turns to the objection that the categories of discussion etc. cause pride, delusion, etc. This is untrue, he says, because a causal relation cannot be established between them. When the knowledge of discussion etc. are absent, some men have desire and the like, but when it is present those who know its true-nature do not have desire and the like.[95] Therefore, the knowledge of discussion etc. is not the cause of desire etc.

This objection, Vācaspati maintains, is advanced by someone who thinks that the teaching of the categories of discussion through grounds for defeat is an obstruction to *niḥśreyasa*, since they cause pride, delusion, etc. insofar as they are means to victory over ones opponent. He thus summarizes Uddyotakara's answer: the meaning of the first *sūtra* is not that the true-knowledge of all the categories contributes directly to *niḥśreyasa*, but rather the knowledge of the true-nature of the soul etc.; however,

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[93]The text is abrupt here (NV 13.2-10): there may be a lacuna. Neither Vācaspati nor Udayana deals with this passage.

[94]NV 21-20-22.

[95]To establish that one thing (a) is the cause (*hetu*) of another (b), the following concomitances must hold: wherever (a) is found, (b) is also found (*anvaya*); wherever (a) is not found, (b) is also not found. (*vyatireka*).

knowledge of the rest contributes indirectly. Furthermore, the categories of cavil etc. perform an intermediate operation of quieting egotism. Hence they are not an obstacle to *niḥśreyasa*, but are favorable to it. Uddyotakara, he notes, shows that the claim that discussion etc. cause pride, delusion, etc. is an invalid reason.[96]

Udayana notes that it is implicit in Vācaspati's discussion that the claim that the categories, starting with discussion, cause pride and the like is erroneous, since discussion does not do so: he gives a different ground why cavil and quibble, though possibly the cause of pride and the like, actually serve to counteract them.[97]

He then treats the argument against causality as a reply to the objection that, while the specific cause given, namely, that these categories are the means to defeating ones opponent, does not establish such causality, yet such causality might actually be established through positive and negative concomitance. Uddyotakara's analysis of these concomitances reveals as well that the reason alleged by the opponent is formally invalid.[98]

Independent Passages in the *Tātparyaṭīkā*

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| 1) | NVT 22.11 | the *śāstra* is the cause of *niḥśreyasa* (cf. NVT 39.26-27) |
| | NVTP 70.21-71.3 | |
| 2) | NVT 25.24-26.7 | the validity of the categories (cf. NV 6.8-9) |
| | NVTP 85.5-18 | |
| 3) | NVT 28.4-6 | seen and unseen activity |
| | NVTP 93.8-9 | |
| 4) | NVT 30.20-31.8 | Uddyotakara's interpretation of the first sentence in the *Bhāṣya* |
| 5) | NVT 31.25-32.3 | relation of two sets of four |
| 6) | NVT 44.8-18 | relevance of categories of being to *niḥśreyasa* (cf. NV 12.14-17) |
| | NVTP 122.16-20 | |

96NVT 68.14-21. The reason is invalid (*asiddha hetu*), literally 'unestablished', because the two concomitances are not established.

97NVTP 149.13-19.

98NVTP 149.20-23. The pride and the like seen in those subject to passion is actually caused by their strong false knowledge and not by the Nyāya categories of cavil and the like (NVTP 23-25).

7) NVT 44.25-45.2 more on categories of being
cf. NVTP 123.10-13
8) NVT 59.14-19 verbal testimony and the thesis of a syllogism
(cf. NB 4.10)
NVTP 139.10
9) 65.22-23 how *vāda* etc. contribute to *niḥśreyasa*
cf. NP 145.11-16

1) Vācaspati frames Uddyotakara's *maṅgala* verse as the answer to the following objection: if Akṣapāda composed the *śāstra* that causes *niḥśreyasa* and if Pakṣilasvāmin explained it, then what remained to justify undertaking the *Vārttika*? This verse, Vācaspati says, first restates the purpose of the *śāstra*, namely that it leads to the tranquility of the world, and then states the purpose of the *śāstra*, the dispelling of the misunderstandings of the *śāstra* by Dignāga etc.[99]

Although Udayana does not here treat of the phrase, 'cause of *niḥśreyasa*', he does speak of Akṣapāda's being the author of the *śāstra* that is the cause of the world's tranquility.

2) Vācaspati frames Uddyotakara's characterization of the distinctive property of the *Nyāyaśāstra* as the 're-examination of the true-nature of objects which are already known through perception' as the answer to the following dilemma: are the categories validly known or not?[100] If the Nyāya categories are not validly known, then since they are created by imagination, they could not contribute to *niḥśreyasa*, nor again would they be precisely sixteen in number, since the richness of imagination is unlimited. But if they have validity, then because one attains *niḥśreyasa* through them as ones means of knowledge, the *śāstra* serves no purpose. Vācaspati thinks that the first horn of the dilemma is refuted by the phrase, 'already known by direct perception or inference'.[101] Uddyotakara, he argues, answers the second horn, namely that the *śāstra*

[99] The discussion on the significance of 'tranquility' (*śama*) in the *Vārttika* passage is treated in Chapter 3, pp. 109ff.
[100] *prāmāṇika / aprāmāṇika* NVT 25.24.
[101] He thinks it significant that only direct perception and inference are stated; both verbal testimony and comparison are ultimately based on either of them, NVT 26.1-4.

serves no purpose if the categories have a valid basis, by relating the audience of the *śāstra*. That is: even though ordinary people regularly use the means of knowledge, since they do not have disciplined minds they cannot differentiate the categories, which, if undifferentiated, do not contribute to *niḥśreyasa*.[102] Aspiring Naiyāyikas, however, have such discipline but do not yet understand their true-nature.[103]

Udayana makes explicit the deeper implications of this dilemma. If the categories are imaginary, then *niḥśreyasa* is itself imaginary and cannot be attained through effort. Likewise, that the imagination is limitless and it is consequently improper to limit the categories to sixteen implies that they lack a nature altogether.[104] Udayana also imaginatively glosses the term 'lacking mental discipline': lacking the understanding which the special training, namely the *śāstra* or *Nyāyaśāstra*, will produce.[105] He supplements Vācaspati's statement, 'they do not differentiate them', with the phrase, 'because of a form they superimpose'.

3) Vācaspati takes up Uddyotakara's differentiation of the two kinds of activity in terms of their successfulness. Uddyotakara adds, he says, the successfulness of the activity of those who have desire, since the seen successfulness of activity is its cause; but not of those who have no desire. The relation between their activity and its result, namely the attainment of *niḥśreyasa*, is not seen, because *niḥśreyasa* is 'other-worldly' (*alaukika*).[106] He does not here address the more important issue of how the validity of Nyāya as the means of knowledge towards the attainment of *niḥśreyasa* can be confirmed by successful activity, which by definition cannot be apprehended in this

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[102]*vainayikabuddhivirahin* NVT 26.5-6.

[103]NVT 26.6-7; NV 6.9-10.

[104]Udayana goes on at some length concerning Uddyotakara's and Vācaspati's singling out of only two *pramāṇa*'s, NVTP 85.9-17.

[105]*vainayiketi viśiṣṭo nayaḥ śāstraṃ nyāyaśāstram* NVTP 85.17-18. (This gloss is untranslatably etymological: *vainayaka* < *vinaya* < *vi* + *nayaḥ* = *viśiṣṭo nyāyaḥ* = *śāstraṃ* = *nyāyaśāstram*). This seems to imply that one can gain the requisite discrimination simply by studying the *śāstra*, but Udayana is not making so serious a claim here.

[106]Udayana glosses this: it is 'otherworldly' because it is necessarily non-directly perceptible (*nityaparokṣatvāt)* for us ordinary people, NVTP 93.8-9.

world.[107]

4) Vācaspati sets out another motivation behind Uddyotakara's explanation of the first sentence in the *Bhāṣya*: that it reveals that both the means of knowledge and the activity based on it are successful. He first frames an objection: since activity, namely Yogic activity,[108] and not knowledge of the Nyāya categories or even the *Nyāyaśāstra* is the essential cause of *niḥśreyasa*, it is what should be pursued and not Nyāya, which is merely its means of knowledge.[109] To meet this objection, the first sentence in the *Bhāṣya* is useful: when there is apprehension of an object through a means of knowledge then the successfulness of the activity consists in its relation with the end, but not when there is no apprehension of the objection through the means of knowledge. Therefore, the means of knowledge, no less than the activity, is successful or purposeful. Thus the means of knowledge is as important as its resultant activity, since activity is not related with its result without a means of knowledge.[110] Since activity is also explained by explaining its means of knowledge, the *śāstra* explains the means of knowledge, namely inference, and not activity.[111]

5) Uddyotakara attempts to correlate the epistemological group of four with the soteriological group of four.[112] Vācaspati clarifies this correlation and argues that, al-

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[107]This is the fundamental problem raised by the first sentence in the *Bhāṣya*; how to extend the empirical confirmation argument to the transcendental. Substantially the same objection is raised in the *Vārttika* to NS 1.1.2 (NV 151.20-152.20), that the uninterruptedness of the Nyāya tradition itself is evidence that speaks against anyone ever having attained *niḥśreyasa* as a result of learning Nyāya.

[108]More particularly he states that one does not attain *niḥśreyasa* by knowing the true-nature of the objects of knowledge (whose means of knowledge is inference or nyāya), but rather by producing no new merit and demerit (through the activities of meditation on the objects of knowledge known as pain and on the nature of the soul) and by using up any old merit and demerit: see further NVT 27.8-16 (quoted below). See also NV 6.19-20.

[109]NVT 30.21-31.5. Vācaspati here equates Nyāya with inference (*anumāna*) as the means of knowledge par excellence.

[110]Cf. NB 1.1-2.

[111]Vācaspati here apparently tries to explain the absence of any mention of Yogic activities early on in the *Nyāyasūtras*. He concludes, in consonance with his introductory remarks, that it is the 'highest Nyāya', or inference, that is the focus of the *Nyāyaśāstra* (NVT 31.8): see ŚṬ 23.21-23, "Even though the word *pramāṇataḥ* in *pramāṇato 'rthapratipattau* [NB 1.1] refers to *pramāṇa* in general, it must be understood to refer to inference alone," and NB 4.11-12.

though the knowledge of the true-nature of both groups of four is the cause of the attainment of *niḥśreyasa*, the means of knowledge alone is pre-eminent, because the others are established through that as their basis.[113]

6) Pakṣilasvāmin holds both that the *pramāṇas* make known being and non-being and that in the first *Nyāyasūtra* types of being are set forth.[114] Uddyotakara addresses the question why the types of non-being are not also stated and sets forth two alternative, explanations: 1) non-being does not appear independently; 2) non-being is included in the epistemological group of four and should be understood to be taught simply by teaching being.[115]

Vācaspati provides a straightforward explanation for the first: because their explanation depends upon a thing to be denied, a denial, and a locus, the appearance of the types of non-being are dependent upon the types of being.[116] His explanation of the second argument is more involved and complicated by a textual problem.[117] He takes Uddyotakara's non-inclusion of the types of non-being to reflect the following line of

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[112]NV 8.4-6. In NB 1.8-12 the 'true-nature' (*tattva*) is said to be exhausted by the epistemological group: in NB 2.10 it is said that one attains *niḥśreyasa* through the correct knowledge of the soteriological group. For a partial correlation between the two sets by Pakṣilasvāmin, see NB 1037.8-10 (TNT) [NS 4.2.1]. The epistemological group is *pramāṇa-prameya-pramātṛ-pramiti* (means of knowledge, object of knowledge, agent of knowledge, and the resultant knowledge), the soteriological group is *heya-hāna-upāya-adhigantavya* (what is to be eliminated, its elimination, the means, and what has to be attained).

[113]NVT 31.25-32.1. His argument is based largely on an etymological analysis: the affix *matUP* in *artha<u>vat</u> pramāṇam* (NB 1.1) indicates pre-eminence. See *Mahābhāṣya* to A.5.2.94 *tadasyāstyasminniti matup*:

> *bhūmanindāpraśaṃsāsu nityayoge 'tiśayāne* |
> *saṃsarge 'stivivakṣāyām bhavanti matubādayaḥ* || (II.393.15-16).

[114]NB 1.19-20.

[115]NV 12.14-17.

[116]*niṣedhya*, *niṣedha*, and *adhikaraṇa* respectively, NVT 44.10-11. That is, in order to describe what is not, one denies that a thing is in a given place.

[117]'Because they are included in the group of four' (*caturvargāntarbhāvāt*) is the reading adopted by Thakur in the *Vārttika* (NV 12.15): several manuscripts of the *Vārttika* and Vācaspati (NVT 44.13, cf NVTP 122.16-17) have 'because they are not included in the group of four' (*caturvargānantarbhāvāt*). The first reading makes better sense in the *Vārttika*: if both being and non-being are included in the group of four, then one can by extension teach non-being by teaching being. Vācaspati and Udayana have to deal with the latter reading and their discussions border on the acrobatic at times. Another complication arises from a failure of any of these three commentators to indicate which group of four is at issue: the epistemological group is the likely candidate.

reasoning: only those things are stated, the true-knowledge of which conduces to *niḥśreyasa*. But those things the true-knowledge of which does not so conduce need not be stated, for that would be like treating what is not conducive. Just as there is no inclusion of existing things that do not contribute to *niḥśreyasa*, so also is there no inclusion of non-being. Vācaspati takes Uddyotakara's next statement, that non-being is taught by teaching being, to answer the objection how one is then to understand 'absence of contributing to *niḥśreyasa*'.[118]

Udayana relates that Vācaspati's introduction of the 'conducing to *niḥśreyasa*' proviso into Uddyotakara's second argument forestalls an objection that the logical reason Uddyotakara provides, 'because they are not included in the group of four', is invalid.[119] Consequently, what is meant is that that non-being which does contribute to *niḥśreyasa* must be understood to be stated, because it, no less than all the kinds of being which do contribute, is included in the group of four.[120]

7) Vācaspati takes up the purport of Uddyotakara's explanation of Pakṣilasvāmin's statement that in the first *Nyāyasūtra* categories of being are related, "the *sūtra* says that these are types of being". The point is: these categories of the means of knowledge and so forth, which are types of being, contribute to *niḥśreyasa*, but sand from the

[118]The force of this objection appears to be that if only things that conduce or contribute to *niḥśreyasa* are taught, then how could one understand what does not contribute? Vācaspati proceeds to say that the means of knowledge are both positive (*bhāva*) and negative (*abhāva*); the latter is exemplified in the second *sūtra*, where the knowledge of the absence of the effect is produced by absence of the effect. (NVT 44.16-17). Moreover, among the *prameyas*, *apavarga* is anointed sovereign (NVT 44.17). Udayana notes that *apavarga* is itself the absence of pain, and various other of the Nyāya categories are in fact types of non-being (NVTP 123.4-7).

[119]*caturvargānantarbhāvāditi hetur bhāgāsiddho viruddhaśca* (NVTP 122.16-17). Śrīkaṇṭha's lengthy comment may be paraphrased thus (ŚṬ 35.2-9): the *hetu* is non-uniform because it does not apply to all types of non-being; for liberation is non-being, yet it is included in the epistemological group. The reason is also contradictory, because there is no inclusion of <such types of being as> sand from the Ganges etc., which are not stated, in the group of four.

[120]NVTP 122.17-20. Udayana lengthy treatment that ensues (NVTP 122.20-123.12) does not bear directly on *niḥśreyasa*. Śrīkaṇṭha presents the inference as follows (ŚṬ 35.11-17): the thesis is that the types of non-being are not stated. (But only those types of non-being are intended which do not contribute to *niḥśreyasa*.) <The *hetu* is:> because they are not included in the group of four. <The *dṛṣṭānta* is:> all those things that do not contribute are treated such, and <the *upanaya* is> sand from the Ganges etc. is such. <The *nigamana* is> Therefore, non-contributory non-being is not stated.

Gaṅges etc. does not. Therefore, among things that are, only the sixteen, the means of knowledge and so forth, are listed, defined, and examined.[121] Sand from the Gaṅges etc., though they exist, are not so treated because they do not contribute to *niḥśreyasa.*[122]

8) Pakṣilasvāmin correlates verbal testimony with the thesis in inference. Uddyotakara appears to take this correlation to hold only in a figurative way.[123] Vācaspati here states the purpose of this figurative usage. Nyāya is assisted by verbal testimony, because of its correspondence with its referent and accordingly takes on a purpose, since the knowledge of the referent of verbal testimony is normally understood as causing *niḥśreyasa*. Therefore, even if the thesis which occurs only in *nyāya* is not verbal testimony, nevertheless this equation should be understood to apply to *nyāya*, which is at issue.[124] It should also be understood that the charge that the thesis is imaginary is refuted by virtue of its being connected with the object through verbal testimony. For some say that common notions of inference and what is inferred are due to the relation of object and attribute, which is mental and does not depend upon external things, whether real or unreal.

Udayana closely glosses Vācaspati and notes that he is forced to explain the purpose of such figurative use because it is extra-ordinary.[125] One of these glosses is revealing: 'because the knowledge of the referent of verbal testimony is normally accepted' means 'because it is well known as causing *niḥśreyasa*'.

9) This is an explanation of Uddyotakara's justification for the separate mention of cavil and captiousness, "because the purpose is to make known the different bases of the branches of sciences".[126] Vācaspati's explanation is novel: discussion, cavil, and

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[121]Cf. NB 181.20-24 [NS 1.1.3].

[122]Udayana merely observes that the claim that the sixteen Nyāya categories are kinds of being is part of the *Bhāṣya* and not the *sūtra* proper, NVTP 123.12.

[123]NB 4.10, NV 17.5-8. *Āgama* here, as elsewhere, oscillates between 'scripture' and 'verbal testimony'.

[124]See Śrikaṇṭha, ŚṬ 54.1-2.

[125]NVTP 139.8-14; see Śrikaṇṭha, ŚṬ 53.26-54.6.

captiousness are branches of science because they contribute to *niḥśreyasa* indirectly.[127]

Independent Passages in the *Pariśuddhi*

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|---|---|
| 1) NVTP 83.12-19 | the *śāstra* proceeds according to needs of students |
| 2) NVTP 89.22-90.2 cf. NVT 27.8-17 | relation of categories of doubt etc. toward *niḥśreyasa* |
| 3) NVTP 103.3 -21 | how the epistemological and soteriological group of four relate to *niḥśreyasa* |
| 4) NVTP 146.7-10 | relation of *chala* etc. toward *niḥśreyasa* cf. NVT 66.21-67.1 |
| 5) NVTP 146.13-21 | that *niḥśreyasa* is based on *ānvīkṣikī* |

1) This passage, which is formally a frame for NV 6.3 (see NVT 25.3) contains a clear enunciation of Udayana's conception of the structure of the *śāstra*. The *śāstra*, he asserts, proceeds by providing answers to the successive questions or needs of students. Thus the first *sūtra* serves to answer the initial question of students, namely from what source *niḥśreyasa* is attained; the second *sūtra* then answers the question of how *niḥśreyasa* is so attained. In the balance of the *śāstra*, the categories are duly listed, characterized, and examined to answer the resultant questions of what the categories are, how many there are, what is their nature, and how these matters are ascertained.

2) Vācaspati's florid explanation of how Nyāya operates (NVT 27.8-17) is treated in some detail by Udayana (NVTP 89.22-90.2). The expression 'doubt etc.' includes all fourteen <categories, doubt...grounds for defeat> as the 'retinue' of Nyāya. The word 'highest Nyāya' establishes the four *pramāṇas* in the relation of 'roots and tree.'[128] Nyāya, which is, as it were, a path, is the 'Nyāya-path' (*nyāyamārga*), because

[126]NV 14.5-6: cf. NB 5.9. Vācaspati here quotes the *Vārttika* out of order. This is a close gloss of NB 2.15.

[127]He analyzes the compound *vidyāprasthānaprabhedajñāpanārtha* thus: *prasthāna* = *vyāpāra*, *tasya bhedaḥ*, *tajjñāpanārthatvāt*, NVT 65.23. Both Pakṣilasvāmin and Uddyotakara take *vidyā* to refer to the four *vidyās*: the categories of *saṃśaya* etc. serve to differentiate *ānvīkṣikī* (= *nyāya*) from the other three. Vācaspati, however, takes the categories of *vāda*, *jalpa*, and *vitaṇḍā* themselves to be separate branches of science: they are elsewhere said to constitute the three types of discourse (*kathā* NVTP 146.9-10), but not separate categories.

it is the cause of ones reaching the realm of *niḥśreyasa*. The *prameyas* are twelve-fold. Hence, the scope and utility of the *śāstra* is shown. The word 'meditation on the true-nature' means 'practice'. Therefore, in the manner previously described the seeker of liberation acts upon the *śāstra*. Knowledge of the retinue results from this. Next arises the purification of the Nyāya-path. Then the accomplishment of the twelve-fold *prameyas* arises through this. Next practice and then meditation arise. Next arises total liberation from attachment to faults. Then non-activity arises. Then no accumulation of future merit and demerit occurs. Thus, there is prevention of all future merit and demerit.[129]

3) To frame a statement by Vācaspati, Udayana sets forth a dilemma concerning the relation between the epistemological and soteriological groups of four: it is impossible for the two groups to apply either alternatively or conjointly to the attainment of *niḥśreyasa* since they are identical. Vācaspati's answer or statement, that the two groups are differentiated because they express different things, is then clarified. While the two groups are in one sense the same, since they have the same constituents, they reflect distinct modalities under which their shared constituents have to be known. To take one example from Udayana: just as liberation (*apavarga*) has to be known as an object of knowledge, so too does it have to be known as what has to be attained.[130] In other words, the soteriological and epistemological groupings are complementary.

4) Pakṣilasvāmin stated that the categories of deceit and so forth are explicitly stated in the *sūtras* in order that one learn how to avoid their use or detect their usage

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128 See NB 4.11-12. The reading of the *Pariśuddhi*, *mūlamūlībhāvī* (NVTP 89.23-90.1), is hard to construe. Śrīkaṇṭha reads *mūlamūlibhāvī* and provides a gloss: *tatra pratyakṣādīni mūlāni* | *anumāna mūli* | *anumānārthatvāt pratyakṣādiparikarasya* (ŚṬ 15.9-13): 'Among the *pramāṇas*, perception etc. <comparision and verbal testimony> are the roots, inference the tree, because the retinue of perception etc. are for the sake of inference.'

129 In NVTP 89.9-18, Udayana takes up Vācaspati's explanation of how one uses Yogic meditation to annihilate such merit and demerit as have already come into being (NVT 27.10-16). In NVTP 90.19-92.22, he discusses how the (absolute) absence of pain (= liberation) is in fact a legitimate human end.

130 The grounds or reason for this argument, and all the others *mutatis mutandis*, is that otherwise one would resort to a different thing to be attained.

by an opponent.[131] Uddyotakara and Vācaspati only gloss this assertion, but do not provide an account of how they contribute to Nyāya specifically or to *niḥśreyasa* in general. Udayana makes good this oversight: the knowledge of theses categories contributes to *niḥśreyasa* by purifying the accessories to the types of philosophical discourse, which are the means to true-knowledge.[132]

5) Udayana explains how Vācaspati's interpretation of Pakṣilavāmin's intention in quoting the *śloka* on *ānvīkṣikī* can be reconciled with the meaning Akṣapāda intended in the first *sūtra*. The meaning of the *Bhāṣya* thus is: because every purpose of prudent men is based on *pramāṇas*, which have to be explained by *ānvīkṣikī*, *niḥśreyasa*, the highest human good or purpose, is *ex hypothesi* also based on *ānvīkṣikī*. Otherwise it does not qualify as a human end if it is not caused by *ānvīkṣikī*.[133]

B. Summary

As noted in the beginning of this chapter, three sets of questions concerning liberation and Nyāya are addressed by the commentators. Briefly stated, they are: 1) whether liberation exists at all, or whether proof for its existence can be provided. 2) Is Nyāya liberation purely a negative notion, merely the total absence of pain or suffering, and why would it therefore be sought as the highest human end? 3) Finally, how is Nyāya soteriological science at all, and even more the best soteriological science? In

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[131]NB 5.10-13; see NV 20.18-26 and NVT 66 21-67.5 for glosses.

[132]NVTP 146.7-12 He uses similar purification language of the Nyāya categories in NVTP 90.4; see also NVTP 126.16-17: "And this (*nyāya*) is explained only through explaining its elements (*aṅga*) and accessories (*upāṅga*), doubt etc." Slaje refers to these categories as 'banal': "Konsequenterweise müsste dann auch die richtige Erkenntnis von — soteriologisch betrachtet — banalen Kategorien wie etwa "Wortverdrehung" (chalam) Ursache für eine endgültige Erlösung von Leid sein.," p. 165-166. That they are only indirectly contributory to *niḥśreyasa* he takes as contradicting the literal sense of the first *sūtra*.

[133]Udayana does not flesh out the precise application of this argument to the first *sūtra*. It seems to run roughly as follows: since every human purpose is based directly on means of knowledge and indirectly on *ānvīkṣikī*, and Akṣapāda teaches that the means of knowledge (and the other categories), which are based on *ānvīkṣikī* (this claim is based on Pakṣilasvāmin's quotation), cause *niḥśreyasa*, *niḥśreyasa* is necessarily a human purpose.

what follows, the various responses set forth by the commentators to these questions are combined as three coherent sets of answers. This method is perhaps historically objectionable, but throws into relief their overarching concerns.

Nyāya, Vācaspati argues, provides inferences that cooperate with scripture to establish the existence of liberation.[134] Such inferences are predicated on cause and effect relations. Thus, one can infer that the absolute absence of pain as effect is produced from the absolute absence of its causes. Strictly speaking this answer does not establish the existence of liberation, but only that, if liberation were to exist, it would be produced by absolutely eliminating all its causes. Scripture thus plays a pivotal role, since it directly attests to the existence of liberation.[135] As will be explored shortly, since Nyāya independently establishes the validity of scripture, there is no circularity in its utilizing scripture as a means of knowledge for liberation. In addition, such scripture argues against such notions being merely imaginary. While liberation is otherworldly, it is known through these two worldly means, inference and scripture, alone, whose validity, in turn, is established through successful activity.

The commentators are nearly unanimously silent on the nature of Nyāya liberation, apparently content with the bare assertion that it is the absolute absence of pain.[136] Far from being a positive good towards which one might strive, Udayana argues that it need not even be sought as something one could consciously experience. The cessation of pain is in itself a human end, since there are indisputable cases in which people avoid pain without any clear desire to attain pleasure. Pleasure, in fact, is not merely the absence of pain. Since, however, pleasure and pain are inseparable, there

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[134]NVT 46.15.

[135]Pakṣilasvāmin claims that the thesis (*pratijñā*) of inference is verbal testimony/scripture (*āgama*), NB 34.10. His successors take this equation figuratively. In a similar vein, he asserts that any inference which contradicts scripture is pseudo-reasoning, NB 3.8.

[136]Udayana in one passage mentions in passing that in liberation there is more good than harm, NVTP 92.9-10. There are scarcely any positive or rhetorically charged statements on the desirability of liberation in the NCG to NS 1.1.1. The commentators appear to view such as a mere sop for those unworthy seriously to study Nyāya.

can be no pleasure which does not involve pain. Thus, one cannot by definition ever seek pleasure without experiencing pain. All seekers of Nyāya liberation accordingly never act positively to obtain the pleasurable, but act or cease to act only to avoid the painful. Udayana provides an additional argument here: since all human ends are determined by the means of knowledge, which Nyāya or *ānvīkṣikī* uniquely validates, liberation too is a human end, since it would otherwise lack, as it does not, means of knowledge so validated. Finally, Nyāya also provides indirect confirmation of liberation's being the highest human good by reductive reasoning (*tarka*). That is, of all the theoretical candidates for human good, only the absolute absence of pain withstands the reductive method. Nyāya thus authorizes that one investigate through valid means of knowledge this absolute absence of pain as the highest human good, but does not establish it: this is properly the function of both inference and scripture.

The response to the third group of questions is somewhat complex. Pakṣilasvāmin introduces four cardinal entities as soteriological presuppositions of Nyāya.[137] Viewed from this larger context, Nyāya can dispense with arguments concerning its status as soteriological science: that liberation is to be attained through knowledge of the soul is accepted by all. The *Nyāyasūtras*, however, provide corroboration for these presuppositions. In the first *Nyāyasūtra*, it is clearly stated that the highest good is achieved from true-knowledge of the Nyāya categories. Since the specific category of object of knowledge, set out in NS 1.1.9, is patently soteriological and is the fundamental category in Nyāya, the claim that Nyāya is soteriological is unexceptionable.[138] A second but complementary argument, articulated by Uddyotakara,[139] is that Nyāya or *ānvīkṣikī* is the fourth of the traditional sciences and has both a unique end and subject matter, liberation and the Nyāya categories respectively. To deny Nyāya its rightful

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[137]NB 2.10-12.

[138]According to Pakṣilasvāmin, the second Nyāyasūtra reveals that it is the knowledge of the true-nature of the objects of knowledge, soul and the like, which produces liberation, NB 2.9-10.

[139]NV 14.10-11. See also Chapter 3, pp. 89 ff.

place in the orthodox tradition would destroy the very structure of that tradition.

The arguments for Nyāya as the best means towards liberation flow from these claims. While liberation may directly result from activity, that activity can only be based on the valid knowledge of the soul and the like which Nyāya uniquely provides. According to Vācaspati, such activity is explained by Nyāya and not *vice versa*. It is not possible to attain such knowledge through a cursory acquaintance with or application of the Nyāya categories: one must master them.[140] One directly attains living-liberation through truly knowing them. Yogic means are subsequently employed to realize, by eliminating past, present or future demerit, final or unconditional liberation.[141]

Nyāya is the cause of liberation because it teaches liberation as the highest human end and the means to attain it. Other soteriological sciences may or even must concur with Nyāya, but they and all other sciences are strictly derivative of Nyāya. This primacy of Nyāya implicitly, at any rate, makes concern over its specific categories or implementation moot. All its categories, even the seemingly lowly category of quibble, are integral to its proper functioning. That is not to say that they are all equally important ultimately speaking, but only that none is dispensable. In fact, only what is soteriologically relevant is articulated in the Nyāya categories: there are, to be sure, other possible categories, but they are not the stuff of soteriology.

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[140]NVT 26.5ff.
[141]NV 13.14ff.

## C. A Critique of Slaje[142]

Slaje's argument may be outlined as follows:

1) *niḥśreyasa* is used, without further elaboration, only in NS 1.1.1. The Nyāya technical term for liberation is *apavarga*, which occurs some eight times.[143]

2) Pakṣilasvāmin's attempt to harmonize the first two *Nyāyasūtras* is historically unjustified. In the first *sūtra*, *niḥśreyasa* is said to be gained from knowledge of the true nature of the sixteen Nyāya categories. The second *sūtra* relates that *apavarga* results from the successive elimination of false knowledge etc.[144] Pakṣilasvāmin treats the second as a (corrective) restatement of the first (NB 2.9-11, 150.1-2); liberation is not achieved directly upon learning the true-nature of the Nyāya categories, but rather through the gradual process of eliminating false knowledge etc. These *sūtras* in reality are irreconcilable:

a) There is a terminological inconsistency between them.

b) There is a clear opposition between the positive, intellectual attainment of *niḥśreyasa* and the purely negative character of *apavarga*.

c) The first *sūtra* states that the true knowledge of the sixteen Nyāya categories leads to the attainment of *niḥśreyasa*. Uddyotakara notes that all these categories must be known since they are on equal footing as members of a *dvandva* compound (NV 12.20-22). Pakṣilasvāmin's contention that the knowledge of the *prameyas* is in fact the source of liberation (NB 2.9-10, 5.18) is thus inconsistent with the first *sūtra*: moreover, he holds that the second *sūtra* restates this contention.

d) Uddyotakara and Vācaspati are beset with difficulties in following Pakṣilasvāmin's interpretation:

i) Uddyotakara (and, with elaborations, Vācaspati) introduces a distinction be-

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[142]Since many of the passages dealt with in this section have been examined in section A, some repetition is unavoidable.

[143]NS 1.1.2, NS 1.1.9, NS 1.1.22, NS 4.1.59, NS 4.1.63, NS 4.2.43, NS 4.2.45: 4.2.46 (*tad* = *apavarga*).

[144]*duḥkha-janma-pravṛtti-doṣa-mithyājñānānām uttarottarāpāye tadanantarābhāvādargaḥ* NS 1.1.2. Other editions have *tadanantarāpāyād* for *tadantarābhāvād* (e.g., Tailanga, TNT).

tween two types of *niḥśreyasa* to reconcile the two *sūtras*; the lower form, equivalent to *jīvanmukti* 'living liberation', is gained through knowledge of the Nyāya categories, while the higher, *apavarga*, results from the knowledge of the *prameyas* (NV 13.14-21, 152.6-9; NVT 155.10-156.18).

ii) Vācaspati relegates the knowledge of the true-nature of the Nyāya categories listed in NS 1.1.1 to the status of accessory causes to the attainment of liberation (NVT 26.17, 44.26-45.2).

e) While the elimination of false knowledge (*mithyājñana*) mentioned in NS 1.1.2 requires a countervailing correct knowledge (*tattvajñāna*), the sixteen Nyāya categories are not said to be the objects of that knowledge (see NS 4.2.35 and 4.2.1).

3) In *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 1.1.2, two types of happiness are contrasted: 'felicity' (*abhyudaya*) and liberation (*niḥśreyasa*).[145] E. Frauwallner has shown that Praśastapāda interpolated the first four *Vaiśeṣikasūtras*. Since Praśastapāda would have known the *Nyāyasūtras* and Pakṣilasvāmin's *Bhāṣya*, the use of *niḥśreyasa* as liberation in VS.1.1.2 reflects Pakṣilasvāmin's interpretation and not Vaiśeṣika doctrine.[146]

4) There is one passage in the *Vārttika* to suggest that the original meaning of *niḥśreyasa* was *svarga*, 'heaven' (NV 6.4-5). Vācaspati's commentary on this passage may contain traces of an authentic contrast between NS 1.1.1 and NS 1.1.2: that *niḥśreyasa* is a positive good, while *apavarga* is the absolute absence of pain (NVT 26.20-24).

Several preliminary remarks are in order. Slaje focuses narrowly on the word *niḥśreyasa* in Nyāya, nowhere discussing its etymological meaning and largely ignoring its use in other sources.[147] The good, which is attained through knowledge, would more likely apply to liberation than to heaven in light of the commonplace idea of lib-

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[145] *yato 'bhyudayaniḥśreyasasiddhiḥ sa dharmaḥ* VS.1.1.1: *Candrānandavṛtti*: *abhyudayo brahmādilokeṣv iṣṭaśarīraprāptir anarthoparamaś ca | niḥśreyasam adhyātmano vaiśeṣikaguṇābhāva-rūpo mokṣaḥ* (pp. 1-2, Jambuvijayaji ed.).

[146] Slaje convolutedly argues that the two types of happiness in the 'Praśastapāda'-*sūtra* actually reflect a similar opposition in Nyāya, despite the obvious terminological differences, pp. 169-170.

erating knowledge. Sacrificial acts more normally conduce to the attainment of heaven.[148] Secondly, it is incredible that he charges Pakṣilasvāmin with misunderstanding or misrepresenting the meaning of *niḥśreyasa* in NS 1.1.1 or the relation between the first two *sūtras*. By his own account, the first *Nyāyasūtra* is a summary of the whole Nyāya system (NB 2.8): that he was so fundamentally misguided hardly inspires confidence in his fitness as an interpreter of Nyāya. Conversely, the claim that Uddyotakara and Vācaspati are more reliable historical guides in this matter is at best counterintuitive. Slaje's overly literal interpretation of the first *sūtra* is, in fact, derisively rejected by Uddyotakara:

> You did not understand the meaning of the *sūtra* to have understood it thus. For who explains its meaning thus: that *niḥśreyasa* results from the knowledge of the categories of the means of knowledge etc.?[149]

Finally, there is nothing in the *Nyāyasūtras* to warrant the equation of *niḥśreyasa* with *svarga* or any other term for heaven; the word *svarga*, in fact, does not occur in the *Nyāyasūtras*.

1) The unique occurrence of *niḥśreyasa* is perhaps puzzling, but not of itself grounds for denying its interchangeability with *apavarga*.[150] In NS 4.2.48, however, *śreyas* is used in the sense of liberation. In order to attain liberation,

> One should go on to hold discussions with the disciple, the preceptor, the fellow-student and other such particular persons as are desir-

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[147]See footnote 14 *supra*. He nowhere translates the word, and provides only one gloss: "einer positive Größe," p. 165. He does not directly address NB 5.17-19 (see, further, NV 21.8-17), where Pakṣilasvāmin relates that the word *niḥśreyasa* is in itself ambiguous, since it can apply to the 'good' of any science. But in soteriological science (Nyāya par excellence), it is liberation. Similarly, the 'knowledge of the true-nature' (*tattvajñāna*) needs to be identified by the science to which it belongs.

[148]How one would attain heaven by knowing, e.g., pseudo-reasons, is no less problematic than attaining liberation thereby.

[149]NV 21-20-22.

[150]Slaje dismisses outright the possibility of stylistic variation: "Stilistiches Gründe müssen wohl ausscheiden..." (p.165).

ous of acquiring the final good [*śreyas*] (i.e. liberation) — who are all without malice (i.e. hold critical discussions not for victory, but for the ascertainment of truth only.)[151]

2) Slaje has properly noted that the relation between the first two *sūtras* deserves close study, but is rash to declare them irreconcilable.[152] Far from glossing over any inconsistencies, Pakṣilasvāmin devotes considerable space to the interpretation of and relation between these two *sūtras*. Moreover, NS 4.2.45-48 provide justification for his interpretation of these *sūtras*.

> But in the state of liberation there is no such (body). (As such no knowledge can be produced when liberation is attained.)
>
> For the attainment of liberation, one has to purify the self with the help of *yama* and *niyama* as well as regulations concerned with the self and the (other prescribed) means (which are to be learned from) Yogaśāstra.
>
> (For the attainment of liberation), one should take up (*grahaṇa*) and repeatedly reflect upon (*abhyāsa*) the Śāstra (*jñāna*, lit. the means by which right knowledge is acquired), and moreover, should hold discussions with persons who have a thorough knowledge of the Śāstra.[153]

These *sūtras* plainly reveal a Yogic element[154] in addition to a ratiocinative element (*jñāna*[155]) and a dialogic element (*saṃvāda*) in the attainment of liberation; one does

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[151]Gangopadhyaya's translation, p. 372. *taṃ <saṃvādaṃ> śiṣyagurusabrahmacāriviśiṣṭaśreyo 'rthibhir anusūyibhir abhyupeyāt* NS 4.2.38. Vācaspati glosses *śreyo 'rthinas* by *śreyasi mokṣalakṣaṇe śrāddhāḥ*, TNT 1097.24. *tad* <sc. *apavarga*> *artham* is to be supplied from NS 4.2.36. Both Pakṣilasvāmin and Uddyotakara think this *sūtra* too obvious to merit comment. The gloss in the *Ṭīkā* on *viśiṣṭa* is corrupt: see the note *ad loc.* (4) in TNT 1097. Ruben translates *viśiṣṭaśreyo 'rthibhis* as "Ausgezeichneten und Heilsuchenden," p. 127, and takes *śreyas* to mean *niḥśreyasa*, p. 254 (Glossar). See also Viśvanātha's *Vṛtti*: *viśiṣṭaḥ prakṛṣṭajñānavān, śreyo 'rthī mumukṣuḥ*, TNT 1098.24.

[152]"In gewissem Sinne sind die beiden Sūtren sogar unvereinbar, wie oben anhand der wenig überzeugenden Glättungsversuche Uddyotakaras und Vācaspatis gezeigt wurde.", p. 168. He thinks that in NS 1.1.2 a completely new conception, of *apavarga*, is set forth.

[153]Gangopadhyaya's translation, pp. 370-372; his translation of NS 4.2.38 was given above, p. 46.
*tadabhāvaścāpavarge* NS 4.2.45
*tadarthaṃ yamaniyamābhyāsātmasaṃskāro yogāccādhyātmavidhyupāyaiḥ* NS 4.3.46
*jñānagrahaṇābhyāsastadvidyaiśca saha saṃvādaḥ* NS 4.2.47
*taṃ śiṣyagurusabrahmacāriviśiṣṭaśreyo 'rthibhiranasūyubhirabhyupeyāt* NS 4.2.48

[154]See also NS 4.2.42 *araṇyaguhāpulinādiṣu yogābhyāsopadeśaḥ*.

not achieve liberation immediately through knowledge or through knowledge alone.

In his *Nyāyasūcīnibandha*, Vācaspati treats the first two Nyāyasūtras as, 'the topic on the content <of the *Nyāyasūtras*>, its goal, and the relationship <between them>'.[156] He, no less than Uddyotakara, follows Pakṣilasvāmin in taking the second *sūtra* as the answer to the objection that, on a literal reading of the first *sūtra*, one attains liberation directly upon learning the knowledge of the true-nature of the Nyāya categories (NB 150.1-2; see NV 21.20-22). Moreover, the second *sūtra* is intended to be an examination into the purpose of and how that purpose is related to each of the Nyāya categories, which are merely listed in the first *sūtra* (NVT 154.22-155.1).[157] It presents the established doctrine (*siddhānta*) of Akṣapāda.[158]

a) Since none of the terms in either *sūtra* has yet to be explicitly defined, concern over a terminological inconsistency between them is misplaced. *Apavarga* is defined first in NS 1.1.22.[159]

b) There need not be an especially positive connotation to *adhigama* in *niḥśre-*

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[155]Gangopadhyaya's translation of *jñāna* closely follows the *Bhāṣya*:

*tadarthamiti prakṛtam | jñāyate 'neneti jñānam ātmavidyā śāstraṃ tasya grahaṇam adhyayanadhāraṇe, abhyāsaḥ satatakriyādhyayanaśravaṇacintanāni* NB 1097.2-4. See also NVT 23.11-12 *...jñāyate 'neneti jñānamiti vyutpattyā tattvajñānaṃ śāstramucyate*, and NVTP 76.11-12, *tasmāt prayojanamabhidheyaṃ tayoḥ saṃbandho 'bhidheyastaddvārā śāstrasya prayojanena saṃbandha ityetadarthatvameva prathamasūtrasya nyāyyamityarthaḥ*.

Uddyotakara glosses *jñānagrahaṇam* by *śāstragrahaṇam* (TNT 1097.11); Vācaspati further glosses *ātmavidyā* in the *Bhāṣya* by *ānvīkṣikī* (TNT 1097.18; cf. *kṛtaṃ tarhy ānvīkṣikyā* TNT. 1097.16).

[156]*abhidheya-prayojana-sambandha-prakaraṇam* (Jhā *POS* 62, p. 1). See also NVT 23.17-18 *tad idam abhidheyasaṃbandhaprayojanapratipādanārthatvaṃ prathamasūtrasya*, and NVT 154.22. See NVTP 84.13-14, *tad yathā prayojanābhidheyasaṃbandhapratipādanam ekam artham adhikṛtya prathamadvitīyasūtrayoḥ samūhaḥ prakaraṇam.*

[157]Udayana says that the first *sūtra* states that liberation arises from the true-knowledge of the Nyāya categories, the second *sūtra* the 'how': *kiṃ tu niḥśreyasaṃ kuto 'dhigamyata iti | tatrottaram — pramāṇāditattvajñanānniḥśreyasādhigama iti | tathaḥ katham iti ? tatrāpi dvitīyaṃ sūtram* NVTP 83.12-15.

[158]NVT 155.10. Vācaspati himself terms the second *sūtra* 'an irregular *sūtra*' (*utsūtreṇa*) NVT 155.4; Udayana glosses this: *utsūtreṇeti | pūrvapakṣaṃ vinā siddhāntasūtrasyāvatārābhāvāt ityāśayaḥ* (NVTP 169.13-14).

Vācaspati also notes that there were some who wished to divide (*yogavibhāga*) the second *Nyāyasūtra* (apparently thus: *duḥkha-janma-pravṛtti-doṣa-mithyājñānānām* 2a || *uttarottarāpāye tadanantarābhāvād apavargaḥ* 2b) and that Uddyotakara rejected this division (NVT 157.13-20).

[159]See also NB 5.17-19 and footnote 143 *supra*.

*yasādhigama*.[160] It should also be noted that *apavarga*, one of the *prameyas* (NS 1.1.9), itself has to be correctly known.

c) The inconsistency Slaje points out between NS 1.1.1 and Pakṣilasvāmin's claim that the true knowledge of the *prameyas* specifically leads to *niḥśreyasa* is plausible enough, but a brief examination of Pakṣilasvāmin's overall interpretation of the first *sūtra* will show that he was fully aware of this apparent inconsistency and successfully resolved it.

Pakṣilasvāmin identifies the long compound in NS 1.1.1, in which all sixteen Nyāya categories are listed, as a coordinating compound.[161] Uddyotakara puts the point more strongly: since the meanings of all its words have equal importance, they must all be known.[162] Shortly after making this statement, however, Pakṣilasvāmin avers:

> The attainment of *niḥśreyasa* results, to be sure, from the knowledge of the *prameyas*, soul etc. – and this is restated in the next *sūtra*.[163]

As noted above, Pakṣilasvāmin attempts to reconcile this seeming consistency throughout the balance of the *Bhāṣya* on the first *sūtra*.[164] He also claims that a more fundamental, soteriological categoriology underlies the *Nyāyasūtras*: the four cardinal entities of what is to be eliminated, its elimination, the means to elimination, and what is to be attained. By correctly knowing these four cardinal entities one attains *niḥśre-*

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[160]See *An Encyclopaedic Dictionary of Sanskrit on Historical Principles*, Volume 3 Part 1, pp. 1605-1618, especially s.v. *adhigama* (pp. 1615-1616) and *adhi* + √*gam* (pp. 1613-1615).

[161]*cārthe dvandvaḥ samāsaḥ* NB 2.5. Cf. Pāṇini A.2.2.29 *cārthe dvandvaḥ*. Udayana has an objector say that this compound is as 'long as a stick' (*daṇḍakasūtrasya*) NVTP 75.4-5; so Vardhamāna, *daṇḍa iva daṇḍakaṃ dīrgham*...NVTPP 28.6-29.1.

[162]*sarvapadārthapradhānaḥ samāso dvandvaḥ* | *kimuktaṃ bhavati* ? *sarva ete pramāṇādayo vijñeyā iti* NV 12.20-21. While the categories are thus 'grammatically' co-equal, does it follow that they are so logically or soteriologically? In the next sentence, Uddyotakara argues that this is the only reasonable way formally to analyze the compound (NV 12.21-22; see NVT 45.3-5 and NVTP 123.14-17 for a fuller treatment).

[163]*ātmādeḥ khalu prameyasya tattvajñānānniḥśreyasādhigamaḥ taccaitad uttarasūtreṇānūdyate* NB 2.9-10. See also NB 5.18-19.

[164]See pp. 33-34.

*yasa*.[165] The *Nyāyaśāstra* is thus itself a means (*upāya*) to liberation[166] and its categories, in turn, prove subordinate means.

Lastly, Pakṣilasvāmin sees Nyāya as a fusion of soteriology with analytics (NB 2.17, 5.17-18). In its fundamental soteriological doctrines it does not materially differ from what is found in the *Upaniṣads*. Its use of analytics both gives it a separate identity as a soteriological science and bolsters its claim to being the best means of attaining liberation. Nyāya is *par excellence* the science of reasoning, and liberation is achieved through true-knowledge.

d i) Fuller treatment of these two types of *niḥśreyasa* will be provided shortly. For the present, brief notice will be paid to the justification Uddyotakara himself provides for this distinction and to Vācaspati and Udayana's assessments of the validity of the distinction. It should be noted that the lower type of *niḥśreyasa*, living liberation, is simply a transitional stage towards final liberation, and is not sought as an end in its own right.

After Uddyotakara introduces these two kinds of *niḥśreyasa*, he justifies this distinction thus:

> This is exactly the way the matter is, because *niḥśreyasa* is attained from the knowledge of the true-nature of the objects of knowledge, soul etc. For if this matter – the objects of knowledge, soul etc. — is erroneously understood, then one does not pass beyond *saṃsāra*.[167]

He proceeds to argue that Akṣapāda explicitly restricted the objects of knowledge to the soul etc. in order that one seeking liberation might have a finite number of items to know correctly (NV 13.21-14.1).

Uddyotakara thus follows and provides a justification for Pakṣilasvāmin's con-

[165]*heyaṃ tasya nirvartakaṃ hānamātyantikaṃ tasyopāyo 'dhigantavya | etāni khalu catvāryarthapadāni samyagbuddhvā niḥśreyasamadhigacchati* NB 2.10-12

[166]See footnote 41 *supra*.

[167]*na pramāṇamasti | na nāsti, arthasya tathābhāvāt | artha evāyaṃ tathābhūto yadātmādeḥ prameyasya tattvajñānānniḥśreyasamadhigamyate | yadā hyayamātmādi prameyaṃ viparyayeṇādhyavasito bhavati, atha saṃsāraṃ nātivartata iti* NV 13.18-20.

tention: one can only attain liberation by knowing the soteriologically relevant objects of knowledge that the *Nyāyasūtras* set forth.[168]

His adoption of a visible good (*dṛṣṭaniḥśreyasa*) that arises through the true-knowledge of the means of knowledge etc. is motivated both by a desire to make the other categories also contribute by their true-knowledge to a 'good' and to meet an objection raised in his *Vārttika* to the next *sūtra* (NV 151.20-152.10; see NVTP 173.1-2).[169] Vācaspati insists that, despite this distinction, it is the higher form of *niḥśreyasa* that Akṣapāda had in mind when composing the first *sūtra*. While the word *niḥśreyasa* denotes no more than 'what is desired' and visible happiness can result for the true-knowledge of means of knowledge etc., since the objects of knowledge, the soul etc., are co-mentioned with the means of knowledge etc., the unseen kind of *niḥśreyasa* alone was intended by Akṣapāda.[170] Udayana makes an even stronger argument: if the higher form of *niḥśreyasa* were not intended to the goal of the *śāstra*, then Akṣapāda

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[168]See NB 382.15-17 [NS 1.1.9] *astyanyadapi dravyaguṇakarmasāmānyaviśeṣasamavāyāḥ prameyam, tadbhedena cāparisaṅkhyeyam* | *asya tu tattvajñānādapavargo mithyājñānātsaṃsāra ityata etadupadiṣṭaṃ viśeṣeṇeti.*

[169]Something approaching 'living liberation' is implicit in NS 4.2.45-48.

[170]*abhimataṃ niḥśreyasaṃ grahītuṃ niḥśreyasadvaividhyamāha — niḥśreyasaṃ punar* | *tatrādṛṣṭaṃ niḥśreyasaṃ grahītuṃ dṛṣṭamatiprasaṅgāpādanena dū — evaṃ ca kṛtveti* | *sūtrakārābhimataṃ niḥśreyasamāha — paraṃ tviti* | *etaduktaṃ bhavati, yadyapi niḥśreyasapadam abhimatamātravāci pramāṇāditattvajñānasya ca dṛṣṭamapi niḥśreyasaṃ saṃbhavati, tasyaiva tataḥ sākṣādutpatteḥ* | *tathāpyātmādivācakaprameyapadasamabhivyāhārādadṛṣṭameva niḥśreyasama-bhipretaṃūtrakārasya* | *tatraca pramāṇāditattvajñānasyāpi pāramparyeṇa hetubhāvo 'stīyeveti* NVT 46.7-14. See also, *tasmāt janmaduḥkhocchedakramasamabhivyāhṛto mithyājñānādyucchedakramaḥ parasyaiva niḥśreyasasya śāstraprayojanasya*, NVT 157.10-11.

Slaje construes this passage quite differently: "Wenn das Wort niḥśreyasam auch bloss die Zustimmung [des Sūtrakāra] zum Ausdruck bringt, dass auch ein sichtbares niḥsreyasam für den, die [Kategorien] Erkenntnismittel (pramāṇam) usw. richtig erkennt, möglich ist, weil dieses [sichtbare niḥśreyasam] aufgrund der [richtigen Erkenntnis der Kategorien] direkt entsteht, [so] is vom Sūtrakāra dennoch nur das unsichtbar (adṛṣṭam — param) niḥśreyasam intendiert, wiel er [in NSū 1.1.1] das Wort Erkenntnisgegenstand (prameya), womit die Seele usw. bezeichnet werden, verwendet. Und für diese [unsichtabare niḥśreyasam] ist gewiss auch die richtige Erkenntnis der [Kategorien] Erkenntnismittel usw. in indirekter Weise einer Ursache.", pp. 166-167. His rendition of *niḥśreyasapadam abhimatamātravāci* by "das Wort niḥśreyasam auch bloss die Zustimmung [des Sūtrakāra] zum Ausdruck bringt" is unlikely; it is more natural to take it, "the word *niḥśreyasam* expresses nothing more than 'what is desired' (*abhimata*)"; see NB 5.17-19. *pramāṇāditattvajñānasya* may, as Slaje takes it, be a *bahuvrīhi*, (though one might expect *pramāṇāditattvajñānakasya*, or *pramāṇāditattvajñasya*), but *sam* + √*bhū* can take a genitive in the sense of 'accrue to, be possible for'; this same compound is found only two lines later and is clearly not *bahuvrīhi*.

would not have taught the specific objects of knowledge, soul etc., because one can obtain visible *niḥśreyasa* without any correct knowledge at all.[171]

d2) Slaje misrepresents Vācaspati's view on this issue. Uddyotakara divides men into four groups; those who know and three groups of those who, being in need, have to be taught (NV 6.10-11). When such men require instruction, the *śāstra* comes into play. Vācaspati sums up Uddyotakara's argument as follows:

> In this passage, Uddyotakara does not mean by 'desiring to know' the desire to know things that contribute to visible ends, but rather the desire to know the categories that contribute to *niḥśreyasa*, and this desire to know causes activity with regard to this *śāstra* alone — and no other.[172]

Thus the remark,

> Ähnlich kann Vācaspati dem tattvajñānam aus NS 1.1.1 nur die Funktion einer Mitursache (upayogi) für die höchste bzw. endgüldige Erlösung zubilligen. (p. 167)

is highly misleading.

e) The two *sūtras* Slaje cites actually interlock with the first two *sūtras*:

> The destruction of false knowledge (*mithyopalabdhi*) due to true-knowledge (*tattvajñāna*) is like the destruction of the delusive belief in dream objects when one wakes (NS 4.2.35)
>
> Cessation of egotism results from the true-knowledge (*tattvajñāna*) of the causes of faults (*doṣa*). (NS 4.2.1).[173]

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[171]*nanu dṛṣṭaniḥśreyasadūṣaṇe kiṃ tātparyam ? na hi tadasmānna siddhyatītyata āha — etaduktaṃ bhavatīti* । *adṛṣṭameva niḥśreyasamabhipretaṃ śāstraphalatveneti śeṣaḥ* । *anyathā ātmādiprameyaviśeṣa-pratipādanaṃ na kuryāt, tattvajñānamantareṇāpi dṛṣṭaniḥśreyasasiddheriti bhāvaḥ* NVTP 124.21-24. Neither Udayana nor Vācaspati seems taken by this distinction offered by Uddyotakara, and neither develops or uses it further in his commentary to NS 1.1.1.

[172] Vācaspati here glosses *apekṣā* 'need' (NV 6.10-11) by *jijñāsā* 'desire to know', NVT 26.16-18. Slaje also cites *ta ete pramāṇādayaḥ sadbhedā niḥśreyasopayogino na gaṅgāvālukādayaḥ* NVT 44.26. In both passages *upayogi* does not mean 'accessory cause' (Mitursache), but simply 'suitable, appropriate, useful, contributory'. See NVT 44.12-14, where the true-knowledge of being is said to contribute (*upayogi*) to *niḥśreyasa*, while that of non-being does not.

[173]*mithyopalabdher vināśas tattvajñānāt svapnaviṣayābhimānapraṇāśavat pratibodhe* NS 4.2.35, *doṣanimittānāṃ tattvajñānād ahaṃkāranivṛttiḥ* NS 4.2.1.

While the content of *tattvajñāna* is not mentioned in NS 4.2.35 nor fully equated with the sixteen Nyāya categories in NS 4.2.1, both *sūtras* obviously echo NS 1.1.2:

> As false knowledge (*mithyājñāna*), faults (*doṣa*), activity, rebirth, and pain successively pass away, liberation (*apavarga*) arises from the passing away of the immediately preceding one.

Since *tattvajñāna*, whose content is the sixteen Nyāya categories, is expressly stated in NS 1.1.1 as the cause of *niḥśreyasa*, Pakṣilasvāmin reasonably concludes that the *tattvajñāna*[174] of this *sūtra* is the cause of the passing away of false knowledge in NS 1.1.2. His gloss of NS 1.1.2 runs, in part:

> But when false knowledge passes away due to true-knowledge (*tattvajñāna*), then faults pass away when false knowledge passes away. Activity passes away upon the passing away of faults; rebirth passes away upon the passing away of activity. Pain passes away upon the passing away of rebirth. And when pain passes away, there is absolute liberation or *niḥśreyasa*.[175]

Further, in the *Bhāṣya* to NS 4.2.1, he states:

> The cause of faults are the objects of knowledge (*prameya*), beginning with body and ending with pain, because false knowledge relates to them. This same true-knowledge that relates to them brings egotism to an end because both [true and false knowledge] are contradictory with regard to the same things. Thus, from true-knowledge, 'As false knowledge, faults, activity, rebirth, and pain successively pass away, liberation (*apavarga*) arises from the passing away of the immediately preceding one'. And this summation of the subject of the *śāstra* is being restated, not set forth for the first time.[176]

3) Slaje's athetization of VS 1.1.1-4 is methodologically questionable and,

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174 NB 150.2.

175 *yadā tu tattvajñānānmithyājñānamapaiti, tadā mithyājñānāpāye doṣā apayanti | doṣāpāye pravṛttirapaiti, pravṛttyapāye janmāpaiti | janmāpāye duḥkhamapaiti | duḥkhāpāye cātyāntiko 'pavargo niḥśreyasamiti* (NB 151.6-9).

176 NB 1038.1-4 (TNT) . See also NB 1036.1-1037.1-12 (TNT)

more to the point, demonstrably false. W. Halbfass[177] has noted that Frauwallner's contention is untenable, since Bhartṛhari, who on Frauwallner's own chronology antedates Praśastapāda, was familiar with these *sūtras*. Given the universally acknowledged anteriority of the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* to and influence on the *Nyāyasūtras*, that *niḥśreyasa* means liberation in VS 1.1.2 is compelling evidence that it also means liberation in NS 1.1.1. These *sūtras* seem also to have been known to Caraka.[178]

4) A close examination of the *Vārttika* passage and the *Tātparyaṭīkā* thereto does not confirm Slaje's claim of an 'authentic' tradition of a contrast between positive happiness and liberation or even that *niḥśreyasa* might mean *svarga*. Uddyotakara does in fact maintain that the *śāstra* states human good.[179] However, in the next sentence he states that the audience for this *śāstra* is not mankind in general, but rather disciples endowed with great spiritual powers (*adhyātmaśakti*). He next defines the different types of 'good' (*śreyas*) and men in order to differentiate the persons and the good intended by the *śāstra*.[180] 'Good' he divides into pleasure and the cessation of pain; the cessation of pain, in turn, may be temporary or absolute. The absolute cessation of pain arises through the elimination of all twenty-one kinds of pain; in NS 1.1.22 it is stated that liberation is the absolute liberation from pain.[181] Men he divides into two groups: those who have desire etc. and those are who do not. Those who are devoid of desire act sole-

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[177]W. Halbfass, review of Erich Frauwallner's *Nachgelassene Werke I: Aufsätze, Beiträge, Skizzen*, JAOS 106 (1986) 857-858.

[178] *maharṣayaste dadarśuryathāvajjñacakṣuṣā* ǀ
*sāmānyaṃ ca viśeṣaṃ ca guṇān dravyāni karma ca* ǁ
*samavāyaṃ ca tajjñātvā tantroktaṃ vidhimāsthitāḥ* ǀ
*lebhire paramaṃ śarma jīvitaṃ cāpyanitvaram* ǁ *Sūtrasthāna* 1.28-29 ǁ

There seems to be no straightforward correlation of *parama śarman* and *jīvita anitvara* with *abhyudaya* and *niḥśreyasa* of VS.1.1.1.

[179]*tacchāstram puruṣaśreyo 'bhidhatte* NV 6.8, and see NV 6.4-5 *śāstrasya puruṣaśreyo 'bhidhāyakatvāt*: Vācaspati *seyamātyantikī duḥkhanivṛttiḥ śreyaḥ* ǀ *tadidamuktam — śāstrasya puruṣaśreyo 'bhidhāyakatvāt* (NVT 27.16-17).

[180]*puruṣetyuktam* ǀ *tatra vivakṣitaṃ puruṣaviśeṣaṃ grahītuṃ saṃbhavinaḥ puruṣaprakārān darśayati*...NVT 26.6-7, *ihābhimataṃ śreyo nirdhārayituṃ śreyomātraprakārān āha — śreyaḥ punaḥ sukhamahitanivṛttiśca* NVT 26.19-20; see NVTP 83.25-84.4.

[181]*tadatyantavimokṣo 'pavargaḥ* NS 1.1.22 (*tad* = *duḥkha*, NS 1.1.21).

ly to avoid what is painful — they do not act in order to attain any positive pleasure whatsoever.[182] Vācaspati adds:

> But men of discrimination, who have an eye to the future, reject even heaven (*svarga*) as being like the shadow cast by the hood of an angry serpent.[183]

Slaje's argument against the traditional interpretation of *niḥśreyasa* must, in light of the foregoing analysis, be pronounced unsuccessful. That is not to say that the larger issue of liberation as an integral or original element of Nyāya is settled: suspicions of its being a later graft are not unfounded.[184]

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[182]NV 6.21-7.2; cf. NV 21.25-26. Thus any 'positive' seeking for those for whom the *śāstra* was intended is thus explicitly denied here by Uddyotakara.

[183]*vivekinas tu āyatim ālocayantaḥ svargamapi kupitaphaṇiphaṇāmaṇḍalacchāyāpratima ityapajahati* NVT 27.23-24; see also NVT 27.24-25 and NVTP 83.25-84.4. Vācaspati correlates *viveka* with *vairāgya*, NVT 27.26.

[184]One here begs the question, however: what was Nyāya originally? To attempt to excise putative interpolations or strip off overlays to get back to a pure or ur-Nyāya is a daunting and likely futile task. What criteria would not be circular? Would the *disiecta membra* of such an analysis actually constitute a coherent and possibly the 'true' philosophy of Akṣapāda? Since the authors of the NCG are consciously engaged in the construction of Nyāya as soteriological and orthodox science, such an analysis would at best be foreign in spirit to the works. What would it mean to declare them historically 'wrong'?

# CHAPTER III

## *ĀNVĪKṢIKĪ* AND *ADHIKĀRA*

In the previous chapter, arguments for and explanations of the causal relation between Nyāya and liberation, as related in the first *sūtra*, were explored. Strictly speaking, the commentators have, at best, established that Nyāya is both the most fundamental science and soteriological.[1] What remains for consideration is what distinguishes Nyāya from a host of other valid soteriological sciences and makes it worth pursuing over and against them.[2] Further, since Nyāya is avowedly a science of discursive reasoning, how it conjointly operates as soteriological science requires further elucidation. A related concern is that, if liberation can be attained by the mere unaided reason, there is no obvious need for scripture (*śruti*) or orthodoxy in general for an aspiring Naiyāyika. Reasoning may, in fact, subvert or even overthrow the whole orthodox superstructure. The commentators' collective response to these issues is the principle subject of this chapter. Central to their project is the equation of Nyāya with analytics (*ānvīkṣikī*), an orthodox science through which they derive the possibility of orthodoxy itself. A corollary of Nyāya's thus emerging as the pre-eminent orthodox science is that some sort of orthodox qualification (*adhikāra*) is in order as a preliminary to its study: with Vācaspati and especially Udayana the need to formulate this qualification is clearly felt. Since it is linked to the larger question of Nyāya and orthodoxy,

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[1]In the previous chapters, arguments for the primacy of Nyāya among all sciences, not specifically soteriological sciences, were considered.

[2]There are several passages in the NCG to NS 1.1.1 in which the commentators reveal a concern that Nyāya appeal to the prudent (*prekṣāvat*): see NVT 27.18 ff., 29.3 ff, 49.5-6, NVTP 75.8 ff., 76.5 ff.

this qualification will be treated here also.

By way of a simple, working definition, Hindu orthodoxy consists in the acceptance of the *Veda* (*śruti*) as an authoritative source of knowledge.[3] Given so minimal a requirement, it is not surprising to find within the orthodox camp a bewildering array of divergent schools and institutions. It should also be noted that the *Veda* is not a monolithic, pellucid structure: a complex interweaving of seemingly irreconcilable doctrines, it contains no lack of genuine obscurities. While it does not intrinsically stand in contradiction with rational enquiry, there are clear boundaries beyond which such enquiry cannot safely go and still lay claim to orthodoxy. It is well to consider a few passages in which an overreliance on untrammeled reasoning is censured.[4]

> I was a savant, a logician, a despiser of the *Veda*, devoted to worthless analytics, the science of reasoning, an utterer of logical doctrines, a speaker with reasons in assemblies, both a reviler and haughty in speech against the twice-born concerning Vedic rituals, heterodox and a doubter of everything, a fool and a self-styled learned man: the full fruition of which is this - my being a jackal, oh twice-born one.[5]

> That twice born man who, out of reliance on the system of reasons, would despise these two bases – he is to be excluded by good men –heterodox, a despiser of the *Veda*.[6]

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[3]The normal term for orthodoxy is *āstikya* 'is-ness': i.e. the *Veda is* or *exists*. (Conversely, heterodoxy is termed *nāstikya* 'not-is-ness': sometimes, however, the adjectival base of this word (*nāstika*) can more broadly mean 'nihilistic'.) By the '*Veda*' is here meant the Vedic texts proper (*saṃhitā*), their closely allied works (*Brāhmaṇas*, *Āraṇyakas*, and *Upaniṣads*), and ancillaries (*Vedāṅgas*). More sweeping but equally valid characterizations are frequently encountered.

An important consequence of accepting the *Veda* as valid is that the whole orthodox social order (*varṇa-āśrama*), which derives from the *Veda*, has to be accepted as valid as well. The notion of qualification (*adhikāra*) is closely bound up with this social order.

See W. Halbfass, *Tradition and Reflection*, pp. 1-130, for a full treatment of a number of issues relating to orthodoxy.

[4]See further A. Thakur, "Nyāya in the Mahābhārata". Uddyotakara, not without humor, criticizes a *kāpālika* for using inference, contradicted by scripture, to justify the use of a begging bowl made of a human-skull (NV 15.15-21).

[5]
*ahamāsaṃ paṇḍitako haituko vedanindakaḥ* |
*ānvīkṣikīm tarkavidyāmanurakto nirarthakām* ||
*hetuvādān pravaditā vaktā samsatsu hetumat* |
*ākroṣṭā cābhivaktā ca brahmayajñeṣu ca dvijān* ||
*nāstikaḥ sarvaśaṅkī ca mūrkhaḥ paṇḍitamānikaḥ* |
*tasyeyaṃ phalanivṛttiḥ śṛgālatvaṃ mama dvija* || (*Mahābhārata* 12.173.47-49)

> While the *dharmaśāstras* are principal, unwise men, fixing their thought on analytics, speak what is worthless.[7]

The arguments for the orthodoxy of Nyāya in the NCG are to be placed against this background: they reflect a delicate balancing act between the claims of reasoning and orthodoxy. It is also possible that the explicit rejection of hypothetical reasoning (*tarka*) as an independent, valid means of knowledge is motivated as much by a concern for orthodoxy as by philosophical rigor.[8]

An outline of the passages considered:

NB 2.13-18 — the four *vidyās:* Nyāya is analytics

NV 14.5-11
NVT 47.13-18
NVTP 126.13-21

NB 3.5-8 — description of *ānvīkṣikī*

NV 15.1-27
NVT 49.6-20-54.4
NVTP 128.6-134.12

NB 4.8-12 — correlation of the means of knowledge and members

NV 17.1-26
NVT 57.13-61.13
NVTP 136.27-141.4

NB 5.13-19 — recapitulation of equation; *śloka* quoted

NV 21.1-17
NVT 67.6-68.5
NVTP 146.13-149.12

Pakṣilasvāmin introduces analytics by way of answering an objection: since the

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6 *yo 'vamanyeta te mūle hetuśāstrāśrayād dvijaḥ* |
*sa sādhubhirbahiṣkāryo nāstiko vedanindakaḥ* || (*Manusaṃhitā* 2.11)

7 *dharmaśāstreṣu mukhyeṣu vidyamāneṣu durbudhāḥ* |
*buddhimānvīksikīm prāpya nirarthaṃ pravadanti te* ||
(*Rāmāyaṇa Ayodhyākāṇḍa* 100.36-39)

8 See NB 4.15 ff. Hypothetical reasoning is not of the same status as are the means of knowledge: it cannot invalidate or overrule them, but instead assists them by determining the proper scope of their operation.

last fourteen categories of doubt through grounds for defeat are subsumed under the first two, their separate mention in the first *sūtra* is inappropriate.[9] On the contrary, their separate mention points to a different purpose, namely that Nyāya is analytics, one of the four orthodox sciences (*vidyā*).[10] Each orthodox science has a distinct basis, and the fourteen dialectical[11] categories form the basis of analytics, which is Nyāya. If these categories were not so specified, Nyāya would, like the *Upaniṣads*, be mere soteriology (*adhyātmavidyā*).

While his contention that the separate mention of these categories has, or must have, a motivation is of the stock in trade of commentators, the specific purpose Pakṣilasvāmin posits here seems at first glance unwarranted. It may be that the four-fold scheme to which he alludes was commonplace enough that his identifying Nyāya with analytics was at least plausible; that there is independent authority for the identity may suffice for his immediate purposes. Yet this equation also underscores the incongruity between Nyāya as soteriology and Nyāya as analytics. Nyāya appears to be an awkward hybrid of these two sciences, hardly an independent and fundamental orthodox science.

He provides an argument, of sorts, for this identity shortly afterwards, when he defines reasoning (*nyāya*):

> <P> But what is this 'reasoning'? <S> The examining of an object through the means of knowledge; and inference depends upon perception and scripture. This is <what is meant by> 'analysis'. The analyzing of an object <already> observed through perception or scripture is 'analysis'. Since it operates through analysis, it is 'analytics' or

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[9]Pakṣilasvāmin has shortly above introduced the *arthapadas* 'cardinal entities', which are essentially soteriological categories (NB 2.9-12) and which, as Uddyotakara relates, are embraced by all teachers in the soteriological sciences (NV 14.4). He seems to subordinate the Nyāya categories to them. The objection to the inclusion of the dialectical categories thus holds at two levels: these categories are subsumed within the first two categories, which are in turn subsumed within the cardinal entities. It should be noted that these four cardinal entities are not strictly orthodox, since they stem ultimately from the four noble truths of Buddhists: see W. Halbfass, *Tradition and Reflection: Explorations in Indian Thought*, pp. 243-265, and NBh p. 442.

[10]Jayanta Bhaṭṭa quotes two verses in which fourteen orthodox sciences are listed: *tarka* appears in the first, and the expression *nyāyavistara* in the second (NM I.4.5 ff.).

[11]This term, which is not in the Sanskrit, is adopted for convenience's sake.

the 'science of reasoning' or the 'Nyāya system'. But that inference which is contradicted by perception or scripture is pseudo-reasoning.[12]

Several questions are prompted by this passage. Pakṣilasvāmin initially states that reasoning is an examining through, presumably, all the means of knowledge. Yet he immediately restricts the operation of reasoning to inference (*anumāna*) and further stipulates that only such inference as is not contradicted by perception and scripture can be used to analyze an object, which is already known through perception and scripture.[13] It is not clear what has become of the other means of knowledge, although a subsequent passage will, it is hoped, shed some light on them. A more serious question concerns the restriction that inference not contradict scripture if it is to qualify as true reasoning. In NS.1.1.5, it is stated that inference presupposes or depends upon perception.[14] Comparison and verbal testimony are introduced after inference,[15] and there is nothing in the *sūtras* that argues for reasoning's being dependent on verbal testimony or scripture. The restriction itself is problematic.[16] First, it undercuts the Nyāya doctrine of the overlapping or merging of the means of knowledge. That is, if perception and scripture are the bases of inference, then how can inference be used to validate or verify either? What exactly is meant by the 'contradiction' stipulation? Does Pakṣilasvāmin mean to claim that there is no such thing as false perception or false scripture?[17]

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[12]*kaḥ punarayaṃ nyāyaḥ ? pramāṇairarthaparīkṣaṇam | pratyakṣāgamāśritaṃ cānumanam | sānvīkṣā | pratyakṣāgamābhyāmīkṣitasyārthasyānvīkṣaṇamanvīkṣā | tayā pravartata ityānvīkṣikī nyāyavidyā nyāyaśāstram | yatpunaranumānaṃ pratyakṣāgamaviruddhaṃ nyāyābhāsaḥ sa iti* NB 3.5-8.

[13]Pakṣilasvāmin here uses *āgama*, 'scripture' or 'sacred tradition', instead of *śabda*, the term in Nyāya for verbal testimony. Does he mean, then, to exclude verbal testimony that is not derived from scripture, or is *āgama* used as a synonymous variant for *śabda*? Cf. NV 17.5.

[14]*atha tatpūrvakaṃ trividham anumānaṃ pūrvavaccheṣavat sāmānyatodṛṣṭaṃ ca* NS.1.1.5. *tat* here refers to perception (*pratyakṣa*), which is characterized in the preceding *sūtra*: *indriyārthasannikarṣotpannaṃ jñānam avyāpadeśyam avyabhicāri vyavasāyātmakaṃ pratyakṣam* NS.1.1.4.

[15]*prasiddhasādharmyātsādhyasādhanam upamānam* NS 1.1.6. *āptopadeśaḥ śabdaḥ* NS.1.1.7.

[16]Udayana, when speaking of *adhikāra*, adopts the strong reading of this sentence, NVTP 72.17-19 (NVT 49.20ff.). See *infra* page 112.

[17]It may be that by 'perception' and 'scripture' Pakṣilasvāmin implicitly means 'true perception' and 'true scripture': this merely begs the question.

He seems perilously close to granting intrinsic validity to both perception and scripture: inference, accordingly, would play a subsidiary role, corroborating perception and scripture or extending their application. Secondly, since his successors assent to this stipulation, how can they consistently argue that inference or analytics actually establishes scripture?

By way of a partial defence of Pakṣilasvāmin, he may, more modestly, mean that inference is based on perception or scripture in the sense that these two supply the raw material on which reasoning, occasioned by doubt, operates. Such an explanation, however, would grant a primacy to inference that he clearly disallows here. Hypothetical reasoning (*tarka*), however, could serve as a check upon both, and Pakṣilasvāmin here does collapse or confuse inference and hypothetical reasoning as being equivalent to analytics. Uddyotakara will argue that all matters, including heaven and everything imperceptible to ordinary mortals, related by verbal testimony are perceptible to someone.[18] If inference operates on what derives from perception, immediately or mediately through verbal testimony, the literal thrust of Pakṣilasvāmin's claim may yet be salvaged.

In what seems to be Pakṣilasvāmin's source passage, from the *Arthaśāstra*, the crucial point is that analytics[19] examines or analyzes matters through logical reasons (*hetu*):

> By analyzing (*anvīkṣamāṇa*) merit and demerit in the Vedic science, success and failure in agriculture, good means and bad means in political science, and the relative strength and weakness of these <three sciences> through logical reasons, it <analytics> aids the everyday world, it strengthens ones mind in reversal and in success, and produces facility in understanding, speech, and action.[20]

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[18] NV 366.1ff (NS.1.1.6).

[19] Kangle, among others, incorrectly translates *ānvīkṣikī* by 'philosophy', influenced by Kauṭilya's statement that *Sāṅkhya*, *Yoga*, and *Lokāyata* are *ānvīkṣikī* (1.2.10). See W. Halbfass on *ānvīkṣikī*, *India and Europe*, pp. 263-286. But Kauṭilya's description, quoted here, speaks more to a logical method than to philosophical enquiry or the like. I have ventured to translate the term by 'analytics', which attempts to capture both its etymological meaning (see NB 3.6) of 'a re-examining' and its status as a methodology.

Explicit here is the supremacy of analytics over scriptural authority, which it is empowered to examine. It is difficult to see how such logical reasons would *a priori* not contradict scripture.

In his discussion of the members of a syllogism (*nyāya*), Pakṣilasvāmin states that the four means of knowledge of Nyāya inhere in the first four members of a syllogism and that reasoning in the truest sense consists in their so inhering and of being concluded in the conclusion.[21] The earlier question of what has become of the other means of knowledge in his description of reasoning is here resolved. His successors, however, shy away from so strong a claim: they will argue that this inherence is largely figurative.

At the end of his commentary on the first *sūtra*,[22] in prefacing his quotation of a *śloka*, he reaffirms that analytics is differentiated, presumably from the other three sciences, through the categories; however, here all the categories, including the means of knowledge and objects of knowledge, and not only the dialectical categories are expressly stated. Since he has earlier argued that reasoning operates on what is in doubt and embodies all four means of knowledge, his inclusion of the category of the means of knowledge is perhaps justifiable: the inclusion of the objects of knowledge will be treated shortly.

He is content merely to quote, without further comment, a *śloka* from the *Arthaśāstra*:[23] that analytics is proclaimed in the listing of the sciences as the lamp of all the sciences, the means to all actions, and the basis of all *dharmas*. His successors will make much more of this *śloka*.

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[20]*Arthaśāstra* 1.2.10-11.

[21]NB 4.8-12. Nyāya refers specifically to the five-membered syllogism, as well as to the *śāstra* which it defines. One can more satisfactorily interpret Pakṣilasvāmin's earlier contention that reasoning was based, non-contradictorily, on perception and scripture/verbal testimony in the light of this. Reasoning (= the conclusion) which contradicts the specific perception (= familiar instance) and verbal testimony (= the thesis) on which it is based is by definition invalid. Vācaspati gives an interpretation along these lines, NVT 49.21 ff. This is a much weaker and narrower claim that centers on formal validity, however, and one that might argue against Nyāya's being fully consonant with perception and scripture in general.

[22]*nigamana* NB 5.15ff.

[23]So Thakur, note 10 *ad*. 5.15.

Finally, he asserts that in every science there is 'knowledge of the true-nature' and 'attainment of the highest good' and that in Nyāya, which is soteriological science (*adhyātmavidyā*), the true-knowledge is of the soul etc. and the attainment of the highest good is the gaining of liberation.[24]

Pakṣilasvāmin's insistence that Nyāya is soteriological science is important: its subject matter is fundamentally the soul and its goal liberation. However, in an earlier passage, he argued that it was not merely soteriological science, in the way the *Upaniṣads* are, but soteriology as fused with analytics. How this fusion is achieved is left for his successors to unravel.

Uddyotakara restates, with helpful glosses, the objection in the *Bhāṣya* and Pakṣilasvāmin's answer, that the separate mention of doubt etc. serves to make known the different bases of the four sciences.[25] He details the bases of the Vedic science, agriculture, and political science in order to reveal their differences from that of analytics.[26] Finally, he supplies an argument implicit in the *Bhāṣya*: since mere soteriology is included in the Vedic science, if analytics were no more than this, the four-fold scheme of the orthodox sciences would collapse.[27]

By maintaining the sanctity, as it were, of the four-fold scheme of the sciences, Uddyotakara raises the stakes in ensuring Nyāya its rightful place in the scheme. A failure to identify Nyāya with analytics now results in the actual dismemberment of the tradition. It would seem to follow that Nyāya must strictly be analytics, not a blending or fusion with soteriology, if the four-fold scheme depends on it. How it can also be soteriology, even in part, is no less puzzling on Uddyotakara's account than on Pakṣilasvāmin's. There seem to be two distinct agendas in Nyāya: the first two categories are

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[24]NB 5.17-19.
[25]NV 14.5-7.
[26]NV 14.7-9.
[27]In NV 14.11, Uddyotakara states that the four cardinal entities (*arthapada*), which Pakṣilasvāmin introduces in NB 2.10-12, are described by all teachers in all the soteriological sciences.

soteriological, the last fourteen dialectical or even analytical. The dialectical categories, in turn, do double duty, since they differentiate analytics both from other mere soteriological sciences and from the other three orthodox sciences.

In his commentary on the second passage in the *Bhāṣya* on what reasoning is, Uddyotakara makes several substantial contributions.[28] He first explains what Pakṣilasvāmin meant by saying that reasoning is the examining of an object through the means of knowledge: that reasoning (*nyāya*) is the apprehension of an object through the operation of all the means of knowledge, and not one taken individually. Uddyotakara here relies on Pakṣilasvāmin's claim that the means of knowledge inhere in the first four members of a syllogism, and he promises to show how this is reasoning in the highest sense, since it teaches a man who is confused.[29] Uddyotakara accordingly takes Pakṣilasvāmin's claim that inference depends on perception and scripture in a weak sense, and more in conformity with the doctrine of the overlapping of the means of knowledge: what is meant is that inference does not contradict perception and scripture. If perception and scripture corroborate a matter apprehended through inference, then that apprehension becomes all the clearer, whereas the independent, non-corroborative use of these means of knowledge is a travesty of reasoning.

Uddyotakara expatiates upon the claim that an inference contradicted by perception or scripture is pseudo-reasoning.[30] He cites as an example of the former the inference that fire is not hot, because, like a pot and the like, it is created.[31] The contradiction consists in the application of inference to what is properly the domain of perception. This principle might be stated even more generally than Uddyotakara does: perception, which is immediate cognition, preempts inference, which is mediate cogni-

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[28]NV 15.1-19.

[29]NV 15.4-5; cf. NB 4.11-12.

[30]NV 15.9-19.

[31]Uddyotakara also cites the inference that, 'Sound is inaudible, because it is created', as one that is contradicted by perception, but disallows it on the grounds that perception is not involved: see further NVT 51.15-52.6.

tion. There are some cases, however, such as optical illusions, in which the reverse holds true and for which provision would have to be made for Uddyotakara's principle to hold true.

His treatment of an inference contradicted by scripture is more involved and muddled: a begging bowl made of a human skull is pure, because, like mother-of-pearl in a shell, it is part of a living creature.[32] Simply stated, he argues that the inference is false because the notion of purity must have some basis and a determinate character. If that basis is the *Vedas*, then the inference is patently false, since there are explicit prohibitions in the *Vedas* about touching a human skull.[33] On the other hand, Uddyotakara implicitly disallows that any heterodox scripture could have validity in this matter, and concludes that, since the proponent of the inference has no coherent account of what is pure or impure, no inference at all is possible for him.[34]

There is, then, on Uddyotakara's view, a complementarity among the means of knowledge. Inference does not intrinsically have independent authority, but is subject to confirmation by the other means of knowledge, especially perception and verbal testimony. His articulation of a principle of scope is insightful, though insufficiently developed.

Uddyotakara devotes considerable space to Pakṣilasvāmin's discussion of members of an inference and especially to his claim that the means of knowledge inhere in these members.[35] These members are members of a sentence, which is the cause of a specific understanding.[36] Further, the inherence of the means of knowledge in these members is figurative: his proposed figurative identification of the thesis with verbal testimony, which Pakṣilasvāmin maintains, deserves brief notice. Since verbal testimo-

[32]NVT 52.7-53.5.

[33]See *Manusmṛti* 5.87. The validity of the *smṛti* texts is directly inferred from extant or posited *śruti* texts.

[34]More strictly, Uddyotakara states that if everything is pure, then since there is no counter-subject, this is a positive-only inference (*kevalānvaya*), whose validity he seems to deny.

[35]NV 17.1-20.

[36]See NB 510.15-16 (NS.1.1.32).

ny, as a means of knowledge, demarcates the true-nature of an object, while the subject matter of the thesis is what has to be conveyed, the thesis is called 'verbal testimony' because one only tells another person a matter that he apprehended through scripture. His explanation of the fifth member, the conclusion, is more enlightening. Pakṣilasvāmin asserts that, when all four members 'inhere' in one matter, the demonstration of their capacity is the conclusion.[37] Uddyotakara gives this a sentential turn. By 'inherence' in one thing is meant fusion in a single sentence, and by 'capacity' is meant their dependency on a meaning which they mutually cause to make known. Hence the members of thesis etc. are concluded or connected with a single, sentential meaning. This conclusion of all the members is what Pakṣilasvāmin termed 'reasoning in the highest sense.' Uddyotakara now makes good on his promise to explain reasoning in the highest sense: that it teaches one who is confused. Each means of knowledge, functioning independently, teaches one who is not confused; but when they form a sentence, they teach one who is confused. This is what is meant by 'reasoning in the highest sense'. His explanation hearkens back to a passage early on in the *Vārttika*,[38] where he divides men into four kinds: he who knows, he who does not know, he who is in doubt, and he who is in error. To bring these passages fully into harmony, reasoning in the highest sense must be equated with the *śāstra*, which embodies reasoning and which instructs those who require teaching.[39]

The final passage for consideration is Uddyotakara's interpretation of the *śloka* and its brief introduction in the *Bhāṣya*.[40] He first explains that analytics, or the science of reasoning, is the lamp of all sciences because it illumines them: the other sciences teach matters which the means of knowledge etc. have explained. His next claim is ex-

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[37]See further, NB.574.4-5, 17-18 (NS.1.1.39).

[38]In NV 6.10-13, those who have to be taught are either *apratipanna* 'un-knowing', *sandigdha* 'in doubt', or *viparyasta* 'in error'. Here Uddyotakara uses the expression *vipratipanna* 'confused'.

[39]This educative function of Nyāya echoes the notion of 'inference for another' (*parārthānumāna*).

[40]NV 21.1-8; cf. NB 5.13-15.

traordinary: the other sciences do not possess the means of knowledge etc. because they lack the qualification (*adhikāra*) for understanding them. Since he does not elaborate, it is not clear wherein this lack of qualification resides, unless he has the distinct bases (*prasthāna*) of the respective sciences in mind. He proceeds to claim that analytics, or Nyāya, is the means to all actions because it is the instrumental cause of the actions the means of knowledge have illumined. Again, the other sciences carry out a matter that the means of knowledge have illumined. It is the basis of all *dharmas* because it assists all the branches of science.

Uddyotakara's emphasis throughout this passage on the means of knowledge in Nyāya is significant. Nyāya as science of the means of knowledge (*pramāṇa-śāstra*) emerges now as a third though related agenda. He clearly subordinates the other sciences to analytics, since it alone, through its means of knowledge etc., establishes their respective subject matters. In this, Uddyotakara seems true to the spirit of Kauṭilya, while Pakṣilasvāmin apparently intends the *śloka* to be general praise of analytics.

Uddyotakara supplies details on the knowledge of the true-nature and the attainment of the highest good in the three other sciences,[41] but is content to repeat without comment Pakṣilasvāmin's assertion that in Nyāya, which is soteriological science, the knowledge of the true-nature is that of the soul etc., and the attainment of the highest good is the gaining of liberation.

Analytics emerges in the accounts of both Pakṣilasvāmin and Uddyotakara as a method of proof or establishment in concert with the means of knowledge. The soteriological aspect of Nyāya, which they claim is its purpose proper, has yet coherently to be reconciled with the analytical.

Vācaspati adds little to the first passage, on the need for the separate mention of the dialectical categories, confining his efforts for the most part to identifying objections and replies.[42] One gloss of note that he offers is of 'basis' (*prasthāna*) by 'opera-

[41]NV 21.10-16.
[42]NVT 47.13-15.

tion' (*vyāpāra*); the separate mention of the dialectical categories serves to differentiate the operations of the sciences. He adds force to Uddyotakara's claim that the four-fold division of the sciences collapses if analytics is omitted: analytics is necessary because this science alone is the cause of the purification of all the sciences.[43] Following Uddyotakara's lead, he is not content to have analytics be merely another orthodox science: it is the science *par excellence*.

By contrast, Vācaspati's commentary on the second passage, concerning what Nyāya is, is extensive and fruitful.[44] Pakṣilasvāmin had stated that reasoning (*nyāya*) is the examination of an object through the means of knowledge, and Uddyotakara had taken this formulation to mean that all the means of knowledge are to be employed by it. Vācaspati makes explicit Pakṣilasvāmin's implicit argument: that the five members, the thesis etc., which have the means of knowledge as their sources, are means of knowledge. Further, the examination through them is not of the object *simpliciter*, as both Pakṣilasvāmin and Uddyotakara maintain, but rather of the logical mark of the object. A logical mark, once it has been examined, endowed with the five-members, alone brings into being as its result the apprehension of what has to be inferred. The object to be inferred, even if it is doubted, is not by its own nature the basis of examination. While reasoning does operate on a matter in doubt,[45] this matter in doubt is a complex of object and logical mark. When the mark is examined and verified by the means of knowledge, inferential knowledge is possible. Vācaspati next poses an objection: if the examining of the object is through the members, then it is not through the means of knowledge (as Pakṣilasvāmin states), because this would represent a failure to distinguish cause from effect. His answer is that the members, the thesis etc., are not directly employed in the examination of the object, but rather by virtue of pointing to (*sūcana*)

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[43]*avadātīkaraṇa*° NVT 47.17. Vācaspati uses similar, sacral language of the dialectical categories in NVT 27.8-10: *saṃśayāditattvajñānapariśodhitaparamanyāyamargaḥ*... See also NVTP 89.23-90.6.
[44]NB 3.5-6; NV 15.1-19; NVT 49.10-54.4.
[45]NB 2.19-20.

their respective causes, the means of knowledge. The members, which occur in the reasoning-sentence, are here relegated to the status of stand-ins for or pointers to the means of knowledge, which perform the examination proper. They only perform an intermediate operation for the means of knowledge.[46] Vācaspati states, in passing, that the 'highest sense' of reasoning is simply the fact that it is assisted by all the means of knowledge. He next claims that, insofar as inference is endowed with the five members, it relies upon perception and scripture and does not contradict them. When there is a contradiction, there is no mutual synthesis, or single sententiality, among the members, the thesis etc., which have the means of knowledge as their sources. If there is a contradiction between the means of knowledge which underlie them, the meanings of the words in the members lack suitability and have no real syntactic connection. That is, suitability for syntactic connection on the part of the members depends upon the suitability or non-contradiction among their underlying causes, the means of knowledge.

Vācaspati's reinterpretation of the 'dependence' of inference upon perception and scripture does not square with Pakṣilasvāmin's assertion. At the member level, the reason-statement must be in accordance with the thesis-statement and the example-statement (as well, presumably, with the application-statement). These statements, in turn, point to concordance among inference, perception, and scripture at the means of knowledge level. There is, however, no compelling reason to grant primacy to any one of the underlying means of knowledge on this interpretation, as Pakṣilasvāmin clearly does for perception and scripture.

After a lengthy treatment of inference's being contradicted by perception, Vācaspati takes up inference's being contradicted by scripture.[47] Since the proponent of the purity of a human-skull does not admit the validity of the *Vedas*, Vācaspati contrives to show how his inference is actually contradicted by it. The proponent's notion

[46]The means of knowledge, by definition, are what demarcate (*niścāyaka*) the true-nature of a thing, while the members cannot do so. See NVT 59.8-9, and NVTP 139.4-5.

[47]NVT 52.7 ff. In addition to making tolerable sense of Uddyotakara's example, Vācaspati makes some comments on orthodoxy of interest. A highly condensed version of his lengthy argument is presented.

of purity must rest on some authority. It will not do for him to claim that it is based on the performance of an immemorial rite, since the validity of such a rite can only be inferred if the performers of that rite duly observe what is prescribed by orthodox scripture in all other respects. That is, because one is, in fact, inferring the existence of an otherwise lost *Veda*. Conversely, no inference divorced from scripture can differentiate the pure from the impure. The proponent's inference thus either contradicts scripture, or is simply incoherent, since anything and everything is pure for him.

Leaving aside its manifest logical deficiencies, Vācaspati's argument appeals to a principle on the relation between scripture and inference. There are domains, purity in this instance, which are not accessible to inference but scripture only. So far as inference is employed as a coequal with scripture in such domains, it will generate either an outright contradiction or nonsense. If used as a subordinate to scripture, it can perform a vital function. That is, a rite not based on an extant scripture can only indirectly be inferred as being pure. Inference leads one to posit a scripture, which directly confirms the purity of the rite, but cannot of itself prove or disprove purity. Vācaspati does not further delineate what these domains are. In any case, his argument supports a strong reading of Pakṣilasvāmin's original claim.

Vācaspati offers a number of insights into the relation of Nyāya to orthodoxy in his commentary on the members.[48] He begins by considering an objection to the equation of the thesis statement with scripture: the thesis statement does not ascertain, as does scripture, because it would render the other statements in the inference otiose. By way of explaining Uddyotakara's answer, he holds that the *śāstra* operates with reference to explaining the objects of knowledge etc. By explaining reasoning, since it is inextricably linked with them, it would also explain that special reasoning which directly ascertains the objects of knowledge, the soul etc., or which ascertains the validity of the scripture which teaches them. Since the first member of this special reasoning is the the-

[48]NVT 59.8-61.7. His discussion of the members proper begins at NVT 57.13, and he dwells at length on what constitutes a sentence in NVT 57.15-59.8.

sis, it is directly the content of the subject matter of scripture and indirectly the content of that reasoning which teaches the validity of the scripture relating to that. The purpose of the figurative usage of 'scripture' to the thesis statement, accordingly, is: reasoning is assisted by scripture through agreement with a subject matter and becomes purposive, because it is commonly held that the knowledge of the subject matter of scripture is the cause of the highest good. Therefore, even if the thesis, which is found in all reasoning, is not scripture, nevertheless this has to be understood as the meaning of the specific reasoning under consideration. He adds that this relation to scripture rules out imaginary contents.

Vācaspati here qualifies the general claim made by Pakṣilasvāmin, and its figurative interpretation by Uddyotakara, that the thesis is scripture, and restricts its application proper to two inferences only: one that establishes the objects of knowledge and one that establishes the validity of the scripture on which the objects of knowledge are based.

It will suffice to note a few points in his discussion of the conclusion.[49] An inherence relation between members and their means of knowledge, as claimed by Pakṣilasvāmin, in a sentence is not possible. Further, the fusion which Uddyotakara postulated is a mental synthesis. The capacity (*sāmarthya*), which both Pakṣilasvāmin and Uddyotakara see as figuring in the conclusion, is given a different twist. Ordinarily an attribute of words, in this case capacity is simply the expectancy of the members, when uncombined, as well as of their underlying means of knowledge. Accordingly, since the members have one and the same purpose, to convey a valid logical mark, and have expectancy when uncombined, that they constitute a single sentence is established. Uddyotakara had stated, without argumentation, that 'reasoning in the highest sense' consists in teaching a man in confusion. Vācaspati gives a fuller account of why the five-membered reasoning, and not its underlying means of knowledge operating

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[49]NVT 60.21-61.8.

singly, does so teach a man in confusion. While there are cases in the everyday world in which perception and the like do teach a man in confusion, nevertheless the validity of the *Veda* and the teaching of the soul etc., which conduce towards the highest good, cannot be established without the five-membered reasoning, which is taught by this *śāstra*.

Vācaspati's contention that the ultimacy of reasoning consists in its ability to teach someone the validity of the *Vedas* and the nature of the objects of knowledge is an extension, if somewhat forced, of Uddyotakara's claim designed to fit the soteriological context.[50] That these cannot be conveyed without reasoning is a bold enough claim: that Nyāya actually demonstrates the validity of the *Vedas* is extraordinary. The *Vedas*, which define orthodoxy, are now dependent upon reasoning for grounding as a means of knowledge. It follows that Nyāya is the most fundamental of the orthodox sciences, since it is the means by which orthodoxy itself is established. Although its teachings about the soul etc. may be found in other works, namely the *Upaniṣads*, those teachings can have no validity until Nyāya is brought into play. In addition, the successful reasoning that results is actually established by true or non-figurative scripture. Far from corroborating the orthodox sciences, Nyāya is corroborated by them. The question of full conformity between scripture and Nyāya has been set on its head.

Vācaspati dwells at some length on the final passage in the *Bhāṣya* and *Vārttika*, on the *śloka* and its interpretation.[51] He first expands on Uddyotakara's assertion that, while Akṣapāda stated that the purpose of the *śāstra* is the attainment of the highest good, Pakṣilasvāmin claims that there is no purpose of which analytics is not the instrumental cause.[52] Even if the other sciences propound a valid subject matter, they operate upon the true-nature they respectively have to explain in dependence upon the means of knowledge etc., which have to be explained by this science. They do not also explain

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[50]This may be a play on the word 'highest' (*parama*): it can so function in lesser matters.
[51]NVT 67.6-68.5.
[52]NVT 67.6 ff.

the means of knowledge etc., any more than inference, operating in dependence on perception, does not at the same time also make the content of perception its domain. By so operating, analytics assists all the sciences.

Vācaspati goes some way towards explaining the qualification (*adhikāra*) Uddyotakara alleged the other sciences lack. Analysis appears to be uniquely qualified to explain both itself (namely, the dialectical categories) and the means of knowledge, which then are applicable to the subject matter of any science.

Vācaspati adds that one should not take the literal statements of the sciences at face value, but rather subject their interpretation to scrutiny. Consequently, the Vedic science and the rest are to entered upon only after one has ascertained the true-nature of what they teach by way of introducing doubt, examination, and the means of knowledge.[53] These other sciences carry out chants etc., which are illumined by the means of knowledge that are purified by analytics. Moreover, all the sciences by making known that substances, qualities, and actions are approved or non-approved means, prompt prudent men to act or to desist from acting. Whether such prompting or non-prompting is to be applied in all the sciences is to be obtained from analytics. That it why Pakṣilasvāmin says that it is the basis of all *dharmas*: *dharmas* are what prompt men in all the sciences and analytics is their basis. However, Uddyotakara, who thinks that analytics is the basis of the sciences themselves, by virtue of *dharmas*, explains this differently: analytics assists by way of being a concomitant when a science prompts one towards action.[54]

The primacy of analytics over the other sciences is complete on Vācaspati's account. It does not merely validate their subject matters and leave them to proceed according to their lights, but is intimately involved in their basic operations.

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[53]Vācaspati here seems to equate analytics with hypothetical reasoning (*tarka*) as providing the key to the exegesis of texts. However, he states that doubt, examination, and the means of knowledge are at issue: how hypothetical reasoning enters in here is hard to make out. Cf. NVT 62.15 ff.

[54]In NV 21.6-8, Uddyotakara states that analytics is the basis of the sciences, while in the *śloka* quoted by Pakṣilasvāmin, it was the basis of all *dharmas*. Vācaspati here tries to explain the discrepancy: that it is the basis of the sciences through their *dharmas*, the promptings and non-promptings towards activity.

Vācaspati treats Pakṣilasvāmin's specification of the appropriate knowledge of the true-nature and the attainment of the highest good in each science, as countering an objection, that there would be a mixture (*saṃkara*) of content and purpose among the sciences, since analytics provides them with these as common. His explanation differs significantly from that of Uddyotakara. The other sciences are employed towards the specific highest good to be effected by that science, by examining the intrinsic nature of that the knowledge of the true-nature of which they carry out, and not towards another. But in analytics, even if the means of knowledge and so forth are common, since they are commentioned with the objects of knowledge, which are unique to analytics, they apply to the appropriate highest good only, namely liberation.

According to Uddyotakara and Pakṣilasvāmin, the distinctive feature of analytics is its dialectical categories. Both hold that in its soteriological doctrines it does not materially differ from the Vedic science, particularly the *Upaniṣads*. Vācaspati argues that these soteriological doctrines are the distinguishing mark of analytics, while its dialectical and epistemological categories are common to the other sciences. He clearly draws on his earlier contention that the five-membered reasoning alone can establish both the validity of the *Vedas* and the soteriological category of object of knowledge. It would follow that Nyāya, or analytics, is the supreme science of soteriology.[55]

While Vācaspati makes a number of significant, even revolutionary contributions towards defining and locating Nyāya in the orthodox tradition, what stands out is his argument that Nyāya is fundamentally soteriological science, mediated through analytics. Neither Pakṣilasvāmin nor Uddyotakara seemed able satisfactorily to harmonize the competing soteriological, epistemological, and analytical claims of Nyāya. The analytical and, by extension, epistemological parts of Nyāya become, as it were, the common property or foundation of all orthodox sciences. It retains as its unique domain the soteriological and, since it uniquely establishes the validity of the *Vedas*, which are

[55]The other sciences are analogously derivative, but at least have unique subject matters.

soteriological in a secondary and corroborative way, it is the actual source of orthodoxy.

Udayana begins his treatment of the first passage[56] by explaining that Vācaspati's gloss, that 'basis' means 'operation', reveals the meaning of the base form, while the affixal meaning is revealed by Pakṣilasvāmin.[57] Accordingly, analytics is differentiated from other sciences insofar as it embodies the operation[58] of explaining reasoning (*nyāya*). Reasoning is explained solely through explaining the constitutive elements of reasoning, namely doubt etc.; hence the categories of doubt are the content of analytics. Without them it would not be a science, insofar as it would lack a content, or would be a different science if it had a different content.[59] Udayana also adds, by way of supplying Vācaspati's intention in claiming that analytics must be the fourth science, that, without analytics, it is impossible for one to be sure how the other sciences propound their respect subject matters.

Pakṣilasvāmin had equated analytics with reasoning and argued that the separate mention of the dialectical categories served to differentiate analytics as a science from mere soteriology. Udayana, apparently following Vācaspati, holds that analytics is differentiated from the other sciences in that it operates towards explaining reasoning. Its unique contents are the constituent elements of reasoning, the twelve dialectical categories. Udayana clearly distinguishes analytics from reasoning. On his account, it is a method or procedure for establishing reasoning and intrinsically to lack a content,

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[56]NVTP 126.12-21.

[57]Udayana intends the following. The base form (*prakṛti*) of *prasthāna* is a derivative of the verb √*sthā* 'to stand' taken together with its *upasarga pra* 'forth'. Hence a 'standing forth' or operation, as Vācaspati claims, is in order as its base meaning. When Pakṣilavāmin says 'is separately established' (*pṛthak prasthāpyate*), he states the affixal meaning of the form: 'that through which' the operation is effected That is, the affix is *lyuṭ* (alias *ana*) in the sense of instrument. Accordingly, when Pakṣilavāmin says that the sciences have distinct *prasthānas* he does not mean that they have distinct operations, but rather that they have distinct instruments by which they are established. The categories of doubt etc. are not 'operations' *per se*, but are instead the objects upon which an operation is performed.

[58]*vyāpāravatayā* is used, in part, to capture the etymological sense (*vyāpāra* being the term Vācaspati used to gloss *prasthāna*). Less literally, it means 'being the instrument'.

[59]NVTP 126.15-19.

since it adopts the elements that belong properly to reasoning as its content. The dialectical categories are no longer a mere appendage to the first two, soteriological categories but are instead critical elements of reasoning which analytics operates on in order to establish reasoning itself. Yet the relation between analytics and soteriology is indirect at best.

Udayana has nothing substantive to add to the first part of the second passage, on what reasoning is.[60] The only interesting point he makes is in his explanation of Vācaspati's claim that, since reasoning is dependent on perception and scripture, insofar as it is endowed with the five members, it does not contradict them. Since the source and end of reasoning have the same content, there can be no contradiction between them.[61] Following Vācaspati, he limits the scope of a contradiction of inference with perception and scripture. It applies to particular inferences, which must concur with the perception and scripture that underlie two of its members, namely the example and the thesis, if its result is not to be in contradiction with them. Whether inference in general can contradict scripture and perception is not discussed.

Udayana adds a new dimension to the discussion of an inference contradicted by perception, in the example of a human-skull-begging bowl.[62] He frames Vācaspati's argument with a preliminary objection. There is no direct statement in the *Veda* that a human-skull begging bowl is impure; on the contrary, there is an exactly opposite statement:

> Rudra indeed performed a mighty vow: he took up a human-skull begging bowl.

[60]NVTP 128.6 ff. Udayana devotes fifty four pages (NVTP 69-123) to the introductory section in the *Bhāṣya* and commentaries, effectively to the category of the means of knowledge. The remaining twenty-six pages of the *Pariśuddhi* (NVTP 123-149), which treat of the remaining fifteen categories, on the first *sūtra* are terse, desultory, and at times have a studied obscurity about them. Udayana here seldom expatiates on a point, often merely identifying, clarifying, or expanding objections and answers in the *Tātparyaṭīkā*.
[61]NVTP 128.24 ff. According to Śrīkaṇṭha, the source of reasoning are the means of knowledge, the end the apprehension of the object to be inferred (ŚṬ 41.17-18).
[62]NVTP 131.18 ff.

Therefore, how can there a contradiction with scripture in this case?[63] According to Udayana, Vācaspati's idea in citing *Manu* and other *smṛti* texts as evidence for the impurity of the skull is this: even if a direct statement (*śruti*) on this matter is not known, nevertheless a clear *smṛti*, which is based on the *Vedas*, is the means of knowledge for its impurity.[64] On the other hand, such a statement as the objector brings forth is mere *arthavāda*,[65] whose purpose is to reveal the praiseworthiness of man's intellect, and is not a means of knowledge for the purity of a human-skull begging bowl. Udayana does not explicitly deny the validity of heterodox scriptures,[66] but implicitly does so by expanding on Vācaspati's contention that the source for the inference for the purity of a human-skull begging bowls would have to be a blameless tradition. Since the due performance of other Vedic matters is the logical mark for inferring an underlying Vedic text, which would validate purity, and the proponent both denies the *Vedas* and does not perform what it enjoins, his tradition can have no basis.[67]

Novel in the passage is the introduction of explanatory statement (*arthavāda*) and its potential for resolving contradictions both between scriptural passages and scripture and inference. It appears that analytics will be the means whereby to decide when Vedic passages are *arthavāda* or not.[68]

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[63]Udayana's objector here is orthodox (later, the *kāpālika* will enter): so the objection is fundamentally the question of how to decide among or between contradictory scriptural statements.

[64]NVTP 52.7-8.

[65]'Praise, blame, contradictory injunctions, and ancient practice are what is called explanatory statement (*arthavāda*)', NS.2.1.64 *stutinindā parakṛtiḥ purākalpa ityarthavādaḥ.*

[66]Vācaspati notes that Uddyotakara mocks the *kāpālika* for observing his own scripture, NVT 52.15-21 (NV 15.17-18).

[67]Udayana, following Vācaspati, here makes a circular argument: only the *Veda* can directly or indirectly teach what is pure (*dharma* also). Those who do not follow the *Veda* can have no coherent notion of purity and so forth.

[68]Jayanta Bhaṭṭa notes that the Mīmāṃsakas are incapable of upholding the validity of the *Vedas*: ...*na ca mīmāṃsakāḥ samyag vedaprāmāṇyarakṣaṇakṣamāṃ saraṇim avalokayituṃkutarkakaṇṭhanikara-niruddhasañcaramārgābhāsaparibhrāntā khalu te iti vakṣyāmaḥ* (NM I.4.27-5.6). See also NVT 67.15-18, where Vācaspati says that Nyāya/analytics is a prerequisite for the Vedic science.

Udayana is largely content, in the third passage, to gloss the *Tātparyaṭīkā* closely.[69] On 'reasoning in the highest sense' he has one helpful contribution: even if there actually is inherence of specific means of knowledge in the conclusion, nevertheless this inherence is intended to apply to the class.[70] Further, there is no other means of knowledge in it different in kind from the four accepted by *Nyāya*. He apparently finds Vācaspati's explanation of Uddyotakara's claim that the inherence is a fusion, that is to say a mental synthesis, in a sentence, convincing, since he adds nothing. He notes that Vācaspati's account tallies with Jaimini's characterization of a sentence.[71] Finally, Udayana turns to the claim that this is 'reasoning in the highest sense' because it teaches a man in confusion.[72] He again frames a statement of Vācaspati with an objection. If another person in confusion can be taught by a statement only, then if he is confusion about the sentence or its meaning, then by what means must he be taught? If appeal is made to another sentence, then there is a regress. Hence, Vācaspati says that while there are cases in which the uncombined means of knowledge do teach one, nevertheless the teaching of the objects of knowledge and of the validity of the *Vedas* can only be arrived at through the five-membered sentence.[73] Udayana explains that these two matters are not the domain of invariant perception or scripture.

Since these matters are beyond the scope of scripture and perception, inference has a unique domain. Further, because neither scripture nor perception are on equal footing with inference here, inference has virtually intrinsic validity on the most fundamental teachings of Nyāya.

Udayana is sporadically helpful in the final passage, the role of analytics among the sciences.[74] He lends some clarification to Vācaspati's attempt to harmonize the pur-

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[69]NVTP 139.4-11.
[70]That is, the fourfold class of the means of knowledge; see ŚṬ 55.25-27.
[71]NVTP 140.12-20. Cf. JMS.1.2.46.
[72]NVTP 140.20-23.
[73]NVT 61.4-7.

pose, the attainment of the highest good announced in the first *sūtra*, with Pakṣilasvāmin and Uddyotakara's claim that the purpose of analytics is to clarify the means of knowledge etc. He asserts that the fact that the seemingly contradictory purposes are congruent is revealed through a pervasion relationship, namely that it is impossible for a thing to be a human end and not to be caused by a means of knowledge. The *Bhāṣya*, accordingly, means: because every purpose of prudent men is based upon means of knowledge which analytics has to explain, there is no cause for apprehension that liberation, the highest human good, might not be based on the means of knowledge because of the undesirable consequence that it loses its status as a human end if it is not based on them. Udayana restates, with elaboration, the claim of Uddyotakara and Vācaspati, that the other sciences employ the means of knowledge which have been explained, but the explanation of them is from analytics only.

Udayana now frames an ingenious, corroborative argument as an objection to which Vācaspati replies. Dependence on the means of knowledge on the part of the author and of a listener are common to analytics also:[75] hence it is no different from another science. That is, analytics itself, insofar as it is based on means of knowledge, does not differ from any other science. Vācaspati answers that the other sciences do not, like analytics, explain the means of knowledge.

Udayana next clarifies an argument implicit in Vācaspati:[76] because the other sciences are means of knowledge, insofar as they consist by their nature of verbal testimony, and verbal testimony has no further need to explain what it has to explain, what will analytics do in this case? Udayana expands on Vācaspati's reply that one should not take the words found in the sciences at face value: a valid means of knowledge does not require another means of knowledge to explain what it has to explain, but it does need hypothetical reasoning, which is its proper implementation (*itikartavyatā*). This is

[74]NVTP 146.133 *ad finem*.
[75]Reading *śrotṛ* with ŚṬ 63.21.
[76]NVTP 147.9 ff.

to be obtained from analytics.

The operation of hypothetical reasoning, which analytics teaches, relates to the appropriate implementation of the means of knowledge. Hence, analytics establishes both the means of knowledge and hypothetical reasoning, which guarantees their proper operation.

He concludes his discussion[77] with the claim that the ends of the other sciences depend upon analytics constitutes establishment of its 'heat' (*ūṣman*). This appears to be a play on the lamp metaphor in the *śloka*.

Udayana has surprisingly little of substance to add to his predecessors' views on the relation between analytics and orthodoxy. Outside of his argument that analytics is the means by which all human purposes are established, he largely provides close glosses on the *Tātparyaṭīkā*.

By way of a summary, the commentators in the NCG make numerous and elaborate arguments for the way in which Nyāya is both orthodox and even the foundation of orthodoxy, largely through the medium of analytics. There may be detected in the effort itself a certain defensiveness about the proper role that reasoning is to play. The commentators collectively grant a priority to analytics in order to establish the validity of the means of knowledge, the *Vedas*, and its soteriological teachings, all of which, in turn, are the bases for establishing both the doctrines of Nyāya proper and the orthodoxy of all other sciences.[78] Analytics so conceived is a method of proof or demonstration, and it is hardly distinguishable from hypothetical reasoning.

Yet the soteriological doctrines of Nyāya, which they no less champion and

[77]Udayana here attempts to explain, not without some exegetical acrobatics, how Vācaspati shifted the discussion from analytics proper to hypothetical reasoning (NVT 67.1; NVTP 147.14-17): it was revealed in a summary that hypothetical reasoning as well as reasoning (*nyāya*) requires doubt: he appears here to refer to NB.2.20. Further, reasoning is examining or examination (*parīkṣa*); cf. NB.3.5-6, NV.15.1-2. Even if examination is nothing but the operation of the means of knowledge together with hypothetical reasoning, nevertheless by the principle of 'cattle and bull', because 'means of knowledge' is indicated by its own word, what is meant <by *parīkṣā* in NVT 67.17 *saṃśaya-parīkṣā-pramāṇa*> to be expressed are purpose, enquiry, and hypothetical reasoning. It is unclear how purpose and enquiry have entered in, but see NB 3.5 and NB 464.6-9 (NS.1.1.23).

[78]Strictly speaking, the credit lies with Vācaspati for formulating a coherent account.

which are the ultimate end of Nyāya, appear to remain indirectly related to analytics. It is the dialectical categories of doubt through grounds for defeat that constitute or characterize analytics proper and give Nyāya its unique identity among orthodox sciences. The epistemological and soteriological categories, namely the means of knowledge and objects of knowledge respectively, are formally at one remove. A stricter connection to which the commentators appear tacitly to subscribe is that analytics only makes sense if its ultimate purpose is to establish human good. There is no need for a mere technique of reasoning for its own sake.[79]

There is one final concern briefly to consider. It is common practice in *śāstraic*, even non-*śāstraic* texts, so profusely to praise both the importance of the subject matter in question and the benefits that accrue to its study that it seems wholly to eclipse all other works.[80] Nyāya (as analytics) here is portrayed as the science of all sciences, the science that justifies all human purposes, and the supremely orthodox science. Such hyperbole need not militate against the genuineness of any particular claim advanced, but such claims collectively are, in part, to be judged against, as it were, a rhetorical standard; namely, which are the most compelling, novel or persuasive.

Now that the commentators in the NCG have brought Nyāya within the fold of, or even made it the criterion for, orthodoxy,[81] the orthodoxy of students of Nyāya itself seems to be necessitated. Yet there is nothing explicit in the *sūtras* or *Bhāṣya* about specific qualifications for a Naiyāyika. With Vācaspati and especially Udayana, this issue is directly addressed.[82] Since Nyāya purports to be a science of reasoning, there is no

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[79]Jayanta Bhaṭṭa calls the reasoning of the Buddhists and Cārvākas 'vile, trifling' *kṣudratarkasya* NM I.4.17.

[80]E.g. *Mahābhāṣya* I.1.14-5.11; principal among its importance is that grammar (*vyākaraṇa*) safeguards the Veda and preserves the tradition (*āgama*). "A brahmin who knows the four *Vedas* with their branches and *Upaniṣads*, but does not know this epic, has no learning at all...Just as the four kingdoms of creatures rise from the five elements, so, ye twiceborn, all Lore ranges in the realm of this epic. Even as all the senses rest on the manifold workings of the mind, so all works and virtues rest upon this narrative. No story is found on earth that does not rest on this epic – nobody endures without living off its food.", *Mahābhārata* I.p.43 (van Buitenen translation).

[81]Udayana incidentally asserts that Nyāya operates in reference to Vedic matters and not mundane matters (*vaidika vyavahāra / laukika vyavahāra*) NVTP 81.5-6 (NVT 24.18).

clear reason why anyone with the requisite mental capacities should not be eligible to study it. Further, as the first *sūtra* relates, liberation is attained by the true knowledge of the Nyāya categories. There is no stipulation of ritual activities and the like for knowing them, qualification for which might be restricted. In the balance of this chapter, the emergence of *adhikāra* as an issue in the NCG to 1.1.1 will be explored.

The role of *adhikāra*, 'eligibility, requirement, mandate' is familiar in the realm of ritual.[83] There are clear prescriptions about who is qualified (*adhikārin*) to perform or have performed Vedic rites. Manu, for example, states that the first three orders of society are so qualified, while Śūdras are not:

> To Brāhmaṇas he [the lord] assigned teaching and studying (the Veda), sacrificing for their own benefit and for others, giving and accepting (of alms).
>
> The Kṣatriya he commanded to protect the people, to bestow gifts, to offer sacrifices, to study (the Veda), and to abstain from attaching himself to sensual pleasures;
>
> The Vaiśyas to tend cattle, to bestow gifts, to offer sacrifices, to study (the Veda), to trade, to lend money, and to cultivate land.[84]

The lowest order, the Śūdras, are debarred from the study of the Veda, which is the

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[82]Bhāsarvajña holds that the student and the like need not be specified in the first *sūtra*, but rather are to be supplied by a commentator: "In this <first *sūtra*> there is no mention of the *śāstra*, the pupil, and the teacher because they have to grasped by reasoning, but it must be done by a commentator, whereby, thinking thus that 'This *śāstra* is connected with a purpose and the like', 'This teacher alone is fit to explain this *śāstra*', 'I, in turn, am qualified (*adhikārin*) to listen to this', and supposing that there will be establishment of his desired object, the hearer acts." *atra śāstraśiṣyācāryāṇāṃ nyāyalabhyatvānnābhidhānaṃ kṛtam, vyākhyātrā tu kartavyam, yena prayojanādisaṃbaddhamidaṃ śāstram, ayamācārya eva etacchāstravyākhyāne yogyaḥ, ahamapyatra śravaṇādhikārītyevaṃ saṃbhāvyātraivretārthasiddhir bhaviṣyatīti manyamānaḥ śrotā pravartate* (NBh 4.6-5.2).

[83]Most notably the sixth *adhyāya* of Jaimini's *Mīmāṃsā Sūtra*. Etymologically, the word is derived from the root √*kṛ* 'to do, make, set', and the prefix *adhi* 'over'; hence an *adhikāra* is a 'setting over', or 'province' or the like. The word is used in a wide range of contexts: legal ('jurisdiction', 'title of law'), political ('mandated', 'in charge'), and even more generally, in grammar, where an *adhikāra* is a heading rule which governs subsequent rules. Here the concern is largely with ritual or social contexts: who in society has the qualification/ eligibility/mandate to perform certain rites or activities. *adhikāra* connotes both an eligibility to perform a rite as well as the compulsion or necessity to perform it. In the case of Nyāya, the second sense is wholly inapplicable. See further, W. Halbfass, *Tradition and Reflection*, pp. 66-74.

[84]MS.1.88-90, Bühler translation.

source of orthodox rituals, and by extension the rituals proper. They also lack a number of societal qualifications, but, by obedience to the three highest orders, they can attain a higher status in the next life:

> One occupation only the lord prescribed to the Śūdra, to serve meekly even these (other) three castes.[85]
>
> But to serve Brāhmaṇas (who are) learned in the Vedas, householders, and famous (for virtue) is the highest duty of a Śūdra, which leads to beatitude.
>
> (A Śūdra who is) pure, the servant of his betters, gentle in speech, and free from pride, and always seeks a refuge with the Brāhmaṇa's, attains (in the next life) a higher caste.[86]

There are two *sūtras* that point to a presumption that Brāhmaṇas are eligible to be students of Nyāya. The first (NS.4.1.59) is framed as an objection: that there can be no liberation due to ones debts, pain, and activity. Pakṣilasvāmin explains how, when a Brāhmaṇa is born, he incurs three debts: abstinence to the sages, sacrifice to the gods, and offspring to his ancestors.[87] Further, these debts have to be discharged throughout ones life, and it is only with death that one is finally released from them. It may also be that such debts are not restricted to Brāhmaṇas; Pakṣilasvāmin, in fact, speaks of the debt as a connection or a relation to the respective rites. The force of the objection would then hold true for any of the three highest classes of society.

The second (NS.4.2.48) is more revealing:

> For the sake of this <sc. liberation> one should resort to this <discussion> with ones pupils, teacher, fellow students and those seeking the specific good – who are without envy.

Now by the immediately preceding *sūtra*, two measures are recommended for the sake

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[85]MS 1.91; see also MS 8.410.
[86]MS 8.334-335.
[87]TNT 1013.1 ff.

of liberation: practice at grasping knowledge and discussion with those who know it. According to Pakṣilasvāmin, knowledge here means the science of soteriology.[88] The mention of fellow students (*sabrahmacarin*) points unmistakably to Brāhmaṇas: being a *brahmacarin* 'student/ celibate' is the first stage in the life of a Brāhmaṇa.[89] Vācaspati, however, thinks that besides pupils, teachers, and fellow-students, the *sūtra* allows another discussant, namely one who is learned in the *śāstra* and is seeking the highest good.[90] It is *prima facie* possible that one could be learned in the *śāstra* and lack any specific eligibility otherwise. Thus a presumption that Brāhmaṇas, or failing that, at least the three highest orders, may study Nyāya is fully consistent with the *sūtras*.

Uddyotakara explicitly relates the audience of this *śāstra*: a student (*antevāsin*) who does not already know the true-nature of real objects through inference and perception.[91] He is richly endowed with spiritual powers (*adhyātmaśakti*): Vācaspati glosses this phrase by 'obedience and the like'.[92] There is, again, a presumption here that Brāhmaṇas are eligible to be Naiyāyikas.

In his introductory verse, Uddyotakara states that Akṣapāda proclaimed the *śāstra* for the tranquility of the world. Vācaspati states that Akṣapāda did so out of his supreme compassion, since he saw the world itself stuck in the morass of pain.[93] If he had not done so, the *śāstra* would not have come into being. He further claims that this treasury of asceticism incurred no sin for teaching those who lacked the qualification (*anadhikṛta*) to receive it. He cites two *exempla*, the sages Viśvāmitra and Vaśiṣṭha performing sacrifice and marriage respectively for and with the unqualified Triśaṅku and

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[88] *ātmavidyāśāstra* TNT 1097.1; Vācaspati glosses this by *ānvīkṣikī*, TNT 1097.19.

[89] MS 3.2, 2.49.

[90] TNT 1097.23-24.

[91] NV 6.9-10. The expression *antevāsin* literally applies to a Brāhmaṇa boy dwelling at the house of his guru. Uddyotakara speaks of the audience (*viṣaya*) for this *śāstra* as such a student: he does not mention any eligibility *per se*.

[92] NVT 26.7 *śuśrūṣādi*. This appears to be canonical list.

[93] NV 6.1; NVT 22.18 ff.

Akṣamālā.[94] It was by the power of their asceticism that they did not suffer any sin, whereas we who are of weak asceticism should not teach the unqualified.

Vācaspati clearly states that it was sinful for *Akṣapāda* to have uttered the *śāstra* for the tranquility of the world. Since later Naiyāyikas would likewise incur sin but lack the required asceticism to destroy it, they should desist from teaching the unqualified. He is content, however, to leave matters thus: he does not explain what qualification the student of Nyāya rightly should have if everyone is not eligible. That the teaching of Nyāya involves sin in any way is, however, an extraordinary claim.

Udayana takes up the whole issue with a passion.[95] He introduces his discussion with a lengthy objection and counter-objection.[96] The phrase, "for the tranquility of the world", in the *Vārttika* is difficult to construe, because it is both inconceivable and impossible. Since no one ever acts out of a desire to save the world, it is inconceivable that even a sage would do so. It is also impossible for those who are bent on enjoyments, nor does the world itself desire liberation. Therefore, the student, whose forms are those of being a Brāhmaṇa etc. and which are grasped from another *śāstra*, must be stated. One who lacks the qualification and acts is no more successful in the Brahmakāṇḍa than in the Karmakāṇḍa. Udayana now introduces a counter-objector to meet these claims. The concern, he begins, about the qualification does not relate to an end, because this is not the domain of human effort and because there is no prohibition about a thing's merely being desired. Rather, the question of qualification concerns the means, because this is the domain of the *śāstra* and of human activity. In this case, the knowledge of the true-nature, like liberation insofar as it is what is sought, is the end, because it is not

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[94]NVT 22.22.

[95]NVT 71.21-74.7.

[96]It is almost certain that the objector is meant to be taken as a Vedāntin: the mention of the *Karmakāṇḍa*, the ritual portion of the *Veda*, and the *Brahmakāṇḍa*, the knowledge portion of the *Veda*, are hallmarks of *Vedānta*. Likewise, the quotation of Śaṅkara's definition of the qualification for an aspiring Vedāntin (NVTP 72.4-5): *śamadamādisampattir nityānityavivekaḥ, aihikāmuṣmikabhogavairāgyaṃ mumukṣutā ca*. Cf. ŚB VS 1.1.1 ( pp. 71.2-73.1 Nirṇayasāgar edition). The counter-objector's identity is hard to make out, other than that he is at some level a champion of Śūdras, if not simply playing the devil's advocate.

established, and the means is the means of knowledge. The teaching of inference and perception is not, like teaching the *Veda*, prohibited for a Śūdra and the like, whereby he would lack the qualification for these things also. If this were the case, then, by apprehending fire from smoke or through perception, he would incur sin, as if he were studying the *Veda*. And inferences and perceptions concerning the soul and the like are not specifically prohibited for Śūdras etc., because there is no teaching of atonement, as there is for a Brāhmaṇa who sees a *cāṇḍāla*. On the contrary, the *Gītā*, a *smṛti* text states:

Women, Vaiśyas, Śūdras, and others of low birth.[97]

Therefore, just as that specific heaven is effected by one who lacks the qualification for Vedic sacrifice by another means, namely obedience and so forth to the three highest classes,[98] in the same way if the apprehension of the soul is made by a Śūdra by some other means, namely inference and the like, then what is the harm?

Udayana at last presents the final view. An inference that is corroborated by scripture ascertains its object, but not one that is contradicted by it. Pakṣilasvāmin states that an inference that is contradicted by perception or scripture is pseudo-reasoning.[99] The determination of the non-contradiction with scripture depends upon the ascertainment of its meaning. In this the Śūdra and the like has no qualification at all.[100] By dis-

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97 *māṃ hi pārtha vyapāśritya ye 'pi syuḥ pāpayonayaḥ* |
*striyo vaiśyās tathā śūdrās te 'pi yānti parāṃ gatim* || 9.32 ||
"For having taken refuge in me, son of Pṛthā, even if they be of sinful birth -
women, Vaiśyas, and Śūdras – even they reach the highest goal."

98 *traivarṇikaśuśrūṣā* (NVTP 70.16). See note 85 *supra*.

99 NB 3.8. Cf. *Śaṅkarabhāṣya* to VS 1.1.2: *satsu vedāntavākyeṣu jagataḥ janmādikāraṇavādiṣu tadarthagrahaṇadārḍhyāyāapi vedāntavākyāvirodhipramāṇaṃ bhavanna nivāryate, śrutyaiva ca sahāyatvena tarkasyābhyupetatvāt* (p. 89.1-2, Nirṇayasāgar edition).

100 See VS 1.3.34-38 (and Śaṅkara's commentary) on the Śūdra's lack of qualification to study the Veda. Rāmānujan comments, *à propos* of Śaṅkara: "We must here point out that the non-qualification for Śūdras for the cognition of Brahman can in no way be asserted by those who hold that a Brahman consisting of pure non-differentiated intelligence constitutes the sole reality...", *Bhāṣya* to VS 1.3.39, p. 343 (Thibaut translation).

regarding scripture and taking refuge in mere inference, he could only produce harm, as in using a begging bowl made of a human-skull. Therefore, since the *śāstra* operates insofar as it forms a single sentence with scripture, only he who is qualified in scripture is qualified in it. Therefore, Śūdras and the like are, so to speak, unqualified. Consequently, Uddyotakara's use of the word 'world' is taken by some to mean, 'all those who are qualified'.

Udayana's hesitation outright to declare Śūdras and the like unqualified to study Nyāya is telling. A Śūdra might, in fact, arrive at an inference fully in accord with scripture, without knowing that scripture. In such a case, it is unclear why his being unqualified in scripture would of itself make him unqualified in inference or make his inference harmful.[101] Secondly, as implicit in the objection to the Vedāntin position, a Śūdra is not disqualified in such inference or perception that does not concern scriptural matters. Insofar as scripture and the *Nyāyaśāstra* form a single sentence, the Śūdra would have no way of determining when he had crossed over the line into scriptural matters when employing inference or even perception. Perhaps Udayana's whole intent is that the Śūdra should not undertake the study of Nyāya at all in order safely to avoid falling afoul of scriptural prohibitions.[102]

Vācaspati spoke of Akṣapāda as being 'supremely compassionate'.[103] Udayana expands somewhat on this by way of answering the original objector to Uddyotakara's verse. Compassion is the desire for the elimination of another's suffering without any ulterior motive. Since one who sees an individual suffering can be compassionate, why could it not belong to one who sees the world itself suffering? If it does, what is impos-

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[101]It is true, however, that since he is forbidden from studying the *Veda* and cannot licitly find out its meaning from any member of the three superior castes (short of encountering an Akṣapāda), he can never be certain that his inference on any soteriological matter is not prohibited. On the other hand, since Nyāya is the means by which one determines the validity of the *Veda*, a Śūdra could paradoxically determine that he is unfit to study Nyāya by studying Nyāya.

[102]Udayana cannot make his case as strongly as can Śaṅkara, on whom he draws. Since the Vedānta is the Jñānakāṇḍa of the *Veda* and a Śūdra is expressly prohibited from studying the *Veda*, the argument for his lack of qualification to undertake the study of Vedānta is cogent.

sible in his operating towards a means to eliminate this pain?

Udayana also frames an objection for Vācaspati's assertion that the *śāstra* would otherwise not have come into being.[104] Even if the sage were compassionate, he should explain it to one eager to have it explained, and not one in the opposite condition: a singer does not sing among the deaf. Vācaspati's reply amounts to this: it is not the case that, because a sick man, to his misfortune, does not act on the medical advice of Caraka, the utility of that advice ceases. Hence, the benefit of the *śāstra* is undiminished if one fails to act upon it.[105]

Udayana again frames an objection, in the form of a dilemma, for Vācaspati's claim that Akṣapāda did not incur any sin by composing the *śāstra* for the benefit of the world.[106] If one does not see that there is only sin in explaining the *śāstra* to those who are unqualified to receive it, how could what he says be taken seriously? Conversely, if he does so see, how could he not desist? Even if he sees and acts out of compassion, he would be deluded. Moreover, who would put his faith in the statements of a man who has no dread of the next world? Udayana restates Vācaspati's claim, that Akṣapāda incurred no sin for having done this, and explains that, according to NS 4.1.63, the activity of one who is free from afflictions does not lead to rebirth.[107] Vācaspati mentions the power of asceticism as able to remove sin, however, since it is otherwise inconceiv-

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[103]In the *Bhāṣya* to NS.2.1.68 (TNT 535.4-536.1), Pakṣilasvāmin lists three attributes of a trustworthy authority (*āpta*): 1) that he has directly observed the matter in question, 2) that he has compassion for creatures (*bhūtadayā*), and 3) that he has a desire to speak of matters in accordance with his correct knowledge (see also NB 365.14-15 [NS 1.1.7], where he mentions the first and third). Vācaspati here emphasizes that Akṣapāda is indeed a trustworthy authority. (As for the first attribute, Chemparathy translates *sākṣātkṛtadharma(tā)* as, "ayant une perception directe du *dharma*", *L'autorité du Veda selon les Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas*, p. 20. This is objectionable on other grounds (Pakṣilasvāmin, NB 365.13-14 [NS 1.1.7], says that *mlecchas* can be *āptas*), but especially because it overlooks Uddyotakara's gloss: *sākṣātkṛtadharmatā – yaṃ te <sc. āptāḥ> <u>padārthamupadiśanti</u> sa taiḥ sākṣātkṛto bhavatīti* TNT 535.9-10).

[104]NVTP 73.6-9

[105]Likewise, it seems, if one is debarred from following it.

[106]NVTP 73.9 ff.

[107]*na pravṛttiḥ pratisandhānāya hīnakleśasya* NS 4.1.63: cf. NS 3.1.24 *vītarāgajanmādarśanāt*. Udayana politely corrects Vācaspati for stating that Akṣapāda incurred any sin.

able how it can be eliminated.

Udayana frames another objection, that it is better not to be involved with what is impure at all, according to the saying:

Far better not to touch muck than to wash it off.[108]

Udayana cites Vācaspati's reply and explains its meaning. Able men, out of pity, and not out of fear of being smeared with muck, rescue cows sunk in the mud. Once they have rescued them, they wash off the muck.[109]

Udayana frames an anticipatory objection to the *exempla* of Triśaṅku and Akṣamālā, in the form of a dilemma: if one is unqualified, how can he enjoy the result, or if he enjoys the result, how can he be unqualified? Vācaspati asserts, in reply, that such is the power of asceticism that such sins vanish. Udayana now explains his reply. Just as these sins vanish due to the power of their asceticism, in the same way, so by the power of asceticism even those who are unqualified, insofar as their resolve is true, enjoy the result. Further, they do not lack qualification in terms of the end: they lack the qualification in terms of a rite. But a rite, performed by one who is unqualified, being defective, does not lead to its end, because the completion of it is due to the good qualities of the specific sacrificer. The sacrificer alone, by sacrificing what should not be sacrificed, would effect sin, like a wise-man assisting a king. His sin vanishes through his asceticism. Hence the claim is made that those who lack the qualification to undertake a rite could not achieve their end; only the duly qualified sacrificer can produce the desired result. If he improperly sacrifices, he may incur a sin though he will also attain his end. By asceticism, he can clear away his sin. Accordingly, an unqualified man can attain the fruits of such a sacrifice and incur no sin thereby.

Udayana does not entertain the question of whether Akṣapāda's selfless act and

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[108]MBh 3.2.47.
[109]NVTP 73.17.

subsequent ascetic cleansing of his sin,[110] apply open-endedly to everyone, regardless of qualification. In what follows, however, it is argued that subsequent Naiyāyikas should not emulate Akṣapāda.

Udayana now cites a final objection that, according to the maxim,

That is the path on which the great men go,[111]

even we ought to teach those who are unqualified. The answer, provided by Vācaspati, is that this is not the case. Udayana does not spell out the perhaps obvious sense: since later Naiyāyikas lack Akṣapāda's asceticism, they should not undertake such teaching of the unqualified.

Udayana is the first author in the NCG to make an explicit argument for a qualification to study Nyāya. He does so by combining a claim in the *Bhāṣya*, that inference must not be in contradiction with scripture, with Śaṅkara's description of the qualifications needed to undertake the study of *Vedānta*.[112] That the fit is imperfect Udayana concedes by hedging on the lack of qualification on the part of Śūdras and the like: they are only, so to speak, unqualified. Whereas the Advaita Vedānta system is held to be derived from the *Veda* proper, Nyāya has only an indirect connection. It is fully in harmony with the *Veda*, teaching soteriological doctrines consonant with those found in the *Upaniṣads*, and even establishes its validity. With Pakṣilasvāmin, explicit arguments for the orthodoxy of Nyāya begin, and Uddyotakara formulates the more radical thesis that Nyāya is itself the means of establishing the validity of all orthodox sciences. Vācaspati asserts that Akṣapāda taught those who were unqualified, but does state wherein they were unqualified. It may simply be that Udayana is making good a lacuna

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[110]If he actually incurred any sin.

[111]NVTP 73.5, MBh Appendix I.32.68 *mahājana* could also mean 'the great majority of people', though this sense is inappropriate to the context. See G.Chemparathy, *L'autorité de Veda selon les Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas*, pp. 58-64, on the ambiguity of this term.

[112]Since Udayana quotes Śaṅkara on this matter (NVTP 72.4-5), it is likely that he was, at least in part, inspired by his treatment and extended its application to Nyāya.

in the overall argument of what Nyāya is and who is to study it.[113] In any case, it is sobering to see Akṣapāda's compassionate act, in uttering the *śāstra* for the tranquility of the world, reinterpreted to apply only to the qualified.

113That there are four *anubandhas* or 'elements', including *adhikāra*, in śāstraic and other texts was something of a commonplace by Udayana's time: see, e.g., Śaṅkara's introductory remarks in his commentary on the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*.

# CHAPTER IV

## THE MEANS OF KNOWLEDGE (*PRAMĀṆA*) AND THEIR VALIDITY (*PRĀMĀṆYA*)

The first word in the *Nyāyasūtras* is *pramāṇa* 'means of knowledge': its importance for Nyāya, which is sometimes also called *pramāṇaśāstra*, can hardly be exaggerated. In the NCG to the first *sūtra*, central issues related to the means of knowledge are addressed: on what their validity (*prāmāṇya*) is based, how they operate, both independently and conjointly, and how they produce valid knowledge.[1] Given the amount and complexity of the material on the means of knowledge and what constitutes their validity, an exhaustive, discursive treatment is precluded here. Instead, the following will be essayed: a close analysis of Pakṣilasvāmin's statements on the means of knowledge and on the true-nature (*tattva*) in his prefatory remarks to the first *Nyāyasūtra*, together with questions about and problems in his formulations. In the balance of the chapter significant resolutions, illuminations, additions or deletions of his successors will be considered. The idea, then, is to watch the gradual ramification of doctrines and shoring up weak points in the *śāstra*.

It is stated in the first *sūtra* that, due to the knowledge of the true-nature of the sixteen categories, means of knowledge through grounds for defeat, one attains the highest good. Since knowledge of the true-nature is here indicated as the cause of the highest good, its acquisition is crucial. Several questions are immediately suggested: in

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[1]In NS 1.1.3 ff the means of knowledge are characterized, and in NS.2.1.8 ff they are examined. V. A. Van Bijlert, *Epistemology and Spiritual Authority*, p. 1-44, provides a concise summary of early Nyāya epistemological and logical doctrines and their influence on Dharmakīrti. (Pakṣilasvāmin does not use the term *prāmāṇya*, but Uddyotakara does use its equivalent, *pramāṇatvam* NV 9.4ff.)

what does knowledge of the true-nature consist? How does one acquire it? How can one be sure one has this knowledge and not false knowledge? Why do the specific categories of Nyāya, whose true-natures are to be understood, alone bring about the highest good, rather than some other possible entities?

A regress appears at the outset. One is to acquire true-knowledge of the means of knowledge and the like in order to gain liberation, yet the means of knowledge themselves are the prerequisites to the attainment of true-knowledge. This regress, if unresolved, generates two dire consequences: that true-knowledge is not possible at all and that one need not take *Nyāya* seriously as a vehicle towards liberation. That the commentators are aware of the second is clear, since on several occasions they take pains to show why prudent men should in fact undertake the study of *Nyāya* in order to attain the highest human good.[2] The first is a fundamental problem of epistemology that is confronted at the beginning of the *śāstra*; how the authors of the NCG frame a response and defend it is the heart of their treatment of the first *sūtra*.

Pakṣilasvāmin's opening sentence, which speaks directly to the validity of the means of knowledge, anticipates this regress.[3] He plunges the reader *in medias res*, by presenting an argument for the validity of a means of knowledge even before explaining what a means of knowledge is. The first sentence of his *Bhāṣya* is, even more than the *sūtra* itself, the focus of the discussion throughout the NCG on the first *sūtra*:

> *pramāṇato 'rthapratipattau pravṛttisāmarthyād arthavat pramāṇam*
>
> 'Because of the successfulness[4] of activity upon the apprehension of an object due to a means of knowledge, <that> means of knowledge has its object'.

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[2]See, e.g. NVTP 85.6 ff, and page 162 *infra*. They are also concerned that *Nyāya* is simply too difficult a means to liberation, assuming that it is a valid means at all.

[3]This sentence is, in part, an answer to an objection set forth by Nāgārjuna in his *Vigrahavyāvartanī*:

*yadi ca pramāṇatas te teṣāṃ teṣāṃ prasiddhir arthānām* |
*teṣāṃ punaḥ prasiddhiṃ brūhi kathaṃ te pramāṇānām* || 31 ||
'And if such and such objects are established for you on the basis of a *pramāṇa*,
then state how these *pramāṇas* are established for you'.

Since Pakṣilasvāmin carefully explains each term in this sentence, a close paraphrase of them will prove useful for its proper interpretation.[5] There can be no apprehension of an object without a means of knowledge, nor successful activity without the apprehension of an object. The agent of knowledge desires to acquire or to eliminate[6] the object he so apprehends, and his striving either way is called 'activity'. Again if he actually acquires or eliminates the object, this right-connection of his activity is successfulness. The object (*artha*) is either pleasure, pain, or their causes: it is innumerable because the differences among living things are innumerable.[7] When the means of knowledge 'has its object', so do the agent, object and resultant knowledge, since otherwise success is impossible. In these four things the true-nature (*tattva*) is completely

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[4]The word *sāmarthya* normally means 'capacity', but the gloss Pakṣilasvāmin himself provides immediately afterwards rules out such a rendition in this context: *sāmarthyaṃ punarasyāḥ* <sc. *pravṛtteḥ*> *phalenābhisambandhaḥ* | *samīhamānastamarthamabhīpsan jihāsan vā tamarthamāpnoti jahāti vā* (NB 3-4). The 'right-relation' (see NVT 23.8) with the result is thus the actual, successful acquisition or elimination of the object, and not merely a capacity for such. See further Vācaspati's gloss (NVT 24.24): *pravṛttisāmarthyāt samarthapravṛttijanakatvāt*. This expression, *pravṛttisāmarthya* has suggestive parallels with the Buddhist term *arthakriyā*. In a study of this latter term in Dharmakīrti's works, and more generally in the Diṅnāga school, M. Nagatomi has concluded that its primary meaning is 'fulfillment of a human purpose', but that it has the closely related, secondary meaning of 'causal efficacy': its primary meaning is normally found in epistemological contexts – how one knows that something is real, while the latter occurs in ontological contexts – as an attribute of a real thing, "Arthakriyā", p. 72). *pravṛttisāmarthya* likewise seems to exhibit both senses, but in the NCG to the first *sūtra*, a decidedly epistemological context, that of 'successfulness of activity' - and that in matters of human purposes – is predominant. But see NVTP 121.16. It is unclear to which school the original employment of the notion belongs. See also E. Mikogami, "Some Remarks on the Concept of *arthakriyā*", who shows that Dharmakīrti and other Buddhists were somewhat embarrassed by a functionality argument to confirm existence. Kewal Krishan Mittal, "What Sort of Criterion is the Criterion of Functionality", sketchily argues that the functionality argument actually applies to epistemology properly. (Cf. Plato: "I suggest that anything has real being that is so constituted as to possess any sort of power either to affect anything else or to be affected, in however small a degree, by the most insignificant agent, though it be only once. I am proposing as a mark to distinguish real things that they are nothing but power." *Sophist* 247e (Cornford translation).)

[5]NB 1.1-12. Further, since most of the commentary treated in this chapter is focused on this sentence, a clear restatement of Pakṣilasvāmin's own interpretation will facilitate later remarks.

[6]The root $\sqrt{}$*hā* is used in two senses in the *Bhāṣya* and succeeding works of the NCG: 1) 'to reject or get rid of' something in ones possession or to which one is subject; and 2) 'to avoid or shun' something not in ones possession. The translation adopted here, 'to eliminate', only marginally covers the second sense, though there does not seem to be a single English verb that catches both senses. It has been so adopted to balance 'to acquire' ($\sqrt{}$*āp*).

[7]*sukha* 'pleasure' is an object (*artha*) but not an object of knowledge (*prameya*): cf. NS 1.1.9. That is to say, it is not something that has to be known in order to achieve liberation, but is needed all the same to validate the means of knowledge.

realized.[8]

Pakṣilasvāmin's restriction of the object to pleasure, pain, or their causes is remarkable both in itself and even more for what it excludes.[9] Leaving aside the knotty question of what pleasure and pain are, the apprehension of them or their causes seems too subjective and non-repeatable a basis on which to determine the validity of a means of knowledge. What pleases one today may displease one tomorrow, or may please one person and displease another at one and the same time.[10] Assuming in both cases that the appropriate activity is successful, two sets of contradictory means of knowledge emerge for the same object: do both sets actually meet the validity test on Pakṣilasvāmin's formulation? Is there any possible criterion for truth in such cases? Can one thus know an object in any meaningful way? How could one then generalize whether such an 'object' causes pain or pleasure or communicate it to someone else?

The difficulties thus formulated are based on an assumption that what is required of a means of knowledge is that it reveal the essence or some abiding nature of an object, which could then be identical for all agents of knowledge under all conditions.[11] Thus far, however, Pakṣilsvāmin, however, argues that the means of knowledge has validity so far as it produces apprehension of an object under the modality of pleasure and pain, and does not even allude to an underlying nature. Each individual's

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[8]Pakṣilasvāmin's discussion of the true-nature proper in the following paragraph (NB.1.13-21), which is closely linked with that of the means of knowledge, will be taken up shortly. The etymological connection among the four terms is made much of by the commentators: *pramāṇa* (means of knowledge), *prameya* (object of knowledge), *pramātṛ* (agent of knowledge) and *pramiti* (resultant valid knowledge)

[9]The translations of *sukha* by 'pleasure' and *duḥkha* by 'pain' though simplistic are based on their being the poles of human action throughout the NCG. Both words have a far richer array of meanings than is thereby captured. They are, for example, regularly used adjectivally of things that are pleasurable or painful.

[10] A further set of complications can be generated in terms of whether the agent is in a normal (i.e. not diseased nor deranged) state or not.

[11]There may be some middle-ground here. On the first alternative, it is hard to justify claiming that perception is a valid means of knowledge, if it is strictly only specific perceptions whose validity is demonstrable; this may be an unwarranted generalization. On the second alternative, if pleasure and pain are discarded in favor of essences, then the question still remains how one can confirm that a means of knowledge is valid: what would it mean to reveal a thing's essence?

means of knowledge would seem to be valid only for him and only for the specific object under the specific operative conditions. Pakṣilasvāmin here reveals no interest in knowledge for its own sake or in understanding things merely for their own sake. In short, knowledge and its validity is bound up with a delimited range of human purposes and needs, which determine and frame their contours.

No less puzzling is his apparent exclusion of all things that are not pleasure, pain, or their causes. Does he mean to exclude them as objects of knowledge altogether or only as such objects of knowledge that do not, through successful activity, confirm the validity of their means of knowledge? Both alternatives are problematic: one presumably knows many neutral objects, possibly validly, and, on the second, why successful activity as a criterion is to be limited only to the realm of pleasure and pain needs further explanation.

Pakṣilasvāmin also clearly gives an ordering to this process: a means of knowledge must yield apprehension of an object which, in turn, yields activity, the successfulness of which confirms that the means of knowledge is valid. Implicit in his argument is that a means of knowledge could, conversely, also produce the apprehension of an object which would not result in successful activity and would thereby not qualify as valid. He uses *arthavat* 'having its object' for the means of knowledge as well as the other three elements of knowledge. Two senses are implied by this term. First and straightforwardly, the means of knowledge is in 'possession of its object' in the sense that its apprehension is correct.[12] One that is not so in possession could not produce successful activity. Secondly, on the sense of object (*artha*) as 'end' or 'purpose', it attains its end in that it is successful.[13] This second sense of 'valid' or 'successful' seems exclusively in order for the object of knowledge, while the first holds also for the agent of knowledge and the resultant knowledge.

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[12]But see Vācaspati's gloss (NVT 24.21), by which he claims that an invariance between the object's intrinsic nature and the mode of its presentation is indicated.
[13]See NV 11.10-13 on this distinction.

Successfulness of the resultant activity emerges as the sufficient condition for the validity of a means of knowledge. Pakṣilasvāmin stipulates that successful activity consists in either the acquisition of pleasure or the elimination of pain. The relation of activity to the apprehension of pleasure or pain merits brief comment. It seems that one could apprehend what is pleasurable, let us a say that one is happy, and not act towards what is already in ones possession. Further, it is unclear on his formulation whether the object itself is or prompts one to act on pleasure or pain, or rather that one seeks pleasure or seeks to avoid pain and avails oneself of an object merely as an instrument.[14] On the other hand, it seems plausible enough to argue that, if one apprehends pain he will act, or at least think to act, to be rid of it. The inclusion of the causes of pleasure and pain likewise seems plausible, since activity is required to realize their effects. Yet a question arises even here: how does a means of knowledge reveal a thing as the cause of either? If one apprehends a glass of water by sight, does sight as his means of knowledge also reveal it as the cause of pleasure, in that it slakes thirst?[15] There seems to be much more involved here than Pakṣilasvāmin indicates: the means of knowledge is part, doubtless a critical part, in a complex cognitive act. Besides these issues, the more fundamental question is the reliability of successful activity itself as the criterion. One might by chance succeed in a pleasurable or painful activity, as wrongheaded as possible in the apprehension of the object.[16] Conversely, one might properly apprehend an object but fail in the activity for reasons unrelated to the apprehension proper. If one tries to drink the glass of water and instead spills its contents or finds that he is still thirsty after drinking it, is the means of knowledge that led to the apprehension of the water as the cause of pleasure thereby invalidated?

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[14]Pakṣilasvāmin seems to imply that it is the apprehension of the object which produces a cognition of pleasure, pain, or their causes.

[15]See NVT 28.25 ff (especially 29.1) on this.

[16]While one may readily dispense with sheer accidental events (though such might still confirm Pakṣilasvāmin's claim in particular cases), there may be some cases of what is termed *upādhi* (adjunctive relations), which might hold good but not universally or intrinsically.

Finally, Pakṣilasvāmin appears to assert that the validity of the means of knowledge guarantees the validity of the object of knowledge, agent of knowledge, and resultant knowledge.[17] His successors devote much space to showing that the means of knowledge is the paramount factor in the production of valid knowledge. In its literal form, the first sentence lends primacy or at least equality to successful activity.

In light of such questions, most of which will be addressed by his successors, one must ask: what is the character of this sentence? What precisely does Pakṣilasvāmin intend to convey by it?[18] If it is a strict definition of what makes a valid means of knowledge – Every means of knowledge that is valid is the cause of successful activity – then no means of knowledge that does not cause successful activity can be valid. In addition to the questions as to activity as a criterion raised above, that there are cases where a successful activity test is either not available or not necessary are further difficulties to be faced. The attainment of liberation through the study of Nyāya is the paradigmatic instance of the first: there is simply no way for one to preconfirm this claim directly through his own successful activity. For the second, ones apprehension of pain requires no activity to confirm the validity of its means of knowledge. A less strict reading may be in order.[19] First and foremost, it might be taken merely as an attempt to break a purely epistemic regress: namely, that the validity of knowledge is ascertained

[17]Uddyotakara is much exercised by the phrase *anyatama* 'any one of which' in this context (NV.11.14-16). He takes it to apply to all four terms, and insists that it be taken in the sense of 'most important causal factor' (*sādhakatama*), namely the means of knowledge as instrumental cause, in light of the operative context. This seems forced, although both Vācaspati and Udayana concur with his interpretation. It is simpler to take it to refer to the three terms, agent of knowledge, object of knowledge, and (resultant) knowledge alone: if anyone of these is absent, the matter is impossible. (It is not immediately clear how any of these could be absent if the means of knowledge is valid; Vācaspati and Udayana, however, argue that these three are the necessary condition, while the means of knowledge is both the necessary and sufficient condition for valid knowledge. See NVT 37.23-25 and note 38 to translation). If, however, one takes the word in its literal sense to apply to all four terms, Pakṣilasvāmin would thereby deny any intrinsic superiority to the means of knowledge, a position to which all his successors are dearly staked. This is an intriguing possibility. It should be noted that Jayanta Bhaṭṭa gives no such primacy to the means of knowledge: he argues that it is the totality of the causal factors (*sāmagrī*) that is of importance (NM.I.12.9 ff, especially 12.21-13.6).

[18]An even more fundamental question is why he feels that the *sūtras* have to be so supplemented.

[19]Uddyotakara, for example, notes that this sentence may be a restatement of worldly conduct (*lokavṛtta* NV 7.24-25).

by yet other instances of knowledge. The invocation of successful activity, based on pleasure and pain, at the least reorients the regress. Some knowledge, at any rate, conforms validly to its object, so far as activity can reveal it. The regress may, all the same, reappear in the form: must one ascertain the successfulness of his activity through a means of knowledge? Pakṣilasvāmin appears to think that the successfulness of pleasurable and painful activity is obvious and requires no mediation. This may well be his motivation in adopting it in the first place. The sentence also is intended to differentiate a valid means of knowledge from a invalid means of knowledge, when some doubt might arise and for which an answer is possible. That is to say, when some test can be directly applied. Viewed from such a vantage, the sentence need not be taken as a definition proper of a valid means of knowledge. Yet his successors argue that the Nyāya means of knowledge are the source of all valid knowledge in all sciences.

Pakṣilasvāmin initially states that the true-nature is the actual existence of what exists and the actual non-existence of what does not exist.[20] What exists, being apprehended as existent according with its being and non-erroneously, is a 'true-nature' (*tattva*);[21] and what does not exist, being apprehended as non-existent according with its being and non-erroneously, is a 'true-nature'. The terms 'according to its being' and 'non-erroneous(ly)' are somewhat ambiguous.[22] Is the apprehension of them 'according to their being' simply according as whether they exist or not? Likewise does the term 'non-erroneous(ly)' indicate merely that one does not apprehend what exists as non-existent, or what does not exist as existent? If, by the first *sūtra*, one is to know the

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[20]NB 1.13 ff. In many contexts a translation of 'present and absent' for *sat* and *asat* 'being and non-being' might be more apt. The lamp, for example, may, aided by inference, reveal the absence of a table: it would seem that the typical case involves the absence of things whose existence is elsewhere or otherwise observed and not non-existence *per se*. For the function of the means of knowledge will be two-fold: to assert what is and to deny what is not. In the very next paragraph, however, Pakṣilasvāmin does explicitly state that the sixteen Nyāya categories are, in fact, sorts of being (*sadvidhā*).

[21]Literally, a 'this-ness'. 'This', Uddyotakara explains, means what exists and does not exist, NV 11.24 ff.

[22]*yathābhūta* 'according as it is', 'according to its being'; *aviparīta* 'non-erroneous(ly)' Both expressions may be taken adverbially.

true-nature of the categories, that he simply knows them as existent or non-existent makes hardly any sense, since they would have no relevance for the end of Nyāya. Accordingly, it seems profitable to take the two terms in a different, if more loaded, sense: 'according to its being' might then mean 'according to its nature' or 'as it really is', and likewise 'non-erroneous(ly)' might mean 'not erroneous(ly) in terms of its nature'. This interpretation fits well with the opening sentence, for one does not act on an object merely as an existent thing, but as having the character of pleasure, pain, or their causes. However, if there are underlying natures at issue, why successful activity is needed as a criterion for knowledge requires explanation.

Pakṣilsvāmin next undertakes to explain how one apprehends what does not exist.[23] Just as, when a visible object is apprehended by a lamp, what is not apprehended like it does not exist, so too when what exists is apprehend by a means of knowledge what is not apprehended like it does not exist: for if either were to exist, they would be apprehended like what exists. Accordingly, the means of knowledge, which reveals what exists, also reveals what does not exist.[24] Further, it is kinds of what exist that are taught in the first *sūtra*.

Pakṣilasvāmin here supplies the connection between the true-nature and the means of knowledge: the relation is one of illumination (*prakāśa*). Clearly, the 'knowledge of the true-nature' (*tattva-jñāna*) is to be realized through a means of knowledge. However, there is still no unambiguous explanation of what the means of knowledge does aside from revealing an object as existing or not existing. Yet the determination of the object as pleasure, pain, or their causes seems crucially the task of the means of knowledge.[25] They must somehow lead one to apprehend the object, on Pakṣilas-

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[23]NB 1.15 ff.

[24]This issue is pursued in detail in the succeeding commentaries, but since the means of knowledge proper play little role in such discussions, these passages are not treated. See NV 11.24-12.17, NVT 43.5-44.18, and NVTP 121.14-123.10.

[25]Positive and negative correlations, however, embody the pervasion relationship (*vyāpti*) on which inference, synonymous with Nyāya (*nyāyam anumānaparanāmānam* NVT 30.22), is based. Further, such grouping is at least the first step towards determining a 'nature'.

vāmin's account, as pleasure, pain, or their causes.

Lastly, Pakṣilasvāmin states that the true-nature is completely realized in the means of knowledge, object of knowledge, agent of knowledge, and resultant knowledge.[26] This is not obvious. Does he mean that the object of knowledge realizes its true-nature by being revealed by a means of knowledge to an agent of knowledge and resulting in valid knowledge? Is the true-nature of a thing then something independent which these four bring to light, or else do the four determine or even constitute the true-nature?

Pakṣilasvāmin has thus set forth provocative doctrines on the means of knowledge, their validity, and how they reveal the true-nature of an object. His formulations, which are admittedly provisional, seem to raise as many new questions as settle old ones. He has left ample opportunity for his successors to elaborate.

Uddyotakara treats the first sentence of the *Bhāṣya* as corroboration of the relation of the *śāstra* to the attainment of the highest good, since the *śāstra* states human good.[27] After characterizing what the *śāstra* is, who its audience is, and into which two groups people can be divided, he defines the good as follows:




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[26]NB 1.8-12.

[27]NV 6.4-8.7 (*puruṣaśreyas*). A detailed analysis of the terms in the sentence is found in NV 8.7-11.6. In what follows, a highly condensed version of his general treatment is offered. Uddyotakara insists that pleasure and pain are the poles of the *śāstra*; the good is either the acquisition of pleasure or the elimination of pain.

The end of the *śāstra* is the absolute cessation of what is harmful through the elimination of the twenty-one kinds of pain, and such activity belongs only to those who are free from desire. Those who are subject to desire, since their activity is two-fold – acquisitive and eliminative – succeed or fail in both ways.[28] Yet, the two-foldness of activity is due to valid and invalid means of knowledge.[29] A means of knowledge is that which demarcates an object. Since a pseudo-means of knowledge demarcates an object as well, it too is called a 'means of knowledge'. Hence, when an agent of knowledge acts upon a valid means of knowledge, his activity is successful. Conversely, when he acts upon a pseudo-means of knowledge his activity is unsuccessful. And this is the successfulness intended by the *Bhāṣya* sentence.

Uddyotakara's characterization of a means of knowledge as that which demarcates an object is only a first approximation at a formal definition. A means of knowledge must minimally demarcate an object: according to what principle or under what modality it actually produces apprehension is left unsaid. His argument also reveals that the sense of the first occurrence of 'means of knowledge' in the sentence is neutral: it may or may not be valid. The success or failure of the activity will determine *ex post facto* whether that means of knowledge was valid or not. Less clear is how the first *sūtra* corroborates the relation between the *śāstra* and the attainment of the highest good. Apparently, the *śāstra* provides the valid means of knowledge whereby one can successfully act towards attainment of the highest good. However, their validity will have been confirmed in successful activity in more mundane spheres. The corroboration, then, is only indirect. Only a valid means of knowledge produces successful activity, and the *śāstra* guarantees the validity of the means of knowledge and also states what the highest human good is, the end of activity towards which they are to be applied.

An objector notes that this argument is circular. A valid means of knowledge is

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[28]By implication, those free from desire succeed or fail only in eliminative activity.

[29]Uddyotakara here shifts the sense of 'two-fold', from that of acquisition and elimination, to that of successful and unsuccessful, which in fact underlie the other two.

that which produces successful activity and successful activity is that by means of which one differentiates a valid from an invalid means of knowledge. Uddyotakara replies that there is no beginning to this process, of ascertaining through a means of knowledge and successful activity, because mundane existence (*saṃsāra*) itself is beginningless. Based on this resolution of the regress, he avers that, alternatively, the first sentence serves to show that between the means of knowledge and activity there is equal successfulness. An ordinary person by acting upon ascertaining an object through a means of knowledge obtains his end. Both the means of knowledge and activity are successful because they are inextricably linked to the attainment of the end. He provides another, but closely related, explanation, that this sentence thus restates ordinary usage: every agent of knowledge, acting upon having ascertained his object through a valid means of knowledge, attains his end.[30]

These two alternatives which Uddyotakara appends do not override his basic contention that the sentence corroborates the relation between the *śāstra* and the attainment of the highest good. They are, instead, supplementary: they assist in explaining the sentence and grounding it in the ordinary world.[31]

He next presents a correlation between elements of the *śāstra* and the four, fundamental soteriological entities: what is to be eliminated, the eliminating, the means, and what has to be attained.[32] What has to be eliminated is pain and its causes. The eliminating is the knowledge of the true-nature, which is the understanding of an entity

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[30]In some contexts, the term *pramāṇa* must mean 'valid means of knowledge' even when not explicitly contrasted with *apramāṇa* 'an invalid means of knowledge'.

[31]That the sentence, which has virtually the status of a *sūtra*, has a number of simultaneous interpretations is by no means a defect. Compare the verse ([*Viṣṇudharmottara* 3.5.1] quoted by Vācaspati NVT 157.25-26):

> *svalpākṣaram asandigdhaṃ sāravad viśvatomukham* |
> *astobham anavadyaṃ ca sūtraṃ sūtravido viduḥ* ||
> 'Those who know *sūtras* know that a *sūtra* is very terse, unambiguous,
> pithy, looks in all directions, is without superfluous words, and is unobjectionable'.

Uddyotakara may, however, simply be recording interpretations of other commentators on the *Bhāṣya*.

[32]*heya* 'what has to be eliminated', *hāna* 'the eliminating', *upāya* 'the means', and *adhigantavya* 'what has to be attained'. See NBh 442 on the connection of these four with the four noble truths of Buddhism.

in its abiding form: further, this is the means of knowledge. The *śāstra* is the means, and liberation, the absolute cessation of pain, is what has to be attained. Finally, he claims that the first sentence in the *Bhāṣya* serves to reveal the pre-eminence of the means of knowledge over against the object of knowledge, agent of knowledge, and resultant knowledge.[33]

Uddyotakara provides no transition to this correlation, which was likewise starkly affirmed by Pakṣilasvāmin.[34] However, he later makes explicit the basis for the correlation: all teachers in all soteriological sciences embrace these four soteriological entities.[35] The implicit argument here is: since the first sentence in the *Bhāṣya* also points to these universally accepted soteriological doctrines, their enunciation in *Nyāya* specifically is corroborated. His correlation of the eliminating with the understanding of an entity in its abiding form[36] sheds some new light on what the means of knowledge are to produce. Concern appears to be with an entity in its own right and not merely as the cause of pleasure or pain, though these are not necessarily excluded. By a slight equivocation, Uddyotakara further equates this understanding with the means of knowledge.[37]

Uddyotakara now turns to a detailed analysis of the sentence.[38] The affix in *pramāṇa<u>tas</u>*[39] is intended to convey an overlapping of grammatical number and case.

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[33]He asserts that three are literally mentioned, *pramāṇa*, *prameya* (= *artha*), and *pramiti* (= *adhigati*), whereas the agent of knowledge is understood because he is inextricably linked to the other three: there can be no means of knowledge without an agent of knowledge, NV 8.5-6.

[34]NB 2.10-12.

[35]NV14.1-4.

[36]*yathāvasthitapadārthādhigatiḥ*. There is an ambiguity in the term *padārtha*: it might mean 'entity' or a '<Nyāya> category'. As noted in the first chapter, one has to know the true-nature of all the Nyāya categories as a preliminary to knowing the true-nature of the objects of knowledge, which properly leads to liberation. See also NV.6.7-8 for the rendition 'category'. *yathāvasthita* simply means 'as situated'.

[37] The word *pramāṇa* can mean 'knowledge' as well as 'means of knowledge'. In the NCG to NS 1.1.1, it is nearly always treated of in the latter sense. See NVTP 78.14-15 on this ambiguity.

[38]NV 8.7-11.6.

[39]*tasil* (or *tas*). Historically, this is an ablative ending. In Classical Sanskrit, however, it is treated as an indeclinable, though its original ablatival sense is not wholly lost sight of.

By an overlapping of number, more than one means of knowledge can operate to reveal an object. The purpose, similarly, of the overlapping of case is to reveal that the means of knowledge is both a cause and an instrumental cause of apprehension.[40]

This doctrine of cooperation or synergy among the means of knowledge which he invokes is crucial to Nyāya's rejection of self-validating means of knowledge. Uddyotakara's reading of the doctrine into this particular sentence, however, seems forced, since the singular of 'means of knowledge' occurs later in the same sentence. That the means of knowledge is the cause *par excellence* or instrumental cause of knowledge is constantly affirmed by Uddyotakara and his successors.

Two objections against the overlapping of the means of knowledge are advanced and refuted.[41] The first, framed by a Buddhist,[42] is simply that the means of knowledge have restricted domains. More specifically, perception concerns particulars only, inference universals only: they can never share domains. Uddyotakara replies that the Naiyāyikas deny that there is no overlapping, that there are only two means of knowledge, and that there are only two domains. He cites as an example the overlapping and restriction of sense-organs, which are means of knowledge.[43] Only one organ, e.g. the olfactory organ, can reveal odors, while two organs, e.g. the tactile and gustatory, can reveal earth. The second objection is adduced by a *Mīmāṃsaka*. Because the first means of knowledge reveals a previously unknown object, the application of a second means of knowledge is as otiose as grinding what is ground. In response, Uddyotakara asserts that, as the different means of knowledge reveal the object in different ways, there is no redundancy. Since there is restriction to a single means of knowledge

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[40]Uddyotakara may, through an overlapping of case, be anticipating the objection that if more than one means of knowledge is operative, there is no single most important causal factor or instrumental cause for the apprehension. It should be noted that Uddyotakara states that the affix *tas* is, in fact, a fifth-case used to indicate instrumental cause (NV 8.8): the overlapping seems another layer of interpretation.

[41]NV 8.14-9.2. These are summarized here solely to facilitate discussion of them by Vācaspati and Udayana.

[42]See NVT 33.1 ff: ŚṬ 27.12-14 does not further identify the Buddhist(s) in question.

[43]That is, insofar as they illumine objects.

in some cases and no overlapping in every case, this overlapping of the means of knowledge is not otiose.

He next ascertains what the intrinsic nature of a means of knowledge is: a means of knowledge is that which causes apprehension, and to be a means of knowledge is to be a cause of apprehension. Further, the means of knowledge is the instrumental cause of apprehension.[44] This formulation is objected to as being too extensive, since the object of knowledge and the agent of knowledge are also causes of knowledge and accordingly qualify as means of knowledge.[45] Uddyotakara answers that the means of knowledge completes the object and agent of knowledge and not *vice versa*. Hence the means of knowledge is truly the cause of apprehension.[46]

Uddyotakara does not here reveal how the means of knowledge cause apprehension. He is, rather, content to show by positive and negative concomitance that the means of knowledge is the most important causal factor in the apprehension of an object.[47]

The fact that the means of knowledge completes the agent of knowledge and the

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[44]*upalabdhi-nimitta*. This formulation underscores his earlier contention that there is an overlapping of case to indicate both cause (*hetu*) and instrumental cause (*karaṇa/nimitta*). There is tacit acceptance of the grammarians' view that the means of knowledge is the instrumental cause until Udayana gives a justification: see NVTP 79.7 ff.

[45]Vācaspati cites the further objection that this formulation would sanction recollection also as a means of knowledge, since it too is a cause of apprehension, NVT 35.5 ff: see NVTP 109.5 ff.

[46]In NV 9.24-10.13, Uddyotakara resumes treatment of the initial objection, framed in a slightly modified form and alluding to the discussion of the *kārakas*: the agent of knowledge and object of knowledge cannot be means of knowledge because they are not the instrumental cause of knowledge. The means of knowledge, because it is the most important causal factor (*sādhakatama*), is the instrumental cause of apprehension. In the balance of the paragraph, he relates seven alternative ways in which to account for the pre-eminence as cause for the means of knowledge: 1) an argument from positive and negative concomitance (*anvaya/vyatireka*); 2) that it is that by the possession of which the agent of knowledge knows; 3) that the object and agent of knowledge have no efficacy in its absence; 4) that it comes into being last, like contact; 5) that immediately after its operation apprehension arises; 6) it is the unique cause of apprehension (*asādhāraṇakāraṇa*); 7) that it specifies the contact/conjunction of the causes of knowledge. Vācaspati lavishes considerable effort on asserting the pre-eminence of the means of knowledge among the other elements of knowledge, NVTP 37.17-38.27.

[47]Since the means of knowledge is, on the grammarians' view, the most important causal factor in the activity of knowing, Uddyotakara independently demonstrates this pre-eminence through positive and negative concomitance.

object of knowledge leads an objector to hold that they cannot then be an agent and object of knowledge proper. Uddyotakara's answer is that both 'agent of knowledge' and 'object of knowledge' are, like 'means of knowledge', *kāraka*-expressions. Roughly speaking, *kāraka*s are semantic categories that indicate constituent elements of an action.[48] They are five in number: agent, object, instrument, locus, point of departure, and end. The object of knowledge thus qualifies as an object-*kāraka*, the agent of knowledge as the agent-*kāraka*, and the means of knowledge as the instrument-*kāraka*. Uddyotakara argues against limiting application of *kāraka*-expressions to a specific, time-bound action. They are not realized solely in reference to such an action, but instead indicate a capacity (*sāmarthya*) that can operate at any of the three times. Consequently, to speak of an 'agent of knowledge' prior to ones actual knowing, which is realized through a means of knowledge, is proper.[49]

There is a somewhat facile equation of semantic and ontological categories in this passage. Uddyotakara seems to assert that the agent of knowledge and object of knowledge are rightly named because of their capacity to be such, whereas the means of knowledge, which apparently is actualized by them, nudges them into actualization. Is the means of knowledge the cause of knowledge by virtue of its ascertaining the object or by actualizing it? What, in short, is this capacity?

He now turns to the word 'object' in the first sentence. He claims that it is mentioned in order to rule out apprehensions concerning the means of knowledge, for such apprehensions do not prompt one to activity: it is the apprehension that an object is such that so prompts.[50] Likewise, indifferent objects are to be excluded. Activity occurs only

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[48]The *kārakas* are set out in Pāṇini A.1.4.23 ff. For an exhaustive treatment, see G. Cardona, "Pāṇini's *kārakas*: Agency, Animation and Identity". (See also NVTP 124.3.)

[49]NV 11.17 ff. Uddyotakara treats the term 'agent of knowledge' in strict conformity with the grammatical definition. By A.1.4.50 *kartā svantantraḥ*: 'The agent is independent'. Hence, the agent of knowledge (*pramātṛ*) is independent in the activity of knowledge. He cites four, alternative explanations (which are collapsible into two) of in what this independence consists: 1) that he enjoys the results of the all the *kārakas*; 2) that these results inhere in him; 3) that he prompts the *kārakas*; 4) that he is not prompted by the *kārakas*.

[50]By the *tathābhāva* 'suchness' of an object he means simply that it is pleasure, pain, or their causes.

when one apprehends objects as the cause of pleasure and pain. In answer to an objection, that the mention of 'object' (*artha*) includes everything without exception,[51] he replies that to claim that everything is sought is contradicted by the statement that there are four, soteriological entities, what has to be eliminated and the like. Further, one cannot eliminate the means of knowledge, nor is such elimination intended. Instead, what is meant is: all those things which are pleasure, pain, or their causes, are included by the term 'object'.[52]

Uddyotakara takes up the innumerability of the 'object' of the means of knowledge advanced by Pakṣilasvāmin.[53] He argues that *artha* does not mean 'object', in which sense enumeration is possible, but rather 'purpose': because one and the same object causes pleasure for some living things, pain for others.

His claim sets out in stark relief the difficulty in adopting a pleasure-pain scheme for ascertaining the validity of the means of knowledge. Since successful activity now depends on the purpose or goal of any living thing, the validity of its underlying means of knowledge is a private, constantly shifting affair. No less striking is that the actual nature of the object again recedes into the background: objects, viewed solely in the modality of pleasure and pain, are merely means to ends.

He provides a helpful gloss of the phrase 'are completely realized' in the *Bhāṣya*. This means 'suitability for use' or 'neglectability'. That is to say, the suitability for use, or correspondence, of an object when ascertained.[54] By knowing that this ob-

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[51]That is, everything is sought for as pleasure, pain, or their causes. The word 'object' he connects with the root √*arth* (*arthyate* 'is being sought').

[52]Uddyotakara cites consciousness as an example of something not to be acted upon by way of elimination, since it is not pleasure, pain, or their causes. Udayana notes, *à propos* of the claim that one has to eliminate all 'objects' including the means of knowledge and even liberation as being causes of pain: even if the *śāstra* and the means of knowledge are causes of pain in a general way, nevertheless they have to be acquired insofar as being the content of the highest human good intended, disregarding the fact that they cause pain. Otherwise, a regress reappears. Further, the means of knowledge cannot be eliminated because this would involve a self-contradiction and because it is the cause of the highest human good (NVTP 117.20 ff).

[53]NB 1.5-7.

[54]NV 11.20-22.

ject is either the cause of pleasure or pain,[55] the 'realization' is the use – the acquisition of the former and elimination of the latter. Similarly, the neglectability consists in knowing that the object does not cause pleasure or pain.

The four elements of knowledge thus 'realize' an object in terms of its fitness to serve a pleasure-pain end or not. Uddyotakara indicates that the complete realization of the true-nature is only the necessary condition for the validity of a cognition or its underlying means of knowledge. An apprehension may be true, independent of activity, but not valid. However, there is no explanation of how the ascertainment of a thing as pleasure, pain, or their causes takes place.

Uddyotakara clarifies somewhat Pakṣilasvāmin's claim that the 'true-nature' is existence and non-existence. They consist, respectively, in being the content of a means of knowledge and not being the content of a means of knowledge. Being is asserted, while non-being is denied. Earth possesses odor, while water does not: the means of knowledge reveals the presence or being of odor in the one, its absence in the other. In reply to an objection,[56] he clearly articulates the difference between being and non-being: being is the independent cause of apprehension, non-being the dependent cause of non-apprehension. Being is the independent basis for the means of knowledge, while non-being, being dependent, is realized through negation.[57]

As was the case with the previous passage, Uddyotakara's comment here is helpful but does not go far enough towards explaining how the means of knowledge reveal more than the mere existence or non-existence of a thing.

In his treatment of the simile of a lamp and a means of knowledge, Uddyotakara adds that what is not apprehended is another visible thing, similar in kind.[58] Since a

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[55]Uddyotakara here (NV 11.22), and in a few other places, treats the 'object' only as the cause of pain or pleasure: he quietly omits the possibility that it is pleasure or pain *per se*.

[56]A specious objection, at that: if being and non-being are both the content of the means of knowledge, they must be the same.

[57]The negation involves an inference or hypothetical reasoning (*tarka*): a non-apprehension is not sufficient. He will argue that because non-being is dependent, only being is taught in the *Nyāyasūtras* (NV 12.15-17).

means of knowledge can reveal the absence of virtually anything, this proviso serves to exclude most if not all irrelevant objects.

Finally, Uddyotakara considers whether, when one speaks of the 'true-nature of the means of knowledge', the true-nature is something distinct from or identical to that whose true nature it is.[59] If it is distinct, then liberation does not arise from knowledge of the means of knowledge and the like, but rather from their true-nature. When one says, 'Fetch the king's man', what is fetched is the man – the king is a mere qualifier for the man, who is properly the object of the action. Similarly, if one is told to know the true-nature of a means of knowledge, the means of knowledge are mere qualifiers. If, on the other hand, they are identical, then the mention of 'true-nature' is redundant. By way of answer, he cites the view of some *ekadeśins*, who deny that either horn of the dilemma is fatal. On the first, although the true-nature is distinct, it is not independent of the means of knowledge but denotes its state. When one says 'occurrence of jujubes in a pot', the occurrence is not identical with the jujubes yet it is inseparable. What is meant is that 'jujubes occur in a pot'. As for the second, if they are identical there is still no difficulty. To speak of the stationariness of an arrow is not to assert a wholly different object, but merely to deny that the arrow is in motion. Uddyotakara peremptorily dismisses this second explanation and may, if only by default, be taken to endorse the first.

Uddyotakara thus thinks that the first sentence of the *Bhāṣya* is a corroboration of the relation between the *śāstra* and the attainment of the highest good. This corroboration depends crucially on the four soteriological entities (*arthapada*) being presup-

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[58]Vācaspati glosses Uddyotakara's 'same kind' (*samānajātīya*) by 'capable of being apprehended by the same apprehension' (*tulyopalambhayogya*), NVT 43.25. This is rather loose: there are any number of things capable of being apprehended by the same apprehension, the absence of which is irrelevant. Uddyotakara's version is superior: it is the absence of the sort of thing for which one looks that is relevant, which, to be sure, is capable of being apprehended by the same apprehension.

[59]NV 13.4-10. This discussion has a grammatical point of departure. The true-nature of the means of knowledge, according to Pakṣilasvāmin, is an instance of the sixth case as 'default' (NB 2.6): that is, there is no indication of a *kāraka* relation between the two, but rather one of possession, description, and the like.

positions of *Nyāya*. The successfulness of action is vouched for by valid means of knowledge: likewise, the means of knowledge are originally established as valid through successful activity in the beginninglessness of worldly existence. He argues that the means of knowledge is the cause, or the instrumental cause, of apprehension, and claims that the synergy of the means of knowledge is prefigured in the first sentence of the *Bhāṣya*. In one passage, at least, he indicates that a means of knowledge reveals an object in its abiding form. He reaffirms that the 'object' of the means of knowledge in question relates only to pleasure and pain, and that the act of knowledge realizes a true-nature only in such terms. Finally, he claims that the means of knowledge reveals being independently, non-being dependently.

Two central issues that emerged in the discussion of Pakṣilasvāmin have yet to be adequately addressed: why successful activity and nothing else is the criterion for the validity of the means of knowledge, and how the means of knowledge reveal or aid in revealing objects as causing pleasure or pain.

Vācaspati reaffirms Uddyotakara's claim that the first *sūtra* is a statement of the *śāstra*'s right-relation: this right, or approved, relation is that of cause and effect between the *śāstra* and the highest good.[60] Since the *śāstra* is the instrumental cause of the apprehension of the true-nature of the categories of the means of knowledge and so forth, it performs an intermediate operation towards the effecting of the highest good, but it is not the cause by its own nature. The first *sūtra* also indicates that the *śāstra* is that which teaches, while the true-nature is what is to be taught. Hence, the first *sūtra* teaches the content, purpose, and relation of the *śāstra*.

That the first *sūtra* is what teaches is confirmation of Uddyotakara's claim that the *śāstra* teaches human good,[61] and that it teaches the content, purpose, and their re-

[60]*abhimataḥ sambandho 'bhisambandhaḥ* NVT 23.8. He notes that the knowledge of the true-nature in this context is called the '*śāstra*'. Vācaspati also reaffirms Uddyotakara's claim that the first sentence of the *Bhāṣya* is a reconfirmation of the *śāstra* as linked to the attainment of the highest good through the first *sūtra*. But he provides no more than an etymological analysis of 'reconfirmation', NVT 23.23-24.2 In what follows, he provides some insights into how the first sentence does so reconfirm.
[61]NV 6.3 (see NVTP 83.22 ff.), NVT 23.10-11.

lation for the *śāstra* is the section heading Vācaspati frames for the first two *Nyāyasūtras*.[62]

Vācaspati addresses the initial regress, mentioned in the discussion of the *Bhāṣya*:[63] the knowledge of the true-nature of the objects of knowledge etc. depends upon the knowledge of the true-nature of the means of knowledge. A means of knowledge must meet two conditions: that it is both what makes an object known and is invariant from that object.[64] If merely being what makes an object known is stipulated, then this holds true for a pseudo-means of knowledge as well. Yet ascertainment of these two is impossible, whether one proceeds intrinsically or extrinsically.[65] Vācaspati replies that this objection is refuted by the first sentence of the *Bhāṣya*. That is to say, in the phrase 'the means of knowledge has its object', the possessive affix indicates constant connection or invariance.[66] Accordingly, the actual meaning is: the means of knowledge is invariant from its object. This same invariance of a means of knowledge from its object is the agreement in different conditions, in different times and places of the intrinsic nature of the object and its mode,[67] which have been revealed by it. The

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[62]*Nyāyasūcīnibandha* NS 1.1.1-2: NVT 23.17-18.

[63]See pp. 119 ff. *supra*; NVT 24.3 ff.

[64]NVT 24.3 ff. *bodhakatvaikārthasamavetenāvyabhicāritvena*. In a later passage, Vācaspati will argue that inference has intrinsic validity (*svataḥ prāmāṇyam*), perception, verbal testimony, and presumably comparison extrinsic validity (*parataḥ prāmāṇyam*), NVT 29.21 ff.

[65]NVT 24.15 ff. His argument may be summarized as follows. If a means of knowledge lacks 'self-awareness', it could not apprehend itself nor its status as a means of knowledge. Even if there is self-awareness, as there is no other means of knowledge available, there is no way in which to establish the invariance. Thus, while the means of knowledge might be (or produce) knowledge, it fails on the invariance test. As for extrinsic validation: the possibilities are that one appeal to another knowledge concerning this, a knowledge that resembles purposive action (*arthakriyā*), or by seeing another object that is inseparable from the domain of that. Since all of these lack validity intrinsically, how could they not disrupt the previous cognition? Or, if they are intrinsically valid, why is the original cognition, that prompts one, defective? It should be noted that Vācaspati here rejects the explanation of 'knowledge that resembles purposive activity' (*arthakriyā*), but strongly endorses 'successfulness of activity' (*pravṛttisāmarthya*).

[66]*nityayoge matup* (NVT 24.21). *matup* is a Pāṇinian term for the affix *mat* and its allomorph *vat*, which mean 'possessing'.

[67]*iyam eva cārthāvyabhicāritā pramāṇasya yad deśakālanarāvasthāntarāvisaṃvādoasvarūpaprakārayos tadupadarśitayoḥ* NVT 24.22-23. According to Śrīkaṇṭha, 'mode' (*prakāra*) here means 'qualities' or 'attributes' (*dharma*), ŚṬ 19.2.

'successfulness of the activity' consists in the fact that it causes successful activity.[68] If the means of knowledge were not invariant from its object, it would not produce successful activity. Finally, the means of knowledge does not directly produce activity, but rather indirectly by means of producing apprehension of the object.

Vācaspati thus views the first sentence as a way of breaking the regress, since it explains how one independently establishes the validity of the means of knowledge. He lays down two conditions a means of knowledge must meet: that it both make known and be invariant from the object. The means of knowledge treated in the first sentence in the *Bhāṣya* meets both: the first 'means of knowledge', by making known the object, might prove to be a pseudo-means of knowledge. The second is clearly invariant from its object, and the reason for this is successful activity. Hence the validation is extrinsic and is not based on another means of knowledge or apprehension.[69] Vācaspati clearly states that the intrinsic nature (*svarūpa*) of the object has to be fully in accord with its mode of appearance for a means of knowledge to have validity. His formulation goes a long way toward a coherent notion of repeatability.

As part of a reply to another objection, Vācaspati affirms that the *śāstra* teaches the good together with its means.[70] This 'means' it would seem, are the means of knowledge by which the true-nature of the categories of the *śāstra* are revealed. Mention of this is made in order to lend yet more weight to the corroborative nature of the sentence: it teaches the way to validate the means by which knowledge of the true-nature is possible. This is also an insightful supplement to Uddyotakara's statement that the *śāstra* teaches human good.

Vācaspati next answers a dilemma: if the means of knowledge are not validly known, then, being created by sheer imagination, how do they contribute to the highest

[68]This is also the 'proper' logical reason, according to Vācaspati (NVT 24.23-24).
[69]Shortly below, Vācaspati will argue that the resultant, or successful knowledge, also must be ascertained, presumably through a means of knowledge. To block this regress, he invokes the notion of beginninglessness of *saṃsāra* adduced by Uddyotakara (NV 7.18 ff).
[70]NVT 25.5 ff.

good? Alternatively, if they are already validly known through a means of knowledge, then the *śāstra* serves no purpose. He simply quotes Uddyotakara in reply, that the *śāstra* re-analyzes matters already known by perception or inference. Hence, the categories are validly known. On the other hand, while an ordinary person can employ the categories of Nyāya,[71] if they are not properly distinguished they do not lead to the highest good.

The *śāstra* thus teaches real objects and teaches them in a critical way such that they conduce to the highest good. Conversely, that the categories are real entities is meant to reassure those who might doubt the efficacy of the *śāstra*.

Vācaspati also discusses how the two-foldness of activity is due to the validity or invalidity of its means of knowledge.[72] Since visible successfulness of activity is the cause, the successfulness of activity on the part of those subject to passion is stated, but not of those free from passion. The connection of their activity with the attainment of the highest good is not visible, because the highest good is not of this world (*alaukika*).

While asserting that the test of successful activity applies only to the visible, and particularly for those subject to passion who desire visible ends, he does not correlate the visible with what is not visible. How does positive activity towards what is visible on the part of those subject to passion connect with the negative activity of the dispassionate towards what is not visible?

Vācaspati provides a lengthy explanation of and reply to an objection raised in the *Vārttika* of mutual dependency.[73] It is not the apprehension of the object that is the cause of the activity, but rather the ascertainment of it. Nor is it only this, but rather, through numerous apprehensions that an object of this kind is the cause of the good, the ascertainment of the object together with an inference that the object now being apprehended is the cause of the good insofar as it is of this kind is the cause of activity.[74]

[71]This is part of the explanation of who the proper student of Nyāya is.
[72]NVT 28.3-17.
[73]NVT 29.3 ff; see NV 7.13 ff.

Such an apprehension of the object is said to be the instrumental cause of successful activity. Yet there is no full ascertainment of an object without ascertainment of the validity of its means of knowledge, and both the ascertainment of its validity and the apprehension of the pervasion relationship of being the instrumental cause together with the inference of its being the cause of good are not possible without successful activity; nor is successful activity possible without these two. Hence the mutual dependency.[75] His answer, while complex, merits detailed treatment. The claim that the validity of a means of knowledge is impossible to ascertain is true, so far as it cannot be ascertained intrinsically. It is, however, extrinsically grasped through successful activity among visible objects with which one is not fully familiar.[76] Now activity depends upon the apprehension of an object and not upon the ascertainment of an object, since prudent men act even out of doubt.[77] Nor do those who act, even having ascertained its being a means, fail to have doubts when the expected result does not obtain. Accordingly, when these men act, even out of doubt, having ascertained the validity of a means of knowledge through successful activity, through ascertainment of the validity of another object of this kind, with which they are fully familiar, through the mark of 'being of this kind' – prior to any other successful activity – they act by ascertaining the object.[78] Similarly, having ascertained the validity of the *Āyurveda*, and *mantras*, with visible objects, through successful activity, Akṣapāda teaches the ascertainment of the validity of the *Vedas*, which are uttered by a reliable authority, and with non-visible objects, even without successful activity, through its being uttered by a reliable authority.

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[74]*tadarthajātīya* 'of this kind of object', *tajjātīya* 'of this kind'. Udayana takes the latter distributively, 'of this and that kind', NVTP 96.16.

[75]See also NVT 28.26-29.1, where an objector asks: Does one apprehend a means to what he desires or simply water?

[76]The term he uses is *abhyāsadaśāpanna*, NVT 29.2: literally, 'endowed with ten(s of) repetitions'. In such cases where there is full familiarity, there is no need to confirm or reconfirm the validity of the means of knowledge which produced it.

[77]See further NVTP 95.19-24.

[78]That is, they have analogically ascertained the object.

Vācaspati insists that one does not, in fact, act upon ascertainment of an object, whose validity cannot be established intrinsically *a priori* in any case, but upon its apprehension. There is no need for successful activity in order to ascertain validity if the object is one with which one is fully familiar, an inference based on its being of 'this kind' being sufficient. If, however, the object is one with which one is not familiar, then successful activity has to be introduced as the determinant of the validity of its means of knowledge. Underlying Vācaspati's argument is something along these lines. In the course of everyday life, through apprehension of and successful activity towards visible objects, kinds emerge, familiarity with which obviates the need to resort to successful activity in order to confirm apprehension of a particular member. If a new object is apprehended, it is ascribed to a given kind, on the basis of some similarity. Then an attempt is made to confirm through activity that the ascription was correct, since it is known that things of this kind regularly produce a given effect. Unsuccessful activity proves the ascription rather than the apprehension of the object wrong. The validity of the *Vedas* is isomorphically determined. As the validity of the *Āyurveda* and *mantras* is established through successful activity, since their ends are visible, and they are uttered by a trustworthy authority, hence one may validate the *Vedas*, which likewise are uttered by a trustworthy authority, though their objects are not visible, through the logical mark of 'being uttered by a trustworthy authority'.[79] That is, that the *Āyurveda* and *Vedas* are of the same kind is the basis of the inference. Since, however, the *Veda*s have non-visible ends, they can never be directly corroborated through successful activity.

Vācaspati entertains the possibility that the result, being what is desired and the end, is not examined but only its means.[80] There is, for example, cognition of water, then activity on the part of one who is thirsty, then acquisition of it upon his acting, then drinking of the water, and by drinking the water his thirst is quenched. With this much

[79]See G. Chemparathy, *L'autorité du Veda selon les Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*, both on the argument from the *Āyurveda* (and *mantras*) to prove that the *Veda* has a trustworthy authority (pp. 40-45), and that it is first with Vācaspati that this authority proves to be *Īśvara* (pp. 27-33).
[80]NVT 29.10 ff. Śrīkaṇṭha attributes this view to Trilocana, ŚṬ 20.12.

the agent of knowledge is content; he does not also inquire into the quenching of his thirst, for this is what he desired. Vācaspati denies this possibility. Even the result knowledge has its invariability ascertained through the logical mark of 'being of this kind', insofar as it is something fully familiar. In order to forestall the regress that, in order that the means of knowledge for the present result-knowledge be ascertained as valid, the validity of its antecedent result knowledge must be ascertained through the logical mark of 'being of this kind' *ad infinitum*, Vācaspati invokes the principle of beginninglessness. The result knowledge can only be doubted as to its connection with an object, as being like what one enjoys in sleep and the like, if it lacks a sufficient number of repetitions.[81] He notes that, since the internal cognition, by virtue of which one apprehends the logical mark of 'being of this kind', which is in the cognition, is intrinsically valid, there is no regress.

A significant point is here advanced by Vācaspati, that the result-knowledge also must be confirmed as valid, and that this is determined ultimately through successful activity. The validity of the successful result-knowledge no less than the successful activity itself confirms the validity of the apprehension of the object. 'Being of this kind' now takes on a double significance: that an object, 'being of this kind', produces an end that is 'of this kind' or predictable. Knowledge of both is directly confirmable by successful activity.[82] Yet such activity and result-knowledge appear properly to apply only to visible objects.

Vācaspati next expatiates upon the status of the validity of the Nyāya means of knowledge.[83] One cannot apprehend that perception is invariant from its object. Verbal testimony, since it does not arise from an object at all, can scarcely have invariance.[84]

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[81]The cumulative weight of such repetitions rules out the possibility that the result one ordinarily obtains is merely imaginary, dream-like, or accidental. Such might occur, sporadically, but not regularly.

[82]He does allow that confirmation may arise through an inference, whose logical mark is 'being of this kind', when the object or its result are sufficiently familiar. The familiarity, however, is nothing but a stand in for a sufficient number of apprehensions confirmed through successful activity.

[83]NVT 29.20 ff.

Both of these require either successful activity or the logical mark of 'being of this kind' to confirm invariance from the object. Inference, on the other hand, actually has intrinsic validity, since it arises from a logical mark whose invariance from the object is apprehended.[85] He further states that internal perception has intrinsic validity, though without providing substantive argumentation.[86] He concludes that there is no mutual dependence between apprehension of an object and successful activity. Yet there is still the charge that between the inference of a thing's being a means to what is desired and successfulness of activity there is mutual dependency.[87] Appeal, again, is made to the principle of beginninglessness to check the regress.[88] He concludes that, when Uddyotakara says, 'apprehension of the object', he means 'apprehension of the object and apprehension of the object's being a means to what is desired'.

Vācaspati is, in essence, saying that invariance from an object is intrinsically valid for inference *ex hypothesi*:[89] a well-formed inference is based on a true logical mark, which is necessarily invariant from the property to be established. By contrast,

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[84]He leaves the explanation of comparison unexplained, on the grounds of simplicity. It, presumably, does not arise from the object either.

[85]He here also states that another means of knowledge, given certain stipulations, likewise has intrinsic validity: from the discussion that follows, he clearly has internal perception in mind, NVT 29.22.

[86]NVT 30.4-6

[87]Udayana expands, by way of a preliminary objection, on Vācaspati's treatment of this regress (NVTP 100.22 ff: see ŚṬ 22.19-20). There is no seeking (*arthitvam*) in the realm of objects until the object (*artha*) is inferred as being the cause of the highest good. If one does not ascertain the object, if he acts he cannot act having ascertained what is the means, because he is not 'seeking' for there is no inference as to <an object's> being a means to his end, without his grasping the pervasion relationship. Nor does he grasp it without activity. Hence there is mutual dependence. Udayana adds that, even if one acts here and there even without ascertaining the object as being the means to what he desires and the validity of its apprehension, nevertheless, simply by choosing one alternative he acts (ŚṬ 22.20). He seconds Vācaspati's claim that 'beginninglessness' is the solution to this mutual dependence. He underscores Vācaspati's interpretation of Uddyotakara's 'apprehension of the object' to include 'apprehension of the object as the means to what is desired'. There is 'doubt' as to whether a thing is or is not a means, and one chooses the one or the other.

[88]Vācaspati offers the following example. When a new born babe sees a breast, an impression produced by the frequent experience of its being an end of such a kind becomes manifest to it and hence there is recollection. Then there is inference as to its being a means to what is desired, then there is activity; and finally successfulness of activity. Since this happens in each antecedent birth, which are without beginning, there is no mutual dependency.

[89]He takes for granted that both the mark and the pervasion relation are established through perception.

external perception, verbal testimony, and comparison require successful activity or an inference based on being of 'this kind' extrinsic and subsequent to their operation to validate them. He also makes explicit the role of recollection in apprehending kindedness.

Vācaspati claims that the first sentence in the *Bhāṣya* has a further purpose, to indicate that the means of knowledge and activity are equally successful.[90] He first frames a cogent objection: that activity, namely that of contemplation of the objects of knowledge as pain or pleasure, is what is central in the *śāstra* – and not the means of knowledge. The first sentence of the *Bhāṣya*, he answers, goes some way toward resolving this. Activity can only be successful when based on a valid means of knowledge, and, by explaining the means of knowledge, activity is also explained.

The first sentence, he holds, is also corroborative[91] by way of challenging an opponent. That is, if one argues against the means of apprehending a means of knowledge, he must be asked whether he does so through a valid means of knowledge or an invalid means of knowledge? He has no choice but to confirm to worldly usage and claim that he does so through a valid means of knowledge, and this worldly usage is restated by the *Bhāṣya*.

The first sentence of the *Bhāṣya* has yet another purpose: clearly to reveal that eliminating in the soteriological group and the means of knowledge in the epistemic group of four are respectively pre-eminent.[92] Vācaspati closely follows Uddyotakara's

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[90]NVT 30.20-31.8.

[91]NVT 31.8-18 He asserts that it was previously stated that it was a corroborative statement insofar as it was intended to teach a means of knowing the validity of a means of knowledge, NVT 31.8-9.

[92]NVT 31.25 ff. In reply to an objection that neither combination nor alternation will hold good for the two groups of four, Udayana insists that the categories of *Nyāya* have, in fact, to be known under both modalities (NVTP 103.2 ff). The means of knowledge has to be known both as means of knowledge and as eliminating; the objects of knowledge both as objects of knowledge and as what has to be attained or eliminated. (Liberation has also to be known as what has to be attained (*adhigantavya*)). The soul has to be known both as an object of knowledge and as the agent of knowledge. The other objects of knowledge have to be known as what has to be eliminated; the categories of doubt etc. both as accessories to reasoning and as the means to eliminating.

These fourteen categories constitute *ānvīkṣikī* proper. In NVTP 103.22 ff., Udayana reiterates the need for all sixteen of the *Nyāya* categories, not merely the soteriological group.

identification of the means of knowledge with eliminating, and claims that the soteriological group is indicated by the term 'object' in the first sentence in the *Bhāṣya*.[93]

Vācaspati deals briefly with the overlapping of case and number which Uddyotakara sees as prefigured in the form *pramāṇatas*.[94] The only contribution of note he makes is a justification for the means of knowledge's being the cause, which is inseparable from its being the instrumental cause: it is in order to deny identity between the means of knowledge and its end, because being the cause and the end have different basis. For an axe is not itself cutting.

Vācaspati seems here to be arguing as follows. If the means of knowledge were denoted as being the instrument only, it might be taken as having the same status as its end, valid knowledge. Hence it is denoted as a cause. But it is unclear, on his account, why the instrument and the result would have the same status. Is he merely asserting that the actual functioning of the axe, cutting, is the same as the end for which it is employed, while the axe considered as cause prior to its operation cannot be so equated with its end?

Vācaspati presents a lengthy treatment of the argument against overlapping of the means of knowledge adduced by a Buddhist, which, however, sheds no new light on the Nyāya position.[95] He does, however, offer more insight in his rehearsal of the *Mīmāṃsaka* objection, that the use of an additional means of knowledge is otiose.[96] He first considers the following answer: insofar as apprehensions pass away so quickly,

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[93]That is, he takes 'object' in the narrow sense of object of knowledge (*prameya*), which is soteriological.
[94]NVT 32.12 ff. Udayana devotes some space on how the sense of the instrument is conveyed by the term *pramāṇatas* in the first sentence in the *Bhāṣya*, NVTP 105.24 ff. Instrumentality is understood directly from the affix (*lyuṭ* or *ana*), causality from the meaning: why is explicit overlapping necessary? He quotes Vācaspati to the effect that the indication of cause, which is inseparable from instrumentality, by the affix (*tasil*) is meant to prohibit identity between a means of knowledge and its result. He anticipates an objection: the identity between the means of knowledge and its result can be denied simply by instrumentality; what is served by explicitly stating cause or causality, which are inseparable from this? His answer is that, because if merely being the most important causal factor is sufficient to deny the identity (so ŚṬ 26.23 ff), the superlative affix serves no purpose.
[95]NVT 33.1-23.
[96]NVT 33.24-27.

means of knowledge are required instant by instant. This is denied on the ground that the apprehensions have permanence. The true answer to the charge of redundancy, in fact, is that the various means of knowledge reveal an object in different ways. He humorously adds that the means of knowledge are not so prescient as to cease when one of their number has apprehended the object.

A more substantial question arises from this discussion. Since the agent of knowledge is conscious, do the means of knowledge operate only when he has a desire to know?[97] That is: if the agent of knowledge, who is the independent element of the action, does not make the means of knowledge operate, how do they come into play? The answer he offers, in echoing Uddyotakara, is that a means of knowledge operates in light of its capacity, and not the will of the agent of knowledge. For, when a thirsty man does not drink water, the capacity of the water to quench his thirst does not vanish. Therefore, valid knowledge (*pramā*) is an apprehension produced by the totality of causes, and the means of knowledge which produce it have the same content. That they reveal the object 'differently' reveals that there are differences among this totality. He adds that, if one were to argue that a second means of knowledge is otiose, then when one sees the color of an object, there would be no need for his touching it and *vice versa*. Overlapping of the means of knowledge is thus not otiose, though it does not apply in every case.[98]

Vācaspati here underscores a point he made earlier, that objects have existence and determinate natures independent of any agent of knowledge. Further, since objects may have complex natures, multiple means of knowledge may be required to reveal them severally.

Vācaspati next takes up Uddyotakara's examination of the intrinsic nature of a

[97]NVT 34.10 ff. Uddyotakara invoked the grammatical notion of independence of the agent of knowledge, NV 11.17-23. Vācaspati sees its relevance here. Since the means of knowledge are not prescient enough to desist, the agent of knowledge must, at some level, be responsible for their operation or cessation.

[98]Uddyotakara's argument for the utility of overlapping was slightly confusing (NV 8.10 ff) and Vācaspati here makes some progress in clarifying it, NVT 34.16 ff.

means of knowledge.[99] By way of introduction, he lists four possibilities for what constitutes a valid means of knowledge:

1) that which produces knowledge of an object not already known

2) the similarity of the cognition, with its form, to the object

3) the capacity, on the part of a cognition which has no form, to reveal the self and the non-self

4) the cause of apprehension.[100]

He merely states that Uddyotakara adopts the latter. The first sentence of the *Bhāṣya* answers two possible objections to this formulation.[101] First, being the cause of erroneous or doubtful apprehension would thereby qualify as a means of knowledge. He rejects this on the grounds that the first sentence contains the word 'valid', or 'in possession of its object'. Secondly, the object of apprehension is not merely something conjured up by the imagination that would not result in purposive action.[102] He also notes that this formulation appears to encompass memory as a means of knowledge, for it too is a cause of apprehension.[103]

His treatment of the *Mīmāṃsaka* denial of overlapping of means of knowledge contains some noteworthy insights. Because, they allege, the object is revealed by the first apprehension alone, whereupon the person is prompted and thereby obtains the subsequent ones, these subsequent ones lack validity as means of knowledge. He answers that the fact that the apprehension leads one to gain an object is nothing but prompting to activity, nor is the prompting anything other than revealing the object.

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[99]NVT 34.22-35.4.

[100]Vācaspati merely lists these without further discussion. Udayana identifies and explains these possibilities out at some length. 1) is the view of *Mīmāṃsakas* (NVTP 107.16-19), 2) of the *Sautrāntikas* (NVTP 107.20-108.12), 3) of *Vaibhāṣikas* (NVTP 108.13-17), 4) of the 'elders' – i.e. the *Naiyāyikas* – and others (NVTP 108.18 ff).

[101]Vācaspati explains how Uddyotakara's definition excludes the first three listed above, NVT 35.2-4.

[102]NVT 35.5-6 *arthakriyā*. This is presumably a gloss on *samartha-pravṛttilpravṛtti-sāmarthya*.

[103]NVT 35.5-12. He will argue that memory is not valid apprehension (*pramā*), which is what the means of knowledge must produce.

Since revealing is no different for the first than for subsequent cognitions, why is the first alone the means of knowledge? He now turns the *Mīmāṃsaka* objection against itself. That only the first apprehension qualifies as a means of knowledge limits the application of means of knowledge to human ends solely and would leave out of account objects that are not relevant to human concerns. That is, if validity as a means of knowledge is dependent upon the person, then the apprehension of the moon, stars, and so forth lack validity as means of knowledge.

Vācaspati's argument is rather sketchy and weak. He apparently thinks that, if only the first apprehension serves to reveal an object not already known, then the validity of a means of knowledge must depend on a person's desire to know something he does not already know. Yet there is nothing to prevent one from not already knowing or desiring to know something about a heavenly body or the like. What is more, since the means of knowledge in Nyāya derive their validity fundamentally from the all too human realm of pleasure and pain, the argument he adduces applies at least as tellingly to Nyāya as to *Mīmāṃsā*.

Vācaspati takes up an objection against overextension stated in the *Vārttika:*[104] both the agent of knowledge and the object of knowledge meet the conditions of the definition for a means of knowledge. Several points in his lengthy discussion merit notice. First, he asserts that every agent does not directly upon his end, but rather upon the means. The agent is thus successful only with regard to the instrument, whereas the instrument is successful with regard to the end only.[105] Similarly, the object of knowledge is properly the content of the means of knowledge, and it is only the cause of knowledge in the case of perception. Consequently, both the agent and object of knowl-

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[104]NVT 36.1 ff (NV 9.5 ff).

[105]Udayana notes that once Uddyotakara had revealed the characterization of instrumental cause as that *kāraka* which as a cause is not complete (*caritārtha*) with respect to another *kāraka*, he indirectly indicated a characterization of the means of knowledge: that what is the domain of the operation of the agent is the instrumental causes, NVTP 115.3 ff. The various characterizations of how the means of knowledge is the most important causal factor by Uddyotakara are, it follows, variations on this claim that a means of knowledge is the domain of the operation of the agent.

edge are successful only in regard to the means of knowledge, while the means of knowledge alone is the cause of the end. Hence, it is the cause of apprehension, as Uddyotakara asserts.

The *kārakas*, and particularly the role of 'capacity' which Uddyotakara assigns to them are treated of by Vācaspati.[106] On his account, a thing is not a *kāraka* only in regard to a specific action, but rather a thing is designated as a *kāraka* through some capacity by virtue of which it can perform a specific subordinate operation towards the principal action. Such linguistic usage as, 'He cooked', is grounded in the ordinary world, and relations between words and objects depend upon such usage. The capacity is of two kinds: the intrinsic nature of the *kārakas* towards producing their effects and the collocation of all accessory factors. Since *kāraka*-expressions operate even in the absence of the accessory factors, it is their intrinsic nature (the three times being imposed properties) that is the cause of their operation. Hence, both the agent of knowledge and the object of knowledge as *kāraka*-expressions operate as such independently of the means of knowledge.

Uddyotakara adopted a sort of *kāraka*-essentialism in his discussion, and Vācaspati presents a more intelligible account. Although the capacity is part of the nature of a thing, it is now filtered through usage. The *kārakas* emerge as hypostasized collocations of objects and conventional usage.[107]

In commenting on Uddyotakara's discussion of the term 'object', Vācaspati provides an account of how to extend validity.[108] One of the purposes for its explicit mention, according to Uddyotakara, is to exclude from consideration indifferent objects, since apprehensions of indifferent objects do not prompt one to activity. Vā-

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[106]NVT 36.22 ff (NV 9.12 ff).
[107]Udayana argues that the objection, how can the means of knowledge be produced by the object and agent of knowledge, and the claim, that a *kāraka* has to be used in connection with a specific action, are formulated by one who holds that *kāraka*-expressions are caused by connection with a principal action which is established in reality. The reply, however, comes from one who thinks that the occurrence is caused by their connection with a principal action that is established in the mind, NVTP 115.8 ff.
[108]NVT 39.5 ff.

caspati denies that such apprehensions do not, accordingly, lack valid means of knowledge. Their validity is arrived at by an inference through their similarity to visible means of knowledge as the logical mark.[109]

It is now possible clearly to set forth how Vācaspati construes the first sentence of the *Bhāṣya*. The successfulness of activity in the domain of pleasure and pain validates the means of knowledge that gave rise to it. Apprehensions of objects that, while in the visible realm, are indifferent in terms of pleasure and pain can be valid as well, through an inference as to their similarity to confirmed means of knowledge. A similar argument figures for apprehensions of objects that are transcendent,[110] yet are or cause pleasure or pain: their validity is determined through an inference based on a mark of similarity with confirmed means of knowledge. The fundamental claim, then, is that successful activity actually is the basis for all valid knowledge: directly, for apprehensions of visible objects that produce pleasure or pain, and indirectly, through inference, for visible objects which are indifferent and for non-visible objects that produce pleasure or pain through inference.[111] Nyāya, whose ultimate end is to procure the highest human happiness, has an ancillary task of providing inferences or grounds for inferences for the validity of apprehensions of transcendent or indifferent objects. While successful activity underlies all validity, the application of inference, which Nyāya uniquely supplies and justifies, allows one properly to understand the highest good.[112]

Vācaspati explains Uddyotakara's denial of the inclusion of all things by the word 'object'.[113] The elimination of all things is not possible, since pleasure, pain, and

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[109]This is also the mode by which transcendent (*adṛṣṭa*) objects have valid means of knowledge.

[110]*adṛṣṭa*. Literally 'unseen, not experienced': that is, things which are beyond the ken of ordinary experience.

[111]There is a fourth group, objects which are transcendent (*adṛṣṭa*) and are indifferent, which is nowhere clearly mentioned by the commentators of the NCG.

[112]It seems that Vācaspati's insistence that inference has intrinsic validation is to be seen in this light: once validity is established extrinsically for apprehensions of visible objects, inference is confidently invoked for the validity of apprehensions of non-visible objects. Incidentally, this principle will also cover validation of scriptural revelations and the like: one needs only to find a 'visible' homolog to infer them.

their causes, being what has to be eliminated, require a means of elimination. There is no means to this besides the means of knowledge and so forth, which cannot eradicate themselves. What is more, liberation is only attained through them.

Since the means of knowledge and the objects of knowledge, at least in part, are only directly validated by such activity as conforms to the pleasure-pain schema, all the other *Nyāya* categories are apparently to be known through verbal testimony,[114] the validity of which is based ultimately on successful activity and inference. The need to justify the validity of verbal testimony is accordingly essential to the utility of the *śāstra*, and derivatively useful towards the *Veda* and the like.

Vācaspati expands on Uddyotakara's claim that the word 'object' means 'purpose'.[115] The purposes for living things cannot be restricted as follows: a means of knowledge concerning sandalpaste has only pleasure as its purpose, that concerning thorns only pain. This claim provokes the telling objection: is the fact that objects are pleasure, pain, or their causes intrinsic (*svābhāvika*) or not? If they are so intrinsically, then an object like 'blue' would be pleasurable for all living things, and thorns would be as pleasant for men as they are for camels. Similarly, in the hot season turmeric would be pleasant, and in the cold season so would sandalpaste. Further, water would be as pleasant for thirsty man as a sated man.[116] Yet if they are not intrinsic, then pleasure, pain and their causes, which would then follow human imaginations, would not be ends of valid means of knowledge. Vācaspati defers a full treatment for later, but does set forth a brief and interesting answer here.[117] The attributes of things do occur in temporal sequence, while the objects proper do not.[118] That is to say, though things

[113]NVT 39.9 ff is a recapitulation of how the means of knowledge is revealed as the instrumental cause of the apprehension of the object.
[114]Vācaspati argues that the term '*śāstra*' narrowly applies to the last fourteen categories (NVT 31.23).
[115]NVT 40.11-26.
[116]See further NVTP 119.9-15, where Udayana provides some helpful glosses on terms in and fuller examples for the passage.
[117]To his commentary on NS 3.2.10-17. His discussion there focuses on the possibility that attributes of objects have a temporal sequence.

are not pleasure, pain, or their causes by their nature, still that they are pleasure, pain, or their causes is justified because of the collocation of different classes, places, times, conditions, individuals, and accessory factors, but not in a determinate way.[119]

Vācaspati here addresses one of the central issues seemingly omitted by Pakṣilasvāmin and Uddyotakara: why are pleasure, pain, and their causes suitable or necessary to determine the validity of means of knowledge? Objects clearly are not pleasure, pain, or their causes *per se*, but certain constellations of object, attributes, person, situation and the like may be. In addition, though there is clearly no deterministic mechanism at play, such constellations are repeatable[120] and admit of truth and falsity, so far as activity can confirm them.

In his treatment of the term 'possessing its object',[121] Vācaspati offers glosses on Uddyotakara's gloss: 'having its object' or 'valid' means 'having its object correctly', that is to say, not variant from its object.[122] The correctness of the object consists in this: that whatever sort of thing the means of knowledge reveals it to be, it is such and not otherwise. But on the interpretation that 'valid' means 'achieves its purpose', the explanation is different: namely, if the means of knowledge achieves its purpose, then the agent and so forth gain their purpose.

Vācaspati restates, if clumsily, the relevance of successful activity towards otherworldly[123] objects, particularly the *Vedas*.[124] There is no direct way to confirm the validity of the *Vedas* on otherworldly matters. Instead, the validity of exactly similar

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[118]That is to say: though there is an abiding nature (*sthemabhāja*) to objects, their attributes are not likewise fixed: they change over time due to changing causal factors and accessory causes. Hence, their attributes are not absolutely invariant in time.

[119]*avyavasthā*. He adds a formal syllogism, NVT 41.1-3.

[120]A justification for a kind of repeatability (namely, one that does not involve strict identity) could readily be framed from three principles Vācaspati variously invokes: the beginninglessness of *saṃsāra*, recollection, and kindedness.

[121]NVT 41.4-6. In the next sentence, he reveals that 'having its object correctly' if applied to the object clearly must have a different sense.

[122]*arthavat* (NB 1.8) = *samartha* (NV 11.13) = *samyagartha* (NVT 41.5).

[123]A succinct reformulation of his argument is given in what follows.

verbal testimony, namely the *Āyurveda*, on visible matters is directly demonstrated through successful activity. Then, since both are verbal testimony, are otherwise similar, and share the characteristic mark of being composed by a trustworthy authority, an inference based on this mark confirms the validity of the *Vedas*. There is no other way in which to confirm their validity.[125]

Vācaspati notes, in his discussion of the expression 'complete realization of the true-nature',[126] that Uddyotakara explicitly mentions 'suitability' in order to show that there is realization of the true-nature in the case of a real object which is visible, even if it is desired, if it is not acquired by a man due to some obstruction. For even if it is not acquired by a person, nevertheless, there is complete realization of its true-nature, since its suitability for acquisition has been revealed.

That a cognition so realizes an object's true-nature does not entail that it is valid, but only that it cannot be valid, which is properly demonstrated through successful activity alone. Such apprehensions are true, yet not formally valid.

Vācaspati provides a number of valuable additions and clarifications to the formulations of his predecessors. Of greatest importance is his introduction of the principle of 'being of this kind' to bridge the gap between bare apprehension and activity. He thus provides a coherent account of how objects can be apprehended validly as pleasure, pain, or their causes and tested against activity. Again, he makes explicit that recollection is an integral part of the apprehension or possibility of apprehension of kinds.

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[124]NVT 41.15 ff. Udayana frames an interesting objection to and justification for the validity of scripture (NVTP 119.18-21) Vedically derived apprehension can only be invariant from its object, because, as you allege, its apprehension arises from the teaching of a trustworthy authority. This is possible to maintain only if one has not ascertained that the teaching of a trustworthy authority does not produce apprehension of an object that is simply invariant. It was in fact stated that: 'having its object' for the means of knowledge is not different from producing invariant apprehension. He proceeds to cite Vācaspati, that such invariance cannot be apprehended with respect to transcendent objects.

[125]One might add here objects that are indifferent but visible: the Nyāya categories are the paradigmatic instances. The trustworthiness of their author, Akṣapāda, is consequently to be established beyond any question.

[126]NVT 42.17-22. Udayana briefly discusses the 'suitability' of the true-nature as realized in the epistemic group: this suitability resides only in the content. Therefore, either the use residing in the object or the apprehension of its suitability is what the group of four results in, NVTP 121.17-21.

His arguments for the extension of validity as means of knowledge to objects that are indifferent but visible and, more especially, those that are not indifferent but otherworldly, are significant. That inference has intrinsic validity is argued, narrowly, in order to avoid a series of regresses, yet has far reaching implications. The possibility of validating otherworldly verbal testimony depends,. on Vācaspati's account, on inference alone: a logical mark of similarity to visible objects is the pivot.[127] In fact, since inference, which Nyāya uniquely teaches, must be employed to validate the apprehension of many non-perceptual apprehensions, Nyāya's supremacy over all sciences is complete.

By way of an introduction to and partial *recusatio* for the balance of this chapter, much of Udayana's *Pariśuddhi* is in the form of highly elaborate objections that serve as introductions to and foils for Vācaspati's replies. It is seldom that he presents a continuous narrative, though he is unfailingly faithful to the letter of the *Tātparyaṭīkā*. What is more, his staccato style leads to frequent obscurity. It is, in consequence, at times difficult to piece his comments together into something resembling a coherent view. Great importance will be placed here on his more discursive passages and on Śrīkaṇṭha's invaluable commentary.[128]

Uddyotakara begins the *Vārttika* with the claims that the first *sūtra* states the right relation between the *śāstra* and the highest good and that the first sentence in the *Bhāṣya* corroborates this relation.[129] Udayana goes into considerable detail on why only this relation is stated and needs to be stated.[130] While much of his commentary on this point is tangential to the means of knowledge, treatment of some parts of it will shed light on the first sentence of the *Bhāṣya* proper.

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[127]No account, however, is given here of how the invariable connection between *sādhana* and *sādhya*, namely *vyāpti*, is determined or grounded

[128]Vardhamāna's *Prakāśa* is not nearly so helpful in explaining the *Pariśuddhi*.

[129]NV 6.3-5.

[130]NVTP 75.6 ff.

He reiterates Vācaspati's contention that, in the phrase 'right-relation', what is indicated is the relation of cause and effect: though the *śāstra* is what teaches and the highest good is what is taught, this is not the right-relation, for such a relation does not prompt men to act.[131] Further, the *śāstra* is both the cause and the instrumental cause of the highest good:[132] it is the cause insofar as it makes known the true-nature of the Nyāya categories and as constituting the operation of the teacher, and the instrumental cause insofar as it embodies this operation on the part of those who are taught.[133] Other relations concerning the *śāstra* have been mentioned, but since they do not prompt the prudent to activity, they are not properly part of the first *sūtra*.[134] The relationship between the purpose and content must be stated, for it is through this that the *śāstra* is related to its end.[135]

Udayana addresses a charge of mutual dependency in the statement of purpose in the first *sūtra*.[136] If the knowledge of the true-nature of the categories is established by a means of knowledge without the operation of the *śāstra*, then a statement of purpose in the *śāstra* serves no purpose. But if the statement is ascertained from the *sūtra* alone, then there is mutual dependency: one has to act upon the *śāstra* by having ascertained his end, yet he needs to ascertain his end before acting on the *śāstra*. Only the

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[131]*abhisambandha* NVTP 75.3 ff.

[132]Neither Uddyotakara (NV 8.7 ff) nor Vācaspati (NVT 32.19 ff) makes it especially clear why both relations are indicated. Vācaspati claims, though, that there might be thought to be an identity between the instrument and the end. The sense of 'instrument' could be understood if positive and negative concomitance (*anvaya/vyatireka*) were derivable from the first sentence of the *Bhāṣya*. Udayana here sheds some light, incidentally, on the claim in the *Vārttika* that there is an overlapping of case in order to capture both 'instrumentality' and 'causality' in the first sentence of the *Bhāṣya*.

[133]NVTP 75.12 ff. Udayana claims that the *śāstra* is the cause and the instrumental cause of both the true-nature of the categories and of the highest good: cf. ŚṬ 4.6. He says that Vācaspati offers a characterization of two by way of partially characterizing five. See NVTP 75.20 ff.

[134]NVTP 76.5 ff: cf. NBh 4.6-5.1: *atra śāstraśiṣyācāryāṇāṃ nyāyalabhyatvānnābhidhānaṃ kṛtaṃ, vyākyātrā tu kartavyam.*

[135]He adds an objection (NVTP 76.12 ff): it is really the soul – or the objects of knowledge – the knowledge of the true-nature of which leads to liberation. All the rest, the means of knowledge, the *śāstra* etc., are not directly related to the highest good. This is framed as a foil to Vācaspati, NVT 23.18-19.

[136]NVTP 76.16 ff.

latter part of Udayana's complex answer is of interest here.[137] Activity, whether characterized by desire or by effort, is not intrinsically established as regards a human end. Instead, it has to be established through an inference that the cause is 'such', i.e. appropriate to its end. For no hungry man, without reflecting on either the elimination of hunger or the pleasure of satiety, either desires or makes an effort to eat. Therefore, the benefit to be gained or the harm to be produced respectively from that towards which a person must be made to act or from which made to desist have to be revealed to him. Consequently, a statement of purpose is necessary. Further, a mere, general statement of purpose is not sufficient. A specific purpose of relevance to us has to be set forth, and such can only be ascertained from the statement of a sage, in the form: 'The highest good has the *śāstra* alone as it means'.

The earlier accounts suggest that an object in itself prompts a purpose. For Udayana, the purpose, however it arises, is arrived at through the appropriate objects only as means. The prompting to activity on the part of the purpose is its being aimed at, but not its being the content of the activity.[138] That inference is needed to direct desire towards what causes human good, particularly the highest good, is striking: this echoes his contention that there is no human purpose of which analytics is not the cause.[139] Finally, the ascertainment through a statement of purpose of the end, namely a human good, will allow one to confirm the successfulness of activity based on the means to that end and the underlying means of knowledge.

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[137]What follows is a rough paraphrase of the beginning of this discussion. He first distinguishes among three mental modifications of men: direct experience (*anubhava*), desire (*icchā*), and effort (*prayatna*). Now direct experience does not correspond to desire, for one can apprehend what is not desired. But desire arises according to each ones inclination towards a human end, and as regards the cause of this, it is to be established through an inference of 'suchness'. The effort has as its domain the means only. Hence desire and effort relate to the means. The first is called 'activity', not direct experience. Alternatively, desire that has the end as its domain is activity: both would require ascertainment of the purpose, NVTP 76.22 ff.

[138]*uddeśyatā*. In NVTP 77.18 ff, Udayana discusses how it is that the prudent act out of doubt. Of note in his discussion are: first, there can be no doubt about the end having a given cause – only that the end may not always result from a given cause. Secondly, he provides something approaching 'odds' on successful *versus* unsuccessful activity.

[139]See Chapter 3, pp. 105ff.

Udayana proceeds to a discussion of the need for a specific recollection and provides an example.[140] One who acts upon someone's statement depends upon a specific recollection which arises from this statement, not independently. One who is sick, if he thinks, 'This may or may not cause the cessation of my illness', will not then act upon one thing or another. Rather, he acts upon the statement of a physician only, even if his trustworthiness is not ascertained. Otherwise, without understanding the statement of purpose, he might anticipate actual harm: does this lack a purpose, is its purpose impossible to perform, or does it have a purpose that is not approved, or is the means simply too difficult? In light of these concerns, he might not act. But these will not arise if there is a statement of purpose. For no one desists from the statement of a doctor, and relies on himself if in doubt.

The point of his argument is: just as one acts on the specific cause or cure of disease upon recollection of a specific means from the statement of a physician, even if his trustworthiness has not been ascertained, and not by relying upon himself, so one seeking liberation will act upon the specific means related by the sage Akṣapāda, even if his trust-worthiness has not been ascertained. One does not normally first ascertain the trustworthiness of all authorities through activity, though the failure of activity upon a means they recommend will call into doubt their trustworthiness. This argument is purely analogical. While the trustworthiness of a physician can be ascertained with respect to disease and health, which are visible, the sage's by definition cannot be.[141]

Udayana considers the characterization of the validity of the means of knowledge advanced by Vācaspati.[142] A means of knowledge is the instrumental cause of valid knowledge. Yet there are no such specific universals as 'instrumentality'. To be

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140 NVTP 78.3 ff. The phrase, 'specific recollection' (or 'recollection of a specific'), appears to mean the recollection of a means specific to what one is seeking (cf. NVTP 78.2-3). A general statement, that herbs cure disease, is not sufficient: one must recollect from someone's statement a specific, relevant, and feasible herb. See also NVTPP 41.5-42.2.

141 While one might, if one survives the therapy, retroactively recognize a bogus doctor and avoid him in the future, the stakes with a bogus sage are far greater.

142 NVTP 79.7 ff.

the instrumental cause is simply to be the most important causal factor, and the specific action in question determines which causal factor is most important. Valid knowledge here is the specific action, and valid knowledge is non-erroneous apprehension. Hence, the validity of a means of knowledge is nothing but invariance, as characterized by producing direct apprehension that is non-erroneous.[143] By 'producing apprehension' is meant 'generating apprehension' or 'existence as delimited by producing apprehension'. 'Being invariant' means 'producing non-erroneous direct perception' or 'existence as delimited by producing non-erroneous direct perception'. Thus, the fact that existence as delimited by two limiting conditions (*upādhi*), being as it were differentiated by the differences in the limiting conditions, inheres in one and the same object is not contradicted; likewise, with 'being created' and 'being non-eternal'.

Udayana thus explicitly denies that 'being a valid means of knowledge' is a true universal, since both of the determinant attributes ascribed to it are only limiting conditions and not intrinsic properties. While this is a striking formulation, it results directly from his predecessors' arguments. It does not, however, follow that there is no such thing as a means of knowledge, but only that it lacks some intrinsic feature, such as redness, that would serve invariably to differentiate it. A valid means of knowledge has thus to be determined essentially on a case by case basis, and successful activity evidently is the means.

In his discussion of a dilemma raised against both intrinsic and extrinsic validation, Udayana notes that an undesirable consequence for intrinsic validation is that one should likewise intrinsically be able to invalidate invalid means of knowledge.[144] He also notes that even if there were self-awareness in an apprehension, there would only

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[143]NVTP 79.1-4. Strictly speaking, this is stated by an objector (NVT 24.6-7): *bodhakatvam* 'producing apprehension' and *avyabhicāritvam* 'being invariant'. Direct apprehension (*anubhava*) is here to used to exclude recollection (*smṛti*), but not mediate apprehension (inference, verbal testimony, and comparison). Udayana ordinarily uses *sākṣātkāra* or *aparokṣa* to describe 'immediate apprehension', which excludes the last three: see NVTP 107.5 ff and 109.19-20.

[144]NVTP 80.1 ff: cf. NVTP 80.10.

be awareness of an intrinsic nature, not of validity as a means of knowledge.[145]

Udayana frames an objection to taking the possessive affix to denote constant conjunction: the means of knowledge and the object are not 'constant' or invariable and there is absence of mutual inherence between them.[146] Vācaspati is quoted in answer, that constant conjunction here means non-variance.[147] But, the objector replies, invariance, no less than conjunction, does not hold between the means of knowledge and the object of knowledge. Udayana expands on Vācaspati's answer, that non-discordance is a characteristic mark of invariance. The intrinsic nature of invariance is to demarcate real objects. Differences in place, time, state, and individual do not produce discordance between the intrinsic nature and the mode of the object as revealed by a valid means of knowledge. Successful activity alone reveals such concordance and discordance. Udayana considers several cases where a discordance may be seen due to differences in place, time, state and the like.[148]

Udayana also formulates an objection to the use of successful activity to confirm validity.[149] An invariable relation between validity and successful activity is not perceptible: validity has to be inferred from the logical mark of producing successful activity. Positive concomitance is not grasped by inference, because validity as a means of knowledge is not apprehended in every case.[150] Alternatively, if it is so established, then inference from only-negative concomitance is otiose. If, again, it is established by a different inference, then there is a regress. He merely cites Vācaspati in answer, that, if a means of knowledge were not in possession of its object then it would not produce successful activity,[151] and raises a further question: if one cannot ascertain that this in-

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[145]NVTP 80.14-15; cf. NVT 24.9 ff.
[146]*matup* NVTP 81.6 ff; unlike an inherence relation which is co-extensive with its underlying relata.
[147]NVT 24.22.
[148]NVTP 81.11-12.
[149]NVTP 81.24 ff.
[150]Udayana seems to allow that there are cases where a valid means of knowledge does not produce successful activity; shortly below, he so treats indifferent objects: NVTP 117.5 ff (p. 58 *infra*).

ference itself is successful, then how can it establish that a means of knowledge is successful?[152] If it is so ascertained, then how can its logical mark be only-negative?[153] In reply, Udayana holds that inference is successful in two way: in terms of invariable connection and in terms of producing valid knowledge.[154] In order to demarcate its proper domain, one relies upon the invariable relation only, and not on the ascertainment of its being the instrumental cause of valid knowledge. Therefore, the validity as a means of knowledge, namely, as being the end of a means of knowledge, is established for a means of knowledge through this inference alone, whose validity has not been established.

The inference, based on successful activity, for the validity of a means of knowledge is the sole way in which one may establish such validity. Yet this inference, in turn, is not validated in the same way. Rather, one ascertains in it an invariable, and apparently negative, relation, which then demarcates its proper domain: this constitutes a sufficient condition for its validity.[155]

In his explanation of Vācaspati's remark, that the means of knowledge does not directly produce successful activity but, rather, by virtue of producing apprehension of an object, Udayana digresses onto an interesting point.[156] The *śāstra*, likewise, is not by its intrinsic nature connected with the highest good, but rather by virtue of teaching validity as a means of knowledge and the like. Hence, just as the knowledge of the true-

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[151]NVT 24.24-25. Udayana here and in the following passage dwells upon this only-negative inference, and seems to treat the denial of such negative-concomitance as a function of hypothetical reasoning (*tarka*), which then authorizes for consideration but does not ascertain that successful activity and a valid means of knowledge have an actual positive-concomitance. Vācaspati, however, next argues that successful activity may also have a positive-concomitance with a valid means of knowledge, NVT 24.25-26: Udayana treats this as a way to forestall an objection against only-negative inference, NVTP 82.23-83.3.

[152]NVTP 82.6 ff.

[153]Udayana adds that this question is what prompts Vācaspati to argue that there is a positive-concomitance between a valid means of knowledge and successful activity, NVTP 82.22 ff.

[154]*avinābhāva* (invariable connection), *pramājanakatva* (producing valid knowledge).

[155]Udayana is clearly attempting to block a regress here: each antecedent inference based on successful activity must itself be validated by successful activity.

[156]NVTP 83.4 ff; cf. NVT 24.26-25.1.

nature of the means of knowledge and so forth are posited as the end of the *śāstra*, insofar as they have to be established by it, in the same way the means of knowledge are to be posited as the end, insofar as they are its content.[157]

Udayana expands on an objection raised by Vācaspati: are the categories of the means of knowledge based on valid means of knowledge or not?[158] If they are not, then constructed out of sheer imagination how do they contribute to the highest good? And how can they be restricted to sixteen only? If they are based on a means of knowledge, then, because they are already established by a means of knowledge, the *śāstra* is useless. Udayana notes that if the categories are imaginary, then so is liberation and any effort made to achieve it. Further, if they are infinite in number, they lack an intrinsic nature altogether.[159]

Uddyotakara stated that a distinctive property of the *Nyāyaśāstra* is its re-examination of objects previously observed by perception and inference.[160] Udayana entertains an objection that the mention of only two means of knowledge here contradicts Uddyotakara's own doctrine of four means of knowledge.[161] As for comparison, Udayana merely restates Vācaspati's claim that the means of knowledge are not the content of comparison.[162] While the objects of knowledge, from soul to liberation, are related by scripture, either inference, based on its having a trustworthy authority, or perception is its root cause. Udayana adds that scripture, when it operates, requires either perception or inference as its content, but they do not likewise require a means of knowledge

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[157]NVTP 83.12 ff. The argument is meant to confirm Uddyotakara's claim that the means of knowledge etc. are stated by the *śāstra* (NV 6.7-8). He proceeds to argue that the *śāstra* meets the successive needs of the student, NVTP 83.12-17. He also distinguishes this *sūtra* from the first *Vaiśeṣika sūtra*, where *dharma* is posited as the end but not the content of the *śāstra*.

[158]NVT 25.24 ff, NVTP 85.6 ff.

[159]See footnote 2 *supra*.

[160]NV 6.8-9.

[161]NVTP 85.9 ff.

[162]NVT 26.2 ff. Hence, it is excluded from the privileged group of two, which do so treat of the means of knowledge.

to operate on their respective contents.

Udayana echoes Vācaspati's answer to the other part of the objection that, if the categories are based on means of knowledge, then the *śāstra* serves no purpose[163] Vācaspati allows that those lacking in discipline might use them, but that, if undifferentiated, they do not conduce to the highest good. Udayana here creatively glosses 'lacking in discipline' by 'lacking in the *Nyāyaśāstra*'.[164]

Udayana concurs with Uddyotakara and Vācaspati that being a delimiter as a universal property is true of both valid and invalid means of knowledge, while specific delimiting is true or real delimiting.[165] He proceeds to say that cognition is either direct apprehension or recollection and that recollection is not valid knowledge.[166] Direct apprehension, however, is apprehension of the intrinsic nature or apprehension of what is not the intrinsic nature. This distinction arises from the contents. Hence that apprehension accounted for[167] by its object abiding in its intrinsic nature is valid knowledge; that accounted for in terms of an object not in its intrinsic nature is invalid knowledge. Accordingly, to be direct apprehension as delimited by 'being such' is to be a valid means of knowledge: but to be direct apprehension delimited as not 'being such' is to be an invalid means of knowledge.[168] Thus, even an invalid means of knowledge has delimitation as a shared property. The specific cause of an invalid means of knowledge has to be inferred from unsuccessful activity, and the specific operation of this specific cause is simply erroneous demarcation of an object. This specific cause, by the assis-

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[163]NVT 26.4-7, NVTP 85.17 ff. That is, they could be known independently of the *śāstra*.

[164]*vainayiketi viśiṣṭo nayaḥ śāstraṃ nyāyaśāstram* NVTP 85.17-18 [*vai-nayika* < *vi* + *naya* = *viśiṣṭo nayaḥ*]. This is part of a discussion on *adhikāra*: the categories demand adept students for their rightful results.

[165]NV 7.8, NVT 28.10, NVTP 93.15 ff. Even an invalid means of knowledge delimits, in a general way, objects, whereas a valid means of knowledge delimits specifically, i.e. properly.

[166]*buddhi* = cognition, *anubhava* = direct apprehension, *smṛti* = recollection.

[167]*nirūpyamāṇa* NVTP 93.19 ff.

[168]NVTP 93.19-20 'Such' here clearly means 'As accounted for by the object according to its abiding, intrinsic nature'.

tance of such an operation, is commonly called 'being an invalid means of knowledge'. Thus, even if there is doubt as between successful and unsuccessful activity, if an invalid means of knowledge gave rise to it, the activity was unsuccessful. Hence, from an invalid means of knowledge the exclusion of successful activity is fixed. The logical mark of 'having contradictory effects' is that by which one apprehends the negative correlation of the two; and the relevant effect must be ascertained through perception. Accordingly, successful activity does not arise from an invalid means of knowledge, which varies from its object or, rather, whose operation is that of variant apprehension.

An invalid means of knowledge erroneously, or non-specifically, ascertains its object, and unsuccessful activity confirms this invalidity, for an invalid means of knowledge produces an effect contrary to that of a valid means of knowledge. Udayana does not argue explicitly for the determination of a positive correlation between valid means of knowledge and successful activity. In cases where there is doubt, he seems to hold that one applies the negative correlation to establish the positive one.[169]

Udayana's glosses of two terms in the *Tātparyaṭīkā* deserve treatment as preparation for his discussion of Vācaspati's principle of repetition and, more generally, of the role of successful activity as a criterion for validity.[170] 'Ascertainment', presumably of an object, means 'accompanied by an inference as to its being a cause of the good'. 'Ascertainment of the validity as means of knowledge' in turn means 'that which customarily produces realization of the logical mark of being the cause of the good'. Now the latter, Udayana holds, is simply to be accompanied by the recollection of a pervasion relationship. In reply to an objection to this formulation, Udayana takes up activity.[171] Activity has two varieties: that whose results happen in this world, and that in

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[169]This is an echo of Pakṣilasvāmin's claim that reasoning is used when a matter is in doubt (NB 2.19 ff). Here reasoning is used closely in conjunction with and dependence on hypothetical reasoning.
[170]NVTP 94.12-25.
[171]NVT 28.24 ff, NVTP 94.18-21. The objection is: no ascertainment nor inference is possible without ascertainment of the validity as a means of knowledge or of the pervasion relation which underlies it. Yet these two only occur due to activity. And activity only occurs through ascertainment of an object and inference that it is the cause of the good.

the next world. Between these, that whose results happen in the next world presupposes ascertainment of the validity of the means of knowledge which produced it.[172] Activity with results in this world does not depend upon ascertainment of the object, let alone apprehension of the intrinsic nature of the means of knowledge; how much less the ascertainment of this.[173]

Udayana now turns to Vācaspati's notion of repetition, which he glosses as 'non-erroneous repetition'.[174] He introduces an important distinction: that an object can be repeated either in accordance with its intrinsic nature or as being a cause of the good.[175] He then considers the four permutations of repetition on this distinction and asserts that successful activity serves to ascertain the validity as means of knowledge in each. 1) If there is intrinsic repetition, then the ascertainment of the validity as means of knowledge is due to successful activity, since it is so ascertained through the absence of erroneous repetitions.[176] 2) When this repetition, whose domain is either the content of the apprehension or that which is inextricably linked to that content and which is the means to ascertain 'being of this kind', does not occur intrinsically, then successful activity establishes the validity as means of knowledge for what produced it. For example: one who, from the statement of a physician, supposes that his illness can by cured by roots found in unfamiliar places.[177] 3) When there is intrinsic repetition, but no causal

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[172]The need to validate a means of knowledge before undertaking 'otherworldly' activity is thus opposed to mere apprehension of an object in worldly matters.

[173]Udayana notes that even if there is ascertainment of the true-nature of a means of knowledge prior to activity, there need not be any activity.

[174]NVTP 95.5.

[175]Udayana seems to mean that the apprehension of the object is what is repeated; Vācaspati had apparently ascribed repetition to the object proper (*dṛṣṭārtheṣvanabhyāsadaśāpanneṣu* NVT 29.2). In the following paragraph, 'intrinsic repetition' is used simply as a short-hand for 'repetition of the intrinsic nature', and 'causal repetition' for 'repetition of its being a cause of the good'.

[176]He provides no example. This is apparently the doubly positive case: 'causal repetition' is to be understood here.

[177]The roots are not familiar or 'repetitive' since he has not seen them. Since he cannot previously have known them causally either, this the doubly negative case: neither intrinsic nor causal repetition is available.

repetition, successful activity again proves the validity of the means of knowledge.[178] The example given here is: one may apprehend from a putatively reliable person that fire is fit for cooking, but it is by his own cooking that he establishes its causal connection.[179] 4) Finally, if there is causal but not intrinsic repetition, then the validity of the apprehension as means of knowledge is also ascertained by successful activity. Udayana's example is: that fire is fit for cooking validates the apprehension of a forest fire, with which one is unfamiliar.[180]

Apart from introducing helpful distinctions and examples, Udayana does not materially advance Vācaspati's discussion.

He directly addresses the question of what is meant by 'being of this kind' by way of a lengthy objection and answer.[181] It cannot be 'being of the 'means of knowledge' kind', for this is the same as what has to be established. Nor is it 'being of the kind that produces successful activity'. For would this be a relation with successful activity or an invariant prior absence that is imposed on this?[182] The first alternative is not viable, because Vācaspati said, "prior to activity".[183] Nor is the second, because this prior absence, which is supra-sensory, cannot be known without a logical mark. If there is a logical mark for this which is actually invariant from validity, then let the validity be inferred from this: what purpose is served in inferring 'being of this kind'? But what purpose is served by inferring 'being of this kind' if it is not invariant from valid-

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178Thakur's reading *abhyastam* is clearly erroneous (95.9). NVTP(P) 99.6 has the correct *anabhyastam*.
179One has seen fire many times, and presumably has heard that fire is fit for cooking. There is thus intrinsic repetition but not causal repetition until one actually cooks.
180It is causally repeated that fire is fit for cooking, but the apprehender in this case does not recognize fire itself in the forest fire, NVTP 95.12-13. Successful activity is then resorted to in order to establish that, if it can cook something, then it must be fire. There may be another dimension to this example. Fire as that which cooks food is a cause of pleasure or good, but as that which consumes forests a cause of pain.
181NVTP 96.1-12. This was first raised by Vācaspati (NVT 29.7 ff), and was touched on briefly above (NVTP 95.6).
182According to Śrīkaṇṭha (ŚṬ 19.2-4), this means 'a prior absence of successful activity that is fixed'; 'imposed on this' means 'qualified by successful activity'.
183NVT 29.7. Hence, it can have no (ordinary) relation with it.

ity? Nor, again, is there any such attribute as 'being of this kind' which is actually established by perception. But if it is perceptible, this is not acceptable because of the consequence that there is apprehension of it even if the means of knowledge reveals what is not familiar. Moreover, in this case also, the ascertainment of validity as means of knowledge would in fact occur before activity, because the pervasion relation is already understood.[184] For the person, in some case at least, inferred the validity as means of knowledge through 'being of this kind'.[185]

Udayana takes up this objection and formulates how 'being of this kind' operates in external perception and, to some extent, inference.[186] Because cognition is caused by its content, all the limiting conditions of the content are limiting conditions of the apprehension. The cognition so limited by the limiting conditions is said to be 'of this kind'. Since these limiting conditions cannot be individually named, they are indicated by the circumlocution, 'being of this kind' or 'being of this kind and that kind'. Moreover, direct apprehension depends upon the intrinsic nature and its mode. Direct apprehension has to do with the mode in two ways: one is limited by the mode of the intrinsic nature, the other by the mode of what is not the intrinsic nature; hence there is doubt in some cases. In order to distinguish the direct apprehension onto which the mode of the intrinsic nature is imposed, the limiting conditions of the mode are distinguished. These limiting conditions are simply qualities and the like; the differences of their intrinsic natures have been ascertained insofar as they necessarily contradict erroneous contents. Thus, to be cognition of a content to be characterized along with its

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[184]That is, if one could apprehend it through perception.

[185]Udayana now has the objector entertain an objection. Let there be no 'being of this kind'. How, pray, is it known by perception? This, he replies, is invalid because of the consequence that, if the validity as means of knowledge is being inferred from 'being of this kind' with respect to objects with which one is fully familiar, then the validity as means of knowledge inferred through successful activity concerning objects that are not fully familiar is a pseudo-familiar instance, insofar as it is defective as a cause. Therefore, 'being of this kind' is not too extensive, NVTP 96.9-12. There is a variant reading in B, followed by NVTP(P): *anatiprasaktam* (96.12) 'not overly extensive'. Śrīkaṇṭha reads *atiriktam* (ŚṬ 19.14-15), but glosses it by 'distinct' or 'different' (*bhinna*).

[186]NVTP 96.13 ff. He merely mentions inference in passing.

characteristic feature is, in a general way, 'being of this kind' that resides in the cognition: this is how perception operates.[187] All those specific instances which do not vary from other specific instances cannot be individually named. Thus, then, one must so understand 'being of this kind' as 'being direct awareness of this and that content as qualified by this and that limiting condition'. For such a cognition to be fully familiar is simply the repetition of the limiting conditions insofar as they are inseparable from the content. When the same object is very frequently repeated, 'being of this kind' is simply its being concordant.

On Udayana's account, 'being of this kind' applies to the cognition of the attribute, or limiting condition, of an object together with that object.[188] One repeatedly sees the same mode or limiting condition, and when this occurs quite frequently, such a concordance of apprehension is equivalent to 'being of this kind'. 'Being of this kind' means here 'concomitance of attributes with an object', and 'full familiarity' is simply the repetition of such. Udayana here tries to dispel the notion that 'being of this kind' is a true universal; if it were, one could dispense altogether with successful activity and inference to establish validity.

In explaining how Vācaspati uses the same reasoning to establish the validity of scripture, Udayana clarifies somewhat his preceding remarks.[189] In this case, 'being of this kind' means 'having a trustworthy author', and 'being fully familiar' is the establishment of invariable concomitance through frequently seeing 'being of this kind' in the *Āyurveda* and *mantras*. Just as the validity as means of knowledge is ascertained through successfulness of activity with respect to objects not fully familiar, so too even

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[187]Śrīkaṇṭha gives an example (ŚṬ 19.21-25): when one perceives earth, whose property/limiting condition is odor, he simultaneously perceives *lakṣya* (earth) and *lakṣaṇa* (odor). Udayana claims that the method of inference, which involves a characteristic mark and an unseen thing, is different. He provides a number of examples for this claim, the final one of which is unintelligible (but see NVTPP 105.13-106.2), concerning substances, qualities, and actions: NVTP 96.24-97.2 (see also ŚṬ 19.28-30).

[188]Since such a property is not causally related to the object, is has an 'adjunctive' or limitative relation. That is not to say it is false: only that it is or may be only contingently and not necessarily related.

[189]NVT 29.8-10, NVTP 97.8 ff.

non-validity as means of knowledge is ascertained through failure of activity. Further, just as the validity as means of knowledge is ascertained prior to activity among objects that are fully familiar, insofar as they are 'of this kind', so is invalidity as means of knowledge. 'Being of this kind' then consists of contradiction with limiting conditions.[190] 'Being fully familiar' is simply the repetition of them. As, for example, the apprehension of two moons with respect to the moon, or yellow to a conch-shell, or pungency with respect to molasses. Therefore, when there is doubt, successful activity has to be ascertained.

Udayana makes a significant addition to Vācaspati's argument for the need to enquire into the result-knowledge also.[191] Since one frequently sees variation even of the result-knowledge from the object in such conditions as the dream state, the validity of the result-knowledge must be ascertained. 'Being of this kind' is simply to be result-knowledge for one in a normal state; for the result-knowledge to be fully familiar means that there is an apprehension of the logical mark which is invariant from validity as a means of knowledge.[192]

One must by internal perception see the mark, namely of concomitance between a result-knowledge and normalcy of state. That is, if one is aware of a result-knowledge and likewise knows that he is in a normal state, his apprehension has validity. Udayana thus argues for a means to confirm that the result-knowledge, which confirms the validity of the means of knowledge, is itself valid. In addition, he shows that 'being of the his kind' and familiarity hold for the result-knowledge no less than for the apprehension of an object.

Udayana, accordingly, turns to how successful activity confirms the validity of

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[190]According to ŚṬ 20.9-11, the limiting conditions here are limiting conditions upon a valid means of knowledge. 'Being of this kind' and 'being fully familiar' accordingly apply, if in different senses, equally well to invalid means of knowledge.

[191]NVTP 97.16 ff.

[192]According to ŚṬ 20.20-22, the 'pervasion' relation, indicated by the logical mark, is: the result knowledge of one in a normal state is invariant.

the result-knowledge concerning what is unfamiliar.[193] Even if the result is not the content of the activity, nevertheless, the relation that activity, whether its domain is what causes this end or its domain is merely a chain of these, has to another result of 'this kind' or its relation to an end of a different kind yet inseparable from this, must be understood as the 'successfulness of activity' for the result knowledge, whether for oneself or for another.[194]

Since the result is not, strictly speaking, the content of an activity, it cannot be confirmed directly through the successfulness of activity. In order to forestall a regress, however, Udayana claims that a relation based on kind which emerges from successful activity confirms the validity of the result-knowledge.

Udayana claims that Vācaspati employs the same type of reasoning employed for perception and verbal testimony to establish the validity as means of knowledge for internal perceptions of the result-knowledge.[195] Doubt as to variation concerns either the intrinsic nature or the cause; and this is dispelled only by such means of knowledge by virtue of which one apprehends the pervasion relationship and subject-attributeness. Consequently, inferential knowledge has all doubts as to its variation dispelled, and knowledge that is such has its validity intrinsically ascertained.[196]

Udayana expands on why inferential knowledge alone, according to Vācaspati, has intrinsic validity.[197] By demarcating the 'thusness' of the object, inferential apprehension arises as follows: 'This mountain is in fact fire-possessing'. Furthermore, this inferential apprehension, apprehended internally by internal perception, is apprehended

[193]NVTP 98.12 ff. An objector asserts that this is no longer needed if the preceding argument holds.
[194]See ŚṬ 20.24-21.4 for a clear explanation of this.
[195]NVTP 98.15-19. Udayana adds, parenthetically, that the justification of inference will facilitate the justification of other internal perceptions also: see NVTP 98.5 on desire (*icchā*), aversion (*dveṣa*), and exertion (*prayatna*).
[196]That is to say: an internal perception of an inference captures both the pervasion relationship (*vyāpti*) and the fact that the *hetu*-property is present in the subject (*pakṣadharmatā*). Udayana clearly has 'realization' (*parāmarśa*) in mind here: see also NVTP 139.20.
[197]NVTP 98.23 ff. In the preceding paragraph, he outlines Vācaspati's methodology.

internally as consisting essentially of ascertainment of each respective object.[198] The fact that this inferential knowledge consists essentially of ascertainment is not determined by one who is not aware that direct apprehension has its objects non-erroneously. Hence this must necessarily be ascertained; and this itself is validity as a means of knowledge. On the other hand, perceptual and verbal cognition do not by their intrinsic natures exclude non-connection, but rather reveal mere contents that are common both to imposition and non-imposition. Further, they are experienced in just this way through internal perception and not insofar as they consist by their nature of ascertainment. Hence they lack intrinsic validity as means of knowledge.[199]

Inference by its nature admits of an awareness of a determination, namely the logical mark as such and as being in the subject. Other means of knowledge only ascertain objects as existent, but do not properly ascertain them since they do not admit of this awareness or realization. Udayana thus shows that inference constitutes a sufficient condition for validity as means of knowledge, since it alone always 'possesses its object'.[200]

Furthermore, Udayana asserts that inference alone is the means for validating internal perception, which apprehends the intrinsic nature of knowledge.[201] This inference consists in successful activity. Śrīkaṇṭha sheds some needed light here.[202] Even if an apprehension is apprehended by internal perception, nevertheless it is apprehended only as an apprehension. It is not the case that ascertainment in the form, 'A valid means of knowledge or an invalid means of knowledge', depends upon this internal perception. Since there is no other cognition due to external perception and the like, inference

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[198]NVTP 99.1: *anuvyavasāyenānuvyavasīyamānam idaṃ <sc. anumitijñānam> svasvārthāvadhāraṇātmakam evāsīyate.*

[199]In the following paragraph, Udayana expands even further on this argument.

[200]NVTP 98.6: *ayogavyavacchedātmaka* 'consisting by its nature of excluding non-connection'. See further, NVT 37.24-25.

[201]NVTP 99.18-19. That is to say, which merely reveals that a cognition is a cognition.

[202]ŚṬ 21.20-23 ff.

alone has to be resorted to.

Udayana likewise expands on Vācaspati's claim that that internal perception, by which one apprehends 'being of this kind' in an apprehension, has intrinsic validity.[203] He maintains that both internal and external perception concerning an object by itself[204] have intrinsic validity, as does apprehension by comparison. While validity as a means of knowledge for an apprehension of the object by itself, through inference, comparison, and internal perception, can be apprehended extrinsically through certain marks,[205] the apprehension of their validity proper occurs intrinsically only, by way of internal perception. They can, however, be extrinsically established for one in confusion.

There is, then, intrinsic validity as well for comparison and another form of internal perception. Yet this is not intrinsic in the sense that these apprehensions of themselves apprehend their own validity, but rather insofar as an internal perception apprehends in them their intrinsic validity.

While discussing how the sense-organs are established as means of knowledge, Udayana circumscribes the need to establish validity.[206] The validity as means of knowledge does not have to be ascertained in every case, because, were such the case, there would be a regress and one would never move on to another object. Such validity, then, has to be ascertained only in two contexts: when a cognition has a forcible presence and when someone else is either confused about or desires to understand something.

Udayana provides an elegant explanation for the overlapping of grammatical number in the form *pramāṇatas* in the first sentence in the *Bhāṣya*.[207] Overlapping in-

[203]NVTP 99.20 ff., NVT 30.4 ff.
[204]*dharmimātram* 'the object alone', or without attributes: the 'This' of a predication. 'is an X' is a function of an attribute.
[205]See ŚṬ 21.19-20.
[206]NVTP 100.10-21.
[207]NVTP 104.10 ff.

volves merely an identity of content, and not a mere collocation of causes. If it did, there would be no difference in their result. Again, there is no possibility for 'instrumentality' among things merely collocated: if there were, their operation would be identical. And by saying 'by one only', Vācaspati clearly excludes another most important causal factor.[208]

Udayana treats the *Mīmāṃsaka* objection against the overlapping or merging of the means of knowledge at great length:[209] he clearly feels it to be a serious competitor to the Nyāya doctrine. When an object is known, one does not use another means of knowledge to apprehend it. Nor, again, are other means of knowledge employed to account for the way in which we speak of each successive apprehension, because that is established by a series of recollections which arise from the trace produced by the first means of knowledge. Nor should one object that it makes no difference whether a sequence of recollections or apprehensions produces our ordinary usages, for the consequence is that that which produces them is not a valid means of knowledge, since they concern objects already known, as is the case with recollections. Thus even in a chain, if that is the cause of valid knowledge, the second means of knowledge reveals what has already been revealed. Hence there is 'grinding what is ground'.[210] If difference in mode relating to the cause was intended,[211] then even if there were difference in the cause, then no difference in the content would be mentioned in order to rebut the charge of 'grinding what is ground'. But if only a difference in content is revealed, then how is there overlapping? For to reveal such a difference is to make known what is not already known. Nor, even if there is no difference in the content, does any difference in

[208]NVT 32.19. Udayana adds that the restrictive particle *eva* does not reveal that there is mutual independence between its operation and end, because this is possible even when there is overlapping.

[209]NVTP 105.24 ff; see also NVT 34.1 ff. In NVTP 105.3 ff, Udayana takes up the Buddhist objection to overlapping: that perception and inference have distinct domains.

[210]Vardhamāna (NVTPP 145.2 ff.) attributes this doctrine to (Kumārila) Bhaṭṭa.

[211]NVTP 106.8 ff. The *Mīmāṃsaka* objector now challenges Uddyotakara's claim that additional means of knowledge reveal the object in different ways (NV 8.23-9.1).

the mode, due to the difference in the means of knowledge, advance the doctrine under consideration.

Udayana quotes Vācaspati in reply and reveals what results if there is 'grinding what is ground' for an additional means of knowledge: it has 1) no result, 2) the same result (as that revealed by the first), 3) an undesired result, 4) it prompts a question 'How does this second produce cognition?', or 5) it is impossible that it be a cause. In the sequel, he reveals how each of these undesirable consequences is resolved by allowing there to be overlapping: the argument is unusually clear and requires no comment.[212]

The intrinsic nature of a means of knowledge is next examined.[213] Udayana treats the first three preliminary views, of four listed by Vācaspati, at some length, and identifies their proponents.[214] Since the characterization by Uddyotakara, that a means of knowledge is that which causes apprehension, sanctions recollection also, Udayana devotes considerable space to Vācaspati's lengthy treatment of this undesirable consequence.[215] Part of this discussion is crucial to an understanding of Udayana's notion of a means of knowledge. 'Being valid knowledge' is not a specific universal, because the specific universal, which resides in the apprehension, has to be apprehended by the internal organ only.[216] Further, it was previously shown that the status of being valid knowledge has to be inferred. Moreover, if being valid knowledge were a specific universal, then it would not inhere in erroneous knowledge. Hence, an erroneous cognition would not be a means of knowledge with respect even to the object by itself; this erroneous cognition would prove to have no basis at all. Consequently a universal, together

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[212]NVTP 106.14-107.11, especially 106.14-18.

[213]NVTP 107.11 ff.

[214]NVT 34.24-25, NVTP 107.15-108.17: *Mīmāṃsakas* (NVTP 107.16-19), *Sautrāntikas* (NVTP 107.20-108.12), and *Vaibhāṣikas* etc. (NVTP 108.13-17).

[215]NVT 35.5-27, NVTP 109.9 ff.

[216]NVTP 109.12 ff. Throughout this passage, *pramāṇatva* and *pramātva* are used almost interchangeably. Since the means of knowledge is said to be the instrumental cause of valid knowledge, it is imperative to define the status of valid knowledge.

with an another universal, in the relation of higher and lower, would inhere in a single particular. Thus, would direct apprehension be higher or would valid knowledge? On the first alternative, how could recollection be valid knowledge? On the second, to be direct apprehension would not vary from the status of being valid knowledge and hence even error would be an honored guest. If being immediate apprehension is higher, then inferential knowledge and so forth would not be direct apprehension, because it is not valid knowledge. Therefore, being a valid means of knowledge is not a specific universal. He also rejects an objector's claim that 'being correspondent' is the universal property in question:[217] the undesirable consequence of this is that recollection could also be termed 'valid knowledge'. Udayana concludes his discussion on recollection as follows: ordinary people have ascertained that correspondence alone with the object, determined solely by direct apprehension, which is different from recollection, is the instrumental cause of the operation of the term 'valid knowledge'. Thus, valid knowledge is direct apprehension correspondent with its object. The means of knowledge is the instrumental cause of this. Hence, Uddyotakara's characterization is not overly extensive.[218]

The *Mīmāṃsaka* argues that he also agrees that valid knowledge is correspondent direct apprehension (*yathārthānubhava*) and that a means of knowledge is its instrumental cause. However, he insists that the means of knowledge operates only on a previously unknown object.[219] Udayana calls into question in what sense objects are previously unknown, and reiterates that the *Mīmāṃsaka* doctrine will not work for a stream of cognitions.[220]

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[217]NVTP 109.21-27: *yathārthatvam*.
[218]NVTP 110.14 ff, cf. NVT 35.10 ff, ŚṬ 31.14 ff.
[219]NVTP 110.20 ff.
[220]Udayana claims that in the beginninglessness of *saṃsāra* there is nothing one would not have encountered at some time, NVTP 110.23 ff. He also spells out the argument adumbrated by Vācaspati, that for a *Mīmāṃsaka* a stream of continuous cognitions cannot be valid knowledge on their characterization of a means of knowledge as being that which reveals an unknown object (NVTP 112.9-16). Śrīkaṇṭha (ŚṬ 33.2-4) ascribes this characterization to (Kumārila) Bhaṭṭa.

He cites another, related *Mīmāṃsaka* objection: if only such apprehension as produces activity and acquisition is valid knowledge, then it is the first and not additional means of knowledge that so causes them.[221] He expands on Vācaspati's reply that an apprehension that produces activity does not make one acquire the object. Nor does it make one compulsorily do so, but, rather, it leads one to attain the object by revealing the form of the object. This is true of all cognitions and not merely the first. The *Mīmāṃsaka* remains convinced. Because one acquires what he desires only from the first, the second and the like are irrelevant. Udayana merely recapitulates Vācaspati's answer: that merely to reveal or merely to produce attainment rules out indifferent objects and makes everything dependent on man.

Udayana also expands on Vācaspati's explanation of what is meant by the 'most important causal factor' and concludes that that *kāraka* which, embodying an operation, is invariant from the result is the most important causal factor.[222] He briefly states the other alternatives for being 'the most important causal factor' raised by Uddyotakara and provides a summary verse.[223]

Vācaspati allows that there is no successful activity for a means of knowledge concerning what is indifferent. Yet such a means of knowledge would not be invalid: its validity is established by similarity to accepted means of knowledge through a logical mark.[224] Udayana clarifies this claim. It is not the case that any object in every respect is to be neglected always by everyone. Moreover, if one can ascertain the validity of a cognition concerning this object elsewhere through successful activity, then its va-

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[221]*vyāpāravat* NVTP 112.16 ff: cf. NVT 35.20 ff.

[222]NVTP 115.14 ff: *vyāpāravataḥ phalāvyabhicāritvaṃ sādhakatamatvam*, NVTP 116.2.

[223] "From the intrinsic nature; from the effect; subsequent to the agent; prior to the agent and effect; from the kind of valid knowledge; because it is the specific cause of valid knowledge — are characterizations of the means of knowledge'.
See NA 25.22-26.2 for a discussion of the *śloka* (NVTP 116.18-19).

[224]NV 10.16 ff, NVT 39.5 ff, NVTP 117.5 ff. It was urged against the *Mīmāṃsaka* that he could not explain indifferent objects. Since one would thus have to have an inference based on a mark, there would be overlapping, which he cannot allow.

lidity is easy to grasp, insofar as one has already grasped its 'being of this kind', even if it is now indifferent. Even when activity does not directly occur, then its 'being of this kind' that one ascertains does not correspond to any possible obstruction.[225]

Udayana thus invokes 'being of this kind' for indifferent objects in a special sense. In given situations when objects are not indifferent, they are to be acquired or eliminated and can be established accordingly as 'being of this kind' through successful activity. One can then be certain of them even in cases where they are indifferent. Failing that, if one can ascertain that the cognitions of them do not correspond with any possible impediments, this will suffice for their 'being of this kind'. Accordingly, all seen or worldly objects have ascertainably valid means of knowledge.

While Udayana breaks some fresh ground, the most innovative aspects of his treatment of the means of knowledge are its sheer analytical precision and systematization. It seems that he can leave no logical stone unturned, and he is no less vigilant in painstakingly defining all terms and in disambiguating senses of words. His treatment of successful activity is paradigmatic in all these ways. Leaving aside these real advances in formalization proper, his denial of the status as true universal to a means of knowledge, its validity as means of knowledge, and even valid knowledge itself is his most noteworthy contribution.[226] The critical notion he draws on is that of the limiting condition (*upādhi*): these putative universals on closer analysis prove to be collocations of such limiting conditions. The other significant notion, especially in light of its role in Navyanyāya, he frequently utilizes is that of realization (*parāmarśa*): he argues that this is the internal perception by means of which one intrinsically validates inference, clearly the most powerful means of knowledge on Udayana's account.

With each succeeding commentator, Pakṣilasvāmin's short, initial sentence takes on a seemingly exponential increase in complexity: it serves as a constant point of reference towards and from which the commentators work and not a rigid agenda.

[225]This may be derived from perception, inference, or instruction.

[226]The same argument is used to deny that 'being of this kind' is a true universal.

Some of their discussions and innovations, to be sure, strain credulity as forming part of Pakṣilasvāmin's possible intent. Yet a coherent, at times compelling account of the sentence as a formulation of Nyāya itself emerges. To make good this claim and to introduce a semblance of order into the preceding, diffuse analysis, a concise narrative of the commentators' final interpretation will be attempted.[227]

> Because of the successfulness of activity upon the apprehension of an object due to a means of knowledge, <that> means of knowledge has its object. (NB 1.1)

This sentence in its literal form is a strict formulation of what constitutes a valid means of knowledge. Successful activity alone concerning worldly objects that cause, or are, pain and pleasure confirms that the means of knowledge by which they are apprehended are valid. As for the relation between the apprehension of an object and activity, there are several interwoven claims to unravel. First, it is argued that one does not apprehend a mere object, but rather an object in its abiding nature together with an attribute or attributes that may differ according to the different circumstances of the apprehension. The apprehension is constituted of this complex, which is what one acts upon. The activity test is normally applied to an object with which one is not fully familiar. If the object is fully familiar, then one apprehends along with the object that it is of a kind regularly to produce a pleasurable or painful effect, and will act without concern for the successfulness of the activity. But if the activity were to fail in its predictable result, it would give one pause. This familiarity with kindedness is nothing but recollection of repetitions of apprehensions of and successful activities upon the same object. Since objects with which one is not fully familiar do not yet admit of a kindedness proper, each apprehension has to be confirmed or denied through successful activity until a distinct kindedness results. In all cases of ordinary objects connected with pleasure and

[227]While the views of all the commentators are represented in this synthesis, Udayana's commentary will perforce be most frequently drawn on.

pain, then, successful activity is the criterion, directly or indirectly, for the validation of a means of knowledge.

This formulation is clearly inadequate on at least three grounds: it leaves out of account most objects, is circular, and leaves unexplained why successful activity alone is the criterion for validity. The commentators' solutions are straightforward. It is the function of inference to confirm the validity of the apprehension of both indifferent, but ordinary, objects and of transcendent ones. That is, by apprehending a mark that connects either kind of object to the pleasure-pain kind, one can infer that the apprehension of them is valid. Since the transcendent kind is clearly of greater interest to the commentators, it will be considered.[228] One first has to ascertain the validity of verbal testimony concerning ordinary pleasure-pain objects, through successful activity and also note that a mark of all such valid verbal testimony is that it is uttered by a trustworthy authority. Thus, the validity of the *Āyurveda* (and *mantras*) can be directly confirmed by acting upon it, since it teaches things of the everyday world. Now, if one turns to the *Vedas*, which are like the *Āyurveda* in that they too are verbal testimony, and above all because they have a trustworthy authority,[229] one can infer that they also are valid means of knowledge, even though their objects cannot be confirmed by activity. Now, how is it that inference can confirm validity without successful activity? Here the answer is that inference can be intrinsically validated: that is, because it consists of the ascertainment of a pervasion relationship (*vyāpti*) and of the presence of the establishing property in the object to be established (*pakṣadharmatā*). These ascertainments are directly confirmed by an internal perception. Even so, the pervasion relationship is arrived at through successful activity and kindedness.[230] Intrinsic validation is also pos-

[228]Indifferent objects are scarcely treated, since they are entirely irrelevant to the gaining of liberation (but see NV 11.5-6 on consciousness). Udayana notes that, since even indifferent objects under different conditions may produce pleasure or pain, their kindedness is actually known, NVTP 117.5 ff.

[229]Namely *īśvara*; the otherwise thorough-going realism in the argument is at odds with such theism.

[230]Pervasion (*vyāpti*) simply is strict positive (*anvaya*) and negative (*vyatireka*) concomitances among things or kinds of things.

sible for certain other types of apprehensions, namely desire and the like.[231] Inference preconfirms the validity of a means of knowledge concerning both indifferent, but worldly, and otherworldly objects.

There are two instances of circularity the commentators attempt to resolve. One takes the form that, if successful activity or the apprehension of successful activity confirms the validity of all means of knowledge, then does it also have to confirmed by further successful activities or apprehensions of such? That when one apprehends the success of an activity and simultaneously that one is in a normal state is sufficient, it is argued, to block this regress.[232] The second is: how can one act upon a thing without ascertaining it and how can one ascertain it without acting? It is first denied that one has to ascertain an object prior to activity, since simply the apprehension of an object will suffice. Secondly, since worldly existence has no beginning, the circularity, if real at all, is not vicious.[233]

Strange to say, there is no sustained discussion of or argument proper for the adoption of successful activity as criterion for validity: implicit reasons, however, are not hard to find.[234] The commentators adopt the principle of extrinsic validation for the means of knowledge and are eager to avoid both a regress and solipsism: an extrinsic, self-sufficient, and non-cognitive or 'objective' criterion has to be located. A less negative explanation may be found in Pakṣilasvāmin's subsuming the Nyāya categories within the soteriological group of four. Since Nyāya is now ultimately focused on

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[231]See NVTP 98.5 ff. Udayana notes that most internal perceptions cannot be so intrinsically validated, since there is nothing in them aside from the mere awareness of an apprehension, to determine validity: again, inference is the sole means.

[232]Vācaspati and Udayana insist that confirmation of the result-knowledge is critical for determining kindedness: see NVT 29.10 ff and NVTP.97.16 ff.

[233]Udayana notes that if *saṃsāra* is without beginning, then there is nothing with which one is not familiar. A point, if obvious, not made by the commentators is that one need not confirm everything by oneself: from ordinary dealings and instruction one can become familiar with anything, though successful activity may be needed to confirm such teachings or when there is a doubt.

[234]Another partial explanation is that the *kāraka* mapping of the means of knowledge and the like centers by definition around activity (*kriyā*).

avoiding pain (*heya*) and gaining the highest good (*adhigantavya*), it is necessarily connected with activity and fitting means to ends, not with mere speculation. In any case, there remains the seeming absurdity that if activity does not occur at all or fails for reasons unrelated to the apprehension proper, the underlying means of knowledge is invalid. The answer is that the means of knowledge reveals the true-nature (*tattva*) of an object as suitable for activity or not. In the cases cited, the apprehension may be true, yet lacks validity proper: subsequent successful activity has to confirm the validity. Failure of activity does not rule out true, but only invalid apprehensions of objects.

It is clear that the commentators apply successful activity as the sole criterion for the validity of all apprehension. Everyday objects and purposes serve to establish and are constant confirmation of such validity. In some cases, inference, which is effectively a stand-in for successful activity, is employed. It is, however, transcendent objects, purposes, and the validation of their apprehensions that is the weakest part of the project; validation through inference here is largely analogical.[235] Given that liberation is the highest human good and the stated goal of the *śāstra*, this is a puzzling outcome indeed.

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[235]There seems to be an argument at work here vaguely along the lines of Pascal's wager. If one studies Nyāya, pursues liberation, and attains it, then he will have achieved the highest human good. If he fails to attain it, he will merely be reborn, likely in a better state. Any seeming pleasures he may forgo through the study of Nyāya are only pseudo-pleasures, which would only make his rebirth less elevated. Conversely, by not studying Nyāya one will certainly never gain liberation, and, by being wholly given over to passion, is guaranteed of a worse rebirth.

# A NOTE ON THE TRANSLATIONS

Page and line numbers to Thakur's *Nyāyadarśanam* are given in the left hand column. The line numbers are not exact in some cases, since some complex Sanskrit sentences have to be completely rearranged to make passable English. The numbers in the right hand column are citations for *lemmata* and other *Nyāyasūtra*.

In the translations proper, a set of short-hand symbols has been adopted to mark when an objector or questioner (*pūrvapakṣin*), the respondent (*siddhāntin*), or a 'schismatic' (*ekadeśin*) Naiyāyika is speaking: <P>, <S>, and <E> respectively. Note that the ascription to a given speaker in some cases is uncertain.

1.1 A 'means of knowledge' (*pramāṇa*) is valid due to the successfulness of activity upon the apprehension of an object on the basis of <this> means of knowledge.[1] There is no apprehension of an object without a means of knowledge. There is no successfulness of activity without apprehension of an object. Now when the agent of knowledge has grasped an object through a means of knowledge, he desires either to acquire or to eliminate it. The striving by him, prompted by the desire to acquire or to eliminate <an object>, is called 'activity'. 'Successfulness', on the other hand, is the right-relation between this <striving> and the
1.5 result. When one strives, whether out of a desire to acquire or to eliminate the object, he either acquires or eliminates the object. But the 'object' is pleasure or a cause of pleasure, and pain or a cause of pain. This same object of the means of knowledge is beyond enumeration, because the differences among living things cannot be counted.

And when a means of knowledge is valid, the 'agent of knowledge', the 'object of knowledge', and the 'resultant

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[1] The opening sentence of the *Bhāṣya* is, in part, an answer to an objection set forth by Nāgārjuna in his *Vigrahavyavartanī*:
*yadi ca pramāṇatas te teṣāṃ teṣāṃ prasiddhir arthānām* |
*teṣāṃ punaḥ prasiddhiṃ brūhi kathaṃ te pramāṇānām* || 31 ||
'And if such and such objects are established for you on the basis of a *pramāṇa*, then state how these *pramāṇas* are established for you'.

knowledge' are valid.[2] <P> Why? <S> Because if any one is absent, the matter (*artha*) is impossible. Among these <four>, the agent of knowledge is he who, prompted by the
1.10 desire to acquire or to eliminate <an object>, acts. That through which he knows – understands – an object is the means of knowledge. The object that is known – is understood – is the object of knowledge.[3] The <resultant> valid knowledge is the knowledge of that object. And it is thus in reference to the four kinds that the true-nature is completely realized.

<P> But what is the true-nature? <S> Both the actual being of what exists and the non-being of what does not exist. That which exists, when apprehended as existing, is a valid and non-erroneous 'true-nature'. And what does not exist, when apprehended as not existing, is a valid and
1.15 non-erroneous 'true-nature'. <P> But how does one apprehend the latter <kind of true-nature> through a means of knowledge? <S> Because when what exists is being apprehended, there is no apprehension <of what does not exist> in the same way – as happens with a lamp. Just as, when a

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[2] *pramātṛ* 'the agent of knowledge', *prameya* 'the object of knowledge', *pramiti/pramā* 'the <resultant> valid knowledge', and *pramāṇa* 'the means of knowledge'.

[3] In this and the preceding sentence, Pakṣilasvāmin glosses the root √*mā* 'to measure', and its derivatives *pramāṇa* etc., by the root √*jñā* 'to know:' *pramiṇoti* = *vijānāti* (NB 1.10), *pramīyate* = *jñāyate* (NB 1.11). T. Burrow, "Sanskrit mā- 'To ascertain'," argues that √*mā* means 'to ascertain'.

visible object is being apprehended through a lamp which illumines it, that which is not apprehended, like this, does not exist. If it did exist, it would, like this, be apprehended; because there is no apprehension, it does not exist. In the same way, while that which exists is being apprehended through a means of knowledge, that which is not apprehended like this does not exist. If it did exist, it would, like this, be apprehended; because there is no apprehension, it does not exist. Thus, then, a means of knowledge, which
1.20 reveals what exists, also reveals what does not exist. And indeed what exists will be concisely taught as being of sixteen kinds.

2.1 Now of these same kinds of what exists,

> Means of knowledge, object of knowledge, doubt, purpose, familiar instance, established doctrine, member, hypothetical reasoning, ascertainment, discussion, arguing, captiousness, pseudo-reason, deceit, futile answer, and grounds for defeat – from the knowledge of their true-nature there is attainment of the highest good.[4] NS 1.1.1

2.5 The analysis <of the compound *pramāṇa...sthānānām*> is <to be made> in accordance with the

[4] The sixteen *Nyāya* categories are: means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*), object of knowledge (*prameya*), doubt (*saṃśaya*), purpose (*prayojana*), familiar instance (*dṛṣṭānta*), established doctrine (*siddhānta*), member (*avayava*), hypothetical reasoning (*tarka*), ascertainment (*nirṇaya*), discussion (*vāda*), arguing (*jalpa*), captiousness (*vitaṇḍā*), pseudo-reason (*hetvābhāsa*), deceit (*chala*), futile answer (*jāti*), and grounds for defeat (*nigrahasthāna*). The highest good (*niḥśreyasa*), evidently liberation (*apavarga*), is one of the twelve objects of knowledge listed in NS 1.1.9.

proper <grammatical> number <of its constituent elements found> in a specific mention. <This compound is> A *dvandva* compound in the sense of 'co-ordination'.[5] The phrase, 'true-nature *of* the means of knowledge…', is <an instance of> the 'remainder' use of the sixth case affix.[6] In both phrases, 'knowledge *of* the true-nature' and 'attainment *of* the highest good', the sixth case affix indicates the object. These, and no more, are the objects that exist. They are taught here to assure that they are correctly known. This should be understood to be the substance of the system stated in its entirety.

Now it is from the knowledge of the true-nature of the <twelve> objects of knowledge, the soul etc., that there is attainment of the highest good; and this same point is
2.10 restated in the next *sūtra*. 'What is to be eliminated' – 'what NS 1.1.2;cf. 1.1.9
produces it' – 'the absolute eliminating of it', 'the means to this <eliminating>', <and> 'what has to be attained' – indeed by correctly knowing these four cardinal entities one attains the highest good.[7]

<P> On this reasoning, the separate mention of <the fourteen categories of> doubt etc. serves no purpose; for, as they are included in 'means of knowledge' or 'object of

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[5] See A.2.2.29 *cārthe dvandvaḥ*.
[6] The sixth case affix is used in situations where there is no desire to express a *kāraka* relation. See NV 12.23-25 and A.2.3.50 *ṣaṣṭhī śeṣe*.

knowledge', as the case might be, they are not distinct. <S>

2.15 This is true enough. However, the four branches of science,[8] which have different bases, are taught for the benefit of living things; the fourth of these, 'analytics', is the science of reasoning (*nyāyavidyā*). The categories of doubt etc., which belong to it, have different bases. <That is to say:> If they were not mentioned separately, this <science of reasoning> would be mere soteriology, as are the *Upaniṣads*. Therefore it is separately established through the categories of doubt etc.

Therefore, reasoning (*nyāya*) does not operate either on an object that is not known nor on one that is known with

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[7] Pakṣilasvāmin's appeal to a (soteriologically) more fundamental group of four *arthapadas* as the basis of *Nyāya* is emphasized by Uddyotakara (NV 14.1-4); see further W. Halbfass, *Tradition and Reflection* (pp. 245-249), on the relation of these four to philosophy and to medicine. There is some inconsistency among the commentators as to which are the four *arthapadas* and how they correlate to the *Nyāyaśāstra*. Pakṣilasvāmin seems here (NB 2.10-11) to mention a fifth *arthapada*, 'that which produces it' (*tasya pravartakam*), unless this is to be taken parenthetically, along with 'what has to be eliminated' (*heyam*), 'the absolute eliminating of it' (*tasya ātyantikam hānam*), 'the means to it' (*tasya upāyas*), and 'what has to be attained' (*adhigantavyas*). (In J, *adhigantavyas* is missing; if one takes *hānam ātyantikam* as equivalent to liberation (cf., e.g., NVT 68.6), this may be the proper reading: the following passage lends support to this.) In the *Bhāṣya* to NS.4.2.1 (T 1037.8-11), he treats the *prameyas* as consisting of four kinds: things to be known (*jñeya*); things that have to be eliminated (*praheya*); what is to be attained (*adhigantavya*, namely liberation); and the means to attaining liberation, which is the knowledge of the true-nature (*tattvajñāna*). Uddyotakara takes the 'cause of pain' parenthetically: *heya-hāna-upāya-adhigantavya-bhedāt catvāri arthapadāni* (NV 8.1; cf. NV 14.1-4). Vācaspati follows Uddyotakara (NVT 47.5-12); Udayana does not comment on this (NVTP 126.5-11).

[8] The four *vidyās* ('branches of science') are: *trayī* 'the Vedic science', *varttā* 'agriculture/commerce', *daṇḍanīti* 'political science', and *ānvīkṣikī* 'analytics'. See *Arthaśāstra* I.4-5 for a fuller treatment.

certainty. <P> What then <does it operate on>? <S> An
2.20 object which is in doubt. As it is said,

> After hesitating, the ascertaining of an object through <the method of> thesis and counter-thesis is ascertainment.[9] NS 1.1.41

Hesitation is 'doubt'. <The method of> 'Thesis and counter-thesis' is the operation of reasoning. The ascertaining of the
3.1 object is 'ascertainment' or 'knowledge of its true-nature'. And this same doubt is a cognition in which there is merely hesitation as to what the object really is and which lacks ascertaining. And although it is included in <the category of> object of knowledge, it is separately mentioned for this very reason.

Now as for 'purpose:' that prompted by which one acts is his purpose; <that is to say> the object which seeking to acquire or to eliminate one undertakes an action. This same <purpose> pervades all living things, actions, and
3.5 branches of science. Reasoning (*nyāya*) also functions with this as its basis. <P> But what is this 'reasoning'? <S> The examining of an object through the means of knowledge; and inference depends upon perception and verbal testimony. This is <what is meant by> 'analysis'. The analyzing of an object <already> observed through perception or ver-

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[9] That is, one applies a thesis and a counter-thesis ('It is a man'/ 'It is a post') to something in doubt and eventually arrives at the truth. Cf.ṠṬ 58.9 ff.

bal testimony is 'analysis'. Since it operates through analysis, it is 'analytics' or the 'science of reasoning' or the 'Nyāya system'.[10] But that inference which is contradicted by perception or verbal testimony is pseudo-reasoning.

With respect to this, both discussion and arguing serve a purpose; but captiousness is <now> examined. One who engages in captiousness is <called> captious. If, when challenged as to his purpose, he acknowledges that his position is such and such, and that his established doctrine is such and such, he rejects his captiousness. But if he does not acknowledge <these things>, it results that he is neither a layman nor an expert.

But even if he says that his purpose is to make known his denial of his opponent's position, then this too is precisely the same <kind of captiousness>. And yet if he acknowledges this: (1) who propounds <this established doctrine>, (2) who knows it, (3) by virtue of what is it made known, and (4) what is made known – then he rejects his captiousness. But if he does not acknowledge <these four>, then this statement of his, that his purpose is to make known his denial of his opponent's position, is meaningless.

And a collection of statements that fails to establish cf. NS 1.2.3

[10] *anvīkṣā* (analysis; more literally 'investigation') > *ānvīkṣikī* (analytics) = *nyāyavidyā* (the science of reasoning) = *nyāyaśāstra* (the Nyāya system).

<a doctrine> is <called> 'captiousness'. If he acknowledges the import of this <collection of statements>, then that is the position he must establish. But if he does not acknowledge <this>, then <his collection of statements> is mere non-sensical babbling, <and> captiousness results.

3.20 Next is 'familiar instance'. A familiar instance is a cf. NS 1.1.25
thing that falls within the ken of perception, regarding which the experience of both laymen and experts does not conflict. It also is an 'object of knowledge;' yet it is separately mentioned. Both inference and verbal testimony are based on this. When it is present, inference and verbal testimony may occur; but when absent, neither may. The operation of reasoning depends on this. And the denial of the position of one's opponent should be stated in terms of its contradicting a familiar instance, and one's own position has to be established in terms of its concurring with a familiar instance. And a nihilist who admits a familiar instance
4.1 rejects his nihilism. If he does not admit a familiar instance, through what means could he refute his opponent? And when familiar instance has been explained, it is possible to say,

> Familiar instance, which, due to its similarity to the property to be established (*sādhya*), has this <same> nature, is an 'example' <in an inference>. NS 1.1.36

Or because of its difference from that,
the contrary. NS 1.1.37

Established doctrine is a matter to which one assents in the following way: 'This is the case'. It is also an object of knowledge. It is separately mentioned because, when there are different established doctrines, discussion, arguing, and captiousness are operative – and not otherwise.

In however large a collection of utterances the establishment of the thing to be established is completely realized, the five members of this <collection>, the thesis etc.,[11] are called members relative to the collection. The means of knowledge inhere in[12] these members: verbal testimony is the thesis, inference is the reason, perception is the example, comparison is the application; when all these inhere in one and the same thing, the demonstration of their capacity <to establish the desired result> is the conclusion. Since this is reasoning (*nyāya*) in the highest sense, discussion, arguing, and captiousness function due to this – and not otherwise. Based on this also is the ratification of the true-nature. These same members, though included in object of knowledge since they are specific utterances, are separately men-

[11] The five members of a Nyāya inference are: thesis (*pratijñā*), reason (*hetu*), example (*udāharaṇa*), application (*upanaya*), and conclusion (*nigamana*).

[12] Uddyotakara (NV 17.5-16) and Vācaspati (NVT 59.14-60.20) see this 'inherence' as figurative.

tioned for this purpose.

4.15 Hypothetical reasoning is not included among the means of knowledge nor is it a distinct means of knowledge; by assisting the means of knowledge it conduces to the knowledge of the true-nature <of a thing>. An example cf. NB 3.2.68
of this is: 'Is rebirth brought about by (1) a non-eternal cause, (2) an eternal cause, or (3) without any cause?' Hypothetical reasoning functions by way of establishing the cf. NS 1.1.40
cause of an object, the true-nature of which is not known, as follows: 'If it is brought about by (1) a non-eternal cause, then the elimination of rebirth is realizable by the elimination of its cause. But if by (2) an eternal cause, then, because the elimination of the cause is impossible, the elimination of
4.20 rebirth is impossible. But if it has (3) no cause, then, because it is produced without any cause, it will not come into being again;[13] hence a cause of its cessation is impossible. Therefore, there is no elimination of rebirth'. In this case of hypothetical reasoning, the operative means of knowledge are assisted by hypothetical reasoning <in determining> that *karma* is the instrumental cause of rebirth. And because it differentiates the proper domain for the knowledge of the true-nature <of a thing>, hypothetical reasoning

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[13] This translation follows Thakur's reading *nirvartsyati* (NB 4.20): TNT 54.4 reads *nivartsyati* 'will cease'.

contributes to the knowledge of its true-nature. This same hypothetical reasoning, which is of this kind, in combination with a means of knowledge is of value in establishing or refuting a matter in a discussion. Hence it is separately
4.25 mentioned, even though it is included in object of knowledge.

5.1 Ascertainment, which is the knowledge of the true-nature <of a thing>, is the end of the means of knowledge. Discussion results in this. Both arguing and captiousness serve to safeguard it. These two, hypothetical reasoning and determination, support worldly life. Hence this same ascertainment, which is included in 'object of knowledge', is mentioned separately.

Now discussion is a collection of statements, involving numerous speakers, <and> which, <while each speaker in it states> proof for his respective position, results in the
5.5 ascertainment of some one position; it is separately mentioned for understanding's sake, since the employment of it when understood leads to the knowledge of the true-nature <of a thing>.

Arguing and captiousness, which both differ from this, are said to have as their aim the preservation of the ascertainment of the true-nature <of a thing>. cf. NS 4.2.50

Pseudo-reasons are mentioned separately from

grounds for defeat, since they will have to be objected to in discussion. But grounds for defeat <will have to be objected to> in arguing and captiousness.

Deceit, futile answer, and grounds for defeat are mentioned separately for understanding's sake. When understood, one avoids deceit, futile answer, and grounds for defeat in his own statements, <but> censures them in the statements of an opponent. But the rebuttal of a futile answer employed by one's opponent is easy to grasp, and its employment is in itself simple.

This same analytics, which is differentiated <from the other three branches of science> by virtue of the categories of means of knowledge etc.,

> Is proclaimed in the list of sciences as the
> lamp of all branches of science, the means to
> all actions, and the basis of all *dharmas*.[14]

This same 'knowledge of the true-nature' and the 'attainment of the highest good' have to be understood in accordance with the branch of science <to which they belong>. But in this <branch of science> – soteriology – the knowledge of the true-nature is the knowledge of the soul

[14] Pakṣilasvāmin seems here to be drawing on the *Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra* (I.4), substituting *vidyoddeśe prakīrtitā* (NB 5.15) for *śaśvad ānvīkṣikī matā* in the last *pāda* of the *śloka*. Śrīkaṇṭha thus glosses *uddeśe parīkṣitā* (NB 5.15; *parīkṣitā* is also the reading of J): *uddeśanāmni nītiśāstraprakaraṇaviśeṣe*: "In the specific section of political science named 'Listing'" (ŚṬ 65.32). Jayanta Bhaṭṭa quotes this same *śloka*, with *parīkṣitā* for *prakīrtitā* (NM I.11).

etc. The attainment of the highest good is the gaining of liberation.

# *Nyāyavārttika*

6.1 A commentary on that *śāstra* which Akṣapāda, foremost among sages, uttered for the tranquility of the world, will be composed by me in order to put an end to the misunderstanding of it due to bad logicians.

The first *sūtra* of this *śāstra*, 'From the knowledge NS 1.1.1
of the true-nature of the categories of means of knowledge
etc. there is attainment of the highest good', is a statement
of its right-relation <to its end – the highest good>. <The
first sentence of the *Bhāṣya*>, 'Upon the apprehension of an 1.1
object on the basis of <this> means of knowledge...', is a
statement which reconfirms this <relation>,[1] since the
*śāstra* states human good.[2]

6.5 The *śāstra*, in turn, is a collection of words which convey <the categories of the> means of knowledge etc. and which is characterized by arrangement. A word, in turn, is a collection of phonemes; a collection of words is a *sūtra*; a collection of *sūtras* is a section; a collection of sections is a chapter; a collection of chapters is a book. The <Nyāya> *śāstra* is a work composed of five books. The means of knowledge etc. are the categories of it. <The categories –> The things to which words refer – the means of knowledge

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[1] Vācaspati (NVT 23.26-27) takes 'this' (*tasya*) differently: "the *śāstra* linked to the attainment of the highest good by the <first> *sūtra*."
[2] *puruṣa* is translated shortly below by 'man', where 'human' is inapt (NV 6.10).

etc., of 'it' – the *śāstra* – are essentially sixteen.

This[3] *śāstra* states human good. The distinctive fea- cf. 25.23
ture of the *śāstra* is the restatement of the true-nature of real
objects, which are already known through perception or
inference. The disciple, richly endowed with spiritual abili-
6.10 ties, who does not <already> know the true-nature of real
objects through perception or inference, is the audience of
this <*śāstra*>. Men, in turn, are divided into four kinds: he
who knows, he who does not know, he who is in doubt, and
he who is in error. Among these, he who knows is the
teacher; the others, being dependent,[4] are those who have to
be taught. When they depend upon sense-organ-object con-
tact, then <they have to be taught> through perception.
When they depend upon seeing the inferential mark, recol-
lection, and so forth, then <they have to be taught> through
inference. But when they depend upon instruction, then the
*śāstra* comes into play. The good, in turn, is pleasure and
the cessation of what is harmful. There is a well established
two-fold division of this good according to the difference
between that which is immediately experienced and that
which is not immediately experienced.[5] Pleasure is the cf. NS 1.1.8

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[3] Vācaspati (NVT 25.23) glosses *tat* here (NV 6.8) by *tasmāt* 'therefore:' this seems forced.

[4] Vācaspati (NVT 26.9) glosses *apekṣā* 'expectation, need, hope, requirement' by *jijñāsā* 'a desire to know, inquiry'.

6.15 immediately experienced <kind of good>. The cessation of what is harmful is not immediately experienced. The cessation of what is harmful, in turn, is either absolute or temporary. The temporary <cessation of what is harmful results> through the removal of such causes of pain as thorns etc. The absolute <cessation of what is harmful>, in turn, <results> through the elimination of the twenty-one different kinds of pain. Now the twenty-one kinds of pain are: the body, the six sense-organs, the six sense-objects, the six cognitions, pleasure, and pain. Body is 'pain' because it is the seat of pain. The sense-organs, their objects, and the cognitions <are 'pain'> because they cause it. Pleasure is 'pain' because it is inseparable from pain. Pain is 'pain' by its intrinsic nature. The elimination of this <pain> <results>
6.20 through the removal of its causes – merit and demerit: that is to say, if merit and demerit have not been produced, by not producing any <new> merit and demerit; and if they have been produced, by destroying them through undergoing them. Men are subject to desire etc. or are free from desire. As between these, desire is characterized by an

[5] In NS 1.1.8 verbal testimony is said to have two forms: *dṛṣṭārtha* 'with seen object' and *adṛṣṭārtha* 'with unseen object'. Pakṣilasvāmin takes the first kind to refer to that whose ends are experienced in this world, the second with that in the next world (NV 380.25-381.2). Uddyotakara takes the 'seen object' kind as that whose end is grasped by perception, while the 'unseen object' kind by inference: *pratysakṣata upalabdho 'rtho dṛṣṭhārthaḥ, anumānata upalabdho 'rtho 'dṛṣṭhārthaḥ iti* (NV 381.4-5).

obsession with objects. Men who have this <obsession with
objects> are subject to desire. Dispassion, in turn, is charac-
terized by non-obsession with enjoyment. Those men who
have this are free from desire. Activity, in accordance with
the difference between men, has two forms. <That is to
say:> The activities of these men correspond, in either case,
to the difference between men. The activity of men who are
free from desire has one form. That is, between these, the
activity of men who are free from desire has, to be sure, one
7.1 form – its purpose is to reject what is unpleasant. They act
only with the motivation, 'Let us eliminate what is unpleas-
ant', but they have no obsession with anything. The activity
of those who are subject to desire, however, is of two kinds.
<That is> The activities of those who are subject to desire
etc. are of two kinds: their purpose is to attain what is pleas-
ant and to reject what is unpleasant. One acts out of desire
thus: 'I will acquire what is pleasant'. One ceases, out of
aversion, thus: 'I will eliminate what is unpleasant'. Activ-
ity, again, is two-fold because of the difference between
successful and unsuccessful <activity>. That is; the activity,
7.5 to be sure, on the part of those who are subject to desire is
either successful or unsuccessful. If a man acts thinking, 'I
will acquire what is pleasant', when he acquires it then <his
activity> is successful. If one acts thinking, 'I will eliminate

what is unpleasant', when he eliminates <it his activity is> successful. When the reverse <occurs in either case>, then <activity is> unsuccessful.

Yet, again, activity has these two forms because the means of knowledge <which gives rise to them> is either valid or invalid. Now a means of knowledge is that which demarcates an object. Even a counterfeit-means of knowledge, because it shares a generic feature[6] with a <valid> means of knowledge, is figuratively called a 'means of knowledge'. <P> But what generic feature does a pseudo-
7.10 means of knowledge share with a <valid> means of knowledge? <S> The fact that it demarcates <an object> is the shared generic feature. <That is to say:> The generic feature <of demarcating an object> is demarcated by a means of knowledge as well as by a pseudo-means of knowledge. When this same agent of knowledge, having ascertained an object through a <valid> means of knowledge, acts, then his activity is successful. But when he acts after having ascertained <the> object through a pseudo-means of knowledge, then his activity is unsuccessful. Now as for its <activity's>
being successful, the *Bhāṣya* <states>, "Upon the apprehen- 1.1
sion of an object on the basis of <this> means of knowl-

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[6] Reading *pramāṇasāmānyāt* with TNT 8.1 for Thakur's *pramāṇasāmānyat* (NV 7.9).

edge..." <P> Neither is be established because they are
mutually dependent. <S> <This is> Not correct, because
there is no beginning <to the process>. <P> If there is suc-
cessfulness of activity upon the apprehension of an object
on the basis of a means of knowledge, or if there is appre-
7.15 hension of an object on the basis of a means of knowledge
because of the successfulness of the activity, then one must
state which is prior and which is posterior. If, on the one
hand, the apprehension of an object on the basis of a means
of knowledge is prior, how, pray, can one apprehend <the
validity of the means of knowledge> without the successful-
ness of activity? But, if the successfulness of activity is
prior[7] then, how, pray, does one act in regard to an object
without having ascertained <the validity of the means of
knowledge>? Therefore, the relation of prior and posterior
is not appropriate for activity or the apprehension of an
object on the basis of a means of knowledge. <S> And this
is not so. <P> Why? <S> Because there is no beginning <to
the process>. In <our commentary on> the *sūtra*, "previ- NS 3.1.18
ously repeated...," we will show that *saṃsāra* is without [153.3-6]
any beginning. And if *saṃsāra* had a beginning, this is a
7.20 defect – whether it is the apprehension of an object on the
basis of a means of knowledge that is prior or whether suc-

[7] Reading *sāmarthyam* NV 7.17.

cessfulness of activity is prior.

Alternatively, the <first> sentence <of the *Bhāṣya*> serves to reveal that, if one enquires into the relative strength and weakness of the means of knowledge and activity,[8] they are both successful. <That is:> Surely when an ordinary person acts, he acts after ascertaining an object through a means of knowledge, and by so acting he obtains his goal. Thus this question arises: is the apprehension of an object on the basis of a means of knowledge successful or rather the activity? Both are successful, because the goal is inseparably related to <both of> them.

Alternatively, to say that <the first> sentence <of the *Bhāṣya*> serves to reveal this meaning is to restate worldly conduct. That is to say: this sentence restates worldly conduct; every agent of knowledge who acts, after having
7.25 ascertained an object through a <valid> means of knowledge, obtains his goal.

8.1 There are four cardinal entities <with which Nyāya cf. 2.10-12
is concerned>, due to the differences among 'what is to be eliminated', the 'eliminating' <of it>, the 'means' <to eliminating>, and 'what is to be obtained'. What is to be eliminated is pain and its cause. We have discussed pain. The 6.17-19
cause of pain is ignorance and desire or merit and demerit.

[8] Reading *pravṛttyor* (NV 7.21 cf. NVT 30.20) for *pravṛttor*.

The eliminating <of pain> is the knowledge of the true-nature. This, in turn, is the apprehension of an entity as it actually is; and this is a <valid> means of knowledge. The means is the *śāstra*; this too has been explained. What is to 6.4; 6.8
be obtained is liberation; this, in turn, is the absolute absence of pain. And <the first sentence of the *Bhāṣya*> serves to reveal that, in this group of four, the means of
8.5 knowledge is pre-eminent. <P> But how is that group of four, means of knowledge etc., revealed by this sentence? <S> 'The means of knowledge', 'the object of knowledge', and 'knowledge' are to be understood from the literal form <of this sentence>,[9] whereas the 'agent of knowledge' <is to be understood> because it is inextricably linked with these. For there can be no means of knowledge without an agent of knowledge.

This same sentence is now carefully examined part 1.1
by part. In it, the expression *tasi*[10] found in the word 'on the basis of a means of knowledge' (*pramāṇatas*) serves to

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[9] The sentence in the *Bhāṣya* is: *pramāṇato 'rthapratipattau pravṛttisāmarthyād arthavat pramāṇam*. Uddyotakara says that *pramāṇa*, *prameya*, and *adhigati* are understood directly from it. *pramāṇa* (means of knowledge) is clearly understood from the first word *pramāṇataḥ*, *prameya* (object of knowledge) from the word *arthaï*; *adhigati* (which he takes to mean *pramā*) may be understood from the word *pratipattau* or from the second occurrence of *pramāṇa*, which might be taken in the sense of 'valid knowledge'.

[10] "*tasi* (1) *taddhita* affix *tas* showing direction by means of a thing..., (2) *taddhita* affix *tas* applied in the sense of the ablative case and substituted for the ablative case affix..." K. V. Abhyankar, *A Dictionary of Sanskrit Grammar*, s.v.

make known that there is an overlapping of both grammatical number and case. <P> This form, 'on the basis of a means of knowledge' (*pramāṇatas*), is an instance of the fifth case affix used in the sense of instrumental cause.[11] <But you allege that:> It is used to indicate the overlapping of number and the overlapping of case. But how can one construe *tasi* except as a fifth case affix? <S> Pakṣilasvāmin
8.10 says that it is so construed, because of <the *Vārttika* to A.5.4.44>,

> In the context of <the affix> *tasi*, a supplement after *ādi* etc. <should be stated>.[12]

<P> What is accomplished by this? <S> Due to the overlapping of grammatical number there is merging and restriction. One understands merging thus: 'Through one means of knowledge, through two means of knowledge, through more than two means of knowledge there is apprehension'. <One understands> Restriction thus: 'Through one means of knowledge only'. Due to the overlapping of case, causality and instrumentality <are understood>. Causality is <understood> thus: 'The apprehension of an object arises because of a means of knowledge'. The instrumental sense

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[11] Uddyotakara seems to have in mind *Vārttika* 1 to A.2.3.23 (*hetau*) || *nimittakāraṇahetuṣu sarvāsāṃ prāyadarśanam* || (I.454.18)

[12] *<tasiprakaraṇa> ādyādibhya upasaṃkhyānam*. This *Vārttika* (to A.5.4.44, II.436.11) indicates that its use in place of the fifth case affix is not restricted to use with *prati*, as the *sūtra* states: *pratiyoge pañcamyāstasiḥ*.

<is understood> thus: 'One effects his end through a means
of knowledge' – because it <the means of knowledge is>
'the most important causal factor'.[13] <P> The merging <of
the means of knowledge> is impossible because they have
restricted contents. <S> <This is> Not correct, because we
do not admit <your doctrine>. We might state your opinion
as follows: 'The means of knowledge have restricted con-
8.15 tents. Perception has particulars as its content, while infer-
ence has universals as its content'. And this much we must
admit. But what of the claim that so far as the universal and
the particular are concerned, perception never has a univer-
sal as its content nor inference particulars as its content?
This also is not correct, because we do not admit <your doc-
trine>. In the first place, we do not maintain that there are
<only> two means of knowledge, nor that there are <only>
two <kinds of> objects, nor that there is no combination <of
the means of knowledge>. <P> Why? <S> Now <we hold>
that there are four means of knowledge and that there are
three different kinds of objects – universals, particulars, and
that which possesses them.[14] Moreover, <we hold that>
there is combination because there is apprehension of one
and the same <object> through all the means of knowledge

[13] See A.1.4.42 *sādhakatamaṃ karaṇam.*

[14] 'That which possesses them' clearly means a substance (*dravya*) that underlies and possesses attributes.

– as is the case with a sense-organ. Now a sense organ, because it illumines an object, is a means of knowledge. It admits of restriction and of combination. There is restriction in the case of odors etc., while there is combination in the case of earth etc., because they can be apprehended by two sense-organs.[15] And knowledge concerning the existence and qualities <of things> derives from all the sense organs.

<P> Because <the object> is already known <through one means of knowledge>, there is no purpose <served by adopting a second means of knowledge>. <S> <This is> Not correct, because there is apprehension of it in different ways. We might state your opinion as follows: 'If the means of knowledge were combined, surely, if an object were apprehended through one means of knowledge, a second means of knowledge would prove useless. To have a means of knowledge make known an object that is already apprehended would be 'grinding what is ground'.[16] <S> <This is> Not correct, because there is apprehension of it in different ways. We deny that an object is also apprehended in the same way through inference etc. as it is through perception. The 'different ways' <consists in this>: <an object> that is contact with a sense-organ <is apprehended> through

[15] Cf. *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 2.2.3 *vyavasthitaḥ pṛthivyāṃ gandhaḥ*, and 2.1.1 *rūparasa-gandhasparśavatī pṛthivī*.
[16] *piṣṭapeśanam* is a maxim (*nyāya*) for fruitless activity.

perception; <an object> that is not in contact with a sense organ <is apprehended> through inference; there is apprehension of the relation between a name and its bearer through comparison; <there is apprehension of an object>
9.1 through a verbal description – verbal testimony. Moreover, since we see that there is restriction in the case of another object, and because merging does not apply to every object, there is no uselessness <in having a second means of knowledge make known an object>. Therefore, it has been established that the expression *tasi* serves to convey an overlapping of both grammatical number and case.

We must ascertain what the intrinsic nature of a means of knowledge is. <P> But what constitutes a means of knowledge's being a means of knowledge? And what is meant by 'means of knowledge'? <S> A means of knowledge is that which causes knowledge; the fact that it is that which causes knowledge constitutes its being 'a means of knowledge'. <P> You have said that that which causes
9.5 knowledge is a means of knowledge. This characterization is incorrect, because <being the cause of knowledge> is common. If that which causes knowledge is a means of knowledge, then surely both the agent of knowledge and the object of knowledge would also be 'means of knowledge', because they cause knowledge. Or else you must state the

difference <among these>. <S> This is the difference: because when a means of knowledge <is present>, the agent of knowledge and the object of knowledge are successful. When a means of knowledge is present, the agent of knowledge and the object of knowledge are successful. But the means of knowledge is not successful <when the agent of knowledge and the object of knowledge are present>. Therefore, this alone is the cause of knowledge. <P> The origination of a means of knowledge has no instrumental cause.[17] <S> <This is> Not correct, because the contact between the object and the sense-organ is the instrumental cause. <P> If the means of knowledge comes into being due to the agent of knowledge and the object of knowledge, then does the origination of a means of knowledge prove to have
9.10 no instrumental cause? <S> <This is> Not correct, because the contact between the sense-organ and the object is the instrumental cause, the origination of a means of knowledge is not without an instrumental cause. A means of knowledge

[17] The argument seems to be as follows. The means of knowledge has been shown to be the instrumental cause of knowledge. On the other hand, the means of knowledge is not the instrumental cause of either the object of knowledge nor the agent of knowledge, because the *anvaya-vyatireka* relationship does not hold: either or both of these can be present without the presence of that. But if the means of knowledge is produced from these two, the problem arises: they are not the instrumental cause of it, since the *anvaya* relationship does not hold true – there are cases when an agent of knowledge and an object of knowledge are present and there is no means of knowledge. The objector thus claims that there is, at least so far, no instrumental cause for the origination of the means of knowledge.

is produced by the agent of knowledge and the object of knowledge – both of which require sense-organ object contact for the origination of the means of knowledge. Therefore, there is no undesirable consequence that the origin of a means of knowledge is without an instrumental cause. <P> Therefore, if both the agent of knowledge and the object of knowledge require sense-organ object contact for the origination of the means of knowledge, but then on what do they depend for the origination of the sense-organ object contact? <S> For this also <they require> the sense-organ; hence the relationship of agent and instrumental cause is beginningless. That is; whatever is produced subsequently depends upon what precedes it. Therefore, the relationship between agent and instrumental cause must be seen to be
9.15 without beginning. <P> If a means of knowledge is produced by an agent of knowledge and an object of knowledge that already exist, then, because the fact that they are an agent of knowledge and an object of knowledge is not established except through a means of knowledge, it is impossible that they be an agent of knowledge and an object of knowledge. How <is it possible>? <S> A means of knowledge. <That is:> Just as this <expression 'means of knowledge'> is a *kāraka*-expression,[18] so are 'object of knowledge' and 'agent of knowledge'. And *kāraka*-expres-

sions do not become realized as such except in connection with an action. For neither a substance in isolation nor an action in isolation is a *kāraka*. For a *kāraka*-expression, when it is <properly> employed, is employed in reference to that which produces an action together with the specific action. And the expressions 'agent of knowledge' and 'object of knowledge', which are *kāraka*-expressions,
9.20 should not be used without an action. <P> <This is> Not correct, because <these expressions> apply to <any of the> three times as does such an expression as 'a cook' etc. <S> We do not say that *kāraka*-expressions are employed only in connection with an action; but rather, that they apply to <any of the> three times; if they were occasioned solely by connection with an action, they could not be used without an action. Yet they are used without connection to an action. <P> But what is the reason <for this>? <S> Their capacity. And this capacity holds true for all the three times. Therefore, it is appropriate to hold that a means of knowledge is produced by an agent of knowledge and an object of knowledge, <and> that it produces knowledge.

Alternatively, <we can argue that> this undesirable consequence does not <arise>, because <the means of

[18] On *kārakas* see G. Cardona, "Pāṇini's *kārakas*: Agency, Animacy and Identity," *JIP* 2 (1974) 231-306.

9.25 knowledge> is the most important causal factor.[19] That is;
and this undesirable consequence does not arise: that both
the agent of knowledge and the object of knowledge result
as 'means of knowledge' because they cause knowledge.
<P> Why? <S> Because it is the most important causal fac-
tor. The means of knowledge is the most important causal
factor, not the agent of knowledge nor the object of knowl-
10.1 edge. <P> Now what is meant by 'the most important causal
factor'? The mere sentence, 'A means of knowledge is the
most important causal factor', is being stated, but not its
meaning. <S> The correspondence of presence and absence.
If the agent of knowledge or the object of knowledge are
absent, there is no valid knowledge; but when they are
present it does arise. But it is not the case that it actually
arises when they are present; but only when the means of
knowledge is present and they are both present does valid
knowledge actually arise. And this pre-eminence is what is
meant by 'being the most important causal factor'. Alterna-
tively, <we can describe> this pre-eminence as that by the
possession of which a person knows. <P> By possessing
what does he know? <S> By possessing a means of knowl-
10.5 edge. That is, when a means of knowledge is present, he
knows; when absent he does not. Alternatively, <we can

[19] See A.1.4.42 *sādhakatamaṃ karaṇam*.

describe this pre-eminence in terms of the fact> that they both, though present, lack efficacy in its absence. <That is:> Pre-eminence is that due to whose absence an agent of knowledge and an object of knowledge do not produce valid knowledge. Alternatively, <we can describe this pre-eminence as> the fact that it comes into being last, as is the case with contact. <That is to say:> Alternatively, just as contact, which comes into being last, is capable of <producing a new> substance, so has a means of knowledge, which comes into being after both the agent of knowledge and the object of knowledge, the capacity of <producing> valid knowledge. Hence, pre-eminence is posteriority of existence. Alternatively, <we can describe this pre-eminence in terms of the> immediacy of apprehension. <That is to say:> Alternatively, the fact that apprehension arises immediately after <the operation of> a means of knowledge is precisely its pre-eminence. Alternatively, <we can describe this pre-eminence as> its being the specific cause.[20] Now the agent of knowledge is an aspecific cause of <all> knowledge, per-
10.10 ceptual etc. The object of knowledge is also such <an aspecific cause> of all apprehensions, because it is common to all men. But the means of knowledge, because it is the spe-

[20] *asādhāraṇakaraṇatā* (NV 10.9)/ *asādhāraṇakāraṇatva* (NV 10.11): cf. *Tarkasaṃgraha* (c. 38) *asādhāraṇaṃ kāraṇam karaṇam.*

cific cause, is pre-eminent. And because of its pre-eminence, it is said to be the most important causal factor. Alternatively, <we can describe this pre-eminence in terms of the fact> that it particularizes the contact which causes valid knowledge. <That is to say:> Alternatively, it is contact <of the sense-organ and object> which causes valid knowledge; as a means of knowledge functions to assist this <contact>, it should be termed 'pre-eminence'.[21]

The explicit mention of "object" serves to rule out 1.1
apprehensions which have the means of knowledge as their content; because an apprehension that has a means of
10.15 knowledge as its content does not prompt a person to the implementation <of an action>; but, rather, one that has the 'suchness' of an object as its content. When one apprehends that an object is such, he then acts. Alternatively, <the explicit mention of 'object'> serves to rule out real entities that are indifferent. For the apprehension of a real entity that is indifferent does not prompt a person to the implementation <of an action>, but, rather, one that has its content an object that is the cause of pleasure or pain. When a person apprehends that an object is the cause of pleasure or pain, he
then acts. <P> The <first> mention of "means of knowl- 1.1
edge" is inappropriate, because this is <already> under-

[21] See NVT 38.26-27.

stood. <S> <This is> Not correct, because it serves to make
known that it is that specific means of knowledge <that is
valid>. <P> If one says, "Because of successfulness of 1.1
10.20 activity upon the apprehension of an object," this is in fact
understood – 'on the basis of a means of knowledge'. For
there can be no "apprehension of an object" at all "without a 1.1-2
means of knowledge." <S> And this is not so, because it
serves to make known that it is that specific means of
knowledge <that is valid>. This expression 'means of
knowledge' is used in the sense of 'valid means of knowl- cf. 39.18
edge' and also in the sense of 'pseudo-means of knowl-
edge', because it shares a generic feature with a valid means
of knowledge. Thus, the apprehension <that arises> thus
through a valid means of knowledge makes the valid means
of knowledge attain successfulness ofactivity, and not the
other <invalid means of knowledge>. Nor is the fact that the
fifth-case affix is used to indicate the cause understood
without the explicit mention of 'the means of knowledge'.
And hence <its mention has> a purpose. Therefore explicit
mention of 'the means of knowledge' was made. <P> The
explicit mention of the word "object" (*artha*) includes 1.1
everything since it is <defined by Pakṣilasvāmin as being>
pleasure, pain, or their causes and because <all objects are 1.5-6
11.1 the> 'object of desire' (*arthyamāna*). All objects, the means

of knowledge etc., are the cause of pleasure and pain and they are all ‘objects of desire’. <A thing is called> ‘An object’ because it is the ‘object of desire’. <S> <This is> Not correct, because it involves a contradiction and because it is not what was intended to be expressed. <That is:> If one says that all objects, the means of knowledge etc., are the cause of pleasure and pain, he would be contradicted by
the statement that ‘there are four cardinal entities – what is cf. 2.10-11
to be eliminated etc.’ Nor can one eliminate the means of knowledge etc. Nor is the elimination of the means of knowledge etc. intended to be expressed. Therefore, this is not the correct explanation. But, rather, <the correct expla-
11.5 nation is:> as many <objects> as are comprehended as being pleasure, pain or their causes are termed <‘objects’>, because they meet the necessary requirement. <For example:> One does not include consciousness <as being an ‘object’> because it does not meet the necessary requirement and because it is not an end. <That is:> Consciousness is not something to be eliminated because it is neither pleasure, pain, nor is it their cause; nor is it the object of desire, because it is not a end.

<P> <The *Bhāṣya* states,> “This same object of the 1.6
means of knowledge is beyond enumeration.” Since this <object>, which lies in the domain of the means of knowl-

edge, is so vast, it cannot be counted, since it is infinite <in
number>. <S> <This is> Not correct, because both are
counted. All these objects of the means of knowledge are, as
it was stated, "pleasure, pain, and their causes". And both of 1.6
these are counted. Therefore, it is not correct to say that,
because they are infinite, they are not counted. <P> It is also
11.10 incoherent <for Pakṣilasvāmin> to say, "because the differ- 1.7
ences among living things cannot be counted," the objects
of the means of knowledge cannot be counted. <S> <This
is> Not correct, because the term 'object' (*artha*) conveys
the meaning of 'purpose'. <That is to say:> The meaning of
this sentence, "The 'object' of the means of knowledge can- 1.6
not be counted," is: the purpose of the means of knowledge
cannot be counted. <P> How so? <S> Because one and the
same object causes pleasure for some <living things>, but
pain for others.

"And when a means of knowledge is valid" – suc- 1.8
cessful – <the agent of knowledge etc.> are valid" – suc-
cessful. Due to the context, the meaning of "any one" must 1.9
be observed to be, 'that which is the most important causal
factor'. For the operative context is that, among the group of
11.15 four <i.e. means of knowledge etc.>, the means of knowl-
edge is pre-eminent. But if the sentence were taken with a
meaning according to the literal meaning <of its constituent

words>, how would the successfulness of the means of knowledge be described? Therefore, <the meaning of sentence> as we have explained it is proper.

<P> <It is said:> "The agent of knowledge is independent."[22] But what is 'independence'? <S> The fact that he enjoys the result(s) of the *kārakas*, because he is connected with the result(s) of the *kārakas*. Alternatively, <this independence consists in> the inherence of these <*kārakas* – in him>, since the person is the locus of the action that is to be effected by all the *kārakas*. <Alternatively, this independence consists in> The fact that he prompts <them>, or that he is not prompted by the rest. <That is to say:> Alter-
11.20 natively, since he calls into play the whole gamut of *kārakas*, whose efficacies are well-known <to him>, and is not prompted by them <he is 'independent'>.

By 'complete realization' of the true-nature' is cf. 1.12
meant either the suitability for use <of the object> or <its> neglectability. The suitability of use for an object that has been ascertained is its concurrence. The use <of the object> after one knows that, 'This object is either the cause of pleasure or the cause of pain', is what is meant by 'realization' – the acquisition or the rejection of the object respectively. Alternatively, because of the fact that <one knows that an

[22] See A.1.4.54 *svatantraḥ kartā*.

object> is neither the cause of pleasure nor of pain, there is indifference.

<P> But what is meant by 'this'?[23] <S> 'This' is what exists and what does not exist. <P> The state of 'this' 1.13
is called 'thisness'. Therefore, you must state what 'this' is
11.25 which has this state. <S> 'This' is what exists and what does not exist, because they meet the requirement of being the content of the means of knowledge. <That is to say:> It is required that what exists and what does not exist be the
12.1 content of the means of knowledge; therefore 'this' means what exists and what does not exist. The state of 'this' is existence and non-existence; to what exists and what does not exist pertain being the content of the means of knowledge and the denial of this. <That is to say:> Indeed, the nature of these two, existence and non-existence, is twofold; that of being asserted and of being denied. That which is asserted in one thing is denied in another. Thus for example, 'Earth possesses odor, <but> water is odorless'. <P> Because they are both the content of the means of knowledge, the undesirable consequence is that what exists and what does not exist are the same. <S> <This is> Not correct, because of variance <of the logical reason>.[24] We might

[23] That is, *tat* ('this') in *tattva* ('this-ness') in NB 1.13-15.
[24] That is, the logical reason varies from the *sādhya*-property. See NS 1.2.5 *anaikāntikaḥ savyabhicāraḥ*.

12.5 state your opinion in this matter as follows: 'If both what exists and what does not exist are understood through a means of knowledge, then, because they are both the content of the means of knowledge, they would prove to be the same'. And this is not correct, because <the logical reason> is variant. <That is to say:> The totality of substances in this world, cows, pots, etc., are to be understood through the means of knowledge and yet they admit of difference. Therefore, this <logical reason> is variant. Further, there is a difference <between what exists and what does not exist> because they are <respectively> the causes of independent cognition and dependent non-cognition. What exists is, to be sure, the independent cause of a means of knowledge. But what does not exist, being dependent, is apprehended
through negation. "As happens with a lamp." That is, just as 1.16
a lamp indeed makes known <the presence of> such objects as pots etc. that are set in a storeroom and the like, in the
12.10 same way it also makes known what does not exist. For no other means is resorted to in order to apprehend what does not exist. For when an object like a pot etc. is being seen, there is no other visible thing similar in kind to it. If there were <another similar visible object> it would, like this, be seen; yet it is not seen. Therefore, one understands that there is no <other similar visible object> because one does not see

it. Likewise too, when one thing that exists is being known through a means of knowledge, there is no other object of knowledge similar to it. If this <other similar object> were to exist, it would exist like this object; but it is not known. Therefore, because there is no knowledge <of it>, it does
not exist. "Thus, then, a means of knowledge, which reveals 1.24-25
what exists, also reveals what does not exist." Therefore,
12.15 since the different kinds of what does not exist do not appear independently, they are not mentioned <as categories>. Alternatively, the plethora of what does not exist, like the plethora of what exists, must be understood also as being listed because it is included in the group of four.[25] Therefore, simply because what exists is taught, what does not exist is taught. And hence, they are not <explicitly> stated.

Thus ~~he says~~, "And indeed what exists will be con- 1.20-21
cisely taught as being of sixteen kinds." 'Order'[26] means 1.20-21
'summary'. The *sūtra* means: these same <categories> are the different kinds of what exists.

12.20 A *dvandva* is a compound in which the meanings of cf. 2.5
all the words have equal importance. <P> What does this

[25] Vācaspati (NVT 44.14) has the same reading as C here, *anantarbhāvād* 'because it is not included'.
[26] Uddyotakara here (NV 12.18) glosses the form *vyūḍham* 'ordered, marshalled' in NB 1.20-21 with the related form *vyūha* 'ordering, arrangement'.

mean? <S> That all these things, the means of knowledge etc., must be known. For otherwise, if one were to take it as a different type of compound, then the means of knowledge etc., employed as qualifiers, would not have to be known.[27]

"The analysis <of the compound *pramāṇa...sthānānām*> is 2.5
<to be made> in accordance with the proper <grammatical>
number..." <That is to say:> Whatever purpose is served in
"a specific mention" in which different numbers are 2.5
expressed, that same purpose is to be observed in this *sūtra*
as well. "The phrase, 'true-nature *of* the means of knowl- 2.6
edge...', is <an instance of> the 'remainder' use of the sixth case affix." <P> But what is meant by 'remainder'?[28] <S> 'Remainder' means that there is no desire to express *kārakas*. <That is to say:> When no *kāraka* nor the end of a
*kāraka* is intended, that qualifies as the remainder. As, for cf. 45.12
12.25 example, 'the water jug *of* the Brāhmaṇa'.

<P> There is a defect <in the formulation of the *sūtra*> – <regardless of> whether the true-nature is the same as or different from the means of knowledge etc. <That is to
13.1 say:> If, on the one hand, the true-nature is distinct from the means of knowledge etc., it results that one does not attain the highest good from the knowledge of the means of

[27] See Vācaspati (NVT 45.3-5) and Udayana (NVTP 123.15 ff.) on interpreting this as one of the other kinds of compound.
[28] See A.2.3.50 *śeṣe ṣaṣṭhī*.

knowledge etc. <S> On what grounds? <P> Because they are used as <mere> qualifiers of 'true-nature', as in the action of fetching the king's servant. <S> But if there is no difference? <P> There is no purpose in mentioning 'true-nature'. That is: if you do not admit that the true-nature is distinct from means of knowledge etc., then the mention of 'true-nature' proves otiose.

<E> Some say: <this is> not correct, because there
is no defect on either score. If, in the first place, the true-
nature were distinct from the means of knowledge etc., then,
13.5 because it is not independent <of them>, <the categories
of> the means of knowledge etc. are also understood, as in
the case of 'The occurrence of jujubes in a pot'. Just as,
when it is stated that 'There is occurrence of jujubes in a
pot', a state of being is being made known; because the state
of being is not independent, what is meant is 'Jujubes occur
in a pot'. So in this case too, when it is said that "there is NS 1.1.1
attainment of the highest good from the knowledge of the
true-nature," there is mention of the means of knowledge
etc. because their state of being <i.e. that they have a true-
nature> is not independent. Even if there is no difference,
there is, as in the case of the stationariness of an arrow,
denial of the thing's being in this state, and not <the affirma-
tion of> a <wholly> different object. Therefore, it is not

asserted 'the means of knowledge etc.' without further qualification, but rather that they are a <wholly> different object is denied. As, for example, when one speaks of 'the stationariness of an arrow', what is meant is not that the arrow
13.10 itself is stationariness, but rather that it <the arrow> is not a different object <that actually> is in motion. <S> This is not correct, because there is a failure to establish that it is not another object.

In the phrase, "there is attainment *of* the highest NS 1.1.1
good from the knowledge *of* the true-nature," 'the true- 2.6-7
nature', since it is what is known, turns out to be an object, and 'the highest good', since it is what is being attained, is an object. <P> But what is 'the true-nature' or what is 'the highest good'? <S> By 'true-nature' is meant that entities are the instrumental causes of the arising of knowledge about themselves as they actually are. <That is:> An entity, as it really is, is the instrumental cause of the arising of the corresponding knowledge. This is what is meant by 'true-nature'. 'The highest good', in turn, is two-fold, because of the difference between what is immediately experienced and what is not immediately experienced. Between these, the highest good which <arises> from the knowledge of the true-nature of the categories of the means of knowledge
13.15 etc., is immediately experienced. For, there is no entity that,

when being known, is not the instrumental cause of the cog-
nition of elimination, appropriation, or indifference. And on
this supposition, all entities without exception are adduced
as being things to be known. But the other highest good
arises from the knowledge of the true-nature of the objects
of knowledge, soul etc. <P> There is no proof (*pramāṇa*)
for saying that 'the immediately experienced <highest good 2.9-10
arises> from the knowledge of the means of knowledge etc.,
but the not immediately experienced <highest good> from [cf. NS 1.1.2]
the knowledge of the true-nature of the objects of knowl-
edge, soul etc.' <S> There is <proof>, because that is how
the matter stands. This is exactly the way the matter stands,
because the highest good is attained from the knowledge of
the true-nature of the objects of knowledge, soul etc. For if
13.20 this matter – the objects of knowledge, soul etc. – is errone-
ously understood, then one does not transcend the realm of
*saṃsāra*. And we will set forth this matter in <our commen-
tary on> the second *sūtra*. NS 1.1.2;153.3-6

But if the highest good arose from the knowledge of
the true-nature of the categories of the means of knowledge
etc., then those who desire liberation would not strive for cf. 455.8-9
liberation. For there is nothing that does not have 'knowl-
edge of the true-nature' in some respect. Therefore, it is
only the objects of knowledge, soul etc., that must be known

by the person seeking liberation. Moreover, <he must know cf. 383.13
these alone> because they are taught separately. <That is:>
Moreover, if the means of knowledge etc. without further
qualification were the objects of knowledge, and if the high-
13.25 est good were to result from the thorough knowledge of
them, then the objects of knowledge, soul etc., would not be
separately taught. And Akṣapāda would have been inept in cf. 383.19-384.2
composing a subsequent *sūtra*, whose purpose is to ascer- NS 1.1.9
tain the objects of knowledge, because the objects of knowl-
edge had been set forth by the first *sūtra*. The *Bhāṣya* says:
14.1 "And this same point is restated in the next *sūtra*." "By cor- 2.9-10; 2.10-12
rectly understanding the four cardinal entities" – because of
the differences among what is to be eliminated, the elimi-
nating, the means <to this>, and what is to be attained –
"one attains the highest good." "What is to be eliminated." 2.10; 2.10
What is to be eliminated is pain. "What produces it" are 2.10
ignorance and desire or merit and demerit. "The eliminat- 2.10
ing"[29] is the knowledge of the true-nature. "The means <to 2.10
this>" is the *śāstra*. "What is to be attained" is liberation. 2.10-11
These four cardinal entities are discussed by all teachers in
all the soteriological sciences.

14.5 <P> It is improper to mention <the categories of> cf. 2.13-14
doubt etc. separately, because they are included in <the cat-

[29] *hāna* can also mean 'means of eliminating'.

egory of> object of knowledge. <S> <This is> Not correct,
because they serve to make known the difference in bases cf. 2.15
among the branches of science. <P> <The categories of>
Doubt etc. are included in <the category of> object of
knowledge; hence they should not be stated separately. <S>
<This is> Not correct, because they serve to make known
the difference in bases among the branches of science, since
'these branches of science are four'. And "they have differ- cf. 2.15; 2.15
ent bases." <Among these four:>[30] The Vedic science is
based on the *Agnihotra* <sacrifice>, the pouring of obla-
tions, etc. Agriculture is based on such things as ploughs,
carts, etc. Political science conforms to such different mat-
ters as the ruler, the minister, etc. Analytics conforms to
such different matters as doubt etc. "Without" – its basis of 2.17
14.10 doubt etc. – "it would be mere soteriology." <P> What
<harm> would come of that? <S> Because it if is mere sote-
riology, it is, like the *Upaniṣads*, actually included within cf. 2.17-18
the Vedic science. As a result, the fourfold division <of the
branches of science> comes to an end. Therefore, they <the
categories of doubt> are mentioned separately.

Now among these, doubt is a cognition which by its cf. 3.1-2
nature lacks ascertainment of the intrinsic nature of a real

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[30] The four *vidyās* ('branches of science') are: *trayī* 'the Vedic science', *varttā* 'agriculture/commerce', *daṇḍanīti* 'political science', and *ānvīkṣikī* 'analytics'. See *Arthaśāstra* I.4-5 for a fuller treatment.

object. <P> It is a contradiction <in terms> to speak of both 'that which by its nature lacks ascertainment' and 'cognition'. <S> There is no contradiction, because there is ascertaining of its intrinsic nature. That is, the intrinsic nature of this <doubt> is ascertained <to be of the form>: 'I have doubtful knowledge'. But the intrinsic nature of the object is not demarcated by this. Therefore, the two expressions, 'that in which there is no ascertainment' and 'cognition'
14.15 <are not contradictory>. <P> How is this an element of reasoning (*nyāya*)? <S> Because "reasoning does not operate 2.19-20
either on an object that is not known, nor on one that is know with certainty." <P> It is a contradiction to speak of <an object> 'that is known' and 'that is not known with certainty'. If <an object> is known, it is known with certainty; but if it is not known with certainty, then it is not known. <Hence> There is a contradiction in saying 'known' and 'not known with certainty'. <S> There is no contradiction, because <the object> is known in a general way, but is not specifically ascertained. <P> Even on this distinction, the contradiction in saying, 'Just as it is known, so it is not known with certainty' still holds true. <S> It does not still hold true, because of the usage of the <correlative> terms 'just as...so...' If <an object> were known with certainty in every respect, it would be idle to say, 'Just as it is known

with certainty, so is it known'. Therefore, <we say that it is>
known in a general way, not specifically ascertained. "And 3.2
this" – same <category of> doubt which is such – "although
it is included in <the category of> object of knowledge, is
separately mentioned for this very reason."

"Now as for 'purpose'." <P> But what is 'purpose'? 3.3
<S> The ordinary meaning is this: "that prompted by which 3.3
one acts is his purpose." <P> But by what is one prompted?
<E> Some say by duty, success, passion, or liberation.[31]
<S> But our view is that one is prompted by the acquisition
of pleasure and the elimination of pain. But, because all
things are the cause of pleasure and pain, they prompt a liv-
ing being. This same 'purpose' is the basis of reasoning
(*nyāya*). <P> But what do you mean by 'basis'? <S> In the
first place, it does not mean 'foundation;' <rather,> by basis cf. 3.5
is meant that it supports; because the practice of examina-
tion depends on this. That is to say: if there is a purpose, one
makes an examination. Thus purpose brings examination
into play. <P> But what is this 'examination'? <S> Reason-
ing (*nyāya*). "But what is this 'reasoning'?" <S> Reasoning 3.5-6
is "The examining of an object through the means of knowl-
edge." <P> What is meant? <S> That reasoning is the

[31] These are the four traditional, Hindu human goals (*puruṣārtha*): *artha*, *kāma*, *dharma*, and *mokṣa*.

apprehension of an object due to the operation of all the
means of knowledge. Each separate means of knowledge,
though established as being a cause of the demarcation of
the object, is not called 'reasoning', but rather, all of them
taken together. We will say that since this same <reasoning>
teaches a man who is in ignorance, it is "reasoning in the 17.19-20; cf 4.11
highest sense." "And inference depends upon perception 3.6
and verbal testimony." By 'depends upon perception and
verbal testimony' is meant that it does not contradict per-
ception or verbal testimony. For if an object which one has
apprehended through inference is corroborated by percep-
tion or verbal testimony, then the understanding <of the
object> becomes clearer still. But when these means of
knowledge do not corroborate one another and are
employed separately, this is a travesty of reasoning, a sem-
blance of a system, which those desirous of gain, honor, and cf. TNT 2000.1-2
fame extol as a mode of discourse.

"But that inference which is contradicted by percep- 3.8
tion or verbal testimony is pseudo-reasoning." Now, <an
example of an inference that is> contradicted by perception
is: 'Fire is not hot, because it is created, like a pot etc.' <P>
What contradiction does this inference contain? <S> The
employment <of inference> in what is not the domain of
inference. This is not an employment of inference in its

domain. That is to say: that is not the domain of inference, if that domain to which it is employed is pre-empted by perception.[32] But others[33] describe a contradiction of perception <with inference> as follows: 'Sound is not audible'. But they do not understand that the domain of perception is not the domain of inference. <P> On what grounds <do you make this charge>? <S> Because the functions performed by the sense-organs are supra-sensory. <That is:> Audition, to be sure, is the function of the <auditory> organ; how can this <function> be directly perceived?

15.15 As for <an inference that is> contradicted by scripture,[34] <an example> is: 'A begging bowl made from a human skull is pure, because it is part of a living creature, like mother-of-pearl in a shell'. <P> How is this <inference> contradicted by scripture? <S> If one says that a begging bowl made from a human skull is pure, he must state the meaning of 'pure' – what is meant by 'pure'. If <he says>, 'absence of sin for the one who touches <it>', he must state on whose authority there is <absence of sin>. If he should say, 'On my own authority', this comes about thus because he abides by the intention of carrying out

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[32] *apahṛta*. More literally, 'taken away, carried off'.
[33] According to Vācaspati (NVT 51.15), Dignāga cited this example.
[34] Note the shift from *śabda* 'verbal testimony' to *āgama* 'scripture', the paradigmatic instance of verbal testimony.

<what is prescribed by> his scripture. But if he should say, 'On the authority of those who are versed in the *Vedas*', one must state that there is a contradiction due to his admission <of the validity> of the *Vedas*. <P> And what is meant by saying that, 'a begging bowl made of a human skull is pure'? <S> This is a specific positive injunction. And a specific positive injunction rules out the other cases. If a bowl made of a human skull is pure, he must state what is 'impure'. But if <he says>, 'Everything without exception is pure', there is no familiar instance <available to him> because everything is made the subject <of the inference>.

<P> But why is <one> inference not contradicted by an <other> inference? <S> There is no <such> contradiction, because it is impossible that two inferences co-apply to one and the same thing. For two inferences, which fully possess positive and negative concomitance, do not apply to one and the same real object. Therefore, <one inference> is not contradicted by <another> inference. <P> Therefore, does not <the case of an inference> contradicted by perception also fail to occur? <S> No, it does not fail to occur, because <an inference>, which possesses positive and negative concomitance, is cancelled by perception.

<P> But then why is there no <case of an inference being> contradicted by comparison? <S> There is not[35] no

<case of an inference being> contradicted by comparison, because this corresponds to the contradiction with the previous means of knowledge. Contradiction <of an inference> with comparison corresponds to the contradiction <we have stated> with the previous means of knowledge. And we will
say that, "Comparison is knowledge of correspondence 356.5-6
<between a name and its bearer>, which depends upon the [NS 1.1.6]
recollection of impressions laid down by verbal testimony." <All> This has been stated because of the contradiction of perception and scripture <with inference>.

16.1 <P> The *Bhāṣya* says, "With respect to this, both 3.9
discussion and arguing serve a purpose:" what is the source
of this? <S> "This same purpose pervades all living things, 3.4-5
actions, and branches of science." Hence, as it is appropriate that one consider what purposes discussion and arguing
have, he says, "With respect to this, both discussion and 3.9
arguing serve a purpose." 'This' means 'pseudo-reasoning'.
"But captiousness is <now> examined" – as to whether it 3.9
16.5 has a purpose or not. <E> Now some say that it has no purpose, because it merely raises objections <to the statement of others>. <S> And this is not so; captiousness is not merely raising objections. <P> What is it then? <S> A per-

[35] According to Vācaspati (NVT 54.10) one here is to supply, 'There is not'.

son, who, although he has adopted a position, does not
establish <it> is called 'captious'. But if he does not even
acknowledge a position, he should be disregarded as one
would a madman. But if his purpose is to make known a
denial of the position of an opponent, then this is just like
the preceding case. But if he acknowledges the four even in cf. 3.13
regard to this <purpose of making known a denial of the cf. 3.14-15
position of his opponent>, then this is his position. These
four are stated in the *Bhāṣya*. But if he does not acknowl- 3.14
edge <these four>, then he deserves to be disregarded as in
the previous cases. And 'a statement that fails to establish a cf. NS 1.2.3
16.10 counter-position is called 'captiousness''. "If he acknowl- 3.17-18
edges the import" – or meaning – "of this, then that is his
position. But if he does not acknowledge <this>," then the
fault is as before. Thus purpose has been explained.

"A familiar instance is a thing that falls within the 3.20
ken of perception." <P> What is meant? <S> That it is not
the cause of contradiction in 'experience between laymen cf. 3.20-21
and experts'. And on this formulation, soul etc. are
included. <That is:> If familiar instance is described
<merely> as not being the cause of contradiction in experi-
ence <between laymen and experts>, then soul etc. are
included <by the definition>. And if <familiar instance were
described merely as> falling within the ken of the senses,

soul etc. are excluded. And hence the *sūtra* <that characterizes> example would be contradicted. This same familiar instance is an 'object of knowledge', because it is the content of cognition. There is separate teaching of it because reasoning (*nyāya*) is based on it. "When it is present, inference and verbal testimony may occur; but when absent, neither may." That is to say, <through a familiar instance> one infers an object previously perceived and tells of an object which he previously had come to know to another person <respectively>. And a nihilist is faced with a contradiction whether he admits <a familiar instance> or not. This is stated in the *Bhāṣya*.

16.15 (izes> example would be contradicted. This same familiar) NS 1.1.36 — 3.21 — 3.22 — 3.24-4.1

Established doctrine is the ratification (*vyavasthā*) of an accepted view. By accepted view is meant, 'There is a 'this' – and it is 'such'. <One accepts a view> In a general way when one says 'this', and specifically when one says 'such'. The ratification of this takes the form, 'This <is held> by the *Sāṅkhyas* only, this by the *Yogas* only'. <P> Therefore, an established doctrine shared by all systems would not be an established doctrine, because there is no ratification; for this is not ratified by any system. <S> This also is incorrect; the same admission by all simply is ratification. Although this <category of established doctrine> is included in <the category of> object of knowledge, it is sep-

16.20 (way when one says 'this', and specifically when one says)

arately mentioned because it is the content of discussion etc.
That is to say, 'discussion, arguing, and captiousness come cf. 4.7
into play when there is a difference of established doctrines'.

17.1 Next <in the *sūtra*> are members. Members are
parts of a sentence. <P> But what is a sentence? <S> A sentence is the cognition of the final word – based on the recollection of the preceding word(s) – which, when synthesized through the assistance of memory, causes a specific apprehension. The segments of this <sentence> are called 'parts'. <P> How many <of these parts> are there? <S> By as many
"as the establishment is fully realized." <P> What is this 4.8
'establishment'? <S> That the entity is such. <P> What is
'complete realization'? <S> The specific understanding. cf. 4.8
17.5 These <members> are assigned special names, thesis etc.
<P> Then it is not appropriate to say, "verbal testimony is 4.10
the thesis," because verbal testimony serves to delimit the true-nature <of a thing>, whereas the state of affairs <set forth> in the thesis is what must be demonstrated. <S> There is no defect in saying that the verbal testimony is the thesis, because <that state of affairs> which has been learned from verbal testimony is what must be established. The state of affairs which has been learned through verbal testimony is precisely what one tells someone else; hence

verbal testimony, is called 'the thesis'. Similarly, "the rea- 4.10
son is inference," because the word 'reason' is figuratively
applied to the mere perception of the logical mark; this sec-
ond perception of the logical mark is called the 'reason'
because it is the cause of the manifestation of the recollec-
tion of this relation. Because there is revealing once again
17.10 on the basis of perception that which is the content of recol-
lection, "perception is the example;" that is, it is due to this 4.10
that one remembers a thing previously experienced and
understands that this thing that is the content of his recollec-
tion is an example. Therefore, as <the example> is, so to
speak, perception, as it corresponds to the <thing> well-
established by prior experience, it is called 'perception'.
<P> But what is meant by 'comparison'? <S> Non-errone-
ous apprehension. That is, just as one is not mistaken con-
cerning perception, so too concerning an example.
"Comparison is the application" because one figuratively 4.10-11
employs the word 'comparison' to mean one part of com-
parison, <namely the correlatives> 'just as..., so too...'
Now as for comparison; when one puts to use the teaching
of comparison, 'just as..., so too...', the knowledge of cor-
respondence, preceded by the recollection of <what was
learned through> perception and verbal testimony, is 'com-
17.15 parison'. Hence, people figuratively use 'comparison' to

indicate this part of comparison. “When all these inhere in 4.11
one and the same thing, the demonstration of their capacity <to establish the desired result> is the conclusion.” <P> What is ‘inherence in one and the same thing’? <S> Fusion in a single sentence. <P> But what is <meant by> ‘capacity’? <S> The fact that they depend upon a meaning that they conjointly make known. And we will explain this. ‘The thesis etc. are concluded by this’ means that they are related
to a single meaning. “This is reasoning (*nyāya*) in the high- 4.11-12
est sense.” <P> But what is <meant by> ‘in the highest sense’? <S> The fact that it teaches a man who is perplexed. That is: the means of knowledge, when they operate singly,
17.20 teach a man who is not perplexed; but when they constitute a sentence, they <teach> a man who is in perplexed. Hence, this is <reasoning> ‘in the highest sense’. <P> But are members a distinct means of knowledge or are they actually included in them? <S> What is the upshot of this? <P> If they are a distinct means of knowledge, then the enumeration <of four only> is incorrect. But if they are actually included in them, then the separate mention <of the category of member> serves no purpose. <S> We say that they are not a distinct means of knowledge. <As for your second point:> They are separately mentioned because, when they are fused and become dependent on a sentence, they teach a

man who is perplexed. These same members, which are distinct from the means of knowledge, cause discussion, argu-
17.25 ing, and captiousness to come into play, and they are the basis for the ratification of the true-nature <of things>. <P> What is meant by 'basis'? <S> The fact that they teach <something> specific.

18.1 "Hypothetical reasoning is not included among the 4.15
means of knowledge, nor is it a distinct means of knowledge," because it does not demarcate <the true-nature of a thing>. A means of knowledge is that which demarcates <the true-nature of a thing>, but hypothetical reasoning does not. Therefore, it is not a means of knowledge; and for
the same reason it is not a distinct means of knowledge. But cf. 4.22-23
because it differentiates what the domain of the means of knowledge is, it assists the means of knowledge: it differentiates the domain of the means of knowledge. <P> But what is 'differentiation'? <S> An enquiry into what is appropriate and what is inappropriate: i.e. 'This is appropriate, this is inappropriate'. That which is appropriate in this <enquiry>
18.5 it approves but does not ascertain. Because there is no ascertainment <of a true-nature>, it is not a means of knowledge.
An example of it is given in the *Bhāṣya*: "*karma* is the 4.16-20
instrumental cause of rebirth." <P> But how is *karma* the instrumental cause of rebirth? <S> Because it admits of dif-

ference. <P> But what is the difference? <S> 'Prosperity' cf. TNT 909.1-5
and 'misfortune'. Within prosperity <different conditions of
rebirth> are 'god' and 'man'. Within being a man one <con-
dition> is 'male'. Within maleness one <condition> is
'*Brāhmaṇa*'. Within *Brāhmaṇa*-ness <different conditions>
are 'sharp-witted' and 'dull-witted'. Within sharp-witted-
ness <different conditions> are 'of high birth' and 'of low
birth'. Within high-birthness <different conditions> are
'sound' and 'impaired'. Within soundness <different condi-
18.10 tions> are 'wise' and 'foolish'. Within wisdom <different
conditions> are 'self-assured' and 'diffident'. Within self-
assurance <different conditions> are 'independent' and
'dependent'. Within misfortune, in turn, <different condi-
tions> are 'animal' and 'inhabitant of hell'. Within inhabit-
ancy of hell, in turn, <different conditions> are 'in sharp
thorns' or 'in a fiery iron-cauldron'. Within animality one
<condition> is 'cow'. This same difference <in the condi-
tion of rebirth> is inappropriate without an instrumental
cause that is: (1) manifold, (2) fixed, (3) non-eternal, (4)
<that inheres in only> one substance, and (5) determined for
each soul. <P> For what reason? <S> Everything would
prove to have the nature of everything, because <the ele-
ments of> earth etc. are common to all men, and because
there is no determinant-cause that consists of earth etc. Yet

it is a matter of experience that there is a difference of deter-
minacy <in rebirth>. Therefore, *karma* is what determines
<rebirth>. "This same hypothetical reasoning which is of 4.23-24
this kind" is an object of knowledge, because it falls within
the scope of cognition.

"Ascertainment, which is the knowledge of the true- 5.1
nature <of a thing>, is the result of the means of knowl-
edge." <P> But when is ascertainment the result of the
means of knowledge? <S> When it is not understood to be
the cause of the demarcation of another object, then it is the
result. When one demarcates <an object> through it, then it
is a means of knowledge. Hence, its status as a means of
knowledge or its result is not fixed. And in <our commen-
tary on> this *sūtra*,

> A scale is also an object of knowledge –
> as well as being a means of knowledge. NS 2.1.16

we will say that because two instrumental causes apply, one TNT 432.7-440.14
and the same object should be referred to by two <differ-
ent> words. "These two, hypothetical reasoning and ascer- 5.2
tainment, support worldly life." <That is:> When an
ordinary person acts on this or that understanding, he elimi-
nates what is to be eliminated and acquires what is to be
acquired through hypothetical reasoning and ascertainment.
It is included under either <the category of> means of

knowledge or <the category of> the object of knowledge. When it is the result <of the means of knowledge> then it is an object of knowledge, but when one demarcates <the true-nature of a thing> through it then it is a means of knowledge.

"Discussion...involving numerous speakers." 5.4
<That is:> Because it corresponds to the difference in estab-
lished doctrines, it involves numerous speakers. "<And> 5.4-5
18.25 which, <while each speaker in it states> proof for his
respective position, results in the ascertainment of some one
19.1 position." 'Position by position' is what is meant by
"respective position." It <involves> 'proving' of this. <P> 5.4
What is meant <by this>? <S> Both <parties> must state
proof <for their respective positions>. 'There is ascertain- cf. 5.4-5
ment with regard to some one position'. This too we will
discuss <subsequently>.[36] <P> What form does this same TNT 601.4
discussion take? <S> Pakṣilasvāmin says, "a collection of 5.5
sentences." <P> And it is revealed that "Discussion is that NS 1.2.1
in which there is establishment and refutation through the means of knowledge and hypothetical reasoning." And the means of knowledge consist essentially of knowledge;

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[36] *ayaṃ tattvabubhūtsurguruvādibhiḥ saha trividhaṃ phalamākāṅkṣan vādaṃ karoti tato 'sya tattvabhūtsāvatastāvat sādhanaṃ vaktavyaṃ yāvadanena jñātam...* NV 601.4-5. *trividhaṃ phalamiti* | *anadhigatatattvāvabodhaḥ saṃśayanivṛttir adhyavasitābhyanujñānamiti phalāni trīṇi* NVT 611.26-27.

because what is meant by a rule such as,

> Knowledge arises from sense-organ object contact, NS 1.1.4

is that the means of knowledge consist essentially of knowledge. And hypothetical reasoning is analogical reasoning (*ūha*); and analogical reasoning simply consist essentially of knowledge. Therefore, it is not appropriate to say that, "discussion is a collection of sentences." <S> <This is> Not 5.5
correct, because there is a different way of explaining the expression "<that in which there is> proof and refutation NS 1.2.1
through the means of knowledge and hypothetical reasoning." And when we discuss the *sūtra*, we will explain this. 598.5-609.15

"Arguing and captiousness, which are both different 5.7
from this." <P> But what is the difference? <S> The surplus in elements and the deficiency in elements <respectively> cf. NS 1.2.1
That is, arguing is of larger scope because it employs <as additional elements the categories of> deceit, futile answer, and grounds for defeat. 'But when this lacks the establishment of a counter-position it is captiousness'. And it is precisely because of this difference that they constitute different paths of philosophical discourse. Moreover, they are different because they have different audiences. That is to say, discussion has as its audience docile students etc., cf. 64.27-65.2
while arguing and captiousness have intractable students

etc. as their audience.

<Those reasons> Which are false reasons, that operate in accord with some one or more properties of a <true logical> mark, appear to be reasons; hence they are <called> ‘pseudo-reasons’. They are also grounds for defeat. The *Bhāṣya* says, ‘but there is separate mention of 5.8-9
them’, which belong to grounds for defeat, “because they must be objected to in discussion.” <P> Because, it is alleged, they are objected to in discussion, hence they are mentioned separately. <S> <This is> Not correct, because the connection fails to hold in both directions. That is, neither is ‘having to be objected to in discussion’ invariably related to ‘separate teaching’, nor is ‘separate teaching’ invariably related to ‘having to be objected to in discussion’. Now if that <category> which is separately taught is objected to in discussion, then all the categories would have to be objected to in discussion. <P> For what reason? <S> Because they are all separately taught. <P> But what <of the other case,> that those <categories> which are objected to in discussion are separately mentioned? <S> This too is incorrect, because <the logical reason> is variant. That is to say, there is no separate teaching of overextension and underextension <which are sub-types of grounds for defeat> from the grounds for defeat, yet both of these are objected to

in discussion. Therefore, to say, 'Because they are to be objected to in discussion, they are taught separately', is nonsense. But the only proper purpose for their separate teaching is this: because their purpose is to make known the difference in bases among the branches of science. <P> But why is there separate teaching of pseudo-reasons, which are in fact grounds for defeat? <S> They are separately taught because they share a generic feature with the means of knowledge. <P> But then why are they mentioned in discussion? <S> Because they share a generic feature with the means of knowledge. That is, the means of knowledge are mentioned in discussion, and pseudo-reasons share a cf. 5.8-9

19.25 generic feature with the means of knowledge. Hence, because they share a generic feature with the means of knowledge, they are mentioned in discussion. <P> But since

20.1 some grounds for defeat occur in a discussion, while others do not, is this a case of dictating to the categories or of describing them, after the fact, as they are? <S> What is the upshot of this? <P> Now if there is dictating in the form, 'Be such!', 'Do not be such!', then you deserve to be dismissed out of hand for dictating to the categories. But if the categories are such simply by their intrinsic nature <and if you> assent to them <as such>, then you must state why some grounds for defeat appear in discussion while others

20.5 do not. <S> <This is> Not correct – 'because the actual nature of an object depends upon its characteristic property' is what we say. The categories do not conform to what the speaker dictates, but rather they are things that are described, after the fact, just as they really are. The man who describes their true-nature as based upon their characteristic property should not be thus accused: 'You are dictating to the categories', because discussion has as its audience docile students etc. And even one who carries on a discussion with docile students etc. should not raise objections to <their use of such grounds for defeat as> non-comprehension etc., since it serves a purpose so long as that one <the docile student etc.> is instructed <by it>. But rather, there is suppression of pseudo-reasons because they resemble
20.10 means of knowledge. <P> For what reason? <S> Because error is a human trait. That is, error simply is a human trait. He who erroneously states a means of knowledge states a pseudo-reason also; hence his defeat. <P> But what is defeat between a docile student and a teacher? <S> Failure to convey the intended meaning. <P> How do <these three sub-types of grounds for defeat> underextension, overextension, and false doctrine appear in a discussion? <S> Simply because they share a generic feature with the means of knowledge. Underextension also shares a generic feature

with a means of knowledge; overextension also shares a
generic feature with a means of knowledge. A <n inferen-
tial> sentence may by error have too few members or too
many, hence their appearance. "But grounds for defeat <are 5.9
to be objected to> in arguing and captiousness." The person
who seeks victory <in discussion> must be refuted by
means of arguing and captiousness. Grounds for defeat on
his part must be stated as is appropriate; hence he should not
be dismissed out of hand.

"One avoids deceit, futile answer, and grounds for 5.11
defeat in one's own statements, but censures them in the
statements of an opponent" – only for the sake of thorough
knowledge. That is; deceit, futile answer, and grounds for
defeat should not be employed for their own sake.
"But...employment of futile answer is in itself simple." <P> 5.11
<This is> Not correct, because it involves a contradiction. It
is a contradiction to say 'avoidance in one's own statement'
and 'simple usage'. If the usage is simple, then there is no
avoidance of it in one's own statements. But if one avoids it
in one's own statements, then its usage is not simple. Hence
the contradiction. <S> There is no contradiction, because
<its usage> serves to dispel any questions. <P> What is
meant by, "and its usage is in itself simple"? <S> 'When a 5.12
futile answer is employed by an opponent', one tells the cf. 5.11

umpires, 'He has used a futile answer'. They would thus ask, 'How <has he used> a futile answer? Which futile answer?' Then one conversant with futile answers can eas-
20.25 ily say, 'A futile answer <was used> thus', and 'It is this futile answer'. And hence its usage is simple. Therefore, these categories, doubt etc., although included <under the categories of> means of knowledge or object of knowledge, are separately taught in order to make known the difference in bases of the branches of sciences.

21.1 "This same analytics" – the science of reasoning 5.13
(*nyāyavidyā*) – "which is differentiated <from the other three branches of science> by virtue of the categories of means of knowledge etc." is "the lamp of all branches of 5.14
science;" it is a lamp because it illumines. That is, the other branches of science propound a subject matter, which has been made known through the means of knowledge etc. <P> Are there no means of knowledge etc. in the other branches of science? <S> Pakṣilasvāmin says there are not. <P> How are there not? <S> Because they lack the proper qualification. That is, these branches of science have no jurisdiction over the complete knowledge of the means of knowledge etc., but rather they function with respect to that
21.5 subject matter which the means of knowledge etc. have illumined. "The means to all actions." It is the means because it 5.14

is the instrumental cause of those <actions> which the
means of knowledge etc. have illumined. <That is:>
Because the other branches of science perform a subject
matter that has been illumined by the means of knowledge.
"The basis of all *dharmas*." It is the basis because it assists 5.15
all the branches of science. That is: it assists all the branches
of science; because it so assists, it is their 'basis', like a
king's servant.

"This same 'knowledge of the true-nature' and 'the 5.17
attainment of the highest good' have to be understood in
accordance with the branch of science to which they
21.10 belong." That is, in all branches of science, there is found
the knowledge of the true-nature and the attainment of the
highest good. <P> Now in the Vedic science, what is the
knowledge of the true-nature and what is the attainment of
the highest good? <S> The knowledge of the true-nature is
the complete knowledge that the materials used in the *Agni-*
*hotra* <sacrifice> etc. are properly acquired etc. and the
complete knowledge that they are untainted etc. The attain-
ment of the highest good, on the other hand, is the gaining
of heaven. For there <in the *Vedas*> it is revealed that
heaven is the result <of sacrifices duly performed>. <P>
Now in agriculture, what is the knowledge of the true-nature
and what is the attainment of the highest good? <S> The

knowledge of the true-nature is the complete knowledge of such things as the land etc. The knowledge of the true-nature takes this form: 'The land is not beset by hindrances etc.' The highest good is the acquisition of grain, which is the result <of this knowledge>. <P> In political science, what is the knowledge of the true-nature or what is the attainment of the highest good? <S> The knowledge of the true-nature is the application, according to the proper time, place, and one's ability, of <the policies of> conciliation, bribery, sowing dissension, and attack.[37] The attainment of the highest good, in turn, is the conquest of territory. "But in 5.17-18
this <branch of science> – soteriology – the knowledge of the true-nature is the knowledge of the soul etc. The attainment of the highest good is the gaining of liberation."

<E> But some say: as for the highest good that results from the knowledge of the true-nature of <the categories of> the means of knowledge etc., this is not what is intended. Because the complete knowledge of <the categories of> discussion etc. is the instrumental cause of such things as pride, conceit, etc., it is not connected with the highest good. And as it teaches what is not connected <with the highest good>, it is inappropriate to say that 'The high- NS 1.1.1

[37] These *tattvajñānas* seem to be drawn from the four *upāyas* ('means'), as in *Manusmṛti* 7.109.

est good results from the knowledge of the true-nature of
<the categories of> the means of knowledge etc.' <S>
<This is> Not correct, because it involves a failure com-
pletely to understand the meaning of the *sūtra*. You cer-
tainly did not understand the meaning of the *sūtra* to have
taken it thus. Who explains the meaning of the *sūtra* thus:
'The highest good results from the knowledge of the true-
nature of the categories of the means of knowledge etc.'?
On the contrary, we will explain in <our commentary on>
the next *sūtra* that through the knowledge of which the 151.20-153.2
highest good results. Moreover, it was stated <by Pakṣilas-
vāmin>, "Now it is from knowing the true-nature of the 2.9
objects of knowledge, the soul etc., that there is attainment
of the highest good." And as for this statement, that discus-
sion etc. are the instrumental cause of pride, conceit, etc.,
this is also not correct, because there is neither negative nor
21.25 positive correspondence.[38] <That is to say:> When the
knowledge of discussion is absent, Sanaka etc.[39] have
desire etc.; yet when it is present, those who know its true-
nature do not. Therefore, the complete knowledge of discus-

[38] *asati bhāvāt sati cābhāvād* (NV 21.24). Literally: 'because of the presence <of pride etc.> in the absence <of discussion etc.>, and because of the absence <of pride etc.> in the presence <of discussion etc.>'. Hence there is neither *anvaya* nor *vyatireka* between pride etc. and discussion etc.

[39] According to Vardhamāna (NVTPP 363.3-4), Sanaka is the 'kind of servant usually given over to intoxication and the like' (*madādipradhāno dāsaviśeṣaḥ – sanakaḥ*).

sion etc. is not the instrumental cause of desire etc.

22.1 The all-pervading, all-powerful, wielder of *pinākа*,[1] the ruler of all, the creator of all, he who takes on all forms, the knower of all, the destroyer of all, whom all should propitiate – let him be propitious to our effort.

22.5 I bow in obeisance to him who is endowed with merit, discriminating knowledge, dispassion, and mastery, a treasure of pure utterances, the preserver, Akṣapāda.

The *Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā* will be composed by us solely on the pretext of explaining <Uddyotakara's> work: it refutes all objections <thereto>.

I desire some merit for rescuing the very ancient words/cows[2] of Uddyotakara from
22.10 the impassable muck of bad commentaries into which they had sunk.

<Uddyotakara,> Eager to dispel the objection <P> that, after noble Akṣapāda composed the *śāstra* which causes the highest good and noble Pakṣilasvāmin explained it, what further remained in order for him to undertake the *Vārttika*, <S> first restates the purpose of the *śāstra*, which Akṣapāda stated, and then makes clear his purpose in undertaking the Vārttika, "that *śāstra* which Akṣapāda..." That is 6.1
to say: even if it was explained by Pakṣilasvāmin, nevertheless, as the *śāstra*, which was obscured by the pitch dark-
22.15 ness of bad reasoning which such moderns as Dignāga etc. generated, was of no use in ascertaining the true-nature, this

[1] *pinākin* (NVT 22.1): the bow of *Śiva*.
[2] *gavinām* (NVT 22.10). This is an untranslatable pun.

<darkness> is dispelled by Uddyotakara by the light (*uddyota*) of his own commentary; hence his undertaking serves a purpose. Moreover, his restatement of the purpose stated in the <first Nyāya> *sūtra* is intended to reveal that as his own commentary has a purpose in virtue of explaining the *śāstra*, which has a purpose, it prompts prudent men to action; and because explanation for its own sake does not prompt prudent men to activity – like a work that investigates crow's teeth. And hence the absolute cessation of pain
in its twenty one different kinds is tranquility – "for the 6.1
tranquility." Of whom? "The world." For the supremely 6.1
22.20 compassionate, noble sage composed the *śāstra* out of a desire to rescue the whole world from the morass of pain into which it had fallen. If no one were to act thus, how would the *śāstra* have come into being? Nor is there any fault whatever on the part of this treasure of asceticism for explaining <this *śāstra*> to men who were not qualified <to receive it>. Moreover, Viśvāmitra performed a sacrifice for Triśaṅku, and Vaśiṣṭha married Akṣamālā, of low birth.[3] For such is the power of their asceticism that sins of this kind
23.1 vanish; yet this outcome does not obtain for us and our like, who are of weak asceticism. For while the digestive heat of

[3] On Viśvāmitra and Triśaṅku see *Rāmāyaṇa* I.57-59. For Vaśiṣṭha and Akṣamālā see *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka* 3.92, *Kāṭhaka Saṃhitā* 37.10.

elephants breaks down the wood of fig trees that they eat,
we and our like also should not have such digestive heat.
"The misunderstanding of it due to bad logicians" is the 6.2
misunderstanding which such bad logicians as Dignāga etc.
produced.

Even if homage to the desired deity, which has been
handed down through the blameless tradition of the conduct
of learned men, was performed by Uddyotakara, who was
learned in the truest sense, it was not introduced <by him>
23.5 into the *śāstra*. Nor, for that matter, has any other benedic-
tion been introduced into the *śāstra*: but students will under-
stand that <the *śāstra*> quite obviously had another <kind
of> benediction.[4] Accordingly, this whole <matter> is
cleared up.

Having concisely restated the first *sūtra* in this
<*śāstra*>, he states its purport, "The first *sūtra* of this 6.3-4
*śāstra*, 'From the knowledge of the true-nature of the cate-
gories of the means of knowledge etc. one attains the high-
est good' is a statement of its" – the *śāstra's* – "right-
relation <to its end – the highest good>." By explicitly men-
tioning "etc.," he shows that it is appropriate that he explain 6.3
what, in fact, comes first in order, and not what is second

[4] This sentence is ambiguous, especially the phrase *mangalyāntaravat*, which could mean, as translated, 'the *śāstra* had another/ different <kind> of benediction', or 'as if it had another/different benediction'.

23.10 etc. By "right-relation" is meant 'the intended relation':[5] the *śāstra* and the highest good stand in the relationship of cause and effect. 6.3

"Of this" <*śāstra*> this statement of the *sūtra* is the "statement of the right-relation." 6.3-4

For in this statement, "from the knowledge of the true-nature of the categories of the means of knowledge etc.," NS 1.1.1

knowledge of the true-nature means the '*śāstra*', according to the etymological analysis, 'knowledge' is 'that through which <something> is known'. And because of <the use of> the fifth case affix, this <*śāstra*> is the cause. For the intended meaning of this <statement> is not that it is the cause of the highest good by virtue of its mere intrinsic nature, as is the case with spells that counteract <the effects of> poison; hence he teaches that the *śāstra* <is the cause of the highest good> in that it is the instrumental cause for understanding the true-nature <of the categories of the means of knowledge etc.>, but not by its intrinsic nature. Therefore, what is meant is: as the highest good is to be produced by the *śāstra*, the understanding of the true-nature <of the categories> of the means of knowledge etc. is an intermediate operation.

23.15 Moreover, the true-nature of the categories of the means of knowledge etc. is what is to be taught, while the *śāstra* is that which teaches them; hence, he indicates both that the

[5] ***abhimataḥ*** *sambandho* **'*bhisambandhaḥ*** (NVT 23.10).

*śāstra* and the true-nature of the categories of the means of knowledge etc. stand in the relation of 'what makes known' and 'what is to be made known', and that the relationship between the knowledge of the true-nature of the categories of the means of knowledge etc. and the highest good is that of cause and effect. Thus, then, the first *sūtra* serves to convey the content, relation <to the purpose>, and the purpose <of the *śāstra*>. And it will shown later how the knowledge of the true-nature of these categories[6] is useful towards the attainment of the highest good. NS 1.1.2

Moreover, after people ascertain his trustworthiness – inasmuch as a sage is trustworthy – when they have ascer-
23.20 tained the purpose etc. from his statement, they will act; but <they will act[7]> out of doubt if his trustworthiness is not ascertained. Surely even in agriculture and the like, those who have ascertained the acquisition of grain etc. do not act, because there is also the possibility that the <expected> result will not arise due to such inhibiting factors as drought etc. Even in the absence of a statement of <its> purpose etc., as doubt is found in Nyāya to be the absence of the means of knowledge that establishes or cancels, it is inappropriate to

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[6] Reading *yat* (NVT 23.18). *pat* is hard to construe, even if it means *pada*, as Thakur claims (note 7, page 23). *yat*, found in C and given as the lemma in NVTP 76.15 (cf. NA 4.21), is the expected and intelligible reading.

[7] Possibly: '<they will not act>'.

say that stating this <purpose> serves no purpose, because doubt does not arise without reference to a specific recollection. But a specific recollection <arises> from the statement <of a trustworthy person>; therefore, there is no lack of purpose <in stating the purpose>.

23.25 Having thus stated the purport of the first *sūtra*, he
states the purport of the first sentence of the *Bhāṣya*: "upon 6.4; 1.1
the apprehension of an object on the basis of <this> means of knowledge...' is a statement which reconfirms this." That is to say: <by> 'This' is <meant> the *śāstra* linked to
24.1 the attainment of the highest good by the <first> *sūtra*. For as there may be, for whatever reason, some doubt that there is no linkage, 're' – after the linkage <stated> in the *sūtra* – 'confirmation' – linkage – is 'reconfirmation'; the statement of this is a "statement which reconfirms." 6.4

<P> It is alleged that an objection arises in this matter as follows: that which teaches the means to an action that is impossible is useless; as is, for example, a sentence that teaches that the crest-jewel adornment of Takṣaka banishes fever.[8] And this *śāstra* is of this sort. To be more explicit,
24.5 the knowledge of the true-nature of the categories of the object of knowledge etc. depends, in the first place, upon

[8] Takṣaka (NVT 24.3) is the name of a famous *Nāga* or serpent. See Dharmottara's *Nyāyabinduṭīkā*, pp. 4.9-5.8.

the knowledge of the true-nature of the means of knowledge. For a means of knowledge that is not ascertained in terms of its true-nature, <but is ascertained> merely as 'that which makes something known', is unable to ascertain its proper domain, because <a means of knowledge that is ascertained> to that extent only has the same characteristic as does a pseudo-means of knowledge; but rather, by virtue of <its being ascertained as> being 'invariant'[9] conjoined simultaneously with <its being ascertained as> being 'that which makes known'. For this alone is what constitutes being a valid means of knowledge. And yet no ascertainment of this is possible. And because there is no ascertainment of this <invariance>, <the remaining categories of> object of knowledge etc. can scarcely be ascertained. To be more explicit, is the validity as a means of knowledge of <a specific instance of> knowledge ascertained either intrinsically or extrinsically? Now the first alternative is not <tenable>. For surely <a specific instance of> knowledge in
24.10 which one has no awareness of the knowledge itself could not even be realized – how much less its validity as a means of knowledge! Nor again is there another <specific instance of> knowledge <by which> one would grasp <the aware-

[9] *avyabhicāra* and related forms are throughout translated by 'invariance' or 'invariability'. A valid means of knowledge is 'invariant' from its object, because it always reveals it as it is.

ness> that 'This is <a specific instance of> knowledge'; nor, again, is this invariant. And to be <a specific instance of> 'knowledge' without further qualification is equally applicable to pseudo-knowledge. Hence, there is no ascertainment of its validity as a means of knowledge intrinsically. Therefore, even on <the adoption of> the principle of
'awareness <of the knowledge> itself', the inclusion of cf. 24.9-10
invariance is denied. Nor <is the validity established> extrinsically. For one would admit that the external thing is either <a specific instance of> knowledge that has this as its content, or else <a specific instance of> knowledge that appears like <a means to> purposeful activity,[10] or else the perception of another object that is invariably related to the domain of that <knowledge that seems like a means to purposeful activity>.[11] And how could all of these, whose validity as a means of knowledge is not intrinsically ascertained, and which are in confusion, not fail to throw into
24.15 confusion the prior <specific instance of> knowledge which prompted it? Alternatively, if the validity as a means of

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[10] The translation here (NVT 24.13-14) closely follows Śrīkaṇṭha (ŚṬ 6.30-35).

[11] *tadgocaranāntarīyakārthāntaradarśanam* 'the seeing of another object that is invariably related to the domain of that <external thing/ cognition>'. Śrīkaṇṭha's explanation is helpful here: 'Water etc. is the content of that – knowledge which appears like a means; what is invariably related to this and another thing is 'cold touch' – the perception of this' (ŚṬ 6.23-25). By way of paraphrase: if one were to see 'water', then an extrinsic check on this cognition would be the sensation of cold-touch, which is different <in kind> but a constant concomitant of water.

knowledge of this <external thing were ascertained> intrinsically, then what is wrong with the <prior specific instance of> knowledge that prompted it, whereby that <validity> would not apply to this also? And it has been shown that its validity as a means of knowledge is not known intrinsically. And if the validity as a means of knowledge <through 'self'> awareness is difficult to obtain in the way previously stated, then how much more for the sense-organs etc., whose status as means of knowledge has to be revealed through their effect, self-awareness, which is invariant? Therefore, then, even despite doubt, let it be granted that the activities of sentient beings for ends that are immediately experienced occur somehow or other; yet Vedic rituals, whose ends are not immediately experienced, and which are to be effected through great exertion and expenditure of wealth, prove 'honored guests'.[12] Therefore, the *śāstra* is not, by virtue of its making known the true-nature of the cat-
24.20 egories of the means of knowledge etc., connected with the highest good. <S> This same objection has been rejected by Pakṣilasvāmin through his first sentence, which relates the cf. 1.1
means of knowing their validity <as means of knowledge>.
To be more explicit, in the phrase, "the means of knowledge 1.1

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[12] *dattāñjalayaḥ* (NVT 24.19). More literally, 'those into whose cupped hands water has been given'.

is valid," <the affix> *matup* is used to indicate 'invariable connection';[13] and invariability is 'invariance'. Therefore, the meaning is: 'invariably connected with its object'. And this same invariable connection the means of knowledge has with its object consists in the fact that there is agreement in different places, times, and situations between the intrinsic nature of the object and the mode <in which it is known>, both of which the means of knowledge reveals.
The logical reason for this is, "because of the successfulness 1.1
of activity" – because it produces successful activity. The
logical reason is based on negative concomitance: 'But if
24.25 this were not valid, it would not produce successful activity
– as does a pseudo-means of knowledge'. Alternatively, <the logical reason> is based on both positive and negative concomitance; because positive concomitance is also possible, insofar as inference is intrinsically a valid means of knowledge. Yet a means of knowledge does not directly
25.1 produce activity: but, rather, by virtue of producing appre-
hension of an object. Hence Pakṣilasvāmin says, "upon the 1.1
apprehension of the object on the basis of <this> means of knowledge..." And we will provide justification for this

[13] *pramāṇam arthavat:* 'The means of knowledge has its object' (1.1). *vat* is an allomorph of *matup*. *nityayoge matup* (NVT 24.21). The *Mahābhāṣya*, under *Vārttika* 1 to A.5.2.94 (*tadasyāstyasminniti matup*), relates: *bhūmanindāpraśaṃsāsu nityayoge 'tiśāyane | saṃsarge 'stivivakṣāyāṃ bhavanti matubādayaḥ* (II.393.15-16).

whole <issue> when we explain the *Vārttika* <on this sentence>.

<P> Let this be granted. <However:> Assume that
the categories, the means of knowledge etc., can be known;
but they are not stated by the *śāstra*. Hence the *śāstra* is not
connected with the highest good. <S> Hence, he says,
"since the *śāstra* states human good." Even if he will say 6.4-5
25.5 that the absolute cessation of pain is the good, still that cf. 6.13-15
<absolute> cessation taken together with the means <to
achieving it> and nothing else is what is meant here by the
word 'good', because that without further qualification is
not the content of the *śāstra*. Thus, this is the meaning: as it
is well known by experience that this *śāstra* indeed states
human good together with the means <to achieving it>, it
should not be denied as being something whose performance is impossible: and if this <objection of> impossible
performance is dispelled by the <first sentence of the
*Bhāṣya*>, "on the basis of <this> means of knowledge...," 1.1
then the *śāstra* is connected with the highest good.

He explains the lemma-sentence, "the *śāstra*...," in 6.4
the <passage> that begins, "The *śāstra*...," and which ends, 6.5-20
"by destroying them through undergoing them." By explic-
25.10 itly mentioning "words which convey <the categories of> 6.5
the means of knowledge..." he alludes to both characteriz-

ings of them and inquiries into them.[14] And so there is no
contradiction involved in saying that, "The <Nyāya> *śāstra* 6.7
is a work composed of five books." By the expression
"work composed of five books" is meant an arrangement in 6.5
which there is due sequence of the constituent parts. He
states the intrinsic nature of words, which <so> allude, "A 6.5
word, in turn..." 'phonemes', which are fused in a single cf. 6.5
recollection <and> which are delimited by their conveying a
single meaning, form a 'collection'. Likewise one is to cf. 6.5
understand <that what is meant by a '*sūtra*' is> 'a collection cf. 6.6
of words in *sūtras*, whose intermediate function is <to produce> the recollection of their respective meanings, <and>
which are delimited by their effect of making known the
sentential meaning, which has the form of a single word
meaning as qualified by many word meanings. And like-
25.15 wise, in some cases, if sentences in *sūtras* by virtue of a single subject constitute one sentence, the 'collection' is a
"section." 'A collection of sections', in turn, by virtue of 6.6; cf. 6.7
some connection between their respective subjects, is "a 6.7
chapter." Likewise, one should understand <that a group of sections found by virtue of some connection> here and there <between their subject-matter is a book>. And we will

[14] *tallakṣaṇāni ca tatparīkṣāścopalakṣayati* (NVT 25.10): an allusion to the three-fold method of *Nyāya* as stated by Pakṣilasvāmin: *uddeśāḥ, lakṣaṇam, parīkṣā* (NB 181.20 [NS 1.1.3]).

briefly indicate in passing these connections in subject-matter between topics, sections, and books.

Having thus revealed the intrinsic nature of the 6.6-7
*śāstra*, since the fact that it states human good cannot be established except by stating what its content is, he states its content, "are the categories of it..." <P> Since the means of 6.7
knowledge etc. are difficult to know because they are infinite in number for every man, the *śāstra* proves useless in
25.20 precisely the same way. <S> Hence he says, "essentially 6.8
sixteen." 'Self' means 'essence';[15] that is to say, the specific universals of 'being a means of knowledge' etc., to which the means of knowledge etc. belong. What is meant is this: even if they are infinite due to their different subtypes, because they are subsumed by their specific respective universals, they are not difficult to know. Hence, as the means of knowledge etc. are its categories, "thus" – there- 6.8
fore[16] –"<the> *śāstra* states human good."

<P> Let this be granted. <However:> Are the categories, the means of knowledge etc., susceptible of being validly known or not? If they are not susceptible of being

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[15] Vācaspati here glosses the word *ātman* at the end of the compound: ***ṣoḍaśātmanaḥ*** | *ātmā svabhāvaḥ* (NVT 25.20-21; cf. NV 6.8)
[16] Vācaspati here glosses *tat* (NV 6.8) by *tasmāt* (NVT 25.23); this seems forced, since Uddyotakara is not concluding an argument, but merely restating a point made earlier, that this *śāstra* states human good (NV 6.4-5). Note NVTP 83.22: *tacchāstraṃ śreyo 'bhidhatte*.

validly known, then, as they are constructed out of sheer
25.25 imagination, how do they conduce to the highest good? Nor
are imaginations 'essentially sixteen', because their store is
infinite. Alternatively, if they are susceptible of being val-
idly known, then, because they are established simply by
virtue of a means of knowledge, the *śāstra* serves no pur-
26.1 pose. <S> Hence, he says, "through perception..." That 6.8-9
they are not susceptible of being validly known is denied by
his explicit mention of, "which are already known through 6.9
perception or inference." For this very reason <he says>,
"the true-nature of real objects." The categories, the means 6.9
of knowledge etc., are not the content of comparison; hence
comparison is not included. Even if the objects of knowl- cf. NS 1.1.9
edge, from soul to liberation, are known through verbal tes-
timony, nevertheless, insofar as verbal testimony involves a
trustworthy authority, even in regard to this <verbal testi-
mony> either inference or direct perception is the root
cause; hence only direct perception and inference are
revealed. <P> But it was stated that if they are susceptible
of being validly known, then the *śāstra* serves no purpose.
26.5 <S> Hence he says, "is the audience of this <*śāstra*>." Ordi- 6.9
nary people, even though they commonly use the means of
knowledge, as they lack mental discipline they do not dif-
ferentiate these categories. And if they are not differenti-

ated, they do not conduce to the highest good. Hence he
says, "who does not <already> know." By 'spiritual abili- 6.9; cf. 6.9-10
ties' is meant obedience[17] etc. He says, "Men..." He 6.9-10
reveals the possible types of men in order that the specific
man who is intended here be understood, "Men, in turn,..." 6.10-11
In the sentence, "Among these types..." he reveals <the 6.10-11
type of man> to be eliminated <from consideration>. He
states those who are to be accepted <for consideration>,
"the others..." "Dependence" means 'desire to know'.[18] 6.11; 6.11-12
26.10 Now this belongs to a pupil who is 'in doubt'. But when cf. 6.11
someone who 'is in error' is being instructed, in the pres- cf. 6.11
ence of witnesses, through arguing and captiousness and
loses his egotism, now that he is in doubt, he 'has a desire to
know' because a desire to know is produced in him. Even
one who 'does not know', if he somehow falls into doubt, 6.10
insofar as he is made to have a desire to know, must be
taught.[19] This same point is stated: "the others, being 6.11-12
dependent, are those who have to be taught." Even one who
has no doubts, who, in order to teach the true-nature, feigns
doubt out of compassion, is taught <P> Then does the *śāstra*
function in regard to one who is dependent? And, by the
26.15 same token, those who have valid knowledge would not act

[17] *śuśruṣādiḥ* (NVT 26.7).
[18] *apekṣā jijñāsā* (NVT 26.10)
[19] Cf. NVTP 85.24 and ŚṬ 12.14.

towards <yet> another means of knowledge. <S> Hence he
says, "When they..." When those who desire to know some 6.12-13
object or other 'depend upon the sense-organ etc.', then they
must be taught "by direct perception." One should construe 6.12
what follows in the same way. This is the idea: the 'desire to
know' intended here is not the desire to know real objects
that are conducive to <the attainment of> immediately
experienced ends, but, rather, the desire to know the catego-
ries, which are conducive to <the attainment of> the highest
good. And this <desire to know> is the cause of activity
toward this *śāstra* alone – and nowhere else. This same
point is stated, "But when..." What has to be supplied is: 6.13
'But those who desire to know the means to the highest
human end'. He states the varieties of the good by itself, in
order that the good intended here <by the *śāstra*> be ascer-
26.20 tained: "The good, in turn, is pleasure and the cessation of 6.13-14
what is harmful." Within this, in turn, he states sub-divi-
sions, "There is a well established two-fold division of this 6.14; cf.NS 1.1.8
good" – pleasure and the cessation of pain. He states this,
"according to the difference between that which is immedi- 6.14
ately experienced and that which is not immediately experi-
enced." <This difference does> Not <apply to them>
conjointly, but rather individually; hence he says, "Pleasure 6.14
is the immediately experienced <kind of good>" – it arises

from the enjoyment of flower garlands, sandalpaste, women
etc. "The not immediately experienced" pleasure is heaven 6.15
etc. Likewise too, one should supply the phrase 'the cessa-
tion of pain, in turn, is immediately experienced good and
not immediately experienced good', because the word 'and'
is omitted. He states the difference between the immediately
experienced and not immediately experienced good – the
cessation of what is harmful – in terms of absolute and tem-
porary, "The cessation of what is harmful, in turn..." He 6.15
26.25 ascertains the good intended <by the *śāstra*>, "The abso- 6.16
lute..." By saying, "in turn," he makes the ascertainment 6.16
clear. For cessation to be absolute means that there is no
reappearance of that which has ceased. And this <non-reap-
pearance> is characterized by the cessation of the effect, the
cause, and what is inseparable from them. For an effect does
not arise without a cause. This same point is stated,
"through the elimination of the twenty-one different kinds 6.16
of pain." And based upon the difference between primary
27.1 and secondary usages, he states the ways in which the
twenty-one, body etc., constitute 'pain', "The twenty- 6.17-19
one..." The internal organ is the sixth sense-organ. Its con-
tent is desire, aversion, and exertion. Even if the body also
is <its> object, nevertheless it is a cause of pain in a differ-
ent way. Hence he says, "the body..." The space <occupied 6.18

by> the soul, as delimited by the body, is the seat of pain;
hence the body is called the "seat of pain." In the sentence, 6.18
"The sense-organs...," he states the reason for the figurative 6.18-19
use of 'pain' in regard to the sense-organs, the sense-
objects, and the cognitions. Now among these, because the
27.5 sense-organs make known such objects as odor etc. <and>
because the sense-objects are what have to be made known,
whereas the cognitions <derived from these> directly pro-
duce pain, they are figuratively called 'pain'. By saying,
"Pleasure...", he states the source of the figurative use of 6.19
'pain' in regard to pleasure. Dependence on a means, tran-
sience, and desire – which cause pain – are inseparable from
all pleasures. Therefore, pleasure also is inseparable from
pain. He <next> states the means to eliminating that pain,
whose varieties he has stated, "The elimination of this..." 6.19-20
Indeed, he who has purified the path of the highest reason-
ing through the knowledge of the true-nature of <the cate-
gories of> doubt etc. and who, through that meditation
which arises from contemplating the true-nature of the
twelve-fold objects of knowledge which are to be elimi- cf. NS 1.1.2
nated or acquired, has wiped away all attachment to faults,
27.10 which cause activity, and who ceases to act, does not pro-
duce a new mass of merit and demerit, which are caused by
the body, the sense-organs etc. And that mass of merit and

demerit, which he acquired in an endless succession of rebirths, even though it is infinite and the appropriate time for their <proper> maturation is not fixed, 'he destroys by cf. 6.20
undergoing' their various results by virtue of creating bodies – through the power of consummate meditation – that share in undergoing completely the various merits and demerits. For meditation has inconceivably great power. Just as the noble <Patañjali> says,

> For who, without the power of Yoga,
> drinks the ocean like Agastya, and like him
> 27.15 creates the *Daṇḍakāraṇya*?[20]

This same absolute cessation of pain is the good. This same point is stated – "since the *śāstra* states human good." 6.4-5

<P> Let this be granted. <However:> The absolute cessation of pain alone is the good which prompts human activity. But as this is the absolute cessation of pleasure no less than pain, how is this the good? And how does it prompt activity on the part of prudent men? <S> Hence he
27.20 says, "Men are subject to desire..." Even if this does not 6.20-21
prompt activity among those who are "subject to desire" – base people: for they even consume food mixed with poison, reasoning thus: 'It produces instant pleasure since it is cf. 151.18-19
sweet; but since it is mixed with poison, it may or may not

[20] *Yogabhāṣya* 3.10. See further *Mahābhārata* 3.102-103 on Agastya's drinking the ocean.

kill us; let us now enjoy the instant pleasure; for who casts
away a sure thing?'[21] Yet, men of discrimination, who look
to the future, reject even heaven as being like the shadow of
the hood of an angry serpent. Therefore, let this not prompt
action on the part of those subject to desire, but will rather
27.25 <prompt activity on the part of> the discriminating. And the
means to producing discrimination even in those who lack
discrimination – be they ignorant or in error – was made
known earlier. And thus the dispassion that is intended, 26.5-18
which alone prompts <men of discrimination> to act with cf. 6.10 ff.
regard to the *śāstra*, is discrimination. "Activity...has two 6.23
forms" – single-formness and double-formness. What is
28.1 meant is: 'The difference between men' is due to desire and cf. 6.23
dispassion; the activity of men of discrimination takes on
one form only – its sole aim is to reject that which is
unpleasant – because they set every pleasure one could
obtain in the camp of the undesirable, since it is inseparable
from pain. But the activity of those who lack discrimination
takes two forms.

Having thus set forth with this detail the purport of
the first sentence <of the *Bhāṣya*>, "upon the apprehension 1.1
of the object on the basis of <this> means of knowledge,"

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[21] *ko hi hastagataṃ pādagataṃ karoti* (NVT 27.22). Literally, 'For who makes what is in his hands be at his feet?'

he now prepares to explain a part of it, "due to the success- 1.1
fulness of activity," <by saying>, "Activity, again,..." Suc- 7.4
cessfulness of activity on the part of those subject to desire
etc. has been explained: that the successfulness of their 7.4-7
28.5 activity, which is immediately experienced, is the cause <of
the two-fold activity>. But not for those free from desire;
for the connection between their activity and its result,
namely the attainment of the highest good, is not immedi-
ately experienced because the highest good is not experi-
enced in this world. <P> It is inappropriate to say, "because 7.8
the means of knowledge <which gives rise to them> is
either valid or invalid," for it is prohibited that a means of
knowledge be invalid. <S> Hence, he says, "Now a means 7.8
of knowledge..." For it is not the case that what is an
invalid means of knowledge and is thought not to be a
means of knowledge conduces to activity. <P> How then?
<S> <That what is an invalid means of knowledge is
thought to be> A means of knowledge. And as there can be
no misapprehension of what is an invalid means of knowl-
edge as a valid means of knowledge unless it shares some
similarity with a valid means of knowledge, <P> he asks
28.10 about this similarity, "But what...?" <S> The answer is: 7.9-10
"The fact that it demarcates <an object> is the shared 7.10
generic feature." He explains this: "by a means of knowl- 7.10-11

edge as well..." The point is: both the cognition of silver and the cognition of mother-of-pearl demarcate a real substance that is before one and which has a shiny appearance. However, with regard to one and the same object, the two cognitions stand in the relation of 'what is to be cancelled and that which cancels <it>', because they <respectively> superimpose and then deny silver. Therefore, then, in both situations <successful> activity results from a valid means of knowledge only, not from an invalid means of knowl-
edge, which varies from its object: hence he says, "this 7.11-12
same agent of knowledge..." The idea is: and hence the negative concomitance between successful activity and invalid <means of knowledge> is established. Moreover,
28.15 successful activity is the logical reason for <the inference
that> a means of knowledge that is fully endowed with negative concomitance with an invalid <means of knowledge>
is valid. Hence he says, "Its" – successful activity's 7.12
(although the means of knowledge is the cause) – 'successfulness' is its invariance from its object. But unsuccessful <activity>, even though it <logically> follows next <for consideration>, is not appended because it is unsuitable.

He now restates the first sentence <of the *Bhāṣya*>
in order to raise an objection, "upon the apprehension of an 7.13; 1.1
object on the basis of <this> means of knowledge." <P> He

objects, “they are mutually dependent...” <S> He answers, 7.13
“<This is> Not correct...” He explains the objection-sen- 7.13-14
tence, “If...on the basis of a means of knowledge...” Now, 7.14-18
28.20 in the first place, it is not the apprehension of the object that
causes activity, but rather the ascertainment of it. Nor is it
that <ascertainment of the object> alone; but, rather, once
one has repeatedly apprehended that this kind of object is a
cause of the good, it is the ascertainment of the object one is
presently apprehending together with the inference that it is
a cause of the good, insofar as it is of this kind, that is the
cause of activity. This same ‘apprehension of an object on 1.1
the basis of <this> means of knowledge’ – ascertainment –
together with the inference that <this object> is a cause of
the good is what is termed ‘the cause of successful activity’.
And as there is no ascertainment of an object without ascer-
taining the validity <of its means of knowledge> as a means
of knowledge, and as there is neither ascertainment of its
validity as a means of knowledge nor apprehension of the
pervasion relationship, which is the instrumental cause of
the inference that <this object> is a cause of the good, with-
out successful activity; and as there is no successful activity
28.25 without both of these, hence there is mutual dependence.
This same point is stated, “If the apprehension of an object 7.15-18
on the basis of <this> means of knowledge” – the ascertain-

ment <of the object> together with the inference that it is the means to what is desired – "is prior, how, pray, does one apprehend" – ascertain –"without successfulness of activ-
29.1 ity" – whether <something> is actually a means to what one desires or simply water?[22] <S> He explains the reply, "And 7.18-20
this is not so..." Now, as for the statement that, because one does not ascertain the object since it is difficult to ascertain its means of knowledge, there is no successfulness of activity; to this we say, this is true – that the validity <of a means of knowledge> as a means of knowledge cannot be ascertained intrinsically. But rather, that is understood extrinsically – only from successfulness of activity in regard to immediately experienced ends with which one is not fully familiar.[23] But activity, which depends upon the apprehension of the object, does not depend upon the ascertainment
29.5 of the object, because prudent men act even when in doubt concerning an object. Nor, to be sure, even when they act with the ascertainment of <the object as> the means, do they fail to have doubts if the <expected> result does not occur. Therefore, these <prudent men>, who act, even when

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[22] If one had not previously come to know that water quenches thirst, the mere sight of water (*toyameva* NVT 29.1) would not lead one to ascertain that it quenches thirst. The abruptness of this sentence points to a short lacuna.

[23] *abhyāsadaśāpanna* (NVT 29.3). This phrase, literally: 'endowed with tens(s) of repetitions', is translated throughout by 'with which one is fully familiar'.

in doubt, by having ascertained the true-nature of the means
of knowledge through successfulness of activity, by ascer-
taining the object through ascertaining the validity as a
means of knowledge of another <means of knowledge> that
is 'of this kind' <and> with which they are fully familiar –
even prior to the success of the activity – through the logical
mark of 'being of this kind' act. And thus, having ascer-
tained "the validity of *mantras* and *Āyurveda* as a means of NS 2.1.68
knowledge," whose ends are immediately experienced,
through successful activity, the ascertainment of the validity
of the *Vedas*, which are of this kind, are uttered by reliable
authorities, but whose ends are not immediately experi-
enced, will be made known, even without successfulness of
29.10 activity, through <the logical reason of> 'being uttered by a TNT 565-571
reliable authority'. <E> Some <argue as follows:> nor is the
knowledge of the result investigated by the prudent because
this, whatever kind it may be, is what is desired; and
because the result is the characteristic mark of what is
desired, they investigate the means to it. To be more
explicit: there is a cognition of water; a thirsty man acts
upon this <cognition>; he acquires that upon acting; he
drinks what he has acquired; and by drinking there is
quenching of his thirst. That is all the agent of knowledge
<of the water> requires to be satisfied. But he does not also

inquire into the quenching of his thirst, because this – whatever it may be – is what is desired. <S> But we say: the invariance of the result-knowledge also can only be ascertained through the inferential mark of 'being of this kind',
29.15 insofar as it is fully familiar. That is to say: thus there was a <result knowledge> antecedent to this, <another> antecedent to that, and <yet another> antecedent to that. Nor should the <following objection> be raised: <P> There is an infinite regress if, in order now to ascertain the validity as a means of knowledge of the present result-knowledge, there is ascertainment of the validity as a means of knowledge of an antecedent result knowledge through <the logical reason of> 'being of this kind'. <S> Because the validity as a means of knowledge of the antecedent <result-knowledge> has already been ascertained through its similarity to its antecedent <result-knowledge>. Likewise, <there is ascertainment of the validity as a means of knowledge> of the antecedent <of the result-knowledge> through its similarity to its antecedent. Thus <there is ascertainment of the validity as a means of knowledge> of the antecedent of the antecedent by its similarity to its antecedent. Thus, simply because this <process> has no beginning, there is an answer to this <objection>. And among these <antecedent result-knowledges>, that result-knowledge whose variance <from

29.20 its object> is doubted, in that it is the same as the enjoyment
one experiences in a dream etc., is not fully familiar <to
us>. Hence, since successfulness of activity has to be pos-
ited in order to ascertain the validity as a means of knowl-
edge of this <result knowledge>, it was stated that, as cf. 7.18
between the apprehension of the object and successfulness
of activity, there is no beginning. But inference, which
arises through the logical mark of 'successfulness of activ-
ity', or <yet> another <means of knowledge/inference>,[24]
all doubt concerning whose variance is removed, has its cf. 98.22
validity as a means of knowledge <ascertained> intrinsi-
cally only, because <it> arises through an inferential mark,
which does not vary from the <object> to be inferred. For
there is no knowledge that is inferential in form without an
inferential mark, nor is there an inferential mark without a
thing that possesses this mark. Hence, that knowledge
which arises through an inferential mark, whose invariance
is apprehended intrinsically only, proves to be unshakable.
29.25 But knowledge through perception, even though it arises
from the object, is not <unshakable> because it <s – the
object's> invariance is not apprehended <intrinsically>, but
rather is established only as being an existent thing. Nor do

[24] Śrīkaṇṭha (ŚṬ 21.7-9) sees a distinction here between 'only negative' inference, which arises from successfulness of activity as a mark, and 'omnipresent/ordinary' inference of fire and smoke.

its other causes, the sense-organs etc., have their invariance apprehended through the object, nor are they invariably connected with the object. But knowledge derived through

30.1 verbal testimony does not arise from the object, because even in the absence of the object, if verbal testimony is present, <knowledge> exists. Nor does verbal testimony have invariance from its object as does the inferential mark; but, rather, verbal testimony makes known the meaning of a sentence by producing knowledge of its <constituent> word meanings – based solely on one's comprehension of the convention <established between word and meaning>. Therefore, there is no grasping, intrinsically, the invariance of both knowledge derived from perception and knowledge derived from verbal testimony. Hence, the inferential mark either of 'successfulness of activity' or of 'being of this kind' must be followed in order that <one establish> invariance from the object; and the validity as a means of knowledge is intrinsically <established> for knowledge that arises through internal perception, in which one apprehends the inferential mark of 'being of this kind' that resides in the knowledge, <and> all doubts as to its being erroneous are

30.5 completely dispelled insofar as the variance of this kind <of knowledge from its object> is not experienced. Therefore, there is no infinite regress. Comparison is explained by this.

And one must understand that, by relating that awareness <of the cognition of the object> does not vary from its object, the validity as a means of knowledge has been stated for the sense-organs etc. also, which cause this. For their validity as a means of knowledge is nothing other than their producing knowledge that is invariant. Nor is it appropriate <to object>: <P> How do the sense-organs etc., which do vary from their object, produce knowledge that does not vary from its object? <S> Because it is not possible both to make use of a cause and to call into question its intrinsic
nature.[25] Therefore, because there is the possibility of 'suc- 1.1
30.10 cessfulness of activity upon the apprehension of an object on the basis of <this> means of knowledge' <even> out of doubt as to the object with which one is not fully familiar, and because one infers the validity as a means of knowledge of the knowledge of successfulness of activity, with which one is fully familiar, by virtue of <the inferential mark of> 'being of this kind', but because one infers the validity as a means of knowledge of <that knowledge of the object> with which one is not fully familiar through the knowledge of <yet> another successfulness of activity – since there is no

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[25] *kāraṇasvabhāvaniyogaparyanuyogayoraśakyāt* (NVT 30.10): see ŚṬ 22.1-2. The translation assumes that we have here a chiastic ordering: (*kāraṇa-niyogasya*) + (*svabhāva-paryanuyogasya*). There are a number of similar chiastic *dvandvas* in Uddyotara (NV 7.3, 12.7, 14.24) and in Vācaspati (NVT 58.4).

beginning <to the process>, there is no mutual dependency between the apprehension of an object and successfulness of activity. <P> There remains <the objection> that, between the inference that an object is a means to what is desired and successfulness of activity, there is mutual dependency. <S> Here also there is refutation through beginninglessness. For, when a new-born babe sees <its mother's> breast, there becomes manifest an impression that was produced by a great number of previous experiences that this kind of thing was desired. Then memory <arises>. Then inference <as to this breast's> being a means to what is desired. Then there is activity. And then this <activity> is successful. Hence, as there is no beginning to the process, since it holds good in each preceding rebirth, there is – as in the case of the sprout and the seed – no
mutual dependency. "the apprehension of an object." The 7.15 (1.1)
meaning is: both the apprehension of an object and the apprehension that an object is a means to what is desired. Therefore, the whole <matter> is cleared up.

Therefore, he has justified, in the way just stated,
that this <sentence> "upon the apprehension of an object on 1.1
the basis of <this> means of knowledge...," is a sentence which reconfirms the *śāstra* as well as its purport. Now he
states a different purport of this same <sentence>, "Alterna- 7.20-21

tively...of the means of knowledge and activity..." <P> In
this matter the following is objected: for the sage
<Akṣapāda>, by virtue of explaining perception, doubt, etc.
and directly through this *śāstra* – analytics – has explained
that reasoning, which is also called 'inference', teaches the
twelve kinds of objects of knowledge, which are established cf. NS 1.1.9
as things to be eliminated or acquired, in order that the high-
est good be attained; and yet it is not from reasoning as the
means of knowledge – which is merely the ascertainment of
the true-nature of the objects of knowledge – that there is
attainment of the highest good. But, rather, from such activ-
ities as the contemplation that of the <twelve> objects of
30.25 knowledge, excepting the first and the last, ten are what is
called 'pain', and contemplation of the actual nature of the
soul <one attains the highest good> "by not producing any 6.20
<new> merit or demerit" – through the sequence of direct cf. 101.15
cognition of the true-nature of the soul, dispassion, and lib-
eration from affliction together with its abode – "and if they 6.20
have been produced, by destroying them through undergo-
31.1 ing them." Moreover, because it is an indispensable element
with respect to <attaining> the highest good, activity in fact
is more important than the means of knowledge – reasoning,
and not reasoning <than it>. Therefore, it is activity alone cf. 7.22-23
that has to be explained, and not the means of knowledge,

even though it is a cause of the highest good, because activity is an indispensable element. <S> In this <matter> the following <consideration> is of assistance: 'upon the appre- 1.1
hension of an object on the basis of <this> means of knowledge', the successfulness of activity consists in its right-connection with the result; but not when there is no apprehension of the object on the basis of <this> means of knowledge. Therefore, "the means of knowledge is valid" – attains 1.1
31.5 its end – just as does the activity. This is what is meant: just as the activity is more important, insofar as it is an indispensable element, so too is the means of knowledge <more important>, insofar as it is the root cause. For it is not the case that activity, which arises from an invalid means of knowledge, is rightly connected with its result. Therefore, both are of equal importance. Further, since activity is also explained by explaining the means of knowledge, the *śāstra* explains means of knowledge but not activity. And the more general statement is aimed at 'reasoning in the highest sense', because that indeed is the subject under consider-
ation.[26] He previously stated that this <the first sentence of 6.4
the *Bhāṣya*> was a reconfirmation statement, insofar as it is intended to make known the means of knowing what consti-

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[26] Śrīkaṇṭha (ŚṬ 23.21-23) takes *pramāṇa* in NB 1.1 as *anumāna* 'inference'.

tutes a valid means of knowledge. Now he demonstrates
that it is a reconfirmation statement by way of refuting an
opponent, "worldly conduct..." To be more explicit, one 7.24
who denies that <there is> a means to apprehending the
means of knowledge, should be thus asked: 'Do you deny
<that there is> a means of knowing the means of knowledge
through a valid means of knowledge or through an invalid
means of knowledge?' If he should say, 'Through a valid
means of knowledge', then he must be answered: 'How can
you speak this way without knowing the means of knowing
the means of knowledge?' But if he <should say>, 'Through
an invalid means of knowledge', then he should be dis-
missed. But if <he should say>, 'Through a means of
knowledge, the validity of which as a means of knowledge
has not been grasped', then there is a discrepancy between
his words and thought. Therefore, even against your will
you must conform to worldly conduct. Otherwise, as you
are neither a layman nor an expert, you should be dismissed
as being mad. Therefore it is in order that an objector be cf. 16.7, 3.11-12
taught this worldly conduct that it is repeated by this <the
first sentence of the> *Bhāṣya*, "A means of knowledge is 1.1
valid because of successfulness of activity upon the appre-
hension of an object on the basis of <this> means of knowl-
edge": because "worldly conduct <consists in>: every agent 7.24-25

of knowledge who acts after having ascertained an object
through a means of knowledge" – through which he comes
to know the true-nature of the object – "obtains his goal."
Hence, the sentence that begins, "on the basis of <this> 1.1
means of knowledge..." restates <worldly conduct> by way
of revealing its cause.

He prepares to state yet another purport of this same
<sentence in the *Bhāṣya*>, <by saying> "what is to be elim- 8.1
inated, the eliminating of it..." As for 'object'; the word
31.20 'object' is found in this sentence, "upon the apprehension of 1.1
an 'object' on the basis of <this> means of knowledge";
those <objects> which a word expresses are thus termed.[27] cf. 2.10-12
Such an explanation will hold true only for this section of
*Vārttika*, but will be false for what is found in the *Bhāṣya*.[28]
"The means is the *śāstra*." The word '*śāstra*' is intended to 8.3
have this meaning, because objects, as well as words, are
the body of the *śāstra*. And hence, because one understands
'object of knowledge' and 'means of knowledge' through
the words 'what is to be eliminated', 'the eliminating', and
'that which is to be attained', the word '*śāstra*' applies to
<the remaining fourteen categories>, beginning with doubt

[27] Vācaspati here analyzes the compound *arthapādāni* (NV 8.1): *padaṃ vācakaṃ yeṣām <arthānām> tāni tathā* (NVT 31.20). He connects the *artha* in NB.1.1 with the *artha* in *arthapadāni*.
[28] *anyathā* = *anyatra*. Cf. NVTP 102.15-16.

and ending with grounds for defeat, according to the maxim of 'cattle and bull'.[29] Therefore, by the word 'means' are meant only <the categories of> doubt through grounds for defeat.

He explains the lemma-sentence, "What is to be 2.10; 8.1-4
eliminated..." He states its purport, "And ... in this <group 8.4-5
31.25 of four>..." By <the word> "and," he suggests yet another 8.4
group of four, namely 'means of knowledge, valid knowledge, agent of knowledge, and object of knowledge'. Thus, in both the 'what is to be eliminated etc.' group of four, which is indicated by the word 'object', since they are what
are being sought,[30] "and in 'the means of knowledge etc.' 8.4-5
group of four" – this <first sentence of the> *Bhāṣya* – "serves to reveal that the means of knowledge is pre-eminent." Even if the understanding of the true-nature of both groups of four causes the attainment of the highest good, nevertheless the means of knowledge alone is pre-eminent,

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[29] *gobalīvardhanyāyena* (NVT 31.23). Śrīkaṇṭha gives an elegant explanation of this maxim in context (24.13-16): "Just as when it is said, 'let the bull be brought in, and let the cattle be brought in', even though the word 'cattle' conveys both <meanings>, because of its proximity to the word 'bull', it indicates a cow (*anaḍvāhī*) only; likewise, occurring in the proximity of the words 'what is to be eliminated, the elimination, and what is to be obtained', the word 'means', even though it expresses the entire *śāstra*, it occurs in the meaning of the fourteen <categories> starting with doubt."

[30] The word *artha* can be derived from the root √*ṛ* 'to go, obtain', or √arth 'to seek...' Vācaspati here adopts the first alternative. See *Uṇādisūtra* 2.14 (169) *uṣikuṣigārtibhyaḥ sthan*: 'After the roots *uṣ*, *kuṣ*, *gai*, and *ṛ*, the suffix *sthan* is added'. Cf. *Uṇādimaṇidīpikā*: '*ṛ gatiprāpaṇayoḥ*' *bhauvādikaḥ* | *aṁvān* | *aryate prāpyata iti arthaḥ* (p. 100).

32.1 because it is the basis for the establishment of the others.
This same point is stated, "valid..." <The affix> *matup* is 1.1
used in the sense of 'pre-eminence'. <That is to say:> A
means of knowledge is pre-eminently successful in refer-
ence to <the group of > agent of knowledge etc. and to <the
group of> what is to be eliminated etc. <P> Why? <S>
Because the agent of knowledge, who acts 'upon the appre- 1.1
hension of an object on the basis of <this> means of knowl-
edge', obtains the rest of these; and because valid
knowledge is the effect of this <means of knowledge>. This
same point is stated, "due to successfulness of activity..." 1.1
That is to say: thus, due to this pre-eminence, the means of
knowledge is listed before both groups of three with a dif-
32.5 ference in intended meaning. Therefore, when some say
<E>: 'If priority <in listing> is due to pre-eminence, then
this <priority> belongs to the object of knowledge only; but
if it were due to being the means <to knowing the means of
knowledge> then this <priority> belongs to doubt etc.,
because they are the means to the means of knowledge. And
how does the means of knowledge have priority over the
agent of knowledge etc.? <S> This is refuted because of the
fact that doubt etc., even if they are the means to the means
of knowledge, are dependent upon the means of knowledge.
<P> It is understood that the group of four, what is to elimi-

nated etc., is revealed in that they are the cardinal entities <of Nyāya>. But how is the group of four, means of knowledge etc., revealed? He asks, "But how...?" <S> The 8.5
answer is, "'The means of knowledge', 'the object of 8.5-6
knowledge', and 'knowledge'..."

32.10 Having thus explained the purport <of the first sentence of the *Bhāṣya*>, he proceeds to explain the meaning of its constituent parts, "This same sentence is now carefully 8.7
examined part by part" – 'is explained part by part'. Because it has priority "among these" – parts that have to be 8.7
explained, he explains <the part> "on the basis of <this> 1.1
means of knowledge," "Among these..." He explains 8.7-8
<this>, "'On the basis of the means of knowledge' is <an 8.8
instance of> the fifth case affix used to express the instrumental cause." <P> If this <is an instance of> the fifth case affix used to express the instrumental cause, then why did he not say 'because of the means of knowledge?' <S> Hence he says, "It is used..." That is to say: <it> – the form 8.8-9
"'on the basis of <this> means of knowledge' is used to 8.8-9
express an overlapping of both grammatical number and of case." <P> We allow that it is used to express an overlapping of grammatical number, but not that it is used to
32.15 express an overlapping of case; because the affix *tasi* can only indicate the fifth case affix. Hence he says, "But 8.9

how...?" <S> He answers, "It is so construed..." <P> He 8.10
asks about the purpose served by overlapping, "What is 8.10
accomplished by this?" <S> The answer is, "Due to the 8.10-11
overlapping of grammatical number there is merging and
restriction." He explains both of these, "Through one means 8.11-12
of knowledge..." In order to relate that, where there is
merging of two or more means of knowledge, there each
means of knowledge taken separately is a cause of appre-
hension, he said, "Through <one> means of knowledge," 8.12
even in the context of <describing> merging. For this same
reason the particle 'only' is used in the case of restriction,
"Through one means of knowledge only." He states the pur- 8.12
32.20 pose served by the overlapping of case, "Due to the overlap- 8.12
ping of case, causality and instrumentality <are
understood>." "Are understood" is continued from above.
He explains this, "Causality is <understood> thus, 'The 8.12-13
apprehension of an object arises because of a means of
knowledge'." The connection is: the apprehension of the
object arises through a means of knowledge; hence the
meaning of 'instrumental cause' is understood. <P> But
from what is the meaning of 'instrumental cause' under-
stood? <S> Hence he says, "through a means of knowl- 8.13
edge..." "One effects his end" – the apprehension of the 8.13
object – "through a means of knowledge' – because it is the

most important causal factor." And thus, the indication of causality – which is inextricably linked with instrumentality– through the fifth case affix serves to deny that the means of knowledge and its result are identical, because being a cause or effect involves a different basis; surely an
32.25 axe by itself is not cutting. <P> In order to show that, the restatement of the instrumental sense, which is already grasped from the base form of 'means of knowledge' is appropriate,[31] and that, because this is honored[32] among the other *kārakas* of valid knowledge, it is appropriate that the means of knowledge <and not activity> has to be explained
and have priority <of listing>, he objects to merging, "merg- 8.13-14
ing..." <S> He replies, "<This is> Not correct..." 8.14

33.1 He explains the objection, "We might state your 8.14-17
opinion as follows:..." Those <means of knowledge> whose content is 'restricted' – different – are thus termed. The plural number denotes different sub-types. For direct perception, which arises due to a capacity on the part of the

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[31] The form *pramāṇa* consists of the prefix *pra* 'forth', the root √*mā* 'to measure', and the affix *lyuṭ* (*-ana* in non-Pāṇinian terms). This affix can indicate the action, instrument, or place of the verb to which it is joined: see A.3.3.113, 115-117 If one takes it as indicating the 'instrument of measuring', an objector notes, then the use of the fifth case affix to indicate instrument is redundant.

[32] By A.2.2.34 (*alpāctaram* <A.2.2.30, A.2.2.32)>, the word with the fewest syllables will occur first in a *dvanda* compound. In the compound to which Vācaspati alludes, *pramāṇa-pramā-pramātṛ-prameya* (NVT 31.25; cf. NV 8.4-5, NB 1.8-12), *pramāṇa* occupies the first place, while *pramā* has fewer syllables. Accordingly, he invokes *Vārtika* 4 to this *sūtra*: ‖ *abhyarhitam* ‖: 'that which is honored <occurs first in a *dvandva*>'(I.436.118).

object, has objects as its domain. This same object, which makes the manifestation of knowledge conform to its own positive and negative concomitance, falls within the domain of direct perception. And yet, a universal, whose capacity for purposeful action is totally denied, cannot be such; but the individual[33] could be <such>. For this alone is ultimately real, because a real object has the characteristic property of having the capacity for purposeful activity. This alone is its 'own' – unique – 'characteristic' that, as it occupies no extension in space – by its nature it is non-spatial – it is atomic, and, because it occupies no extension in time, it is momentary. Therefore, direct perception has individuals as its content. Nor is an individual the domain of inference also. For it <inference> is caused by the inferential mark, through which the invariable relation is grasped; and since the invariable relation, in the form of identity or dependent origination, has individuals as its content and cannot be grasped, it depends upon two universal properties. Nor can a universal, which is one, be related to more than one time, place, or condition. This same <universal> – <whether one views it as> the basis of judgements that arise through

[33] *svalakṣaṇa*. More literally, 'own-characterized/'self-characterized': a radical individual which shares no characteristic in common with anything else. Vācaspati here quotes from Dharmakīrti's *Nyāyabindu*: *tadeva paramārthasat* | ... *arthakriyāsāmarthyalakṣaṇatvādvastunaḥ* (23.15, 21 *KSS* 22); cf. NVT 33.4-5.

beginningless impressions, or the reification either of the form of judgements or of what is unreal – must be admitted to be the domain of inference. And because this is common to what exists and what does not exist, is similar to external objects, and its manifestation is restricted, it rests on 'difference from other'.[34] Surely that which is common to what exists and what does not exist rests solely in 'difference from other', as for example 'incorporeality'. This is common both to what exists, knowledge etc., and what does not exist, hare's horns etc. And the domain of judgement is common both to what exists and what does not exist – 'There is a pot, There is no pot'. But if what exists were
33.15 unique, then the word 'is' would not be employed, because it is redundant. Nor, on the other hand, should one say 'is not', because this involves a contradiction; this kind of objection will be urged thus also if what does not exist is unique. Nor is it supposed that the unreal, which has no efficacy whatever, is similar to the individual, which is ultimately real, because of its 'difference from other'. Nor are the concept of and expression for 'cow' determinate except

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[34] *anyavyāvṛtti* (NVT 33.10), cf. also NVT 33.24. This is a clear invocation of the Buddhist doctrine of *apoha* 'exclusion'; the commonality between two things consists in their 'difference from other' rather than any positively shared feature(s). That two things are called 'cow' does not mean that they share in 'cowness', but rather they are different from what is a non-cow.

in terms of difference from horse etc. Therefore, inference makes the universal, which has the form of 'difference from other' and is not external, <but> which is apprehended as being external because of a failure to differentiate it from what is external, operate on what is external. And as it indirectly leads one to grasp an external thing due to its invariable connection to what is external, it is a means of knowledge that is in correspondence with <its object> and yet is erroneous due to the will of the agent of knowledge. Therefore, the individual is not its domain. It was stated that perception, in turn, did not have the universal as its domain. And there is no means of knowledge besides these two; because the real means of knowledge is included in these two only, or, if it is not included, it cannot be a means of knowledge. The meaning is: and there is no other object of knowledge above and beyond the universal and the particular, since these two will subsume it.

In the passage, "This also is not correct...," he 8.16-18
explains his refutation-statement. And how this is he will
explain here and there. A 'particular' is that which demar- cf. 8.18
cates. Moreover, this <takes the form, in reference to a pot,
of> curved, hollow, etc. and it is ultimate. He states an
example of restriction and combination, "as is the case with 8.19-20
a sense-organ." <P> One who does not admit merging says,

"Because it is already known..." <S> He replies, "<This is> 8.21
Not correct,...in different ways." He explains the objection, 8.22
"If the..." 8.22-23

34.1 <P> Let this be granted. <However:> There is no
uselessness, because another means of knowledge is valid in
regard to producing another cognition that has this <same
object> as its domain, insofar as cognitions pass away very
quickly. Hence he says, "To have a means of knowledge 8.23
make known an object that is already known..." That is to
say: even if cognitions pass away very quickly, neverthe-
less, they have permanence due, in fact, to the impression
produced from the cognition of the object one of the two
means of knowledge produced; hence, "to have a means of 8.23
knowledge make known an object that is already known
would be" 'the ground being ground', because of the possi-
bility that the memory of this object is continuous. <S> In
34.5 order to explain his rebuttal statement, he repeats <his
answer>, "That is not correct...in a different way." He 8.23-24
explains <this>, "We deny..." This is the idea: for the 8.24
causes of a means of knowledge are not so prescient as to
reflect thus: 'A means of knowledge has indeed been pro-
duced by one of us; let us desist in this'. Nor again can the
means of knowledge, which arise through the strength of
their respective causes, cease to function thus: 'This object

has been revealed by some one means of knowledge among us; our work is done'. <P> This <answer> is <in itself> a reproof <to the doctrine of merging> because the agent of knowledge is a sentient being. <S> <This is> Not correct, since he repeatedly desires to know through this <means of knowledge> a real object he finds most desirable; and,
34.10 because he also is knowing through this <means of knowledge> an object of knowledge, such as statements of base people, which he does not desire to know. Therefore, it is not due to the will of the agent of knowledge that a means of knowledge either operates or does not operate with regard to an object, but rather because of a capacity <of the object>. Otherwise, the undesirable consequence is that such painful things as burning heat are not directly perceived.

But as for a means of knowledge that functions in dependence on the desire to know, if the agent of knowledge were not to make it function, how would the means of knowledge arise? For it is not the case that, if a man who desires to drink does not drink water, its capacity to quench
34.15 thirst vanishes. Therefore, that cognition which is produced by the totality of causes that are present is valid knowledge. Moreover, the means of knowledge which produce this also have the same content. And he has revealed this same 'dif-

ference' in the totality of causes in the sentence, "The 'different way' consists in this...through direct perception..." 8.24-9.1
Even if there is a difference in mode, such as that between immediate and non-immediate cognition etc., nevertheless, that has not been mentioned because it does not contribute to the subject under discussion. And if it were said: 'If a substance is apprehended through the tactile sense, then the visual sense is superfluous', or 'If it is apprehended through the visual sense, then the tactile sense is superfluous', then either the cognition of its color or the cognition of its tactile properties would not arise. It is for this reason that either the visual sense or the tactile sense would have be to admitted. And by same token, even if the merging <of the means of
34.20 knowledge> serves no purpose, there is no purposelessness
in regard to restriction. Hence he says, "in some other 9.1
object..." He summarizes the subject under discussion,
"Therefore..." 9.2

Now that he has described the meaning of the case affix, he introduces an explanation of the meaning of the
base form, "a means of knowledge..." And in this context 9.3
'ascertainment' – <according to the etymological analysis of> 'that by means of which ascertainment is produced' – means 'examination'. <P> To further the examination, he
inquires into both the state and its exemplification,[35] "But 9.3

what..." <E> Some say that a means of knowledge is that which makes known an object not already known. Others says that it is the correspondence between the object and the
34.25 cognition that takes on its form. Others say that it is the capacity of knowledge alone, which has no form, to reveal the self and the not-self. The venerable say that it is that which causes apprehension. Therefore, because there is
35.1 doubt due to <this> difference of opinion, a question arises. By explaining the question as to the state, he explained the question as to what exemplifies the state. <S> The answer is, "A means of knowledge is that which causes knowl- 9.4
edge." And <in this answer> there is no undesirable consequence that which causes doubtful knowledge or erroneous knowledge <would qualify as being a means of knowledge> because of the requirement of 'valid', because both <of these kinds of knowledge> are invalid because of their variation from the objects which they reveal. Surely that which admits of two <contradictory> interpretations is not a real thing, nor is it employed in purposeful actions.

35.5 <P> Let this be granted. <However:> There is the undesirable consequence that that which causes recollection

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[35] *bhāvabhavitārau* (NVT 34.23). Literally, 'the action/state and the agent of the action/state'. The 'state' is 'means of knowledge-ness' (*pramāṇatva/prāmāṇya*), the exemplification a 'means of knowledge' (*pramāṇa*). See NA 21.1.

also is a <valid> means of knowledge. For that does not fail to cause knowledge. Nor is it appropriate to say that, since that which accompanies an object is a means of knowledge, the impression <which produces recollection> is not a valid means of knowledge because it does not accompany the object; because the undesirable consequence is that a flooded river and the movement of ants' eggs, which are inferential marks <respectively> of past and future rain, and verbal testimony, which has the past and future as its domain, are not valid means of knowledge as they lack accompaniment with their object. If the impression also has a relationship in some sense to the object <recollected>, whether as that which makes it known or as its effect, this <objection> holds alike; therefore, even this <impression>, which is the cause of apprehension in the form of recollection, proves to be a valid means of knowledge. <S> This
35.10 cannot be so, because this <the fact that the impression that causes recollection is a means of knowledge> is ruled out by the word 'means of knowledge'. For a means of knowledge is that which produces valid knowledge, and yet recollection is not valid knowledge. For the ascertainment of the relation between word and meaning depends upon ordinary usage; and ordinary people say that valid knowledge, which is knowledge that does not vary from its object, is different

from recollection, which arises from impressions only. Therefore, that which causes this is a means of knowledge; hence, there is no undesirable consequence <that means of knowledge applies> with regard to that which causes recollection. And, since the view that <a means of knowledge consists in> making known a previously unknown object destroys the validity as a means of knowledge for those cognitions which are continuous, since they have as their domain objects that are already known and their validity as a means of knowledge is accepted by ordinary people, we do not give it serious consideration. Nor is it appropriate to hold that <cognitions> that are continuous have as their domain <objects> which are not already known because of the difference in time, because the minutest fractions of
35.15 time are not observable by those, like us, whose eyes are made of flesh. <P> Nor should it be urged as an objection that, because the object is revealed by the first cognition only and the subsequent <cognitions> are gotten because a man has begun to act <based on the first cognition>, the <subsequent> cognitions are not valid means of knowledge at all. <S> For the acquisition of an object of cognition is nothing other than activity, and activity, in turn, is nothing other than revealing the object. Therefore, cognition, whose function is simply to reveal the object, produces activity and

produces acquisition <of the object>. And as the prior revealing <of the object> is not different from that of subsequent cognitions, how is the earlier cognition alone the means of knowledge, and not the subsequent <cognitions> also? But if the validity of the means of knowledge depends

35.20 upon man, the undesirable consequence is that such cognitions as of the moon, stars, etc., which are not desired by man, do not have validity as means of knowledge. Nor is this <cognition>, in turn, desired by man, insofar as its object is to be eliminated, as it is very remote, because this <cognition> has as its content objects that are indifferent. And it will be shown that even that which is indifferent, because it is not something to be acquired, is not something to be eliminated. And if one says that a means of knowledge causes knowledge, he rejects the claims that a means of knowledge consists in making known an object that is not already known, that it consists in its correspondence with the object, and that it is the capacity for revealing what is the self and the not-self. That is to say: because the word 'valid knowledge' is used to indicate knowledge alone, which does not vary from its object and <which> is different from recollection. <The other two claims are rejected:>

35.25 Because by explicitly using the word 'cause', he rejects both correspondence and capacity, which are not different

from their result, since the relation of cause and effect is impossible in the case of identity. And "the fact that it is that 9.4
which causes knowledge is what constitutes its 'being a means of knowledge'." The state <of being a means of knowledge> is explained by explaining its exemplification. Therefore, then, it has been established that that which causes knowledge, whether knowledge or false knowledge, is a means of knowledge; the state of 'this' is its 'thisness'.[36]

36.1 <P> He objects to this same <characterization> as
being overly inclusive, "because <being the cause of knowl- 9.5-6
edge> is common..." <S> He answers, "This is the differ- 9.6-8
ence..." This is the meaning: every agent operates in the domain of instruments, but does not operate directly on his end. And instruments are of two kinds, those that are actual, and those that are potential. Between these: an actual <instrument> is an axe etc. for cutting wood; it is said that when a man repeatedly lifts and makes <the axe> fall on the tree, he cuts down the tree.[37] But it is not the case that the splitting of the tree is directly the domain of the operation of
36.5 the agent, but rather of <the operation of> the contact of the
axe <with the tree>, which, since it is in contact <with the

[36] *tasya bhāvas tattvam* (NVT 35.27: a quotation of NV 11.24).
[37] This passage is strikingly similar to *Vārttika* 11 to A.1.4.23 (*kārake*): *udyamanipātanāni kartuśchidikriyā* (*Mahābhāṣya* I.325.4).

agent> and is endowed with impetus <by him>, it is made into an instrument. Whereas the operation of the agent, namely the lifting and making fall <of the axe>, has the axe alone as its domain. Similarly, even an agent who desires <to attain> heaven does not operate directly on heaven, but rather effects a sacrifice, which is potential, which is the instrument <for attaining> that. But <the attainment of> heaven is directly produced by what is called '*apūrva*' – which resides in sentient beings, and whose specific maturation does not flag due to differences in place, time, or circumstance – only from the operation of sacrifice. This is the same in the present context as well: if an agent of knowledge brings into play or brings into being <respectively> an actual <instrument>, a sense-organ etc., and a potential <instrument>, the contact of this <with the object> etc., he is successful only with regard to the instrument. But the
36.10 instrument, whether it is the sense organ etc. or its contact, is not successful with regard to anything else; therefore, it operates on knowledge alone, which is its end. But an object of knowledge is indeed not a cause of knowledge except in the case of direct perception, but rather is employed only as being the content of a means of knowledge. But even where – in direct perception – it is admitted to be a cause <of knowledge>, even there the object of knowledge is

employed in respect of its relation to the sense-organ alone. But it is the sense organ alone, or that and its contact with it etc., that is directly the cause of valid knowledge. Hence this has been established: the agent of knowledge is not directly the cause of valid knowledge, because he is the agent. Not every agent is directly the cause of his end, as for
36.15 example a wood-cutter, the sponsor of a sacrifice, etc. And he <the agent of knowledge> is such; hence, like this <he is not directly the cause of knowledge>.[38] Similarly, an object of knowledge that is directly perceptible is not directly the cause of valid knowledge, because it is an object of knowledge. Not every object of knowledge is <directly> the cause of valid knowledge, as for example <objects of knowledge> that have to be inferred. And this <object of knowledge> is such; hence, like this <it is not directly the cause of knowl-
edge>. This same point <was made in the *Vārttika*>: both cf. 9.6-8
the agent of knowledge and the object of knowledge are successful when the means of knowledge <is present>, while the means of knowledge is not successful <when they

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[38] This, and the following argument, are full-fledged Nyāya syllogisms (NVT 36.14-17). To treat of the first only:
*pratijñā* (thesis): The agent of knowledge is not directly the cause of valid knowledge.
*hetu* (reason): Because he is an agent.
*udāharaṇa* (exemplification): Not every agent is directly the cause of an effect. As for example, a woodcutter and the sponsor of a sacrifice.
*upanaya* (application): And this agent of knowledge is such.
*nigamana* (conclusion): Therefore he is such <i.e. not directly the cause of valid knowledge>.

are present>; therefore, this alone is the cause of the end. But since both the agent of knowledge and the object of knowledge function in reference to the end, they in a certain sense are its causes.

<P> He objects, "no instrumental cause." The mean- 9.8
ing is: an agent without an instrument cannot obtain a
36.20 means of knowledge too. <S> He replies, "<This is> Not 9.8-9
correct, ...the object and the sense-organ..." The meaning
is: when cognition is the means of knowledge, then <sense-
organ– object contact is the instrumental cause> "for the 9.10-11
origination of the means of knowledge" – cognition. <P>
He again objects, "Therefore, if..." <S> He replies, "For 9.12; 9.13-14
this also..." <P> He objects, "If a means of knowledge...by 9.15-16
an agent of knowledge and an object of knowledge that
already exist..." The meaning is: because there is no valid
knowledge without a means of knowledge, neither the agent
of knowledge nor the object of knowledge is established.
<P> He asks, "How <is it possible>?" <S> He answers, 9.16
"'The means of knowledge'..." <P> Then why is the intrin- 9.16-18
sic nature alone <of a thing> not a *kāraka*? And yet this also
exists prior to its being connected with an action. <S>
Hence he says, "Neither a substance in isolation." <P> 9.18
36.25 Therefore, let this type of subordinate operation be a *kāraka*
in respect of the principal action that has to be effected,

because this too is the instrumental cause with regard to the
principal action. <S> Hence he says, "nor an action in isola- 9.18
tion..." <That is to say:> For Devadatta is not a wood-cutter
37.1 by his intrinsic nature, nor again does this kind of operation
of lifting, making fall etc., reside in a clod of earth etc. <P>
Then in respect of what does a *kāraka*-expression operate?
<S> Hence he says, "For a *kāraka*-expression..." A *kāraka*- 9.18-19
expression operates in respect of a cause, "which produces
a" – principal – "action together with a specific" – subordi-
nate – "action." For, while splitting is the end or principal
operation, the lifting and making fall etc. is an intermediate
operation on the part of the agent that has the instrument as
its domain. And the contact itself with the axe, which is very
sharp, which has impetus imparted <to it by the agent>, and
which is in contact <with the agent>, is the intermediate
operation on the part of the object, the tree. For it is through
37.5 this <intermediate operation> that the tree, because of the
sundering of its parts, which is produced by the movement
of its own parts, becomes split. Therefore, having estab-
lished <this principle> in a general way, that a *kāraka* is
joined with both a principal and a subordinate action, he
applies it to the subject under discussion, "And the expres- 9.19-20
sions 'agent of knowledge' and 'object of knowledge'..."
The meaning of "without an action..." is: 'a principal 9.20

action'. <P> He rejects <this>, "<This is> Not correct...as 9.20
does such an expression as 'a cook' etc." <S> Surely, this relation between word and meaning is ascertained in dependence on ordinary usage. And ordinary people employ
*kāraka*-expressions with the intention of expressing nothing cf. 9.24
but their connection with an action, be that past, future, or present; <in the following sentences:> 'Bring the cook, he
37.10 will cook', 'This cook cooked', and 'This cook is cooking', one sees alike the employment <of the *kāraka*-expression> in connection with the three times. <P> Therefore, for what reason does Devadatta etc., even when he is not cooking, have an intrinsic capacity in connection with cooking? <S> For *kārakas* have two capacities with regard to producing their effect: their intrinsic nature and the convergence of a multitude of accessory factors. As between these: because *kāraka*-expressions function even when the convergence of a multitude of accessory factors is not present, and because even if their intrinsic nature, which pervades the three times, is present they cannot function if there is no possibility of their effect being connected with the three times, the intrinsic nature – a limitation on which is only imposed by its effect's being connected with the three times – is the
37.15 instrumental cause of the operation of *kāraka*-expressions. That is to say: even when there is no connection with the

present causes of valid knowledge, the expressions 'agent of knowledge' and 'object of knowledge' operate; hence, "it is 9.24
appropriate to hold that a means of knowledge is produced by an agent of knowledge and an object of knowledge..." It
is established that "it" – the means of knowledge – "pro- 9.24
duces cognition" directly and not the agent of knowledge nor the object of knowledge.

And even if the agent of knowledge and the object of knowledge produce cognition, there is no undesirable consequence here that they are the 'cause of knowledge', because as between what is the most important causal factor and what is not, because of the conviction that the effect <arises> with respect to what is the most important causal factor, this <the most important causal factor> arises as hav-
37.20 ing pre-eminence; hence he says, "Alternatively... because 9.24
...the most important causal factor." <P> He asks what is
meant by 'the most important causal factor', "What is 10.1
meant by...?" <S> The answer is: what is meant by the
'most important causal factor' is "The correspondence" – 10.2
the correspondence of presence and absence of valid knowledge, which is its effect – "of presence and absence" – of the means of knowledge.[39] Because he does not intend to

[39] Vācaspati here glosses *tad* (in *tadvattā* NVT 37.21) by *bhāvābhāva*: cf.NB1.12.

differentiate the defining characteristic from the thing to be defined, they have the same status; but it is not the case that there is correspondence, in turn, of the positive and negative concomitance of the agent of knowledge and the object of knowledge with the positive and negative concomitance of valid knowledge; hence he says, "If the agent of knowl- 10.2
edge...there is no..." The relation of the origin of valid knowledge with the agent of knowledge and the object of knowledge <arises> by virtue of <their> excluding connection with another; but the relation between the means of knowledge and the origin of valid knowledge <arises> by
37.25 virtue of excluding both non-connection and connection with another;[40] hence, the means of knowledge has pre-eminence. For the agent of knowledge and the object of knowledge, whose operations are absorbed by the means of knowledge, do not operate on valid knowledge. Therefore, because there is the possibility of an impediment, valid knowledge does not necessarily arise when the agent of

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[40] *pramotpādāyogānyayogavyavacchedakābhyām* NVT (37.24-25). *anyayogavyavaccheda(ka)*: 'exclusion of connection with another'. That is: it is through connection with this, and not another, that *pramā* can originate. *ayogavyvavaccheda(ka)*: 'exclusion of non-connection'. That is: without connection to this, *pramā* cannot originate. Since *pramāṇa* has both attributes, it is pre-eminent among the *pramākāraṇas*. The distinction often drawn between 'necessary' and 'sufficient' conditions applies here exactly. The agent of knowledge and the object of knowledge are necessary conditions, while the means of knowledge is both the necessary and sufficient condition for the origination of valid knowledge.

knowledge and the object of knowledge are operative. But
38.1 valid knowledge arises only when the means of knowledge operates; hence he states another alternative <explanation>, "Alternatively, <we can describe> this pre-eminence as that 10.4
by the possession of which a person knows." By the expression, "knows," he shows that the agent is independent, in 10.4
order that <this agent> be differentiated from the instrument, which has to be explained. And the expression, "by 10.4
the possession of which" conveys limitation, 'only'.[41] Hence, "by the possession of which" excludes another agent. For an agent does not possess an agent, but rather possesses a means of knowledge. For the basis, which is independent, is relied upon by what is dependent. For it was
38.5 stated that an instrument depends upon an agent. In some cf. 36.8 ff.
cases, the agent of knowledge might possess the object of knowledge also, because the object of knowledge depends upon him. But he does not without exception possess the object of knowledge, because in the case of inference etc., he does not possess this, because the object of knowledge has passed etc. The result of <this> ascertainment is: but sometimes he possesses knowledge of the inferential mark etc. This is precisely what differentiates the means of

[41] Reading *sāvadhāraṇam*, (with TNT 19.4) for *sāvadhāraṇām* (NVT 38.3). *yadvān* = *yadvāneva*: 'By the possession of which only'.

knowledge from the agent of knowledge and the object of
knowledge. And he shows, by positive and negative con-
comitance, that this difference itself is its pre-eminence,
"when a means of knowledge is present..." 10.5

He states another alternative <explanation>, "Alter- 10.5-6
natively, that they both..." The difference is this: the same
such thing that was shown by the previous <alternative> to
have a pre-eminence that is mainly positive, is here <shown
to have> a pre-eminence that is mainly negative. By "lack 10.5
of efficacy" is meant 'failure to be a cause'.

He states another alternative <explanation>, "Alter- 10.6-8
natively, the fact that it comes into being last, as is the case
with contact..." For an instrument is that which operates in
accordance with an implementation, but the intrinsic nature
of the visual organ etc. does not. But it was previously cf. 37.14
stated that the intrinsic nature would be nothing other than
the fact that is the cause of the operation of such expressions
as 'the instrument' etc. And this <instrument>, whether it is
actual or potential, proves to be such only after the opera-
tion of the agent of knowledge and the object of knowledge;
hence it is said to be 'coming into being last'. This same
'coming into being last' is its pre-eminence; as, for exam-
ple, when a cloth is to be produced, the different contacts of
the threads are last – immediately after which the cloth actu-

ally comes into being.

He states another alternative <explanation>, "Alter- 10.8-9
natively, the immediacy of apprehension..." Simply
because the means of knowledge comes into being last,
hence because "apprehension" – valid knowledge – comes
into being 'immediately after this'; the pre-eminence of the
means of knowledge consists in just this immediacy of
apprehension. In the expression "this indeed," the <parti- 10.8-9
cle> '*ca*' has the sense of 'limitation'. This <alternative
explanation> was also stated without any desire to state a
difference between the thing to be characterized and its
characteristic property.

He states another alternative <explanation>, "Alternatively, its being the specific cause." Now, the four types of valid knowledge, perceptual etc. <inferential, verbal, and comparative>, are known to involve different concepts and to have different names. Neither is the agent of knowledge the cause of these differences, because he is common <to all four of them>; nor again is the object of knowledge <the cause of these differences>, because a single object of knowledge is the same for all cognitions if there is merging <of the means of knowledge>. But the means of knowledge are specific to all four types of valid knowledge respectively; hence they are the cause of the different concepts and names. This same specificity is their pre-eminence. In this context, all men are meant by the term 'agent of knowledge'. 10.9-11

He states another alternative <explanation>, "which causes valid knowledge..." Now the contact between the soul and the internal organ is the non-inherent cause of valid knowledge;[42] and this is common to all valid knowledge. Nor can this <contact> be differentiated in terms either of the agent of knowledge or the object of knowledge, because they too, like this <contact> itself, are common. But the 10.12-13

[42] *asamavāyikāraṇam* 'non-inherent cause'. Only a substance (*dravya*) can be inhered in: since contact is a *guṇa*, it may well be a cause, but a non-inherent cause.

means of knowledge, which is specific, respectively delimits the contacts between the soul and the internal organ. Thus, one must understand that the internal organ alone is the specific differentiator of such objects of knowledge as pleasure etc. also. This same <property> is its <the means of knowledge's> pre-eminence. He says, "it should be termed 10.13
'pre-eminence'" – without a desire to express any difference between the pre-eminence and that which has this pre-eminence.

39.1 He explains the explicit mention of "object," which occurs next <in the first sentence of the *Bhāṣya*>, in terms
of its purport, "The explicit mention of 'object...'" <P> But 10.14; 1.1
why is an apprehension that has a means of knowledge as its
content rejected? <S> Hence he says, "because <an appre- 10.14-15
hension> that has a means of knowledge as its content..."
"Implementation" – performance: 'to this' <it does not 10.15
prompt>. Since it is 'that which is sought', it is an 'object' – cf. 11.1-2
water, thorns, etc. It's 'suchness' is 'being sought-ness'. cf. 10.15
And this is being the cause of pleasure and pain. For that which causes pleasure is sought as something to be acquired, while that which causes pain is sought as some-
39.5 thing to be eliminated. He states another purport, "indiffer- 10.16
ent." As there is no successfulness of activity upon a means of knowledge that has what is indifferent as its content, this

is denied. Nor is this <means of knowledge> an invalid means of knowledge, because of the inference that this too is a valid means of knowledge through the logical mark of 'similarity to known means of knowledge'. <P> He objects:
"The <first> mention of 'means of knowledge' is inappro- 10.18-19; cf. 1.1
priate..." The meaning is: for since an apprehension which produces successful activity does not arise from a invalid means of knowledge, from the situation itself one understands 'from a means of knowledge'. <S> He replies,
"<This is> Not correct, because it serves to make known 10.19-20
that it is that specific means of knowledge <that is valid>..." This is the idea: for the fact that a means of knowledge is valid has to be inferred through its effect, suc-
39.10 cessfulness of activity. And this <successfulness of activity> is not directly the effect of a means of knowledge, but rather of the apprehension of an object. For immediately after this <apprehension of an object>, valid apprehension arises. But the apprehension of an object is the effect of a means of knowledge; hence, successful activity, being the effect of a means of knowledge, leads one to infer that the means of
knowledge is valid. Therefore, the means of knowledge, cf. 10.20
even if it is to be understood from the situation, has to be explained as the instrumental cause of the apprehension of the object. Otherwise, if the means of knowledge is valid

because the apprehension of an object produces successful
activity, what is connected with what? The distinctive fea-
ture of a valid means of knowledge is its difference from a
pseudo-means of knowledge; <it serves to> 'make known
this <differentiating feature>'. This same purpose for the cf. 10.19
39.15 explicit mention of 'means of knowledge' is so termed: the
state of 'this' is its 'thisness'. Therefore, this is what is
meant: successfulness of activity <arises from> the appre-
hension of an object, which is the effect of a means of
knowledge, and not the effect of a pseudo-means of knowl-
edge. One understands that the means of knowledge is valid
from this. This same point is stated, "Thus, the apprehen- 10.22-23
sion <that arises> thus through a <valid> means of knowl-
edge, makes the valid means of knowledge attain
successfulness of activity..." This is the meaning: the
means of knowledge is the <secondary> agent that attains –
reaches – successfulness of activity; the apprehension of the
object, which is the effect of the means of knowledge,
makes this <valid means of knowledge> attain – reach –
<successfulness of activity>. This also is the purpose in
explicitly mentioning 'means of knowledge'; hence he says,
39.20 "Nor is...the explicit mention of 'the means of knowledge." 10.23-24
<E> He sets forth the explanation of an *ekadeśin*, "plea- 10.24-11.2
sure..." Because <objects> are sought and known not only

because they are the cause of pleasure and pain. <S> He
refutes <this>, "<This is> Not correct..." The contradiction 11.2-4
arises from the undesirable consequence that, because one
puts every <object> in the camp of 'what is to be elimi-
nated' because it is plain, pleasure, or their causes, the
means of knowledge, the *śāstra*, and liberation which
<actually> are things to be acquired, are not <things to be
acquired>. "And because it is not what was intended to be 11.2
expressed." The impossibility of elimination, which is con-
joined by the word 'and', reveals another cause, "Nor is the 11.3
elimination of the means of knowledge etc..." For pain,
pleasure, or their causes, being things to be eliminated,
require a means of eliminating. And there can be no means
39.25 to this other than the means of knowledge etc. And the
means of knowledge etc. cannot destroy themselves; nor is
liberation not attained through them. Therefore, it is not
possible to eliminate the means of knowledge etc. through
the means of knowledge etc. Nor was this what was
intended to be expressed either by Akṣapāda, who com-
posed the *śāstra* which is the cause of the highest good, or
by Pakṣilasvāmin, who follows him. Hence he says, "Nor is 11.3; cf. 11.4
40.1 the elimination of the means of knowledge etc. intended to
be expressed." Therefore, our explanation alone is good;
hence he says, "But rather..." The 'necessary requirement' 11.4-6

is the suitability for producing successfulness of activity.
Therefore, the meaning is: for it is only the apprehension of
an object as pleasure, pain, or their causes which produces
successful activity, but not the apprehension of an object
without further qualification. Not only are all things not
included by the word 'object' because of contradiction, the
impossibility of elimination, and its not being the intended
meaning, but also there is no inclusion of all things because
of its impossibility. Hence he says, "not consciousness..." 11.5
40.5 There is no "inclusion" – comprehension – of consciousness
as being pain, pleasure, or their causes – even though it lies
amidst all things. <P> Why? <S> "Because it does not meet 11.5
the necessary requirement" – because it lacks suitability as
pain, pleasure, or their causes. Nor is it comprehended as
being a thing that is sought for; hence he says "and because 11.6
it is not an end." Now, not every instance of consciousness,
which has consciousness as its content and which arises
from the internal organ, can be known, because thousands
of human life-spans result in a mere succession of
<instances of> consciousness that have only a single blue
<object> as their content, and because of the undesirable
consequence that there is no movement towards another
object. Therefore, out of fear of an infinite regress, one must
in the end admit that some <instance of> consciousness or

other is simply the result, insofar as it cannot be known.
And hence it <consciousness> is not sought for. The mean-
ing is: because <it> is not pleasure, pain, or their causes,
there is no inclusion of all things, because consciousness is
not included.

Therefore, having thus explained the first sentence
<in the *Bhāṣya*>, and having introduced the next sentence in
the *Bhāṣya*, he sets forth the explanation of an *ekadeśin* on it
in order to refute it, <E> "This same 'object' of the means 11.7-8; cf. 1.6-7
of knowledge..." <S> He refutes <this>, "<This is> Not 11.8
correct, because both are counted," through the passage in
the *Bhāṣya* that begins, "Now 'object' is pleasure..." 'Both 1.5-7
of them' because of cause and effect. <P> And as the logical
reason <for this inference>, "Because the differences 11.10; 1.7
among living things cannot be counted," does not concur
with the subject of the thesis – as, for example, <the infer-
ence> 'The palace is white because the crow is black':
hence he says, "And the differences among living things..." 11.10-11; 1.7
<S> Since this same objection to the opinion of the *ekadeśin*
does not apply to this explanation, he says, "<This is> Not 11.11
correct ... the term 'object'..." The meaning is: neither of
these can be 'counted' – restricted – in this way: a means of
knowledge that has sandalpaste etc. as its content has plea-
sure only as its end, while a means of knowledge that has a

thorn etc. as its content has as its end the origination of pain only.

<P> An objection is raised in this matter, it is alleged, as follows: is the fact that real objects are pleasure, pain, or their causes intrinsic to their nature or not? If if it is intrinsic to their nature, then since an object, like 'blue', is pleasurable to all living beings, a thorn <flower> would be as pleasurable for men as it is for camels. Likewise, saffron
40.20 would be pleasurable even in the summer. And sandalpaste would be pleasurable even in the winter. Thus, water would prove as pleasurable for a man who is sated of water as it would be for a thirsty man. But if it is not intrinsic to their nature, then pain, pleasure, etc., which result from the imagination and attributes of the person, which are <both> produced by an endless variety of impressions, cannot be the end of the means of knowledge. <S> With regard to this
<dilemma>, this <sentence> "This same object of the 11.7, 1.6-7
means of knowledge..." is helpful. For, as will be related in
the section on Buddhism, because real objects, whether they NS 3.2.10-17
have permanence or lack sequence, have a collocation of causes and accessory factors, which do have sequence, there are entities, with the attributes of coming into being and
40.25 passing away, that have sequence; this applies here also. The point is: even if entities are not by their nature the cause

of pleasure and pain, nevertheless, because of the collocation of the accessory factors of different genera, places, times, situations, and individuals, they will be justified as being the cause of pleasure and pain in no fixed way.

41.1 Thus, this has been established: that the object of the
means of knowledge is not determinate, because it is caused by indeterminately different sentient beings. Every effect that has an indeterminate <number of> causes, is, without exception, indeterminate; as, for example, rain, which is caused by the appearance of clouds at indeterminate times. And this <object of the means of knowledge> is such. Therefore, it is indeterminate.

<P> But why, among the group of four of agent of
knowledge etc., should the means of knowledge alone be
called 'valid', and not the agent of knowledge etc. also?
<S> In order to refute this objection, he explains the *Bhāṣya*
simply by restating it, "And when a means of knowledge is 11.13-14; 1.8
41.5 valid – successful" – that is to say has its object correctly or
does not vary from the object – "they" – the agent of knowledge etc. – "are valid – successful" – have their objects correctly. But this alone is the 'correctness' of the object: that whatever sort of thing the means of knowledge reveals it to be it actually is, and not otherwise. But if the expression
'object' in the first sentence of the *Bhāṣya* indicates 'end', 1.1

then the explanation is as follows: "And <if the means of knowledge is> valid" – and if it gains its end, since a means of knowledge has an ability – capacity – with regard to an end, in the manner previously stated, 'apprehension <of an object>...'; hence "the means of knowledge" if it is successful <then> "the agent of knowledge etc. are successful" – gain their end; because they too, like the means of knowledge, have an ability – capacity – with regard to an end. The logical reason <Pakṣilasvāmin gives> for this is: "if any one is absent..." <Uddyotakara> Explains the meaning of this, "the meaning of 'any one'...." <P> The expression 'any one' expresses some unspecified one among many, but not 'the most important causal factor'. <S> Hence he says, "Due to the context,..." For an ordinary expression takes on a specific meaning due to the context. As for example, in the context of bearing a palanquin, when one says, 'Bring the man', the word 'man' means 'servant'. In the same way here also, the context restricts the expression 'valid' to the means of knowledge by eliminating the agent of knowledge etc.; hence a distinction between means of knowledge and agent of knowledge etc. has to be stated; therefore the word 'any one' indicates just this meaning. Even if the invariance of the means of knowledge with regard to an object that is immediately perceptible is understood by means of the

cf. 11.11 (1.8)
1.8
41.10
1.9
11.14
11.14
41.15

invariance of the object from the apprehension of the object, nevertheless, with regard to an object that is not immediately perceptible, the invariance of verbal testimony as a means of knowledge cannot be known through the invariance of the cognition that this produces, because the invariance of knowledge <with the object known> cannot be known without grasping the invariance of the means of knowledge <with the object>. Therefore, the grasping of the invariance of the three <*Vedas*> indeed follows from grasping the invariance as means of knowledge of sentences <that enjoin such sacrifices as the> *Agnihotra* etc. due to their having a trustworthy authority – out of their similarity to *mantras* and the *Āyurveda*, which have immediately
41.20 experienced ends and whose invariance from its object is ascertained from successfulness of activity. Nor, in turn, can the invariance of the three <*Vedas*> in respect to this be demarcated from another source. And, in this context, there is a purpose served in the group of four <means of knowledge etc.>, which have ends that are not immediately experienced as their content, being valid – because it is established that one uses <them> with respect to immediately experienced ends even when in doubt. Thus, then, among the group of four, the means of knowledge has preeminence.

In the <sentence in the> *Bhāṣya* that is meant to dif- 1.10
ferentiate the group of four, the agent of knowledge is set
forth first. Hence he states its characteristic mark, "The 11.17
agent of knowledge is independent." <P> He asks about
independence, "But what is independence?" – by the right- 11.17
connection to what he is independent? Pakṣilasvāmin
41.25 alluded to the agent of knowledge, but did not characterize
it. Surely, independence in regard either to both the desire to
acquire and to eliminate or activity does not constitute being
an 'agent of knowledge', but rather in regard to valid
knowledge. But independence, which exists prior, with
regard to valid knowledge, which exists subsequent to that,
42.1 is alluded to by independence in regard to the desire to
obtain etc. Therefore, following his <Pakṣilasvāmin's>
practice, Uddyotakara states another partial characteriza-
tion, <that independence consists in the fact> that being the
agent of knowledge is posterior in time, "The fact that he 11.17-18
enjoys the result(s) of the *kārakas*..." For it is not the case
that every agent enjoys that which is produced by all the
*kārakas* – whether <the attainment of> heaven etc. or of
food etc. – because we see that there is variance in the case
of priests, cooks, etc. But rather, the fact that a real *kāraka* is
the enjoyer of the results <of *kārakas*> subsequent to the
time of its being the agent suggests <that> this <is the inde-

pendence of the agent> insofar as it is inseparable from

42.5 being an agent, because the sponsor of a sacrifice and a king are the agents <respectively> of those respective actions by means of issuing a command etc. As the noble <Patañjali> says

> A command or a request, preceded by that intention: it is fitting that all of this is meant by 'cooking'.[43]

He states a characterization of independence, "Alter- 11.18
natively, the inherence of these <*kārakas* in him>." By the

42.10 pronoun 'these', which means '*kārakas*', he indicates the <principal> action through which they are collocated. For that <*kāraka*>, whose operation either the verb root or the verb-affix designates as principal, is the independent agent. To be more explicit, in this <sentence>, 'Are softened <by cooking>', rice etc. are the agents; but in this <sentence>, 'They cook', Devadatta etc. are. <P> For what reason is this true? <S> Because in the one case it is understood that the operation belongs to the rice etc., while in the other to Devadatta etc. And the principal action is what is to be effected by all the *kārakas* since it is principal, because all the *kārakas* function with reference to the principal action, even though there are different subordinate operations. The

[43] *Mahābhāṣya* to A.3.1.26. J (NVT 42.6) presents the same reading as the *Mahābhāṣya* (II.32.25-26): Thakur adopts *tatsarvam* for *yatsarvam*. Vācaspati omits *syāt*.

expression "person" is in reference to the action under con- 11.19
sideration, because valid knowledge resides in a person. He
42.15 states another characterization, "The fact that he prompts 11.19
<them> or that he is not prompted by the rest." 'He' – the cf. 11.20
sentient being – prompts all the *kārakas*, or 'and is not
prompted by these' *kārakas*. The point is: but an insentient
being is an agent in a derivative way, not intrinsically. He
explains the meaning of 'complete realization' <by saying>,
"the complete realization of the true-nature." For the 'true- 11.20-21; 1.11-12
nature' means 'being pervaded by the means of knowledge'
<or rather> 'being the content of the operation of the means
of knowledge'; and this results in either elimination, acqui-
sition, or indifference. By 'complete realization' is meant
'resultancy'. Whereas he ought to have said, 'usability', he
explicitly uses 'suitability' in order that, if an immediately
perceptible real object that one desires to acquire is not
acquired by the person because of some impediment, there
42.20 not be 'incomplete realization of the true-nature'. That is to
say: for even if this <real object> is not acquired by the per-
son, nevertheless, because it reveals 'suitability' for acquisi-
tion, there is 'complete realization of the true-nature'. In the
expression, "And the elimination of that," by the word 'that' 11.23
he indicates the 'use' in the form of acquisition or elimina-
tion.

<P> Since he desires to explain the <passage in the>
*Bhāṣya* that begins, "But what is 'true-nature'...?", he asks 1.13
about the meaning of 'this', which is the base of the affix in
'true-nature',[44] "But what...?" <S> The answer is, "'This' 11.24; 11.24-25
is what exists and what does not exist" <P> He explains the
question, "The state of 'this' is called 'thisness'. There- 11.25
42.25 fore..." <S> He explains the answer: "'This' is what exists 11.25
and what does not exist...." <P> But why are either primor-
dial matter and the person, or the five heaps, or the ultimate,
non-dual *Brahman*, or the seven – life, non-life etc., the
streams etc., or the four elements, earth, water, fire, and
43.1 wind, and so forth not expressed by 'this'? <S> Hence he
says, "because they meet the requirement of being the con- 11.25-12.1
tent of the means of knowledge." In the statements of the
*sūtras*, *Bhāṣya* and their commentaries, the means of
knowledge and the content of the means of knowledge are
set forth as the necessary requirement. But matters that cor-
respond to the different established doctrines of the *Sāṅkh-
yas* etc. are not the content of the means of knowledge. And
this will be taught <in our commentary> on this same 67.8-12
<*sūtra*>.[45] He concludes, "Therefore..." 12.1

43.5 Having explained the meaning of the base, he

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[44] *sadasatī tat* | *tasya bhāvastattvamiti* (NV 11.24). *tat* 'this' is the base, *tvam* '-ness' is the affix. See NB 1.13 and NV 11.23-12.2.

explains the meaning of the affix, "The state of 'this'..." As 12.1-2
between what exists and what does not exist respectively,
the 'state of what exists' is its being the content of a positive cf. 12.2
means of knowledge, and the 'state of what does not exist'
is the denial of this. By 'this' he indicates that a thing is the
content of a positive means of knowledge. And by the
'denial of this' a negative means of knowledge is estab-
lished. Therefore, what is meant by this is: the denial of
'this' is simply being the content of a negative means of
knowledge. He explains this, "Indeed... of the two..." <P> 12.2-3
He objects, "Because...the content of the means of knowl- 12.4
edge..." The meaning is: but what does not exist, because it
is totally devoid of efficacy, is different from what exists.
43.10 Yet if what does not exist also is the content of a means of
knowledge, then it does not lack efficacy. And hence what
exists and what does not exist are the same. <S> He replies,
"<This is> Not correct, because of variance <of the logical 12.4
reason>." The point is: we do not say that what does not
exist is different due to a lack of efficacy and thereby merit
censure in this way. <P> He explains the objection, "We 12.4-6
might state... in this matter..." <S> He explains the refuta-

[45] *atraiva* (NVT 43.3) 'right here'. Thakur refers the reader to his commentary on NS.1.1.9, but no such discussion is to be found there. Vācaspati literally means 'right here': later in his commentary on the first *sūtra* (NV 67.8-12).

tion, "And this is not correct..." That is to say: cows etc. are 12.6-7
sentient beings, while pots etc. are insentient beings. <P> If both what exists and what does not exist are efficacious, then on what grounds do they differ? <S> Hence, he says,
"independent..." The cognition of what does not exist, 12.7-8
which differs from the cognition of what exists, is simply non-cognition. <P> Even when conjunction, disjunction,
43.15 etc. are present, the cause of the cognition is dependent, because their formulation depends upon what is being
brought into contact, disjoined, etc. <S> Hence he says, "is 12.8
realized" – is known – "through negation." The meaning is: even though some things that exist are dependent, <this> is not the dependence <involved in> what has to be denied, the denial, and the locus.[46]

Now a lamp is set forth as a familiar instance by cf. 1.16
Pakṣilasvāmin, who wishes to establish that a means of knowledge, which produces cognition of what exists, produces cognition of what does not exist. <P> But this <logical reason> is 'the same as the *sādhya*',[47] because this also enters into the totality of the means of knowledge; <S>

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[46] *niṣedhya-niṣedha-adhikaraṇa* (NVT 43.16-17). These are the three elements of a Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika negation: *niṣedhya* 'what is to be negated', *niṣedha* 'the negation', and *adhikaraṇa* 'the locus'. That is: one denies something in some place.

[47] *sādhyasama*. This is type of pseudo-reason (*hetvābhāsa*), in which the *sādhana*-property is the same as the *sādhya*-property: nothing is proved in such an inference. See NS 1.2.8 (657.5-664.15).

43.20 entertaining this objection, he corroborates the fact that this
is a familiar instance, in that it is well known by everyone
without exception, "as happens with a lamp." For even the 12.9 (1.16)
wives of cowherds, when they are doubt – 'Is there a thief
here? Our money is either in the storeroom or not' – take a
lamp, survey the storeroom thoroughly, and quite correctly
ascertain, 'Our money is here; there is no thief'. But they do
not use another means in order to ascertain the absence of
the thief. Therefore, a lamp is a familiar instance well
known from cowherd-wives up to those in the form of pan-
dits. This same point is stated, "For no other means is 12.10
resorted to" – by an ordinary person – "in order to appre-
hend what does not exist."

He states the logical reason for there being no
43.25 dependence, "For when an" – independent – "object, like a 12.10-11
pot etc. is seen" – by means of a lamp – "there is no other
visible thing similar in kind" – that is capable of being
known by the same cognition – "to it." For blue and yellow
are not mutually absent; hence if one denies blue one does
44.1 not necessarily affirm yellow. But what exists and what
does not exist are by their nature mutually absent; for,
indeed, the non-existence of what does not exist is nothing
other than the nature of what exists; nor is the non-existence
of what exists anything other than non-existence. Therefore,

by denying another visible thing that is similar in kind, the lamp establishes that there is, indeed, absence of another visible thing <of the same kind>. Thus, then, having stated the method by which an agent of cognition, whose means is a lamp, comes to have cognition, he states the method by
which experts prove it, "If there were..." <P> If anyone 12.11-12
44.5 were to object, 'Granted that what does not exist is seen by a lamp; it will also be what exists', the following hypothetical
reasoning of experts is helpful in this, <S> "If there 12.11-12
were..." Having thus adduced a familiar instance, to which both laymen and experts assent, he applies it to what is
being exemplified, "Likewise too, when a thing that exists 12.12
is known through a means of knowledge..." – the sense organs etc. This is to be explained as in the previous case.
He concludes, "Thus, then,..." And this whole <issue> will 12.14 (1.19-20)
be justified later.

<P> If what exists and what does not exist are the content of the means of knowledge, then why does Akṣapāda not state the different kinds of what does not exist as he does for the different kinds of what does exist? <S>
Hence he says, "Among these..." – among these different 12.15
kinds of what exists and what does not exist – "since the dif-
44.10 ferent kinds of what does not exist do not appear independently, they are not mentioned." The meaning is: because

the formulation of the different kinds of what does not exist depends upon a thing to be negated, a negation, and a locus, their manifestation depends upon the different kinds of what exists; hence, simply by relating the different kinds of what exists, the different kinds of what does not exist are understood; hence they are not stated <by Akṣapāda>. Alternatively: only those things are stated, the knowledge of the true-nature of which conduces to the highest good; but things that are not such, the plethora of them need not be stated, as the plethora of what exists but is not conducive <to the highest good need not be stated>. Hence he says,
"Alternatively, the plethora of what does not exist, like the 12.15-16
plethora of what exists,...because it is included in the group of four." That is to say: just as failing to be included in the group of four <of what is to be eliminated etc.> applies to the plethora of what exists but does not conduce to the highest good, likewise also with regard to the plethora of what
44.15 does not exist. <P> But on what grounds is it to be understood that they are not conducive to the highest good? <S>
Hence he says, "simply because what exists is taught, what 12.16
does not exist is taught." There are two kinds of means of knowledge – presence and absence;[48] as for example,

[48] *dvividhaṃ pramāṇam bhāvo 'bhāvaśca* (NVT 44.16). Literally, 'being and non-being'.

knowledge of the absence of the effect through the absence
of its cause – this is source of the second *sūtra*. And among
the objects of knowledge, liberation alone is consecrated.
Thus one has analogically to apply this argument through-
out with regard to <the categories of> purpose etc. He con-
cludes, "And hence..." 12.17

Thus, then, having explained the purport <of the
first *sūtra*>, he cites the *Bhāṣya* to explain the meaning of
its parts, "And indeed what exists will be concisely taught 12.18 (1.20-21)
as being of sixteen kinds." In this <sentence>, on the first
interpretation, the word '*ca*' expresses 'certainty', while the
word '*khalu*' indicates 'obviousness'. That is to say, what
exists alone – and not what does not exist – will be taught as
being of sixteen kinds, because the illumination of this
<what does not exist> depends upon what exists. But on the
second interpretation, which is the true one, '*ca*' indicates
'conjunction', while '*khalu*' indicates 'limitation'. The
meaning is: as what exists will be taught as being of sixteen
kinds only, what does not exist will also be taught. He
explains the meaning of the base form, "Order." After hav- 12.18
ing explained the purport, with an exhaustive account, of
the *sūtra*, Pakṣilasvāmin, who was eager to explain the
meaning of its parts, after introducing the *sūtra* with the
<section in the> *Bhāṣya*, "Of these kinds of what exists," 2.1

quoted this <*sūtra*>. Uddyotakara states the purport of this <*sūtra*>, "The *sūtra* means: these same <categories> are the 12.18-19
different kinds of what exists." <That is to say:> "These same" – <categories of> the means of knowledge etc. – "are the different kinds of what exists" – that are conducive to the highest good, <and> not sand from the Ganges etc. The
45.1 point is: therefore, among things that exist, only sixteen, the means of knowledge etc., are listed, characterized, and examined;[49] sand from the Ganges etc., though existent things, are not because they are not conducive to the highest good.

He states the intrinsic nature of a *dvandva*, "all the 12.20
words..." He brings to light his purpose in taking <this> as a *dvandva* through positive and negative concomitance, "That all these..." The meaning is: because it is impossible 12.20-22
<to analyze the compound> as either a *bahuvrīhi* or a *karmadhāraya*, if one were to take it as a sixth case affix <*tatpuruṣa*> compound, the undesirable consequence is that one
45.5 rejects the intended meaning, if the meaning of the final word, 'grounds for defeat', is pre-eminent. He states the purport of the <sentence in the> *Bhāṣya*, "The analysis <of 2.5 (12.22)
the compound *pramāṇa...sthānānām*> is <to be made> in

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[49] *uddiṣṭā lakṣitāḥ parīkṣitāśca* (NVT 45.1). See *Bhāṣya* to 1.1.3 (NB 181.20).

accordance with the proper <grammatical> number <of its
constituent elements> in a specific mention.", <by saying>
"is in accordance with the proper <grammatical> number." 12.22-23
The point is: for, as the means of knowledge each by itself,
independently of one another, causes valid knowledge, there
is a purpose served in their having the plural number. But as cf. NS.1.1.3
for the objects of knowledge; even if each individually is a
real object of knowledge, nevertheless being an object of
knowledge in terms of causing liberation is realized in refer-
ence to their totality, but not taken individually. For "what- 12.22-23
ever purpose" – because there is no cessation of *saṃsāra* if
one does not know the true-nature of any one among the cf. NS.1.1.9
soul etc. – "is <served in the use> of a different number, that
same purpose is served in" their listing <in this first *sūtra*>
45.10 as well, because both <statements> constitute a single state-
ment. <P> Having cited the <sentence in the> *Bhāṣya*,
which purports to explain the meaning of the case affix,
"The phrase 'true-nature' *of* the means of knowledge...," he 12.23; 2.5-6
asks, "But what...?" <S> The answer is, "*kārakas*." He 12.23
explains this, "When..." "The end of a *kāraka*" is the prin- 12.24-25; 12.24
cipal action, in reference to which all the *kārakas* func-
tion.[50] And by explicitly mentioning '*kāraka*', the principal

[50] *kārakārthaḥ pradhānakriyā, yaduddeśena sarvakārakapravṛttiḥ* (NVT 45.12; on NV 12.24)

action is ushered in also, insofar as it is inextricably linked to it; hence, it too is revealed in his explanation. The meaning is: even if the relation of action and *kāraka* is included in such relations as that between the possessor and the possession etc., because mere relation is the source of action

45.15 and because a *kāraka* is inextricably linked to it, nevertheless that is not intended to be expressed: but, rather, the mere relation itself is intended to be expressed. <P> To this

he objects, "the true-nature." (It should also be noticed that 12.25-13.4

the use of the sixth case affix also has no purpose, because one cannot justify it if there is no difference <between them>.) <E> Here an *ekadeśin*, who holds the doctrine of

'non-restriction', replies, "<this is> not correct...on either 13.4-10

score." Because the formulation of the state depends upon its exemplification, he objects to the formulation of the state

alone as being a formulation of the exemplification, "Even 13.8-9

if there is no difference..." As, for example, "the denial of 13.8

this state" – by the stationariness of the arrow; the state, of the arrow, is the property of motion; the denial of this is stationariness, because standing stationary means 'cessation of

45.20 motion'. So here also, "it is not asserted 'the means of 13.8-9

knowledge' – the object of knowledge – "'etc.' without further qualification" – by the explicit mention of the 'true-nature', "but, rather, that they are a <wholly> different

object" – whatever form is imposed on them – that is to say that they are otherwise – this "is denied." In the expression, 13.10
"possessing motion," the statement has principally to do with the state. As, for example, <in the *sūtra*>,

> The dual and the singular <respectively>
> indicate 'two-ness' and 'one-ness'.[51]

that is 'duality' and 'singularity'. But if there were an intention to express the things to be counted, <the *sūtra*> would be, 'twos and ones'. The meaning is: therefore, the posses-
45.25 sion of motion is not something different from the arrow; hence, the sentence 'stationariness of the arrow' is used in this sense. <S> One who propounds the doctrine of 'restriction to there being a different object'[52] criticizes this same doctrine of the *ekadeśin*, "This is not correct..."; 'because 13.10
there is a failure to establish that' both the true-nature is 'not a different object' from the means of knowledge etc., and
46.1 that the absence of motion is 'not a different object' from
the arrow. And, it will be shown in the section on Buddhism NS.3.2.10-17
how non-existence is different from existence. And he will immediately show that the 'true-nature' is different from the means of knowledge etc.

He explains the <passage in the> *Bhāṣya* that

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[51] A.1.4.22 *dvekayordvivacanaikavacane.*
[52] *arthāntaranigamavādī* (NVT 45.26): it is unclear whether this is a real *ekadeśin* of Nyāya.

begins, "knowledge of the true-nature...," <by saying> "the true-nature being what is known...." <P> He asks about both <expressions>, "But what...?" <S> His answer to the question about the true-nature is, "By 'true-nature'..." By 'being the instrumental cause' is meant a capacity of the means of knowledge etc. And this <capacity> has two kinds: that which is intrinsic to its nature and that of the totality of accessory causes, because the Naiyāyikas do not admit a capacity that is supra-sensory. What is meant is: and because capacity, as it is a state, has its formulation dependent on the formulation of its exemplification, there is also a formulation of its exemplification. 2.6; 13.11 13.12 13.12-14 46.5

In order that one understand the highest good that is intended <by Akṣapāda>, he states the two kinds of the highest good, "The highest good, in turn,..." Between these two, in order that not immediately experienced highest good be understood, he criticizes the immediately experienced <highest good> by generating the undesirable consequence of over-extension, "And on this supposition..." He states the highest good intended by Akṣapāda, "But the other..." This is what is meant: even if the word 'the highest good' expresses merely 'what is desired' and there can even be the immediately experienced highest good for the knowledge of the true-nature of the means of knowledge etc., because it 13.14 13.16 13.16-17 46.10

patently does arise from this; nevertheless, Akṣapāda admits
only the not immediately experienced highest good, because
he co-mentions the word 'object of knowledge', which indi- NS.1.1.9
cates the soul etc. And thus the knowledge of the true-nature
of the means of knowledge etc. is indeed also indirectly the
cause <of the not immediately experienced highest good>.
<P> He objects, "The immediately experienced..." The 13.17-18
meaning is: direct experience itself is the means of knowl-
edge with respect to the immediately experienced <highest
good>, but the not immediately experienced highest good
lacks a means of knowledge <for its apprehension>,
because there is no experience <of it>. <S> He replies, "No, 13.18
there is a <means of knowledge>, because that is how the
matter stands." The 'matter' is the soul etc. The point is: the cf. NS.1.1.9
means of knowledge for this matter is simply the inference
46.15 of the absence of the effect through the absence of the cause
– with verbal testimony and inference as accessory causes.
But those who might impudently think that it is merely the
knowledge of the true-nature of the categories that causes
<attainment of> the highest good, as, for example, those
who say,

> He who has experienced one entity in its true-nature, has experienced all entities in their true-natures.[53]

[53] Cf. *Syādvādamañjarī* p. 92 (Dhruva edition).

these people he answers, "But if..." The point is: for there is no other true-nature of entities apart from this form in which they are made the content of direct perception. 13.22-24

As for the form "those who desire liberation" (*mokṣamāna*), before <the desiderative affix> *san*,[54] 13.19

46.20 There is optionally guṇation of <the root> *muc* <'to release'> when it is used intransitively.[55]

Hence, <there is> guṇation and deletion of the reduplicative syllable.[56] Not only does <the attainment of liberation through the knowledge of the objects of knowledge> really exist, but this is what Akṣapāda also intends. Hence, he says, "Moreover, because they" – the objects of knowledge 13.24
– "are taught separately" – from the means of knowledge etc. And if there is attainment of the higher form of the highest good through knowledge of any object of knowledge whatsoever, then why does Akṣapāda ascertain, by means of the *sūtra*, "The soul...," that there are exactly twelve NS.1.1.9
objects of knowledge – no more no less? Therefore, this alone <the knowledge of the true-nature of the twelve

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[54] A.7.4.54.
[55] A.7.4.57.
[56] By A.7.4.54, which introduces *san*, the desiderative affix, and A.7.4.57-58, if the desiderative stem of the root √*muc* 'to release', when used intransitively, is optionally guṇated, it will undergo deletion of the reduplicative syllable:
A.7.4.54 *sani...*
A.7.4.57 *muco 'karmakasya guṇo vā*
A.7.4.58 *atra lopaścāsyasya*
√*muc* + *san* - {*mumukṣa*- // {*mumokṣa* - *mokṣa*-

objects of knowledge> is directly conducive to the highest
good – and not merely <the knowledge of the true-nature of
the sixteen> categories. Hence he says, "And Akṣapāda 13.26
would have been inept in composing a subsequent *sūtra*,
46.25 whose purpose is to ascertain the objects of knowledge."
<P> Why? <S> "Because the objects of knowledge had 13.26
been set forth by the first *sūtra*." Therefore, if there is justi-
fication <for this claim> and if Akṣapāda maintains on both
scores that the thorough knowledge of the true-nature of the
objects of knowledge is the cause of the higher form of the
highest good, then this explains the <sentence in the>
*Bhāṣya*, "Now...the soul etc." 2.9-10

47.1 <P> Does the knowledge of the true-nature that has
the soul etc. as its content possess some exceptional capac-
ity, which is wholly beyond experience, due to which the
highest good arises? <S> By no means. <P> How then? <S>
<It arises> Only through immediately experienced means.
Pakṣilasvāmin says, "And this same point..." By 'is 2.9-10
restated' is meant 'is stated after' – subsequent to – the
statement that it is the cause of the highest good. For it is cf. NS.1.1.2
restated by the second *sūtra* that, when the knowledge of the
true-nature arises, liberation directly results – through the
sequence of the cessation of false-knowledge that has this
<the soul> as its content etc. Having restated this same

47.5 <section in the> *Bhāṣya* that begins, "And this same 14.1 (2.9-12)
point..." and ends, "attains...," he explains it <in the sen-
tence>, "What is to be eliminated..." With regard to the 14.1-4
objects of knowledge, soul etc., false knowledge is 'igno- cf. 14.3
rance', whose source is 'desire'. And this is a partial charac-
terization; 'aversion' must be understood also. And 'merit cf. 14.3
and demerit' are their sources – this is what has to be elimi-
nated. "Elimination is the knowledge of the true-nature," for 14.3
all of that <desire etc.> is eliminated through it. "It" means 14.3
'the means of knowledge'.[57] "The *śāstra* is the means." 14.3
"Liberation is what is to be attained." Having thus explained 14.4
the parts, he states the import, "These..." The meaning is: 14.4
the purport of <this section of the> *Bhāṣya* is as follows: 2.11
'These four cardinal entities' – the bases of human ends –
are accepted not only by Akṣapāda, who revealed the
47.10 twelve-fold object of knowledge on the basis of the differ- cf. NS.1.1.9
ence between what is to be eliminated and what is to be
attained, and who composed the *śāstra*, which explains the
means of knowledge called 'reasoning' (*nyāya*), together
with its accessories, in order that one might acquire knowl-
edge of the true-nature of them <the twelve objects of

[57] *tasya pramāṇasya* (NVT 47.7-8). In the lemma (NV 14.3), *tasya* (*nirvartakam*) clearly means *heyasya* ('what has to be eliminated') or pain (*duḥkhasya*). In NB 2.10, on which the *Vārttika* is based, *tasya* can only mean *heyasya* as well. Vācaspati seems to have nodded off here.

knowledge>, but also by all teachers of soteriology. cf. 14.4

He explains the <sentence in> the *Bhāṣya*, which
raises the following objection, "On this reasoning, the sepa- 2.13
rate mention of <the fourteen categories of> doubt etc.
serves no purpose," <by saying> "It is improper to mention 14.5
<the categories of> doubt etc...." He explains <the sentence
in> the *Bhāṣya*, which answers the objection, "true...," <by 14.5-6 (2.14)
saying> "<This is> Not correct...branches of science." He 14.5-6
explains the objection, "Doubt etc..." He explains the 14.6
answer, "<This is> Not correct...branches of science." By 14.6-7
"basis" is meant 'operation'. He explains the <sentence in 14.6
the> *Bhāṣya*, "they...mentioned separately...," <by saying> 2.17
"its basis of doubt..." And let it not be objected – <P> There 14.9-10
are only three branches of science; there is no need for the
branch of science <known as> 'analytics' – <S> because
this alone is the cause of the clarification of all the branches
of science. As he will say, "The lamp of all branches of sci- 21.1-2(5.14)
ence..."

The *Bhāṣya* says, "And this doubt is a cognition in 3.1-2
which there is merely hesitation as to what the object really
is and which lacks ascertaining." He explains this: "Now 14.12
among these" – among <these fourteen categories of> doubt
etc. – "doubt..." <P> One who thinks that knowledge,
ascertaining, and cognition are synonymous, objects,

"which by its nature lacks ascertaining..." That is to say: 14.12-13
the word 'ascertaining' is not synonymous with the word
'knowledge' without further qualification. But, rather, when
it expresses 'the ascertainment of this specific thing'.
Because, when a cognition, ranging to both extremes and
oscillating – 'What is it?' – even if by its nature it lacks
ascertainment with respect to its object, is ascertained by
every soul through internal perception. <S> He replies,
"There is no contradiction..." "Therefore" – hence – "the 14.13; 14.14
two..." <P> In order to introduce the <section in the>
*Bhāṣya* that begins, "Therefore ...not known...," he asks, 2.19
47.25 "How is this <an element> of reasoning?" The point is: if 14.15
doubt were an element of reasoning, it too should be
explained. <S> The answer is, "Because..." <P> He objects 14.15-16
to this, "'that is known'..." The meaning is: reasoning is the 14.16
logical reason, whether it has four or five elements;[58] alter-
natively, reasoning is the aggregate of the <five> members
thesis etc. <The etymological analysis of 'reasoning' is:>
'That through which the realization of the intended meaning
48.1 is 'reached' or obtained'. The basis of this, its content, if it

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[58] Śrīkaṇṭha sheds some light on this (ŚṬ 61.16-19): 'The five forms are subject-attributeness etc. with respect to a logical reason that has positive and negative concomitance. And with respect to <a logical reason> that has only-negative or only-positive concomitance there are four <forms> because of the absence, respectively, of the presence of a co-subject and the exclusion of counter-subject'.

is said to be known, must be said to be ascertained. For if this <content> is in doubt, the logical reason would not hold valid, in that its basis is in doubt. As, for example; <the inference that> there is a peacock in this mountain-bower because of the impingement of the cry '*kekā*'.[59] If there is doubt as to the impingement of this <cry>, then <the peacock's presence> is neither ascertained nor known. And
hence, "There is a contradiction in saying" both "'known' 14.16-17
and 'not known with certainty'." <S> He replies, "There is 14.17-18
no contradiction..." That is to say: the mountain by itself is known – or ascertained – 'in a general way', but a 'specific'
48.5 <property> of it – that it has fire etc. – is not ascertained.
<P> He, in turn, objects: "Even on this distinction..." The 14.18
point is: for by saying '<an object> when known is ascertained', he shows that <these two terms> have the same referent because there is 'co-referentiality'. And hence the contradiction. But by removing the contradiction according to the difference between 'general' and 'specific', you do
not establish co-referentiality. <S> He replies, "It does not 14.18-19
<still hold true>, because of the usage of the <correlative> terms, 'just as..., so too...'" The meaning is: because both the universal and particular are correferential, the same

[59] Vācaspati here quotes from Dharmakīrti's *Nyāyabindu*: *yatheha nikuñje mayūraḥ keyāyitāditi* (92.2 *KSS* 22).

<object> that is ascertained generally, may also not be ascertained specifically; hence there is no contradiction.
48.10 "For this reason" – that reasoning may come into play, 14.21; cf. 3.2
because it is inappropriate that reasoning operate with respect to what is not in doubt. For, when they see an elephant, prudent men do not infer it from its trumpeting.

He restates the <sentence in the> *Bhāṣya*, "Now as 14.22; 3.314.22
for 'purpose'...," in order to reveal the purpose served by the word 'purpose', once he has taught the intrinsic nature of 'purpose'. <P> In order to explain <this>, he asks, "But 14.22-23
what is...?" <S> The answer is, "that by which..." The 14.23
meaning is: this is quite obvious. <P> He asks another question: "by what...?" <S> He states the answer according to 14.23
the doctrine of an *ekadeśin*, "duty..." <P> In this <state-
48.15 ment>, by <the word> "desire" is merely 'wish' meant, or, 14.23
rather, 'passion for one's beloved'? If 'desire' is meant in the first alternative, then one can dispense with duty etc., since they are all desired. If <it is meant> in the second, there is underextension <of characterization>, because it fails to include such desirable things as liquor, hunting, etc. Moreover, neither duty nor liberation prompt nihilists. <S> Therefore, thinking that this <explanation> is inappropriate, he says, "But our view is..." By the 'acquisition of plea- 14.24
sure' and the 'elimination of pain', which are their content,

he alludes to the cognition that has them as its content. That is to say: because if they are both absent, activity has no cause; or, if they are present, it serves no purpose. Neverthe-
48.20 less, the undesirable consequence of the agent's acting only with regard to the acquisition of pleasure and the elimination of pain does not hold with regard to their causes, because it is an overly extensive <characterization>: for it is impossible for one to know and to desire one thing and act upon another. Nor is the end the domain of human activity, but rather the means to this <end> is its domain. From the knowledge that <something> is a means to this <end>, one acts solely with respect to the means to this <end>. <P> This is not an overly extensive characterization? <S> He says, "But because all objects are the cause of pleasure, and 14.24-25
48.25 pain, they prompt a living creature to act...", with this intention: Goodness! Therefore the knowledge of <something's> being a means to this <end> alone prompts <an agent>, and not the knowledge of the result, because it is agreed that knowledge, desire, and activity – which are causes and effects – are correferential. The word "but" con- 14.24
trasts <this knowledge> from <that of> the result. Here again, he alludes to the cognition, which has the content, by its content. What is meant is this: by cognizing <the presence of> water, one recollects that one has previously expe-

rienced that this kind of thing was a means to what he desired. Then he infers that what he is presently seeing is a means to what he desires through the logical mark of 'being
49.1 of this kind'. And after he infers <this>, a thirsty man acts. Therefore, the knowledge of the means is directly the cause of human activity, whereas the end, 'which is what one most desires to obtain',[60] <is a cause> insofar as it is what one aims at. Hence, the whole <issue> is cleared up.

He explains the <sentence in the> *Bhāṣya*, "Reason- 3.4
ing also functions with this as its basis," <by saying> "This 14.25
same 'purpose'... of reasoning." <P> He objects: "What 14.25
...?" <S> He replies, "that it supports..." That is, just as a 14.26
pandit relies upon a king <for his support>. He makes clear
just what is meant by 'that it supports', "because...is based 14.26
49.5 on this." By "practice" is meant 'activity'. The meaning is: 14.26
prudent men never undertake a fruitless examination, as for
instance into <the issue> of crow's teeth etc. <P> He
objects, "But what is this...?" The point is: if one adopts as 15.1
a thesis that 'purpose' is the basis of reasoning, then it is
inconsistent to establish <it> as the basis of examination.
<S> The answer is, "Reasoning." The meaning is: therefore, 15.1
it is not inconsistent. <P> He objects, "But what is this 'rea- 15.2 (3.5)
soning'?" <with this intention>: even so, according to the

[60] See A.1.4.49 *īpsitatamaṃ karma*.

etymology <you provided above, that 'reasoning' (*nyāya*)
means> 'that through which the realization of the intended cf. 47.27
meaning is reached or obtained', <the means of knowl-
edge> perception etc. taken individually are 'reasoning'.
And yet this end is not depended upon by each one individ-
ually, because it is our common experience that objects
which we do not desire to know, even if they are not desired
to be eliminated or not desired to be acquired, are the
49.10 domain of perception etc. <S> He replies: "through the 15.2 (3.5-6)
means of knowledge." The five members, thesis etc., which
are based on the means of knowledge of perception etc., are cf. 4.9-12
means of knowledge. 'Examining' the logical mark of an
object through them is "examination". But the logical mark 15.2
endowed with five members, once examined, alone pro-
duces as its result the cognition of what has to be inferred,
but not the examination of the object that is to be inferred.
That is to say: because even if this <mark> is doubted, it is
not intrinsically the basis for examination. <P> If the exam-
ining of an object is through the members <of an infer-
ence>, then it is not through the means of knowledge,
because there is no identity between cause and effect.
49.15 Hence, he says, "What does this mean?" <S> The members, 15.2
thesis etc., are not directly employed in the examination of
the object, but rather insofar as they indicate that these

means of knowledge are their respective causes. Therefore,
as the subordinate operation of the means of knowledge are
the thesis etc., the 'examining of an object through the
means of knowledge' is justified. This same point is stated,
"due to the operation of the means of knowledge..." There- 15.2-3
fore, <he says>, "Each separate means of knowledge...is 15.3-4
not..." And because all the means of knowledge assist <it>,
it is <reasoning> 'in the highest sense'; hence he says, "this 15.4-5 (4.11-12)
same <reasoning>..." And having restated the <sentence in
the> *Bhāṣya* in order to show that, by reason of its possess-
ing five members, it relies on perception and verbal testi-
mony, but is not in contradiction with them, he explains its
49.20 purport, "perception and verbal testimony." <P> But how 15.5-6 (3.6)
does that <sentence in the> *Bhāṣya* state this? <S> Hence,
he says, "For if...through inference..." He explains the 15.6-7
<sentence in the> *Bhāṣya* which begins, "But that infer- 3.8
ence...," <by saying>, "But when..." For when there is a 15.7-8
contradiction, then the mutual combination of the <five>
members thesis etc., which are based on the means of
knowledge, does not constitute a single sentence; that is,
because there is no real syntactic connection among these
word meanings, which lack suitability, since they contradict
the means of knowledge. By "shrine" is meant 'philosophi- 15.8
cal system' – of this "a semblance." That is to say: it makes 15.8

what is not, so to speak, a philosophical system into one. The meaning is: surely this type of employment of the five
49.25 members, which pseudo-pandits, "desirous of gain, honor, 15.8
and fame," describe in detail <as a mode of discourse>, leads to sin – how much less to liberation? Having thus explained the <sentence in the> *Bhāṣya* as a whole, he
quotes it in order to explain its members, "But that infer- 15.9; 3.8
ence..." He states an example <of an inference> that is con-
50.1 tradicted by perception: "Fire" – a composite – "is not hot, 15.9-10
because it is created, like a pot." <P> To this he objects,
"But what...?" The intention here is this: does this <logical 15.10
reason of> 'createdness' fully possess the three forms or not? If it does not, then simply from this fact alone because this is a pseudo-inference, we can dispense with its contradicting direct perception. But even if it possesses <the three forms of> positive concomitance, negative concomitance, and 'subject-attributeness',[61] is this an invalid means of knowledge in that its content is annulled <by perception>? <S> This is inappropriate: surely if there is full possession

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[61] A good *hetu*/ *liṅga* has *anvaya* (positive concomitance), *vyatireka*, (negative concomitance), and *pakṣadharmatā* (subject-attributeness) (NVT 50.3).
*pratijñā*: *pakṣa* + *sādhya (dharma)*
*hetu* / *liṅga*: *pakṣa* + *sādhana (dharma)*
*udāharaṇa*:
*sapakṣa* + [*sādhana* + *sādhya (dharma)*]
*vipakṣa* ~ [*sādhana* + *sādhya (dharma)*]
*upanaya: pakṣa* + *sādhana* (+ *sādhya*)
*nigamana: pakṣa* + *sādhya*.

of the three forms, this <logical reason> is invariably
50.5 related to its own *sādhya*. Nor can impediment and invariable-relation co-exist. If there were an impediment, the logical reason would not possess the subject property, and would be variant. A subject which possesses a property that is desired to be known is the 'subject' of an inference in the sense that it is being brought to completion;[62] but not <a subject which possess> a property whose contradiction with the *sādhya* <property> is already ascertained by direct perception. And because this property is not a property of the subject of the inference – insofar as it <the subject> is not the subject of an inference, because this <property> is not desired to be known – <the logical reason> is not invariant: because there is variance through actually seeing <the property> in what possesses the *sādhya*-property – which possesses a property in contradiction with the *sādhya*-property that perception has established. And it is not proper to hold: the 'co-subject' and the 'counter-subject' alone are the content of perceiving the invariable relation that has to be understood through positive and negative concomitance, <and> not the subject of an inference. For if the invariable

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[62] *jijñāsitadharmaṇo dharmiṇaḥ pacyamānatvena pakṣatvam* (NV 50.6). Vācaspati here derives *pakṣa* 'the subject of an inference' from the root √*pac* 'to cook; to bake; to ripen, mature; to bring to perfection, to develop; to melt' (V.S. Apte, s.v.).

relation between a co-subject and a counter-subject were
50.10 known extrinsically only, omitting the subject of the inference, then, by dint of mere extrinsic pervasion, the logical reason, even if it were a property of the subject, would not establish the *sādhya* <property> in the subject of the inference. For the pervasion relation between this <logical reason property> and its corresponding *sādhya* property is not established in this case. Thus, this is just like a young, innocent girl who marries a eunuch and desires a son. Therefore, whether intrinsically or extrinsically, the invariable relation has to be grasped by the inclusion of all <instances>. And thus, as the variability of the *sādhana*-property is established even with respect to the subject of the inference, therefore, <the logical reason> is not invariant. And so it is impossible for a logical reason fully to possess the three forms and also have its content annulled <by direct perception>. <P> Therefore, it is well-stated, "What contradiction 15.10
50.15 does this inference" – which fully possesses the three forms – "contain?" The meaning is: for it is not possible that it <the logical reason> fully possess the three forms and be contradicted <by direct perception>. <S> He states the answer to this, "The employment <of inference> in what is 15.10-11
not the domain of inference." For, he will say in the section on inference that a non-limiting relation[63] between the logi- NS.2.2.5-7

cal reason and the *sādhya* is an element of inference; but not the relation of cause and effect and so forth, because <these relations> are insufficiently inclusive and because of over-extension. And this <employment of inference to what is not its proper domain> operates thus: 'Whatever is artificial is without exception not hot, as for instance a pot etc.' And a limiting condition is not grasped in the relation between 'createdness' and 'non-hotness' – in the way that the contact with wet-fuel <is understood as the limiting condition> in the relation between smoke and fire, and that self-study
50.20 and teaching <are understood as the limiting conditions> in the association between a teacher and his disciple. On the one hand, it is through perception that <it is ascertained that> this same limiting condition, which is in doubt or superimposed, does not exist, since when one looks for it diligently and repeatedly it is not perceived here and there, as in pots etc.; <and, on the other hand> by the aid of hypothetical reasoning it is ascertained that: if it were to exist, it would, just like pots etc., be cognized; because there is no cognition <of it>, it does not exist. This same <limiting condition> is like <the relation> between color and taste, <or> between the rising of the sun today and its rising yesterday,

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[63] *anaupādhikaḥ sambandhaḥ* (NVT 50.17). In the following discussion (NVT 50.19-25), Vācaspati expatiates on *upādhi* 'a limiting condition'.

<or> the rising of the tide and the simultaneous rising of the moon; the intrinsic or general relation between 'createdness' and 'non-hotness' is established thus in a general way:
50.25 'Whatever is created, that is without exception not hot'; but not specifically in the case of a composite fire. For the pervasion relation, which subsumes all <instances>, cannot hold true <only> in some cases. If it holds true in <only> a few cases, it is precisely in those cases in which it is not revealed that objections about its variance would thereby arise. Moreover, it is impossible to perceive the pervasion relation in each and every individual case, because there is
51.1 an infinite number. Therefore, the revealing of this <pervasion relation arises> only through including all <instances>; thus, in this case, in order to establish 'createdness' in reference to non-hotness – associated with a recollecting of the pervasion relation in terms of the universal, which holds generally – with respect to a specific case – composite fire – by virtue of its having the subject property – which one could not establish: is this so because its content is preempted by perception, or, rather, because it is variant? Now its being variant is not <the cause>, because there previously has been ascertaining of a non-limiting relation in a general way. <P> Because one observes createdness in a composite fire, which is hot, createdness is either variant or

51.5 is not a property of the subject of the inference. <S> <This is> Not correct, because one establishes the non-hotness of it <the subject of the inference> through inference, whose pervasion relation is ascertained in a general way. <P> The cognition of the pervasion relation, even though it arises in light of the occurrence of the logical reason 'createdness', is cancelled here, because one apprehends hotness in a composite fire through perception. And hence, <this> inference does not operate, because it is not invariant. <S> <This is> Not correct, because it does not produce variance of the logical reason with respect to what has the *sādhya* property, which is the domain of the operation of inference. Otherwise, if there were doubt as to the *sādhya* property being in this <subject>, the *sādhana* property that one apprehends in it would be variant, because the negative concomitance is in
51.10 doubt. The *sādhana* property is, as it were, a familiar instance for a *sādhya* property which is in doubt. Moreover, the inference itself would be destroyed, because one directly perceives the contrary of the *sādhya* property through perception. <P> A composite fire cannot be established as being non-hot, and so <the logical reason> is either variant or is not a property of the subject. <S> Therefore, <on this argument> the establishment of the contrary of the *sādhya* <property> through perception and cancellation <of an

<inference> would be identical. This same point is stated, "if 15.11-12
that domain..." – the non-hotness of heat – 'to which this
<inference> is employed', "is pre-empted by direct percep-
tion." The point is: and if an inference is flawed in this way,
one may dispense with <concerns as to> both the non-sub-
ject-attributeness and variance <of the logical reason>,
which depend upon this.

<P> But he sets forth the example cited by Dignāga cf. 15.9
as 'that inference which is contradicted by perception', "But 15.12-13
others..." The point is: one who says that sound is inaudible
because it is created, as is the case with pots etc., simply
denies the intrinsic nature of sound. For there is no cause for
apprehending sound other than the auditory organ. And a
sound that is not apprehended does not fall within the scope
of real usage. Therefore, the non-existence of sound per-
vades the idea of one who speaks thus. And hence there is a
contradiction with direct perception. <S> He criticizes <this
example>, "But they..." For the general rule is: when affir- 15.13-15
mation and denial involve a qualifier, they apply to the qual-
ifier. But sometimes an affirmation also applies to what is
qualified, because there is no other way <to understand it>.
As, for example,

Priests with red hats perform...[64]

[64] *Ṣaḍviṃśa Brāhmaṇa* 4.22.

> If he has the wherewithal, an initiate should not wear old, stained clothing.[65]

In the same manner here also, by dint of <the principles> of 'direct' statement' and 'sentence',[66] the negation, which applies to the qualifier 'audibility', is not connected with what is qualified, 'sound'. Nor, again, is it the case
51.25 that, because of the negation of 'audibility', the negation of sound, which pervades the idea of the speaker, is the real meaning. Because a meaning which does not contradict the meaning of the words is to be understood as the meaning – and not <a meaning> that contradicts them, and as sound is the locus of the negation of audibility, hence the negation of this <'audibility'> is not possible if sound does not exist.
52.1 And it will be taught in the third <book> that what does not NS.3.2.10-17
exist is not void. Nor is audibility the domain of direct perception. For the relation between sound and hearing is, according to Kātyāyana's statement,

> In primary affixes, secondary affixes, and compounds, the statement of relation is through the <suffixes> *tva* and *tāl*.[67]

And a relation that holds between what is perceptible and

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[65] *Gautama Dharma Śāstra* 1.9.4.
[66] *śrutivākyayoḥ sāmarthyāt* (NVT 51.23). These are two of the *Mīmāṃsā* principles (*naya/pramāṇa*) of textual exegesis. *śruti* 'direct statement' is the first, and most powerful principle: the sense of a word or passage is clear from the literal text. *vākya* 'sentence' is the third principle in exegetical efficacy: the distinction between what is principal and subordinate is determined through the syntactic connection of the entire sentence: see F. Edgerton for a fuller explanation and examples, *Mīmāṃsānyāyaprakāśa*, §68-69, §105-115.

what is not perceptible is not <itself> perceptible. There-
fore, as audibility is not perceptible, there is no contradic-
tion with direct perception here. This same point is stated,
"Because the functions performed by the sense organs are 15.14
suprasensory." By 'function' is meant: 'connection with its
proper object'.

He cites an example of <an inference> that is contra-
dicted by scripture, "pure..." That is to say: because prohi- 15.15
bition against touching human bones is set forth by *Manu*
etc. and because there is teaching of expiation if one does
touch <them>, bowls made of human skulls etc. are impure.
<P> A user of a human-skull bowl (*Kāpālika*) objects,
"How...?" The idea is: neither the *Vedas* nor the *smṛtis*, 15.15-16
which are based on them, is a means of knowledge with us.
<S> The answer is: if you say that, "a bowl made from a 15.16-17
human skull is pure," then you must state what is meant by
'pure' in regard to this real object through the aid of infer-
ence by itself, without reference to *śruti*, *smṛti*, *itihāsa*, and
*purāṇa*. "What is meant by 'pure'?" If it should be said, 15.16-17
'absence of sin for the one who touches <it>', the *siddhān-*
*tin* asks, "he must state on whose authority there is absence 15.17
of sin?" <P> If the *Kāpālika* should say, "'on my own 15.17

[67] This is not a *Vārttika* of Kātyānana, but is cited (in a more elaborate form) as 'the opinion of others' by Kaiyaṭa in his *Pradīpa* on the *Mahābhāṣya* to *Vārttika* 5 on A.5.1.119.

authority'": for we *Kāpālikas* have an unexceptionable tradition of touching bowls made from a human skull and taking food and drink from them, as the Southerners have the beneficial rite of *Āhnevaivuka*.[68] Therefore, a bowl made from a human skull is pure, insofar as it produces no sin for
us. <S> To this point he answers humorously, "This comes 15.18
about thus" – for the *Kāpālika* only – "because he abides by 15.18
the intention of carrying out <what is prescribed by> scripture. Of the Southerners who perform matters prescribed by scripture, namely, *śruti*, *smṛti*, *itihāsa*, and *purāṇa*, and who avoid what is proscribed by it, the immemorial performance of <such rituals as> the *Āhnevaivuka* etc., which continue up to the present day, leads <them> to infer that they are based on a unexceptionable scripture, insofar as they produce the good for themselves; but one who does not rely upon scripture cannot by any means understand these matters even by thousands of inferences. The point is: whereas for the *Kāpālikas*, who zealously do not perform what scripture prescribes and do perform what this proscribes, a tradi-

[68] This seems to be a misspelling of *Āhnīnaibuka*, rites performed at full moon: see Śabara to JMS 1.3.15 (II.172). Śrīkaṇṭha relates of this rite: *āhnenavuketi* I *ekatra pātre bahūnāṃ bhojanamahnenavuketyucyate dākṣiṇātyaiḥ* (ŚṬ 43.25-26). The *Pariśuddhiprakāśa* of Vardhamāna is more informative, if less decided: *āhnenaivukāditi* I *gomayamayīṃ devatāṃ dūrvādibhirabhyarccya jñātitvakalpanamāhnenaivukamityeke* I *maṅgalavāre dadhimanthanamityanye* I *pratidinaṃ taṇḍulamiṣṭaṃ māsamekaṃ bhāṇḍe niḥkṣipya ghṛtena tenāpūpamekam kṛtvā devatāpūjanamityapare* (NVTPP 279.5-280.2). Thakur erroneously reports both explanations as belonging to Śrīkaṇṭha (NVTP 132.5).

tion, even though it is immemorial, is <based>, as it were, <on the teachings> of *Śākya*, *Mallaka*,[69] etc., <and> not the
basis on which to infer a *Veda*.[70] "But if he should say" – 15.18-19
that bowls made of human skulls do not cause sin – "'on the authority of those versed in the *Veda*'," then there is 'a contradiction with scripture', because he accepts, in the manner
to be related, the validity of the *Veda*, because it is certain cf. 15.18-19
that the touching of such things causes sin, because they are proscribed in the *Vedas*. Moreover, if one tries to establish purity for a human-skull bowl through inference and with-
out taking into account scripture, he must be asked, "What 15.19
is meant by saying that, 'a bowl made from a human skull is pure'?" <P> He says, precisely what is understood from the
52.25 statement alone is the meaning; why is this asked? <S>
Hence he says, "This is a positive injunction" – of purity – 15.19
"of a specific thing" – a bowl made from a human skull.
<P> What results from this? <S> Hence, he says, "And" – it 15.20
53.1 is universally known that – "a specific positive injunction

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[69] *Śākya* is, of course, the Buddha. *Mallaka* does not obviously refer to a heterodox teacher: Monier-Williams has only, "N. of a people MārkP." (s.v.). *malla* regularly means 'wrestler', and such a meaning would not be at all inappropriate in this context. Śrīkaṇṭha (ŚṬ 43.35), along with J, (NVT 52.20) reads *bhinnaka* for *mallaka*. According to MW, *bhinnaka* means, "a Buddhist mendicant" (s.v.). Śrīkaṇṭha glosses *bhinnakāḥ* by *turuṣkāḥ*, "The Turks" (s.v.).

[70] The translation here follows Śrīkaṇṭha's gloss on *vedānumānamūlam* (NVT 52.21): *vedasya anumānam vedānumānam tasya mūlam liṅgam* (ŚṬ 43.35-36). Abhaytalika takes this quite differently: *etadatharvavedavākyāstitve liṅgam* (NA 33.22): 'This is the inferential mark for the orthodoxy of the *Atharvaveda*'.

rules out the other cases." As, for example, when it is said that one sees with his right eye, it is understood that he does not see with his left eye. The point is: thus in this context,
"If a bowl made of a human skull is pure, he must state 15.20
what" – else – "is 'impure'." For there is no other means of knowledge besides scripture for the impurity of human excrement etc. And you do not esteem the validity of scrip-
ture. <P> "But if" it is out aversion for the *Veda* that you 15.21
side with inference and include "everything without exception" – human excrement, human skull bowls etc. – among
what 'is pure'; <S> hence he says, "But if everything with- 15.21
53.5 out exception is pure," <S> He replies: "There is no familiar 15.21
instance" <P> Why? <S> "Because everything is made the 15.21
subject <of the inference>."

<P> He objects, "But why is <one> inference not 15.21-22
contradicted by an <other> inference?" The point is: there is surely no difference, in terms of being a means of knowledge, between inference on the one hand and perception and verbal testimony on the other, due to which these two cancel inference, but not <another> inference. <S> He replies:
"because of the absence[71] of the co-application of two 15.22
inferences to one and the same thing." This is the idea: now if a subsequent inference, which has its content contradicted

[71] *asambhavāt* NV 15.22, *abhāvāt* NVT 53.8.

by a previous one, arises by virtue of that, it is unable to produce its proper effect. As, for example, when it is said
that this inference, "Sound is inaudible because it is created, 51.16; cf. 15.12
like a pot etc.," contradicts <another> inference. For it will
be taught in the third <book> that a real object, whose NS.3.2.10-17
intrinsic nature is known, is denied somehow in some respect, but the form of knowledge and the unreal are not external. Thus, in this <inference>, one who denies the audibility of sound must first infer two real things – the sense organ of hearing and that to be grasped by it is supra-sensory – through the effect, namely the apprehension of sound. And thus, the last inference, as to inaudibility, whose content is pre-empted by this same inference, even though it fully possesses positive and negative concomitance, does not produce the effect appropriate for itself. Thus, even such an <inference> as,

> *Īśvara* is not the creator of bodies, the worlds, etc. because he has no body, <or> because, as with a liberated soul, he has no <further> purpose <to achieve>.[72]

is to be understood as pseudo-reasoning, insofar as its content is pre-empted by an inference based on *Īśvara*'s having attributes or being a perceiver. Therefore, this <sentence in the *Vārttika*> was stated with the idea that there is no co-

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[72] Provenance unknown.

application <to one and the same thing> of two inferences
that are valid and which operate simultaneously and inde-
pendently of each other. For between these two <infer-
ences>, one cannot be cancelled the other what cancels; but,
rather, they do not produce valid knowledge in that they are
mutually true-rivals.[73] <P> But why do two inferences not
co-apply? Alternatively, if they do not co-apply, how can
they be true rivals? <S> Hence he says, "For two inferences, 15.22-23
which fully possess positive and negative concomitance, do
53.20 not..." By using the expression 'positive and negative con-
comitance' here, he suggests that two equally valid <infer-
ences> have positive and negative concomitances, subject-
attributeness, and are not true rivals. That is to say: if these
two <inferences>, fully possessing these <characteristics>,
were to co-apply to one and the same thing, then one of
them would in fact be understood as the cancelled or what
cancels. But this is not the case, because they do not fully
possess 'true-rivalness'. He concludes, "Therefore" – one 15.23
inference of equal force – "is not contradicted by <another>
inference." The meaning is: but rather a true-rival. <P>
With the idea that – 'Since perception establishes <a prop-
erty> that is in contradiction with <the property> that is to

[73] *satpratipakṣatā*: cf. NS 5.1.17. Vācaspati appears to use *satprati-pakṣa* as equivalent to the pseudo-reason of *prakaraṇasama* 'counter-balanced/ counter-acted': see NS 1.2.7 and NVT 653.18 ff.

be inferred, it is also the rival of inference, there is no co-
application of an inference which fully possesses positive
53.25 concomitance, negative concomitance, etc., insofar as it is a
true rival, with perception which annihilates an object that is
contradicted by it. Hence there is no relation of what cancels
and what is cancelled – he objects, "contradicted by percep- 15.24
54.1 tion also..." <S> He answers, "No, it does not..." For when 15.24-25
two things have equal force, they are mutually rivals, but
not when one thing is weak and the other strong. For a
hyena is not the rival of a young doe, but rather of a wild
buffalo, which scratches boulders with the tips of its horns
obedient to its yearning for battle. The meaning is: there-
fore, it is appropriate to say: a prior perception, which is
invariant, cancels an inference, which is not its true-rival,
because they co-apply to the same object.

54.5 <P> He objects, "But then why is there no <case of 15.25
an inference being> contradicted by comparison?" The
meaning is: if a city-dweller has heard the statement of a
forest-dweller, that a *gavaya* is like a cow, when he goes to
the forest and sees a cow-like individual, then the cognition
of <its> similarity to a cow – comparison – which depends
upon recollection, which is produced by the rousing of the
impressions deposited by experiencing the meaning of his
statement, is his <valid> means of knowing that the individ-

ual standing before him should be called by the term '*gavaya*'. Thus if someone were to infer: 'This individual should not be called by the term '*gavaya*', because it, like other individual cows, resembles an individual cow'; then
54.10 let this same inference have its content contradicted by the
comparison. <S> The answer is an admission: "no...contra- 15.25
dicted by comparison..." 'There is no' is supplied from above. <P> But if there is, then why was it not stated? <S>
Hence he says, "because this corresponds to the contradic- 15.25-26
tion with the previous means of knowledge." 'Was not
stated' has to be supplied. He makes this clear: "Contradic- 15.26-27
tion with comparison..." He reveals the means of knowl-
edge of verbal testimony through its proper end, "verbal 15.26
testimony..." He reveals the means of knowledge of per-
ception simply by its proper end, "the knowledge of the cor- 15.27
respondence..." He concludes, "This" – that inference is 15.27
contradicted by comparison – "has been stated because of the contradiction of direct perception and verbal testimony <with inference>" – because the contradiction was stated.

54.15 <P> He restates the <sentence in the> *Bhāṣya* and
objects, "With respect to this, discussion and arguing..." 16.1 (3.9)
The meaning is: whereas the word 'familiar instance' ought to be explained immediately after stating the intrinsic nature and the use of 'purpose', what occasion is there for <treat-

ing> discussion and arguing by leaping past this? <S> He
states the occasion, "This same..." The point is: this <sec- 16.2 (3.4-5)
tion in the *Bhāṣya*> is an element of the explanation of 'pur-
pose' alone – not an element of the explanation of
discussion and arguing; hence there is occasion <for dis-
cussing them here>. He explains the meaning of the word
'this', "'This' means 'pseudo-reasoning'." That is to say: 16.4
for there cannot be two correct means <for establishing the
positions> of both the proponent and his opponent whose
mode of discourse are discussion and arguing, because two
contradictory properties cannot apply to <one and the
54.20 same> real thing. Therefore, as reasoning belongs to the one
of the two, but pseudo-reasoning to the other, a distinction is
drawn between discussion and arguing. But because of its
proximity, the term 'pseudo-reasoning' is meant, because
the pronoun <'this'> denotes what is proximate. "But cap- 16.4-5 (3.9)
tiousness is <now> examined, as to whether it has a purpose
or not." The word 'but' differentiates <captiousness> from
discussion and arguing, which are well-known as having a
purpose. For captiousness is said to be 'devoid of establish- cf. NS.1.2.3
ing a counter-position'. Thus, because it is devoid of estab-
lishing, one understands that it is devoid of a counter-
position. For surely there can be no <position> to be estab-
lished in the absence of establishing. Similarly, according to

54.25 the etymological analysis <of the word 'captiousness'> as
'that by virtue of which the establishment of a counter-posi-
tion is 'carped at' – thwarted', one understands by process
of elimination that, because it attacks the position of one's
opponent, its purpose is the establishment of one's own
position. Thus, then, as captiousness has its purpose in
doubt, it is examined as to "whether it has a purpose or not." 16.4-5
Between these <possibilities>, if it lacks a purpose, then it is
not the case that 'all branches of science, all actions, and by cf. 3.4-5
55.1 virtue of them all sentient beings are pervaded by purpose',
simply because captiousness, whether in the form of an
action or of a branch of science, lacks a purpose. But if it
does have a purpose, then the pervasion <of all things> by
purpose is justified. <P> What, then, is the result? <E>
Between these <possibilities>, "Some say <that captious- 16.5
ness> has no purpose." In the first place, there is no position
to be established <by it>, inasmuch as it is devoid of estab-
lishing; although according to the etymological analysis of
its elements, one understands that there is an assault upon
the establishing of <the position of> one's opponent. And
yet there is no establishing of one's own position by this
55.5 alone. For it is not the case that, when the smoke that occurs
on the slope of a mountain is objected to as not being estab-
lished etc., the absence of fire there is ascertained. This

same point is stated, "because it merely raises objections." 16.5
<S> He answers this same proponent of captiousness' hav-
ing no purpose, "And this is not so..." The point is: by his 16.5-6
objecting to the establishment of his opponent, one's own
position may be established or not be established by process
of elimination, yet he <the captious person> attacks the
establishment of the counter-position with the establishment
of his position alone as his end. Hence, the <sentence in
the> *Bhāṣya* that begins, "If, when challenged as to his pur- 3.10
pose, [he]...," is explained by this. He explains the <sen-
tence in the> *Bhāṣya* that begins, "But if he does not 3.11-12
acknowledge...," <by saying> "But if he...even a posi- 16.7
55.10 tion..." He explains the <sentence in the> *Bhāṣya* that
begins, "But even if...," <by saying> "But if...the position 3.13; 16.7-8
of an opponent..." The meaning is: for a nihilist utterly
rejects <the existence of> objects of knowledge, on the
grounds that they cannot withstand examination in terms of
'being', 'not-being', 'both being and not-being', and 'nei-
ther being nor not-being'.[74] Thus, he proceeds prompted
only <by the desire> to refute his opponent's position. But
he has neither a position nor an establishing, because both
of these will be objected to as falling in the camp of object

[74] See NVTP 135.4 for an illustration of this method, which is associated with Nāgārjuna.

of knowledge. He explains the <sentence in the> *Bhāṣya* that begins, "this too...," <by saying> "then this is just like 3.13; 16.8
the preceding case." He explains this: "But if he acknowl- 16.8-9
edges the group of four even in regard to this" – position – "then this is his position." By 'acknowledgment' is meant
55.15 'admission'. Even if it is the position alone which has to be established, nevertheless, because by merely admitting <the group of four>, insofar as they are inextricably linked to that, the group of four is also called the 'position'. <P>
Which group of four? <S> Hence he says, "The group of 16.9; cf. 3.14
four..." The meaning is: one who propounds establishing <a position> announces the following: 'As a captious person, I know that by this five-membered establishing statement this <thing> to be established is made known'; hence the group of four. Surely, the purpose of the captious person proves, due to his understanding this, to be the denial of his opponent's position. And so this captious person is not without a purpose. He objects to the second alternative, "But if 16.9; cf. 3.15-16
55.20 he does not acknowledge..." The meaning is: since he does not even acknowledge objecting – because it is inextricably linked to the group of four – he should be ignored as mad. He states yet another objection to a nihilistic captious person, "a counter-position..." The end of the statement 16.10-11
employed by the captious person is such defects <of the log-

ical reason> as non-established, contradicted, etc. If he admits to this <end>, this is his position. But if he admits to the true-existence of <such defects as> non-established, contradicted, etc., then his admission that those things which are included among <the category of> object of knowledge cannot withstand the investigation <whether they are> objects of knowledge at all is incoherent. Therefore, as he does not acknowledge that what is stated in his own statement is itself non-established, contradicted etc., the fault is as before, "he is neither a layman nor an expert." 3.11-12

55.25 Therefore, it is established that to assert that captiousness too has a purpose does not make <the characterization of> 'purpose' underextensive. As this same doctrine of entailment from a consequence forms part of the explanation of purpose, he says, "purpose has been explained."[75] 16.11

[75] *so 'yaṃ prasaktānuprasaktivādaḥ prayojanavyākhyānāṅgam* (NVT 55.25-26).

56.1 He restates the <sentence in the> *Bhāṣya*, "falls 16.12 (3.20)
within the ken of perception," whose purpose is to explain
the word 'familiar instance'. <P> He objects, "What is 16.12
meant?" That is to say, the objection is: to begin, it is not the
case that everything that falls within the ken of perception is
a familiar instance, because even that which is not a familiar
instance falls within the ken of perception. Nor again is
every familiar instance something that falls within the ken
of the senses, since the content of verbal testimony etc. is
also a familiar instance. Therefore this <explanation> is
inappropriate. <S> The <sentence in the> *Bhāṣya* that
answers this is, "regarding which..." He explains this: 3.20-21
56.5 "That it is not the cause of any contradiction in experience 16.12-13
between ordinary people and experts." And by this we must
understand: in some cases <the contradiction> is between
laymen and experts, in other cases between experts. Otherwise, that which is not established among laymen but which
can be known only by those in the form of experts – the ultimate atoms etc. – would not be a familiar instance. And thus
one must observe: a familiar instance is such, but that which
is such is not a familiar instance. He makes clear the purpose of such an explanation, "And on this formulation..." 16.13
He explains this: "of contradiction in experience..." <P> 16.13-14
Not only is there a contradiction with an object of knowl-

edge but also with a *sūtra*. Hence he says, "And hence the 16.15
56.10 *sūtra* <that characterizes> example is contradicted."[76] A
*sūtra* which <provides> an example that is beyond the ken
of the senses in various parts of this *śāstra*, be it for the *sid-*
*dhānta* or the *pūrvapakṣa*, as for example,

> Like the validity of *mantras* and the *Āyurveda*. NS 2.1.68

> Like the permanence of blackness in atoms. NS 5.1.67

and the like; this is contradicted. But not the *sūtra* which NS 1.1.25
characterizes example. For this indeed is justified, even on
the view that a familiar instance falls within the ken of per-
56.15 ception. Therefore, he characterizes the term 'perception' in 3.20
the *Bhāṣya* in order to corroborate the means of knowledge
that relates to a familiar instance. That is to say: alterna-
tively, a familiar instance is directly perceptible because it is
based on perception, because, otherwise, there is the unde-
sirable consequence of a regress. While this same familiar
instance is included within <the category of> object of
knowledge, it is separately mentioned for this reason. Hence
he says, "This same..." Familiar instance is the 'basis' of 16.15
reasoning, which by its nature has five members <and> cf. 3.22-23
which is a collection of words; hence this is separately men-
tioned. And hence there is separate mention of this because,

[76] *vyāhanyate* NVT 56.10, *vyāhanyeta* NV 16.15.

"When it is present..." He states that <this> is the instru- 3.22; 16.16-17
mental cause of inference, "previously perceived..." The 16.17
56.20 meaning is: <one infers an 'object' previously perceived> which is ascertained by an even surer means of knowledge, in the presence of an object that has the attribute of the familiar instance. He reveals that familiar instance is the basis of verbal <ly derived knowledge>, "and an object 16.17; cf. 3.21-22
which he already had come to know..." That is to say: a familiar instance is a matter that is the content of grasping a relationship, and grasping <this> relationship is the instrumental cause, in turn, of verbally derived knowledge, because one cannot understand the meaning from a word that he hears the first time. Therefore, familiar instance is also utilized in verbal <ly derived knowledge>. He states yet another purpose for its separate mention, "a nihilist..." 16.18
He states the reason for his brief treatment, "This is stated in 16.18; 3.24-4.5
the *Bhāṣya*."

56.25 He explains the <sentence in the> *Bhāṣya* that cf. 4.6
explains the word 'established doctrine', "accepted view..." 16.19-24
He explains this: "By accepted view is meant: 'There is a 16.19
'this' – and it is 'such'". He explains this, "'this'..." For by 16.19-20
<the word> 'this' he reveals that the established doctrine has to do with an object (*dharmin*), the object being the content of the 'established doctrines shared by all systems'. By

<the word> 'such' he reveals that the <attribute of the sub-
57.1 ject> is the content of 'unique established doctrine, postu-
late established doctrine, and agreement established
doctrine'. He cites 'unique established doctrine' only as an see NS 1.1.26-27
example of 'ratification', by way of partial characterization,
"This <is held> by the *Sāṅkhyas* only..." <P> Someone 16.20-21
who does not understand that the example is a partial char-
acterization, objects, "shared by all systems..." <S> He 16.21-22
replies, "the same..." The point is: the 'ratification' of 16.22
agreement differentiates <agreement> from non-agreement,
but does not cause ratification <of the agreement> for a spe-
cific person. In the sentence, "this...in <the category of> 16.22-24
object of knowledge...", he states the purpose served by (cf. 4.6-7)
separately mentioning this, even though it is included in the
57.5 object of knowledge. Thus, to begin, the object is estab-
lished in the established doctrines shared by all systems –
even by proponents <of theories> that are in conflict; the
unique established doctrines function in regard to the spe-
cific characteristics of this object, which is established in
the established doctrines shared by all systems. To be more
explicit: if a 'pot' were not established in the established
doctrines shared by all systems, on what basis could the
unique established doctrines operate as follows: 'It is either
a whole <consisting of parts>, or an aggregate of atoms, or a

form of knowledge, or an evolution of primal matter, or an evolution of *Brahman*, or an illusory evolution of *Brahman*'? And how do discussion, arguing, and captiousness, which are based on the unique established doctrines, func-
tion? And on what would reasoning (*nyāya*) be based? Like- cf. 16.23-24
wise; if there were no postulate-established doctrine, then (4.6-7)
how would a specific *sādhya* <property> be understood from a specific *sādhana* <property> according to the principle that the *sādhana*-universal is pervaded by the *sādhya*-universal? Therefore, there is a purpose served in separately mentioning 'established doctrine', even though it is an object of knowledge. And since Uddyotakara will later on examine 'agreement established doctrine', we have not stated its purpose here.

He states 'members', which occur next in the series,
"Next <in the *sūtra*> are members." <P> Is it the case that, 17.1
just as threads are the inherent-cause of a cloth, so too are these <members> thesis etc. <the inherent-cause> of a sentence? Surely, the phonemes, which are a quality of the ether, do not attain the status of being an inherent-cause.[77]
<S> Hence he says, "parts of a sentence". That is to say: 17.1
members are, as it were, members, but not the inherent-

[77] *no khalu gaganaguṇā varṇāḥ samavāyikāraṇatāṃ pratipadyanta iti* (NVT 57.14-15). If phonemes are qualities of the ether (*gagana* = *ākāśa*), they cannot be the inherent cause of a sentence.

cause; for just as members are constituents with respect to
one whole – which they are to effect and to maintain – so
are the members thesis etc. constituents of the sentence they
constitute – with respect to one thing – the conveying of the
intended meaning. <P> He objects, "But what is a sen- 17.1; cf. 4.9
tence?," with this idea: because there is no collection of
phonemes, which are <uttered> in sequence and which pass
out of existence very quickly, as they do not exist at the
same time, how can a sentence be a collection of them? And
how are they parts? <S> The answer is, "A sentence is the 17.1
57.20 cognition of the final word – based on the recollection of the
preceding word(s) – which, when synthesized through the
assistance of memory, causes a specific apprehension."
"Specific," <according to the etymological analysis>, 'is 17.1-2
specified', is a single word meaning; the meaning of a sentence – whether it is an action, a *kāraka*, or the meaning of a nominal base – is specified by different word meanings. For example:

> One should offer with Soma...[78]
>
> <One should offer> Cow's milk as for a person who desires cows.[79]
>
> He whose father or grandfather ought not to drink Soma is outcaste (*vrātya*).[80]

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[78] Of unknown provenance: to be construed with the following?
[79] *godohanena paśukāmasya*: *Mānava Śrautasūtra* 1.2.1.8.

<A sentence> is 'the cause of the apprehension of' this one 'specific' thing. Thus, then, he indicates that words have a single effect, which is due to their aggregation. <P> What is <meant by saying> 'the cause of a specific understanding'?

57.25 <S> Hence the answer is, "the cognition of the final word..." What is final is what is qualified, because it is preceded by qualifiers; 'the word of this'.[81] <P> And it is not the case that, if this <final word> is not understood, it conveys what is qualified merely because it exists – as do the visual-organ etc. <S> Hence he says, "the cognition..." The word which expresses what is qualified, when understood, makes one understand what is qualified. And the understanding <of it> is not direct experience, but rather recollec- 17.2

58.1 tion. For an aggregate of phonemes <uttered> in sequence – a word – cannot be the domain of direct experience through the auditory-organ; but the phonemes taken individually can be. Yet, when taken individually, they do not constitute a word. Nor is it appropriate to hold that the direct experience of the final phoneme, together with a multitude of recollections of antecedent phonemes, is produced by the auditory-organ, because recollections, such that their respective

[80] The first part of the quotation, *yasya pitā pitāmaha iti*, is found in *Āpastamba Dharmasūtra* 1.1.1.32.

[81] Vācaspati here glosses *antyapada* (NV 17.2) | *antyaṃ viśeṣyam*...| *tasya padam* (NVT 57.25).

effects and latent impressions are in conflict, cannot co-exist. But there might be <co-existence> between the memory of the second to last phoneme and the awareness of the final phoneme – which are in the states, respectively, of passing out of existence and not passing out of existence. And one does not understand the meaning by that and nothing more, because the recollections of the preceding phonemes have vanished. <P> Nor is it proper <to argue as
58.5 follows>: 'The phonemes – which are the content of a single idea, which arises solely from audition accompanied by the impressions produced by the direct experience of the preceding phonemes, <and which> pervades both the present and the vanished phonemes, <and> whose manifoldness has the form of the recollections and cognitions attributed to it – produce an understanding of the meaning'. <S> <The reason being:> Because they <the phonemes> perish at the time when recollection of their connection <to a meaning> arises due to the impression they respectively produce – which <impression> arises at the time when there is rousing of the impression that was laid down by awareness of the connection – they <the phonemes> cannot produce understanding of a word meaning. Therefore, the cognition is recollection alone. It is precisely for this reason that the massive *Veda*, which is gotten from the mouth of

one's guru at the time of teaching, only when recollected by one learned in the ancillary Vedic sciences and the <four> supplementary sciences,[82] produces understanding of its meaning. And thus, if the direct experience of a word is not in fact the cause of conveying the meaning of a word, then how much less of understanding the sentential meaning, which is at a remove due to the recollection of many word meanings, and the ascertainment of <their> expectancy, suitability, proximity, etc.? <P> Therefore, if the qualified word alone when recollected makes known the specified meaning, there is no need for other words, because of the apprehension of the sentential meaning from this alone. <S>
Hence it is said, "based on the recollection of the preceding 17.2
word(s)..." That which precedes is a qualifier, because the cognition of what is qualified is preceded by that; 'the word of that'.[83] <The cognition is> 'Based upon the preceding words being recollected'. Even if recollections cannot exist simultaneously, nevertheless the words – whether they are fused into a single recollection or else fused into an uninterrupted string of recollections – are mutually dependent. And

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[82] The six *Vedāṅgas* are: *śikṣā* (phonetics), *chandas* (prosody), *vyākaraṇa* (grammar), *nirukta* (etymology), *jyotiṣa* (atronomy), and *kalpa* (ritual). The four *Vedopāṅgas* are: *purāṇa*, *nyāya*, *mīmāṃsā*, and *dharmaśāstra*.
[83] *pūrvapāda* (NV 17.2): *pūrvaṃ viśeṣaṇam... | tasya padam...*(NVTP 58.13-14).

so, the qualified word, when recollected, makes known the qualified meaning, which is based upon the qualifying words.

<P> Let this be granted. <However:> If a string of words, when recollected, produces knowledge of the sentential meaning, then there is no need for making known the word-meanings, and no need for making known the relationship between words and their meanings. <S> Hence, the
answer is, "through the assistance of memory..." <That is to 17.2
say:> Through the assistance of those memories of word meanings that arise from the words individually. This is what is meant: even if a string of words is employed to make known the sentential meaning, nevertheless it requires
58.20 the recollections[84] of word meanings as intermediate opera-
tions – just as logs of wood used in cooking <require> a flame as an intermediate operation. And, since it is not the case that words, whose conventional meanings are not known, cause the recollection of word meanings, the requirement of recollecting words, meanings, and understanding their relationship is justified. For if a string of words, requiring <only> the recollection of words and meanings, conveys sentential meaning, then such <a string

[84] Reading the plural *smṛtīr* (as with TNT 50.6) for the otherwise mysterious singular, *smṛtir*.

of words> as the following also would convey sentential meaning:

> Oh! The ten pomegranates are six small cakes![85]

<S> Hence he says, "when synthesized..." The meaning is: 17.2
'synthesizing' is joining – combining – word by word. And this depends upon the expectancy, suitability, and proximity
58.25 by means of their respective meanings.[86] And as this <synthesizing> does not exist in such sentences as, 'The ten pomegranates...', then one does not understand a sentential meaning from them. Thus, then, a collection of words, by virtue of merging into a single recollection and by determining a single meaning, constitutes a sentence.

59.1 "The segments of this are called parts." <P> He 17.3-4
introduces the <sentence in the> *Bhāṣya* that begins, "In 4.8-9
however large...", <by saying> "How many are these?" 17.3
<S> By way of explaining the *Bhāṣya*, the answer <given>
is "By as many..." <P> He asks, "what...?" The idea is: for 17.3; 17.3
realization is nothing other than establishment or success.

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[85] *Mahabhāṣya* I.38.5-6 etc.
[86] Naiyāyikas stipulate three conditions for a well-formed sentence: *ākāṅkṣā* 'expectancy', *yogyatā* 'suitability', and *āsatti* 'proximity' which Vācaspati lists here (58.24-25). The first is that there be syntactic fulfillment: a transitive verb 'expects' an object etc. Suitability concerns semantic appropriateness: 'Triangle drinks quadruplicity' meets the *ākāṅkṣā* condition, but fails in terms of *yogyatā*. The third condition is that the words in a sentence have to occur in proximity in time: i.e. not one word today, the second word tomorrow etc. Cf. *Tarkasaṃgraha* c.60.

<S> The answer is, "the entity..." The meaning is: the fact 17.4
that an object really is qualified by the property that was
desired to be established. <P> He asks about establishment,
"What...?" <S> The answer is, "specific..." The meaning 17.4; 17.4
is: this is the difference: establishment is a real entity, while
success is an ascertainment that relates to this and is an
attribute of men. Anticipating the objection, 'By how many
and by what kind of parts is the establishment fully real-
ized?', Pakṣilasvāmin says, "the five... of this..." He 4.8-9
<Uddyotakara> explains this, "special..." <P> He restates 17.4-5
the <sentence in the> *Bhāṣya*, and objects, "Then...verbal 17.5-6 (4.10)
testimony..." That is to say: for the thesis statement, unlike
verbal testimony, does not produce ascertainment, because
the reason statement etc. would be useless; because to be a
cause with respect to an object, activity towards which has
already been effected, violates the principle of 'being a
cause'. <S> He replies, "learned from verbal testimony..." 17.6-7
For this *śāstra* functions with the aim of teaching the
<twelve> objects of knowledge <of> soul etc. As it explains
reasoning, insofar as it is inseparably bound up with these
<objects of knowledge>, it <this *śāstra*> should indeed
explain this <reasoning>, which directly produces ascertain-
ment of the <twelve> objects of knowledge soul etc., or,
rather, produces ascertainment of the validity of verbal testi-

mony as a means of knowledge, which <in turn> teaches these <twelve objects of knowledge, soul etc.>. And the first member of this specific 'reasoning', the thesis, directly has the objects of verbal testimony as its content and indirectly belongs to <reasoning> which makes known the validity as a means of knowledge of the verbal testimony that has this as its content. Therefore, the verbal testimony is the thesis. And the purpose served by using <the expression> 'verbal testimony' in a figurative sense is this: reason-
59.15 ing is assisted by and becomes purposive through verbal testimony by its agreement on a matter, because the knowledge of matters <related by> verbal testimony is commonly spoken of as causing the highest good. Therefore, even if the thesis, which is found only in reasoning, is not verbal testimony, nevertheless this must be understood to the purport of the reasoning now under consideration. And by the same token, by virtue of its connection with matters <related by> verbal testimony, one must understand that it is also denied that the thesis has imaginary contents. Because some say that all these ordinary ways of speaking about inference and what is to be inferred <arise> through the relation of attribute and object, which is imposed by the mind only, and do not depend upon what exists or what does not exist externally.

59.20 Similarly, Pakṣilasvāmin, by figuratively using the word 'reason' to mean inference, states that inference assists reasoning (*nyāya*), "inference is the reason". <P> 4.10
Now this <reason> statement, which conveys inference, must be assisted by inference in that <the reason> is its content. And it is not the case that merely perceiving the logical mark causes the apprehension of what is to be inferred, but rather <perceiving this logical mark> in conjunction with the recollection of the relation. And the conjunction is not known through the reason-statement alone. Therefore, since the reason statement does not convey inference, how can one figuratively say that it is 'inference'? <S> Hence he
says, "Similarly... because the word 'reason' is figuratively 17.8
applied" – figuratively applied to its being inference – "to the mere perception of the inferential mark" – which is being perceived, has the form of a logical mark, and in
59.25 which there is no recollection of the relation. Pakṣilasvāmin
says, "inference is the reason". <Uddyotakara> Explains 4.10
this same <statement>, "but the second perception of the 17.9
mark..." The first perception of the mark occurs when one
60.1 grasps the relation; the second perception of the mark is with respect to the object that possesses the property to be established – <the *pakṣa* of the inference>, since it depends
on that <first perception>, "because it is the cause of the 17.9

manifestation of the recollection of this relation." <The etymological analysis of> Recollection is: 'that by virtue of which one recollects' or the latent impression. 'The manifestation of this' is making its effect noticeable, because it is its cause. In some <manuscripts> there is a <variant> reading, 'because it is the cause of the manifestation of the cause of the recollection of the relation'. But this is quite obvious.
Hence, "it is called 'the reason'". What is meant is this: 17.9
although 'the second perception of the logical mark' is pure, because it immediately causes the recollection of the relation, it in fact is accompanied by the recollection of the rela-
60.5 tion. And inference is like this. And thus it is established that the figurative use of the <reason> statement that conveys this <inference> to mean 'inference' is appropriate. And since there is thus a connection with a real logical mark, one should understand that it is ruled out that the statement of this <mark> has as its content a logical mark that the mind has conjured up. Thus, this same purpose is to be construed in the other members that will be stated. The
*Bhāṣya* <says>, "perception is the example". <Uddyo- 4.10
takara> Explains this, "that which is the content of recollec- 17.9-10
tion..." That is to say: since there is recollection of that content of perception in regard to which the pervasion rela-
tion was previously apprehended, "Because there is reveal- 17.9-10

ing once again on the basis of perception" – because there is
recollecting once again, insofar as it is non-erroneous – "the
60.10 example" – the statement that makes one recollect this – "is
perception," because it arises from the perceptual means of
knowledge which is its basis.

<P> "But what is meant by 'comparison'?" The 17.12
meaning is: as the particle 'as it were' is used in the phrase
"that which is, as it were, perception is <called> percep- 17.11-12
tion," what is meant here by 'comparison'? <S> He
explains this same point, "because..." The *Bhāṣya* says, 17.10-11
"comparison is the application". <Uddyotakara> Explains 4.10-11
this, "one part of comparison, <namely, the correlatives> 17.13
'just as...so too...'" That is to say: for, as the application,
which operates in the form, 'And this is so', requires the
meaning of the word 'just as', which is found in the exam-
ple; hence it operates in the form, 'just as...so too...' <P>
But what is comparison, which possesses this <same part>?
60.15 <S> Hence he says, "Now as for comparison; when one 17.14-15
puts to use the teaching of comparison, 'just as'" – a cow –
"'so too'" – is a *gavaya*. 'Usage' is the direct knowledge of 17.14
the meaning of that <teaching>. 'When this is present' – cf. 17.14
when a city-dweller later goes to the forest and sees by per-
ception an individual that he had not previously seen. And
he remembers the meaning of the teaching. And he sees by

perception alone the similarity the individual that is before
him has with a cow – as he remembers one. Thus, this kind
of knowledge of the similarity <between the two>, which
causes the knowledge that, 'This individual should be called
by the term '*gavaya*'', is comparison. The meaning is: thus,
the 'just as...so too' that is found in one part – similarity –
of this comparison, which has the form of a recollection of
the meaning of the teaching and the non-perception of the
similarity between a cow and the individual *gavaya*, is also
found in the application; by this consideration alone there is
figurative use of comparison in regard to 'application'.
Because there is inclusion of all the means of knowledge,
this same <conclusion> is praised as "reasoning in the high- 4.11-12
est sense." <P> He restates the <sentence in the> *Bhāṣya*
that explains conclusion and objects, "But what...?" The 17.15-16 (4.11)
point is: surely there can be no 'convergence' – relation –
either of members or of the means of knowledge in a sen-
tence. <S> The answer is, "a single sentence". 'Fusion' is a 17.16
synthesis by the mind. <P> He asks about capacity, "But 17.16-17
what...?" <S> The answer is, "conjointly..." For capacity is 17.17
a property of words. But in this context, it is the expectancy
itself of the uncombined members and the means of knowl-
edge which are their basis that is the property of 'capacity'.
Thus, then, the single purpose is to make known the inferen-

tial mark that fully possesses all the forms; and <hence>
there is expectancy among the uncombined <members>;
61.1 therefore, it is established that the members constitute a sin-
gle sentence. He <etymologically> explains the word 'con-
clusion', "are concluded". <P> He restates the *Bhāṣya*, "this 17.17
same..." and asks, "But what is meant by" – the expression 17.17-18;4.11-12
– "'in the highest sense'?" <S> The answer is, <that> the 17.18-19
'highest sense' of the five-membered sentence <termed
'reasoning'>, "The fact that it teaches a man who is in igno- 17.19
rance". He explains this same claim through negative con-
comitance, "singly..." This is the idea to be understood: 17.19-20
even if in the ordinary world it is observed that perception
61.5 etc. singly do here and there teach a man who is in igno-
rance, nevertheless, as for the validity as a means of knowl-
edge of the *Veda* and the teaching of the <twelve objects of
knowledge> soul etc., which conduces to the highest good,
they are not established without the five-membered sen-
tence, whose assistance this *śāstra* teaches. <P> In order to
object to the separate mention of members, he poses a
dilemma: "But are members...?" <S> He asks about the 17.20-21
purpose of the dilemma, "What is the upshot of this?" <P> 17.21
The answer is, "If they are a distinct means of knowl- 17.21-23
edge..." <S> He replies, "they are not a distinct means of 17.23-24
knowledge". He states another purpose <for their separate

mention>, "These same..." That is to say: simply because 17.24-25
'they are the cause of the operation of <the categories of> cf. 17.25
discussion etc.', hence "and they are the basis for the ratifi- 17.25
cation of the true-nature". <P> He asks, "What...?" The 17.26
meaning is: for the ratification of the true-nature does not
support the members in the same way as a pot <supports>
jujubes. <S> The answer is, "The fact that they teach 17.26
<something> specific". A 'specific' thing is an object as
qualified by an attribute. The meaning is: according to the
etymology <of 'specific'> as 'that which is specified', the
fact that the members teach this <specific subject> constitutes their being the basis for the ratification of the true-nature.

In order to explain the word 'hypothetical reasoning', which comes next in order, he restates the <sentence in
the> *Bhāṣya*, "Hypothetical reasoning is not included 18.1 (4.15)
among the means of knowledge..." The meaning is: for four means of knowledge are subsumed by the word 'means of knowledge', and hypothetical reasoning is not any one of these. <P> Therefore, let it <hypothetical reasoning> be a distinct means of knowledge, different from the means of knowledge, which are subsumed by the word 'means of knowledge', not subsumed by the word 'means of knowledge', as <the categories of> doubt etc., which are not sub-

sumed by the term 'object of knowledge', are objects of
knowledge. <S> Hence, he says, "nor is it a distinct means 18.1; 4.15
of knowledge." He restates the <sentence in the> *Bhāṣya*
and states the reason, "because it is does not demarcate" – 18.1 (4.15)
because it does not ascertain. He reveals this same <claim>
through negative concomitance, "A means of knowl- 18.1-2
edge..." <P> Let this be granted. <However:> The fact that
hypothetical knowledge does not demarcate is <still> not
established, because, as is the case with doubt etc., it is a
mark for the soul, in that it is a quality <of the soul>. But NS 1.1.10
61.20 otherwise, there is no purpose served in teaching it, because
it yields nothing whatsoever. <S> Therefore, he says, "But 18.2-3
because it differentiates what the domain of the means of
knowledge is..." The meaning is: for we do not assert that
hypothetical reasoning does not ascertain in the form either
of being a quality or of having origination, but rather in
terms of its being the cause of differentiating the <proper>
domain for the means of knowledge. And thus it does not
produce nothing whatsoever. <P> He asks, "But what...?" 18.3-4
<S> The answer is, "what is appropriate and what is inap- 18.4
propriate...,'This is appropriate, this is inappropriate'." By
the particle '*iti*' he indicates that hypothetical knowledge
relates to what is appropriate and what is inappropriate.
Thus, then, he has shown the intrinsic nature of hypothetical

61.25 reasoning. He <next> states its operation, "That which is 18.4-5
appropriate in this" – is possible – "it" – hypothetical reasoning – "approves but does not ascertain". What is meant
62.1 is this: a means of knowledge, which functions in order to ascertain the true-nature, requires an implementation as its instrumental cause. And hypothetical reasoning, which by its nature consists in examining what is the appropriate and what the inappropriate domain of the means of knowledge, by approving a means of knowledge when it operates with regard to an appropriate entity, assists the means of knowledge. The means of knowledge, which is assisted by it, is capable of ascertaining the true-nature. Nor is it correct <to argue thus>: <P> If hypothetical reasoning operates with regard to the <appropriate> domain of the means of knowledge, then one can dispense with its giving assent to the means of knowledge; why does it itself not ascertain? <S>
62.5 Because in itself it is not a cause, insofar as it is dependent in that it is an undesirable consequence. For hypothetical reasoning is an undesirable consequence, <and> an undesirable consequence is not a logical reason. To be more explicit; now perception alone, when it operates with regard to the floor and when it also operates with regard to the absence of pot, insofar as it <absence of potness> qualifies this <floor>, when it is assented to by hypothetical reason-

ing as follows – 'If there were a pot here, it would, like the floor, be seen because it is appropriate that it be seen together with it <the floor>; and yet it is not seen; therefore, it does not exist' – operates with regard to the floor, as qualified by absence of pot – 'There is only this floor, there is no pot here'. In the same way, verbal testimony also operates through the assent of hypothetical reason as follows:[87] since an operative command of the lord *Īśvara*, the ultimate reli-
62.10 able authority, <such as>

> Let him who desires heaven perform sacrifice.[88]

does not tally with the effecting of a sacrifice that does not result in <the attainment of> heaven, it is not appropriate <to conclude from it> that the root meaning, even though it is conveyed by the same word, has to be effected, in that it involves suffering <by the sacrificial victim>: <on the other hand> even if it is conveyed by a different word, heaven, even if it qualifies a person, is indeed the end of effecting the sacrifice, and <it> is appropriate <that it be effected>. And it is not the case that, in the statements, 'If there were a pot', or, 'If the root meaning were to have to be effected', there is 'incompletion of the action';[89] that on the basis of

[87] This syntax here is somewhat puzzling (NVT 62.9-14, especially 62.9-12).
[88] *svargakāmo yajeta: Tāṇḍyamahābrāhmaṇa* 3.12.

which inappropriateness or, otherwise, appropriateness <is shown> though an undesirable consequence is ascertained by hypothetical reason. Therefore, it is not a means of knowledge, but, rather, by aiding a means of knowledge that operates for the sake of ascertainment, through distinguishing its <the means of knowledge's> domain, it is employed as an implementation. As it has been stated,

> Reasoning (*tarka*), which is called 'enquiry' (*mīmāṃsā*), arises from all the *Vedas*; the *Veda* <is different> from it like the nature of salt in a piece of wood found on the *Rumā* <salt-lake>.[90]

For the word 'enquiry' means 'examination into what is esteemed'. By denying what is inappropriate, hypothetical reasoning constitutes assent to what is appropriate. And insofar as it is the implementation of a means of knowledge, its difference from the *Veda* – the means of knowledge – is stated. The phrase, "the *Veda* from it," <is stated> with a desire to express no difference between the whole and its parts. And that it <hypothetical reasoning> is its implemen-

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[89] According to A.3.3.139 (*liṅnimitte lṛṅ kriyāpattau <bhaviṣyati>*), if, when the optative affix (*liṅ*) is to be used in the sense of the future tense, the conditional (*lṛṅ*) is used in its place to convey the sense of non-completion of the action. That is, the use of the conditional may imply that an action never occurred at all. Vācaspati holds that when one employs the conditional in *tarka* to exclude one alternative, he implies no intention to express the incompletion of the action from the outset.

[90] This is likely a quotation from Kumārila's *Bṛhaṭṭīkā*. Compare his *Tantravārttika* on J.M.S.1.3.7:
*yathā **rumāyāṃ** lavaṇākareṣu merau yathā yojjvalarukmabhumau* |
*yajjāyate tanmayameva tatsyāttathā bhavedvedavidātmatuṣṭiḥ* ||.

tation is revealed directly:

> For when duty is understood through the *Veda,* which is by its nature is the instrumental cause, enquiry will fulfill the part of implementation.[91]

Hence the whole <matter> is cleared up.

He says, "An example of it is given in the *Bhāṣya,* 18.5-6 (4.16-22)
*karma*..." That is to say 'the unseen' (*apūrva*), which is
caused by *karma*, or 'merit and demerit' – because he figu-
ratively uses 'being the cause' to express the effect. <P> In
62.25 order to justify this point, he asks, "But how...?" The mean- 18.6
ing is: rebirth is the right-connection <of the *ātman*> with
new gross sense-organs, ideas, and sensations as qualified
63.1 by a body; "how is *karma* the instrumental cause" of this? 18.6
<S> On this point he states an inference as the means of
knowledge, "Because it admits of difference." The meaning 18.6
is: because it is manifold. <P> He asks, "But what is 18.6-7
the...?" <S> He states the difference, "Prosperity..." Hav- 18.7-12
ing stated the means of knowledge, he introduces hypotheti-
cal reasoning, which is its implementation, "This same 18.12
difference..." <P> If there were one instrumental cause,
there would not be manifoldness; for manifold effects are
not produced from the same cause, because of the undesir-

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[91] Śālikanātha (*Prakaraṇapañcikā* 404.14-16) explicitly ascribes this verse to Kumārila (*vārttikakāramiśraiḥ* 404.8). Since it is not found in his other works, the *Bṛhaṭṭīkā* is its likely source. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa quotes this same verse in his *Nyāyamañjarī* (I.8.10-11).

able consequence that this <manifoldness> has no cause.
<S> Hence he says, "manifold..." <P> Let the cause be 18.12
manifold, in the form of such actions as sacrifices etc., the
murder of Brāhmaṇas, etc.; there is no need for *apūrvas*.
<S> Hence it is said, "fixed". The meaning is: but such 18.12
actions as sacrifice and the like, which pass away very
quickly, do not conduce to <the gaining of> heaven, which
is enduring. <P> But if it is fixed that the unseen, which is
produced by sacrifice etc., is merit, then one should always
be happy. Likewise, <if it is fixed that it is> demerit, one
would always be in misery; therefore, that pleasure and pain
are intermittent would be rejected. For an unfixed effect
does not result from a fixed cause. <S> Hence it is said,
"non-eternal..." <That is to say:> For we do not say that its 18.12
fixed state is eternality; but rather, it must remain until it
produces the knowledge of the final pain and pleasure, and
then passes away. <P> Let there be different *apūrvas*; nev-
ertheless, all of them inhere in all souls, as a whole
<inheres> in its constituent parts. And thus, the manifold-
ness you mentioned does not originate from a common fea-
ture shared by all. <S> Hence it is said, "<that inheres in 18.12
only> one substance". <P> Therefore, assume that the one
substance occurs in anything at all, earth etc., which is com-
mon to all things; nevertheless, the manifoldness is impossi-

63.15 ble. <S> Hence it is said, "determined for each soul". <P> 18.12
With the idea – 'But then why is not earth itself etc. the
cause of the manifoldness of rebirth?' – he asks, "For what 18.13
reason?" The meaning is: 'due to what cause?' <S> The
answer is, "earth etc..." <P> Let it not be earth etc., it will 18.13
be something that consists of earth etc. <S> Hence he says,
"of what consists of earth etc." He states the reason for 18.13-14
hypothetical reasoning's being <included in the category
of> object of knowledge, as stated by the *Bhāṣya*, "because 18.15 (4.23-25)
it falls within the scope of cognition."

Ascertainment is listed immediately after hypotheti-
cal reasoning because it is caused by it. He states the intrin-
sic nature of it, "Ascertainment, which is the knowledge of 18.16 (5.1)
63.20 the true-nature..." <P> If this were the case, then even per-
ceptual knowledge, which arises from impingement on the
sense-organs, since it constitutes 'knowledge of the true-
nature', would be ascertainment. <S> Hence he says, "of 18.16
the means of knowledge" That is to say: by this <statement>
he alludes to the five-membered sentence, because the
<four> means of knowledge, together with hypothetical rea-
soning, converge in this. But ultimately speaking, it is the
determination of the true-nature, preceded by hypothetical
reasoning, that is ascertainment; hence, even perception
etc., together with hypothetical reasoning, have ascertain-

ment as their end. <P> Let this be granted. <However> With
the idea – 'If fire etc. being is inferred through ascertain-
ment relating to smoke etc., the ascertainment is itself the
means of knowledge, and not its result' – he asks, "But 18.16-17
63.25 when...? <S> The answer to this well-known idea is,
"When..." He states the purpose for the explanation of 18.17-18
hypothetical reasoning and ascertainment taken together,
64.1 "These two..." In this context, 'experts' are the people 18.20-21 (5.2)
meant by the word 'people', because there can be no hypo-
thetical reasoning for <people> other than them. "<on this 18.21
or that> understanding." The meaning is: making an ascer-
tainment through examination. The remainder <of the *Vārt-
tika* on this passage> is clear by <merely> mentioning it.

The *Bhāṣya*, in order to explain discussion immedi-
ately after ascertainment, <says> "Now discussion..." 5.4-6
Uddyotakara restates this and states its appropriateness,
"Discussion..." That in which numerous speakers are 18.24-19.8
involved is so termed.[92] Since a collection of statements,
which convey the establishment and refutation of both the
64.5 prior view and the later view, of a single author of a *śāstra*
might be <termed> 'discussion', it was said, "involving 18.24; 5.4
many speakers." The meaning is: for "Because it corre- 18.24

[92] *nānā pravaktāro yasmin sa tathā* (NVT 64.4): Vācaspati's *samāsavigraha* to the *Bhāṣya*: *nānāpravaktṛkaḥ* (NB 5.4; cf. NVT 18.24).

sponds to the difference in established doctrines," both <discussants> state both establishment and refutation corresponding to their respective established doctrines. He restates the <sentence in the> *Bhāṣya*, "his respective posi- 18.25 (5.4)
tion...", and explains <it>, "the proof for his respective 18.25-19.2
position..." A 'position', on the <etymological analysis of> 'that which is set forth', is what is to be established, because one engages in establishing <this> when one has set it forth. That discussion in which there is establishment of each respective position is so termed.[93] <P> In order to elicit the meaning of this same <compound>, he asks, "What is 19.1
meant by this?" <S> He elicits <the meaning as>: "Both" – 19.1-2
64.10 the proponent and the opponent – "must state proof" – with regard to their respective positions to be established. And thus, even if they are the same insofar as they involve many speakers, the difference between discussion and captiousness is established by <the proviso of> 'establishing each respective position'; because there is no 'establishing each NS 1.2.3
respective position' for captiousness, since it is "devoid of establishing a counter-position." <P> Nevertheless, there is no difference between discussion and arguing, for both 'establishing each respective position' and 'involving many

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[93] *pratyadhikaraṇaṃ sādhanaṃ yasmin vade sa tathoktaḥ* (NVT 64.8-9): Vācaspati's analysis of the compound in the *Bhāṣya*: *pratyadhikaraṇasādhano* (NB 5.4; cf. NV 18.25-19.2).

speakers' are true of arguing. <S> Hence he says, "There is 19.2; 5.4-5
ascertainment with regard to some one position." For one
speaks in a discussion until ascertainment arises for some
one position, because the requirement is that 'both discus- cf. 601.4-5
sants in a discussion desire to know the true-nature'. But in
arguing, which is characterized as an examination of per-
sonal abilities, the ascertainment of the true-nature does not
necessarily <arise>, because there is the possibility of vic-
tory even through such <grounds for defeat as> 'non-com-
prehension' etc. Therefore, it is established that discussion
differs from arguing in that it results in the ascertainment of
some one <position>. And this point will be justified later 601.4-5
on; hence he says, "This too..." <P> He asks about the 19.2
intrinsic nature of it, "this same..." <S> The answer is, 19.2-3
"sentences..." <P> He objects, "And it..." The meaning is: 19.3 (5.5); 19.3-7
it is contradictory to speak both of 'a collection of sen-
tences' and 'knowledge'. <S> He answers, "<This is> Not 19.7-8
correct..." The meaning is: there is no contradiction,
because the concepts of 'establishing' and 'refutation' relate
to language.

He explains arguing and captiousness at the same
time, "are both different from this". By "are different" 19.9 (5.7)
means 'they are distinguished from – are differentiated
from. "Different" – differentiated – "from this" – discus- 19.9

sion. <P> He restates the <sentence in the> *Bhāṣya* and asks, "But what is the difference?" The meaning is: by vir- 19.9 (5.7)
tue of what are arguing and captiousness different from discussion? <S> The answer is: "The surplus in elements and 19.9
the deficiency in elements" respectively. He clarifies the same point, "deceit..." <P> Does this now mean that argu- 19.10
ing and captiousness are absolutely different from discus-
64.25 sion, just as they are from <the categories of> doubt etc.?
<S> He denies this by saying, "And it is precisely because 19.11
of this difference that they constitute different paths of philosophical discourse". The meaning is: that same degree of difference does not hold true universally, because there is no difference among the three insofar as they are philosophical discourse – which is a specific universal different from <that of the categories of> doubt etc. He states yet another
reason for their difference, "Moreover... because they have 19.11
different audiences." He explains this, "docile students 19.11-12
65.1 etc..." That is to say: an intractable student is one who is totally in error, obtuse due to pride in his scanty knowledge. The point is: but the docile student etc., though he is in error, is not such, because he is not arrogant.

He states the intrinsic nature of pseudo-reasons,
which come next in order, "some one or more..." They are 19.13-14
called 'pseudo-reasons' because they are false reasons, but

as they correspond to "some mark or property"[94] – one or two or three among the four or five marks, they appear like
65.5 <true> reasons. In order to introduce the <sentence in the> *Bhāṣya*, "from grounds for defeat...", he says, "They are 5.8-9; 19.14
also grounds for defeat". He introduces <it>, "grounds for 19.14-15
defeat..." <E> Having introduced <it>, he explains <it> according to the doctrine of an *ekadeśin*, "Because, it is 19.15-16
alleged, they..." in order to refute it. The expression 'it is alleged' here expresses contempt. <S> He objects to this same explanation of the *ekadeśin*, "<This is> Not correct, 19.16
because the connection fails to hold in both directions." The meaning is: is it the case that all <the categories> that are separately mentioned from grounds for defeat are objected to in a discussion? Or, rather, is it the case that all these <categories> that are objected to in a discussion are separately mentioned <from grounds for defeat>? There is no relation of invariable concomitance because there is vari-
65.10 ance in both directions. He explains this same point, "nei- 19.16-17
ther is 'having to be objected to in a discussion'..." <P> Why is there no invariable concomitance in both directions? <S> He says, "Now if..." Therefore Pakṣilasvāmin did not 19.17-18

[94] Vācaspati here (NVT 65.3-4) takes the *Vārttika* (NV 19.13) strangely: *anyatamaliṅgadharmānuvidhānāī: pañcasu caturṣu vā liṅgarūpeṣvanyatmamaṃ liṅgaṃ dharmamekaṃ dvayaṃ trayaṃ vā anuvidādhāne*.... He takes *liṅga-dharma* as a *karmadhārya*: as a *tatpuruṣa* it makes far more sense: 'property of a *liṅga*'.

state that 'having to be objected in a discussion' or 'separate mention' is an invariably concomitant logical reason; hence he summarizes, "Therefore..." One must also observe an 19.21
indirect characterization in the phrases 'because they must be objected to in a discussion' and 'because of separate mention'. Thus, then, having refuted the doctrine of the *ekadeśin*, he explains the <sentence in the> *Bhāṣya* according to his own doctrine, "But the only proper...is this..." 19.22
The purpose in mentioning pseudo-reasons separately from the grounds for defeat is what is understood directly from
65.15 the syllables of the *Bhāṣya*. While a special case is taught through teaching the general rule, the teaching of a special case indicates an additional purpose. Just as in the sentence,

Feed the Brāhmaṇas and Kaṭha

one understands that there is a special case in feeding Kaṭha; in the same way here also, as the pseudo-reasons are grasped simply by teaching the grounds for defeat, the special mention of them indicates an additional purpose. Precisely this operation of a *sūtra*-author is what one terms 'composing *sūtras*' (*sūtraṇa*). Having thus considered the intrinsic nature of pseudo-reasons – that they are specific kinds of grounds for defeat – and that discussion 'results in the ascertainment of the true-nature', Pakṣilasvāmin has
65.20 described the purpose thus: the pseudo-reasons, insofar as

they are grounds for defeat – and not <such grounds for
defeat as> non-comprehension etc. – "will have to be 5.8
objected to in a discussion". <P> Let this be granted. <How-
ever:> Let the pseudo-reasons be what have to objected to
in a discussion – and do not let non-comprehension etc. be
<what have to be objected to in a discussion>. Why, even on
this distinction <are they mentioned separately>? <S>
Hence he says, "because their purpose is to make known the 19.22
difference in bases among the branches of science." Discus-
sion, arguing, and captiousness are branches of science
because they are useful, in an indirect way, towards <the
attainment of> the highest good. By 'their basis' is meant
'operation'; 'the difference consisting in this' <operation>,
because their purpose is to make this known. For the same
reason he says, "But...in arguing and captiousness..." <P> 20.15 (5.9)
He objects, "But why...?" The meaning is: if pseudo-rea- 19.23
65.25 sons were employed in discussion, then they would be
objected to as being grounds for defeat; but there is no
<such> employment of them, because they are not <valid>
means of knowledge, and because discussion <consists in>
'the establishing and refutation through the means of cf. NS 1.2.1
knowledge and hypothetical reasoning'. Therefore, pseudo-
66.1 reasons are nothing but grounds for defeat. And hence there
is no separate mention <of them>, because they are under-

stood simply by teaching the grounds for defeat. <S> He replies, "Because they share a generic feature with the 19.23-25
means of knowledge." Surely a proponent and an opponent do not employ pseudo-reasons with this idea <that they are such>, but rather with the idea <that they are true> reasons. And thus, they are employed in a discussion; therefore, the separate teaching <of pseudo-reasons from grounds for defeat> has this purpose: let the pseudo-reasons, insofar as they are grounds for defeat, and not non-comprehension etc., be objected to in discussion. <P> He objects to this same point by posing a dilemma, "some...in a discus- 20.1-5
66.5 sion..." <S> He replies, "<This is> Not correct – 'because 20.7-9
the actual nature of an object depends upon its characteristic property' is what we say." A 'characteristic property' is 'that by which a thing is characterized'; <that is> the nature – the same in species, different in species, or different in genus[95] of both discussion and of grounds for defeat. For the actual nature – the fixed state – of them 'depends upon this' <characteristic property>. Having made the general claim that only some, but not all, grounds for defeat <are to be objected to> in a discussion, he applies this same 'dependence on characteristic properties' to the specific instance

[95] *lakṣyata iti lakṣaṇam, samānāsamānajatīyāvyāvṛttaṃ rūpam...* (NVT 66.5-6).

intended, “of discussion.” <P> He objects to what is stated, 20.7-9
“because they resemble means of knowledge.” The meaning 20.9-10
is: for when they are both ascertained, they produce discus-
sion; and ‘ascertainment is the end of the <valid> means of cf. 16.18; 5.1
66.10 knowledge’. How is there scope for an invalid means of
knowledge? <S> The answer is, “error...” The point is: not 20.10
every ascertainment is based on a valid means of knowl-
edge, because we perceive that they are also based on an
invalid means of knowledge; because, if the case were oth-
erwise, the undesirable result is that there is no action due to
error. And if both discussants are not in error, then a real
object would simultaneously be characterized by two con-
tradictory properties. <P> He asks, “But what...among doc- 20.12
ile students?” The point is: there can be no mutual
destruction of the worshipped and the worshipper. <S> The
reply is: “Failure to convey the intended meaning” only – 20.12
not reviling. And the separate treatment of the pseudo-rea-
66.15 sons is not intended for mere ascertainment in a discussion;
rather, its purpose is to include all those grounds for defeat,
even if they have not yet been generated, in regard to which
there is a conflict with the apprehension of the true-nature.
And thus even <the grounds for defeat of> underextension,
overextension, and wrong doctrine are included. <P> He
asks about them, “underextension, overextension...” <S> 20.13

The answer is, "means of knowledge". He restates the 20.15
*Bhāṣya*, "But...arguing and captiousness...", and justifies 5.8
<it>, "But...in arguing and captiousness..." The meaning 20.16-17
is: an egotistical seeker of victory, censured through the
grounds for defeat <of> non-comprehension etc., stripped
of his egotism and led towards a desire to understand the
66.20 true-nature, is thereafter taught through discussion.

He restates the <sentence in the> *Bhāṣya*, whose
purpose is <to set forth> the purpose of the separate teach-
ing of <the categories of> deceit, futile answer, and grounds
for defeat, "deceit..." He explains a part of <this sentence 20.18-19 (5.11)
in> the *Bhāṣya*, "for understanding's sake," <by saying> 5.10
"only for the sake of thorough knowledge"; the end of the 20.18-19
thorough knowledge <of them> is stated – "one avoids...in 20.18
one's own statements" – does not employ <them>, and pro-
duces <them> in the sentences of one's opponent. <P> He
objects, "Deceit, futile answer, and grounds for defeat..." 20.19-20
<That is to say:> For having here stated that 'one avoids cf. 20.19
futile answer in one's own statements, yet the employment
66.25 is not in itself proper'. <S> Why? <P> "because it involves 20.20
a contradiction." He explains this, "in one's own state- 20.20-22
ments..." <S> He replies, "There is no contradiction..." 20.22
<P> Why? <S> "because <its usage> serves to dispel any 20.22
67.1 questions." <S> He explains this: "What is meant by" this 20.22

<sentence in the> *Bhāṣya*, "and it usage is in itself simple"? 5.12-13
"When a futile answer is employed by an opponent" – one's 20.22-25
opponent in a discussion – the discussant "tells the umpires'
– the judges – "He has used a futile answer" – his opponent
in the discussion. "They" – the umpires – "would ask him";
My learned man, "How" – in what manner – "<has he
used> a futile answer? Which futile answer?" – among the
twenty four futile answers. This is the 'question' on the part
of the umpires. The meaning is: 'the employment of futile
answer is in itself easy' in order to dispel this <question>.
He summarizes the subject under consideration, "There- 20.25-26
fore..."

Akṣapāda has stated that the purpose of the *śāstra* is
the attainment of the highest good, which has the form of
the absolute cessation of pain. But Pakṣilasvāmin, <holding
that> that of which analytics is not the instrumental cause is
indeed not the purpose of prudent men, says, "This same 5.13
analytics..." Uddyotakara explains this same <sentence in
the> *Bhāṣya*, "This same analytics – the science of reason- 21.1
ing..." Even if the other branches of science devote them-
selves to a subject-matter that indeed admits of being
known by the means of knowledge, nevertheless it is
through their dependence upon the means of knowledge etc.
– which this branch of science alone can explain – that they

engage in the respective entities that they have to explain,
but they do not explain the means of knowledge etc. also.
As, for example, inference, when it operates in dependence
on perception etc., does not right then bring the content of
perception etc. within its scope. Thus, by this explicit men-
tion of 'that which assists the branches of science' is the cf. 21.7-8
operation of analytics revealed. Now, since analytics is the
means even in respect of these things – chants, the *Agni-
hotra* sacrifice, ploughing etc., which actions the branches
of science must explain, he says, "the means to all actions" 21.5
– which the <other> branches of science have to explain,
but not also the actions of ploughmen, hunters, etc. For
there is only comprehension from the words of the
'branches of science' to the extent that prudent men find
67.15 satisfaction. From such <words> as

The sun is the sacrificial post[96]

etc. let there be no <comprehension> that the sun etc. is a
sacrificial post etc. Therefore, once one has ascertained the cf. 147.17
true-nature of its meaning by way of the introduction of
doubt, examination, and the means of knowledge, he should
then enter upon the Vedic science. This same line of reason-
ing should be followed in both <branches of science> polit-
ical science and agriculture. "Therefore the other branches 21.6

[96] *Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa* 2.1.5.

of science perform" – chants etc. – "which the means of knowledge have illumined" – which analytics has purified:

67.20 what has to supplied is 'as their domain'. Moreover, all the branches of science, by making known, in their respective ways, that substances, qualities, and actions are approved or non-approved means, make wise men act or make them desist. <P> Therefore, should they make <wise men> act in regard to what is to be effected, the means to effect it, and the implementation without any distinction, or, rather, only with regard to the means and the implementation?[97] <S> Between these, if the 'to be effected' element also falls within the scope of prompting to activity, then the violence that is to be effected in <the course of> the *Śyena* sacrifice etc. does not produce harm, since it is enjoined. But if, the means and the implementation alone are enjoined, after restating the 'to be effected element' as what obtains according to one's desire, then the violence that is to be effected in <the course of> the *Śyena* sacrifice etc., since it is not enjoined, produces harm, because of the prohibition,

67.25 One should harm no creatures.[98]

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[97] Cf. *Arthasaṃgraha* (*CSS* 21: 17.1-2)*: sā ca bhāvanāṃśatrayamapekṣate sādhyaṃ sādhanamitikartavatāṃ ca kiṃbhāvayet kena bhāvayet kathaṃ bhāvayediti* ||
'And this effecting of a sacrifice (*bhāvanā*) depends upon three elements: the *sādhya*, the *sādhana*, and the *itikartavyatā*: namely, what one must effect, by what one must effect it, and how one must effect it'.

[98] Cf. *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 8.15: *ahiṃsantsarvabhūtānyanyatra tīrthebhyaḥ...*

Thus in this case, non-prompting with respect to the 'to be effected element' has to be understood through analytics. Likewise, the fact of being that which prompts and of not

68.1 being that which prompts etc., which relate to the performance, have to be understood through analytics. Likewise also in <the branches of science of> agriculture etc. Since all the branches of science thus depend upon analytics, he says, "the basis of all *dharmas*" – the basis of those *dhar-* 5.15
*mas* which are found in all the branches of science, that prompt men to activity. But Uddyotakara explains <this sentence in the *Bhāṣya*> with the understanding that it is actually the basis of the branches of science by virtue of *dharma*: "It is the basis because it assists all the branches of 21.7-8
science. That is, it assists all the branches of science..." The

68.5 meaning is: this <analytics> assists insofar as it is an accessory to that activity which a <specific> branch of knowledge has to perform.

<P> Let this be granted. <However:> If the means of knowledge etc., which must be explained <by this *śāstra*>, are beneficial to all the branches of science, therefore the absolute cessation of pain is not understood from the word 'the highest good' to be the end of analytics. For it <the end> is understood through reflecting on the intrinsic nature of what has to be explained, and this <the attainment

of the highest good> is common to the other branches of science. Therefore, there is the undesirable consequence of there being a mixture <of the highest good to be attained by this *śāstra*> with the highest good that is to be attained by the other branches of science. <S> Hence he says, "This 21.9 (5.17)
same 'knowledge of the true-nature' and 'attainment of the highest good' have to be understood in accordance with the branch of science to which they belong." That is to say: now
68.10 the other branches of science are employed for a different highest good, which that branch of knowledge alone can produce through reflection of the intrinsic nature of that the 'knowledge of the true-nature' of which they produce, and not for another. But in this <branch of science>, even if the means of knowledge etc. are common, nevertheless as they are mentioned in conjunction with the objects of knowledge, soul etc., which are unique <to this *śāstra*>, they apply to the intended highest good only.

"properly acquired..." – the acquisition of a sub- 21.11
stance, that is an instrument involved in an oblation, by a <ritually> pure procurement. By explicitly mentioning "etc.", one understands a whole collection of elements that 21.11
are sequentially bound. By "that they are untainted" <is 21.11
meant> that there is no pollution due to dogs, cats, etc. That is: because of the explicit mention of "etc.", the idea is clar- 21.11

ified. The remainder is not obscure.

<P> Thinking that – 'The teaching of <the catego-
ries> beginning with discussion etc. <and> ending with
grounds for defeat hinders <the attainment of> the highest
good, insofar as it causes pride, conceit, etc., in that they are
means to victory in <debate>' – he objects, "pride, conceit, 21.18-20
etc...." <S> He replies, "<This is> Not correct, because it 21.20
involves a failure completely to understand the meaning of
the *sūtra*." The meaning of the *sūtra* is not this: 'The knowl-
edge of the true-nature of all <the categories> is directly
conducive to the highest good', but rather, 'The knowledge
of the true-nature of the soul etc.' But <the knowledge of
the true-nature of the categories> other than this <conduces
to the highest good> indirectly. The meaning is: thus, as the
quelling of egotism etc. of one's opponent is an intermediate
operation which arguing etc. perform, they are not impedi-
ments to the highest good, but rather foster <it>. And as
'being the instrumental cause of pride, conceit etc.' is an
non-established logical reason, he says, "And as for this..." 21.23-25
He summarizes, "Therefore, the knowledge of discussion 21.26
etc. is not the instrumental cause of desire etc."

The <particle> '*iti*' indicates the completion of the 21.26
<*Vārttika* on the> *sūtra*.

69.1 Mother Sarasvatī, bowing repeatedly in obeisance with cupped hands, I here request something – listen; be so attentive to my words and thoughts that they do not falter in respect of Vācaspati's words.[1]

69.5 In the expression "whom all should propitiate" the 22.4
word "all" is meant to express the whole class of living things subject to *saṃsāra*, because they indeed propitiate
him. In the expression "the ruler of all" <the word 'all' is 22.2
meant to express> the totality of desires and their fruition, because these depend solely upon the lord. In the expression
"the creator of all" <the word 'all' is meant to express> the 22.2
totality of material causes, because they are indeed pervaded by his creative activity. In the expression "the 22.3
destroyer of all" <the word 'all' is meant to express> the mass of all things that are transient, because they indeed
will be destroyed by him. In the expression "all-powerful" 22.1
<the word 'all' is meant to express> the aggregate of all effects, because they indeed are the province of his power.
In the expression "the knower of all" <the word 'all' is 22.3
meant to express> the totality of all things that can be known, because they indeed are the content of his knowl-
69.10 edge. In the expression "The all-pervading" <the word 'all' 22.1
is meant to express> the totality of all material substances,

[1] Note the pun on *vācas* (NVTP 69.3-4) 'words' in Vācaspati's name.

since they alone are specifically pervaded by him. Whereas the other <immaterial substances> <are pervaded> through
them <the material substances>.[2] In the expression "all 22.2
forms" <the word 'all' is meant to express> the totality of all *kārakas*, because they indeed are like our bodies etc., insofar as they have to be governed by his effort directly. It is precisely for this reason that there is no requirement for another body in this case, for that would be like a staff etc. among things that are not to be governed through his effort directly. But it is not like a body among things that must be governed through his effort directly. Whereas the word
"wielder of *pināka*," by proclaiming his title, which is 22.1
caused by his bearing <this> specific weapon, indicates that the removal of an obstacle to what is undertaken alone is
69.15 desired. Construing <the *maṅgala* verse as here proposed> based on question and answer, in terms of <each antecedent word's being> the effect and <each succeeding word's being> the cause, is superior. But if one construes it according to its literal form, the answer to be essayed for the undesirable consequence that there is a repetition of meaning is that there is praise only.

"I bow in obeisance..." "Merit" is that which puts 22.5; 22.5

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[2] *itarasya tu tadvārā* (NVTP 69.10-11). Śrīkaṇṭha: ***itarasya tvamūrtasya*** *punarākāśāderīśvarātmanā saha saṃyogaḥ* | ***taddvārā*** *mūrttādvāreṇa* | *saṃyuktasaṃyoga iti yāvat* (ŚṬ 1.11-12).

an end to. “Knowledge” is the direct cognition of the soul, 22.5
as discriminated from the body etc. “Dispassion” is absence 22.5
of desire. “Mastery” is victory over the elements and the 22.5
sense-organs. “Endowed with” these: for this very reason 22.5
“treasure of pure utterances.” For lack of discrimination is 22.6
caused by demerit. Non-dispassion is caused by lack of dis-
crimination, lack of mastery is caused by non-dispassion.
69.20 And impurities of statements originate from this. Now these
<impurities of statements> are three.[3] Among them, the first
70.1 is lack of content. The second is erroneous content. The
third is content that has no purpose. How will these belong
to a great sage who has conquered the ‘elements and the
organs’? For the speech of one who has not conquered the
elements, but desires to speak, is lacking in content, because
the effort of such a person fails to reach completion. And all
the statements of one who has not conquered his sense-
organs have false meanings, as they are caused by misun-
derstanding or by a desire to deceive; and <all the state-
ments> of one who has not subdued his mind, careless and
mad, have no purpose. And Akṣapāda himself will fully
70.5 explain these impurities of statements in <his discussions
of> deceit, futile answers, and grounds for defeat.[4] Since he

[3] The three *vacasām aviśuddhayaḥ* are: *nirabhidheyatā, viparītābhidheyatā, and niṣprayojanābhidheyatā* (NVTP 69.20-70.1).

is not like this, he is a "treasure of pure utterances." For the 22.6
same reason he is "the preserver"; he promotes the tradition, 22.6
which is able to safeguard the apprehension of the true-
nature.

Having thus done homage to his higher and lower
teachers, he reveals the uniqueness of his undertaking in
order to bring tranquility to the minds of students, "work." 22.7
<P> One who uses the title "Brief Commentary on the Pur- 22.8
port" (*tātparyaṭīkā*) reveals a concise work that is intended 22.7
for ready usage; and it is not the case that he intends to state
in summary fashion a collection of established doctrines
and nothing else for students who are devoid of understand-
ing the 'how'. Or, if that is the case, let there be the *Upa-*
70.10 *niṣads* alone. Or let them be the teachings of the teacher,
according to the maxim of the clenched fist of the corpse.[5]
What purpose does it serve? <S> Hence he says, "it refutes 22.7
all objections." <P> <As> The work's purport must be
explained thus: 'and the objections must be refuted', hence
once again the work is ponderous. <S> Hence he says,
"solely on the pretext of explaining the work." 22.7

<P> There are <already> many such commentaries

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[4] Akṣapāda does not use these terms: see NS 1.2.10 (*chala*); NS 5.1.1-43 (*jāti*); NS 5.2.1-21 (*nigrahasthāna*).

[5] Thakur reads *śavamuṣṭinyāyena* (NVTP 70.10). Abhayatilaka has *śiva-muṣṭinyāyena*, but his explanation is not helpful in understanding the meaning: *upapattyapekṣārāhityena ityarthaḥ* (NA 2.10).

on this ancient commentary which great men have readily
accepted; hence this work <of yours> has no purpose. <S>
Hence he says, "I desire..." <P> If these commentaries 22.9
involve no disruption in the tradition of authors, how can
they be "bad commentaries"? But if the tradition has been 22.9
disrupted, how can this *Tātparyaṭīkā* of yours, in turn, that
belongs to a disrupted tradition, be a good commentary?
<S> Hence he says, "very ancient." The meaning is: for the 22.10
tradition of Uddyotakara is the flower among those <com-
mentaries>. And this faded, as it were, by the progress of
time. It is appropriate <to say> here: 'However, the elixir of
teaching which he had obtained from his *guru* Trilocana is
being given in order to give new life to those <commentar-
ies>'. And it is not appropriate that this be given to those
that are "sunk in the muck of bad commentaries"; therefore, 22.10
having pulled <them> up from this <muck>, the "rescuing" 22.10
<of them>, in the form of lodging <them> under the roof of
his own commentary, is indeed proper.

<P> Thus it is perfectly well known from scripture
etc. that "noble Akṣapāda" is 'foremost among sages'; what 22.11; cf. 6.1
good is served by announcing this? Nor is it fitting that this
be used excessively. And the fact that he is the author of that
*śāstra*, which is the root cause of the universe's tranquility,
is what reveals his composing this. And what good is served

by revealing this also? <S> Namely: the fact that his own commentary has this <same> content is understood directly

71.1 from his explaining this. <P> What good is served by mentioning this <same-contentness>? And it is not appropriate for this great ocean of *nyāya* to make such a show of arrogance[6] at the outset. Therefore, there must be a purpose

here. <S> He states this, "that..." "This is dispelled." By 22.11-13; 22.16

realizing that – "This" – the 'pitch darkness of bad reasoning, which obscures the *śāstra*, produced by Dignāga etc.' – cf 22.14-15

must be removed, he reveals that this commentary is on the

71.5 *śāstra* only. And the *Bhāṣya*, which has the form of describing this <*śāstra*>, is not thought to be a super-addition to the *śāstra*, insofar as it forms part of the body of the *śāstra*, as *Mīmāṃsā* <is not thought to be a super-addition to> the *Veda*. It is for just this reason that the present commentary (*ṭīkā*) does not stand in contradiction to <this *śāstra*> which

ends with the *Vārttika*. Therefore, the explanation that, "a 6.2

commentary on the *śāstra*," his work on the *Bhāṣya*, "will be composed in order to put to an end to the misunderstanding of it due to bad logicians," must be disregarded as con-

tradicting the *Ṭīkā*. <P> But what is the aim of "his 22.16

restatement of the purpose stated in the <first Nyāya>

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[6] *uttānatāpratibhāsa* (NVTP 71.2). Abhayatilaka glosses *uttānatā* by *auddhatya* 'arrogance' (NA 2.19).

*sūtra*"? For by restating it nothing positively enjoined or
prohibited is found. <S> Hence he says, "The *sūtra*..." <P> 22.16-18
What is accomplished by his demonstration that "his own 22.17
commentary has a purpose"? <S> Hence he says, "prudent 22.17-18
men..." <P> Those who desire to explain act with explanation as their aim. Hence their sole purpose when they engage in explanation is explanation; what need is there for
another purpose? <S> Hence he says, "explanation for its 22.17
own sake..."

The meaning is: this is the intention of Uddyotakara: [71.13-18]
for purpose has two varieties, the principal and the secondary. Between these, the principal <purpose> is simply a human end (*puruṣārtha*). But the other is an element of that. Thus, those who seek the principal <purpose>, who strive for the means to this, act with regard to this: hence this <means> too is actually a purpose. Hence, when there is a principal purpose there is a secondary purpose, but in the absence of that <principal purpose> this <secondary purpose> too could not exist; therefore, purposelessness alone remains. Nor does this have a principal purpose independently; therefore, that of which this is an element, to that belongs the principal purpose; once this has been revealed, a prudent man engages in activity. From this <line of> reasoning – 'An element of this <*Bhāṣya*> lacks an end in juxtapo-

sition with that <the *śāstra*> whose possession of an end is made manifest by <this> portion of the *Ṭīkā*' – one should also understand that this <*Vārttika*> is an element of the *śāstra* only, not an element of the *Bhaṣya*.[7] For the *Bhāṣya*
71.20 does not independently have a principal purpose, whereby the *Vārttika* would become an element of it. Therefore, <the statement> in its literal form is blameless.

<P> It is perfectly well known in such <statements found in the> *Upaniṣads* as,

Tranquil, subdued[8]

that "tranquility" is the control of the action-organs,[9] and 6.1
yet that is not a human end. Hence it is not the principal pur-
pose. <S> Hence he says, "And hence..." <P> To assert 22.18-19
72.1 "for the tranquility of the world" is difficult, because it can- 6.1
not be conceived and because it is impossible. Surely no one in any respect acts out of a desire to benefit the world, and hence we conceive that even a sage is such. And <some manuscripts> read 'even a sage who dwells in the forest'. Nor is this possible, because those who desire <worldly> enjoyments are incapable of being set into action <towards tranquility>. Nor does the world itself desire liberation.

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[7] The latter part of this passage is confusing (NVTP 71.18-19); the translation follows Śrīkaṇṭha's explanation (ŚṬ 2.20-22).
[8] Cf. *Subālopaniṣad* 9.14.
[9] *karmendriya*: see ŚṬ 2.23-25 *vākpāṇi*.

Therefore, the one to undertake it alone must be explained – the pupil, whose forms of being a *Brāhmaṇa* etc. are
72.5 grasped from other systems. And his forms are: full possession of tranquility, control, and the like, the discrimination of what is eternal from what is not eternal, dispassion towards enjoyments in this world and in the next world, and a desire for liberation.[10] But he who, simply lacking the proper qualification,[11] acts upon the *Brahmakāṇḍa* no less than the *Karmakāṇḍa*[12] does not achieve his end. <P> The following <objection> might apply here: in the first place this doubt as to qualifications does not have to do with the end, because that is not the domain of human striving, and because there is no prohibition against a thing's merely being wished for. But, rather, it has to do with the means, because this alone is the domain of the *śāstra* and the domain of human activity. And thus, just like liberation, the knowledge of the true-nature is actually the end – insofar as it has purposiveness, because it is not actualized.[13] But the
72.10 means is the means of knowledge, nor is the adoption of inference and perception prohibited for *Śūdras* etc., as is the

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[10] *Śāṅkarabhāṣya* 1.1.1 (pp. 71.2-73.1 Nirṇayasāgar edition).
[11] *anadhikārin* (NVTP 72.6)
[12] The *Karmakāṇḍa* is the portion of the *Veda* concerned with ritual: the *Brahmakāṇḍa* (more or less synonymous with the *Upaniṣads*) with soteriology: see *Śāṅkarabhāṣya* to VS 1.1.1.
[13] Taking *tadarthatayā* as in NVTP 73.8 (cf. ŚṬ 3.11).

study of the *Vedas*, whereby he would have no eligibility for them also. If this is the case, then, by coming to know of fire from smoke or from perception, he would be in sin, as if here were studying the *Vedas*. Nor are perception and inference, which concern the soul, specifically prohibited for *Śūdras* etc., like an initiated *Brāhmaṇa*'s seeing an outcaste etc., because there is no teaching of atonement. On the contrary, his qualification itself is actually ascertained from such *smṛti* passages as,

> Women, peasants, *Śūdras*, and others of sinful-birth.[14]

72.15 Therefore, just as this specific heaven is achieved by one, even if he is not qualified in Vedic sacrifices etc., through another means, such as obedience etc. towards a man of the three highest castes, in the same way if the knowledge of the soul is produced even by a *Śūdra* through another means, inference etc., what is the defect in this? <S> This is true. However, inference, when it is confirmed as being in agreement with scripture, determines its object, but not when it
contradicts that. Which he <Pakṣilasvāmin> says, "But that 3.8
<inference> which contradicts perception and scripture is pseudo-reasoning." And this ascertainment of the non-contradiction, through non-contradiction with scripture,

[14] *Bhagavagītā* 9.32.

depends upon the ascertainment of the subject matter of that
72.20 <scripture>. And in this the *Śūdra* etc. is simply not qualified. But one who, disregarding this <subject matter of scripture>, takes refuge in mere inference, would only produce what is harmful – such as <begging with> a vessel made from a human skull etc. Therefore, as the *śāstra* operates insofar as it states the same thing as does scripture, only he who is qualified in the latter is qualified; therefore, *Śūdras* etc. are, so to speak, unqualified. Hence some say
that the word "world" has the sense of 'all those who are 6.1
73.1 qualified'. Thus he says, "For the supremely compassion- 22.19-20
ate..." For there actually are some people whose hearts are tender out of compassion, to whom the world itself is a friend. If this is not the case, the undesirable consequence is that the <following> command has no meaning,

By providing safety to all beings.[15]

Compassion is the desire for the removal of another's suffering with no ulterior motive whatsoever. And just as this
73.5 belongs to one who sees an individual suffering, why could it not likewise belong to one who sees the word itself suffering? But if this does <belong in this way>, what, pray, is impossible in his acting towards a means for its removal? <P> This <compassionate man>, even if his heart is tender

[15] *Manusmṛti* 6.39.

out of compassion, would teach only one who desired to be taught – not the opposite, for a singer does not sing among the deaf. <S> Hence he says, "If no one... thus..." The 22.20-21
meaning is: for it is not the case that because a sick man does not, to his misfortune, act upon the instruction of Caraka etc., that the purposiveness of this <instruction> comes to an end.[16]

<P> If one does not see that there is nothing but sin in teaching those who are unqualified, how could he be one whose words are worthy of attention? Or, if he does see, <how> would he not act? If, even though he sees, he acts out of compassion, he would be negligent. By the same token, who will lend any credence to the words of one who has no dread of the next world? <S> Hence he says,
"Nor..." Even if neither demerit or merit actually arise for 22.21-22
him, because his delusion has vanished, – for he will say,

> The activity on the part of him who has eliminated suffering does not lead to <any> reattachment <to suffering>. NS 4.1.63

– nevertheless, because the elimination of suffering is <so> hard to comprehend, after admitting the origination of sin,
he stated that the "power of their asceticism" leads to the 22.23
absence of that. <P> Even so,

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[16] Caraka is a famous physician, after whom a medical treatise is named.

It is far better not to touch muck than to
wash it off.[17]

<S> Hence he says, "Moreover..." The meaning is: for it is 22.22
not the case that able men, who are ruled by compassion, do not rescue cows that are sunk in the muck because they are afraid of being smeared by the muck; rather, after they rescue <them>, they wash off the muck. With the idea – <P>
73.20 'If one is not qualified, how is he successful? But if he is
such <successful> how is he not qualified? – <S> he fully
explains what is meant, "For such is the power of their 22.23-23.2
asceticism." The meaning is: for just as "these kinds of sins [73.21-73.4]
vanish through the power of their asceticism," in the same 22.23
way just through the power of asceticism do those who are unqualified also gain their ends insofar as their resolve is true; hence there is no contradiction at all. Nor is it the case
74.1 that they are unqualified relative to their end. <P> How
therefore <are they unqualified>? <S> Relative to a sacrifice. But even <the claim> that a defective sacrifice performed by one who is not eligible is not adequate to <produce the desired> end is not correct, because that is only fulfilled by the good qualities of the specific sacrificer. The sacrificer alone, by performing a sacrifice that should not be performed, would produce sin, in the same way as a

[17] *Mahābhārata* 3.2.47.

wise man who assists kings. And this <sin> vanishes only through very severe asceticism. Therefore, according to the maxim,

> That is path on which great men go.[18]

we too instruct those who are unqualified. Hence he says, "and...not..." <P> How, by his putting an end to the 'mis- 22.23-23.1
understanding of it due to bad logicians' would the *śāstra* cf. 6.2
be benefitted? <S> He says, "bad logicians..." By "misun- 23.2-3; 23.2-3
derstanding" is meant 'incorrect understanding'. (6.2)

<P> Now, at the beginning of an action prudent men, desiring the completion of their undertaking through the absence of any impediments, first pay homage to the desired deity and then proceed. And one frequently sees a variation in various instances: because there is no completion of an undertaking even for one who performed homage, because there is completion of an undertaking even for one in the opposite state <who did not perform homage>, <and> because there is no completion of an undertaking even for one in the opposite state.[19] Nor, in this matter, as is the case with,

> He who desires rain should perform the *Kārīrī* sacrifice.[20]

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[18] *Mahābhārata* Appendix I.32.68.
[19] The 'variation', then, is that there is no positive and negative correspondence between performing homage and completing an undertaking: hence, there is no need to perform one.

is there is a scripture <that states>, 'One who desires the completion of his undertaking should pay homage to the
74.15 divinity', whereby we posit that, even in the case of variation <the causes are> defects in the action, the agent, or the means.[21] <P> With the idea – 'Therefore this <principle> is manifested by such unfounded commonplaces, as

> One who desires wealth should do homage to the spirit that dwells in this banyan tree.[22]

– <he says,> why then did Uddyotakara not 'compose an cf. 23.4
homage to the desired deity'? <S> Hence he says, "blame- 23.4
less..." The meaning is: even the blameless conduct of the learned, is, like perception, indeed the means of knowledge for the actual existence of <otherwise non-extant> scripture; both because there can be no conduct of the learned that has no basis, and because that whose basis lacks a means of knowledge could not fail to be in contradiction with <conduct> that has a valid means of knowledge. And if this is so, the absence <of completion> depends upon a defect in the
74.20 action, agent, or means. And if this is not so, the presence <of completion depends upon> a wealth of good deeds in another existence. But the experience of an absence of posi-

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[20] Cf. *Taittirīya Saṃhitā* 2.4.6-9; *Śāṅkhāyana Śrautasūtra* 14.35.1; *Śābarabhāṣya* to JMS 2.2.28-29.
[21] *karmakartṛsādhanavaiguṇyam* (NVTP 74.15).
[22] Provenance unknown.

tive and negative concomitance, which has to do with a
means of knowledge other than scripture, rules out the rela-
tion of cause and effect. <P> If this is so, why did he not
perform <an homage>? <S> Hence he says, "in the tru- 23.4
est..." <P> If it had was performed, how then did this magi-
cally disappear so that it is not extant? <S> Hence he says,
"nor...introduced..." A familiar instance of this same point 23.5
<is given> "Nor for that matter..." The meaning is: nor, for 23.5-6
75.1 that matter, is the introduction of this <homage> too, like
the homage to the desired deity, employed elsewhere. <P>
Students also should be made to understand such conduct of
the learned. Nor could they be made to understand without
the introduction of this. <S> Hence he says, "had another 23.6
<kind of> benediction..."

"In this" – 'in the *śāstra* that has to be explained'. 23.7
<P> There is no restatement of the stick-long *sūtra*.[23] <S>
75.5 Hence he says, "concisely..." <P> It is perfectly obvious 23.7
that this is the first *sūtra*, because it is a statement of the
relation <between the *śāstra* and its end>; therefore, what is
the point in saying this? <S> Hence he says, "By explicitly 23.9
mentioning 'etc.'..." <P> It is by virtue of this <the first

[23] Vardhamāna gives this a slightly humorous explanation (NVTPP 28.6-29.1): ***nanu daṇḍaketi*** | *daṇḍa iva daṇḍakaṃ dīrghaṃ tāvat-padānabhidhāne 'pyādipādenaiva tadabhidhānād arthānuvādādvā saṃkṣepānuvādau na viruddhāvityarthaḥ*. Both Śrīkaṇṭha and Abhayatilaka are silent on this.

*sūtra*> that the relationship between the *śāstra* and the highest good is described: therefore, it is appropriate to call it 'the relation-statement'. But what purpose does the <expression> 'right' serve? <S> Hence he says, "desired..."[24] The meaning is: for there is also the relation- 23.10
ship between the highest good and the *śāstra* of what has to be expressed and that which expresses it, yet this is not intended here, because it does not prompt prudent men to act. For there is no acquisition of what is to be expressed from the cognition of what is to be expressed from that
75.10 which expresses it, whereby <if this were the case> one who seeks liberation would act with respect to that which expresses it; but, rather, when one seeks an end he acts upon its means. Therefore, it is only the relationship of cause and effect that is meant to be expressed. <P> The *śāstra* <is> not <mentioned> in this <*sūtra*>, or is it <elsewhere> revealed that it is the cause of the highest good. <S> Hence he says,
"the means of knowledge etc." <P> What is the purpose of 23.11-12
going beyond the conventional path?[25] Hence he says, "For 23.12-14
...not..." Even if, according to the etymological analysis of '*śāstra*' as 'that by which the means of knowledge etc. are taught' — taught again, its being the cause is even thus

[24] ***abhimatasambandha*** (NVTP 75.8).
[25] So ŚṬ.4.1-2: ***rūḍhapadātikrama iti*** | *rūḍhaṃ mārgaṃ tyatvā.*

understood, nevertheless that is <so understood> insofar as
it is involved in an operation connected with a teacher, but
not insofar as it is involved in an operation that is connected
with a pupil. And this <sense of its being a cause> is what is
meant to be expressed here. Otherwise, even if one had
come to know the means of knowledge etc. in terms of their
true-nature, one is not liberated until one should teach <it>
again. The same point is stated: "in that it is the instrumental 23.13-14
cause for understanding the true-nature of the categories"
and "not by its intrinsic nature." <P> Its being both the
cause and the instrumental cause cannot occur, because they
have different domains. <S> Hence he says, "Therefore..." 23.14-15

The meaning is: the *śāstra* is the cause and instru-
ment cause of both. However, <it is the cause> 'of the
knowledge of the true-nature of the categories' insofar as it cf. 23.14
teaches <them>, and <it is the instrumental cause> of the
highest good insofar as what embodies this operation is the
instrumental cause.[26] This same point is stated, "More- 23.15
over..." And if this is the case, "as the highest good is to be 23.14
produced by the *śāstra*," since the knowledge of the true-
nature of the categories has been shown to be the operation
by dint of its etymology, the relationship of cause and effect
holds between what embodies the operation and the opera-

[26] The reading in J *kārakatayā* seems superior.

tion. Likewise, the relationship of that which teaches and that which is to be taught <holds> between the *śāstra*, which is involved in the operation, and the means of knowledge etc. which is the content of the operation. Likewise, the relationship of being the content and that which has this content <holds> between the means of knowledge etc., which is the content of the operation, and the knowledge of the true nature, which is the operation. Likewise, the relationship of cause and effect <holds> between the knowledge of the true-nature, which is the operation, and the highest good, which is the result of the operation. Likewise, the relationship of cause and effect between the content of the operation and the result is indicated, because they are invariably related. For the operation of this is by no means
76.1 not caused by that; nor again is the content of this operation not the object of this; nor again is the operation of this dissimilar to the result of this, nor is the content of its operation <dissimilar to the result of this>; as these five <relationships> have to be stated, he states two for the sake of partial
characterization, "the *śāstra* and...of the means of knowl- 23.16-17
edge..." Having admitted that this same operation has to be understood through etymological analysis — since Pakṣilasvāmin has shown that in the <phrase in first *sūtra*>
"'knowledge *of* the true-nature'...the sixth case affix indi- 2.6-7

cates the object" — the etymological analysis of its being the instrumental cause is not contradicted.

<P> The relationships between pupil and teacher and the *śāstra* and its commentaries have been set forth by certain <authors> of the same system;[27] why are these <relationships> not set forth <here>? <S> Hence he says, "Thus, then,...content..." The meaning is: for a thing 23.17-18; [76.6-12]
should not be revealed solely on the grounds that 'It exists'. <P> How then? <S> Just that much is revealed, that, if it were not taught, there would be no activity on the part of prudent men. And the relationships between pupil and teacher etc. do not prompt prudent men to activity, because they are the end of activity. For it is established that the student must be taught subsequently to the activity,[28] and that the teacher is the one who teaches, the *śāstra* is what has to be explained, and he <the teacher> is the one who explains it etc. Nor is the teaching of the intrinsic nature of the *śāstra*, the teacher, and so forth employed because they are established through other means of knowledge. Therefore, the relationship between these two, the purpose and the content, must be stated; it is by means of this <relationship> that the *śāstra* is related with its purpose; hence it is proper

[27] See NBh 4.6-5.1 and NVTP 83.8-9.
[28] Presumably that of his teacher.

that the first *sūtra* have this purpose only. <P> If the false knowledge of a thing protracts *saṃsāra*, then the knowledge of its true-nature is itself the cause of the highest good; and the soul is such; but those things other than it, the *śāstra*, the content, etc. are not the cause of the highest good. And by the same token, they have no relationship with the highest
good. <S> Hence he says, "these categories..." 23.18-19

<P> If the fact that the knowledge of the true-nature of the <sixteen> categories of means of knowledge etc. is the cause of the highest good is established by a means of knowledge prior indeed to the operation of the *śāstra*, then the statement of the purpose in the *śāstra* serves no purpose; because if <this is> established through some other <means of> knowledge, one disregards the teaching. But if the determination of this is from this <statement of the *śāstra*> alone, then <the charge> that there is mutual dependence is hard to answer. For after a man has acted, he might ascertain his goal. And when a man has ascertained his goal, he might act. Nor does one ascertain <this> from the statement of a
"sage" prior to activity; because there can be no activity 23.19
without ascertainment of the goal in the first *sūtra* itself. And here also there is a regress in stating another other goal in order for there to be activity. If activity is first, even without ascertainment of this <purpose>, the undesirable conse-

quence is that the same situation holds true in the case of each subsequent activity. Therefore, some people say that the statement of the goal etc. serves no purpose. <S> This is improper. For men have three kinds of mental modifications: direct experience, desire, and exertion.[29] Among these, direct experience does not conform to desire, because there is apprehension of even what is undesirable. But
77.1 desire arises according to one's own inclination with regard to a human good, and it has to be made to arise with regard to the means to this through an inference as to its 'suchness'.[30] But the exertion concerns the means only. Thus, desire and exertion relate to the means. The former <desire>
is called 'activity', but direct experience is not <so-called>. cf. 1.4
Alternatively, desire that relates to an end is <called> 'activity', so that both would depend upon the ascertainment of the purpose. For it is not unknown that what has no purpose should be disregarded. Nor is it not allowed that pleasure is devoid of another purpose. Nor again does a person who
77.5 desires liberation, without desiring heaven, fail to know that sacrifice etc. is the means to this <i.e. heaven>. But with respect to the means to human ends, activity — whether

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[29] *cittavṛttayaḥ*: *anubhava* 'direct experience', *icchā* 'desire', and *prayatna* 'exertion'.
[30] *tathābhāva* (NVTP 77.1) That is: that the means is 'such' – correspondent.

characterized by desire or by exertion — is not established
through one's own inclination. That is to say: for no one
who experiences hunger, without ascertaining either the
elimination of pain or the pleasure of satisfaction through
satiety, either desires or strives to eat food. Therefore, if
someone has to be made to act towards something, he <will
so act> once he has been shown the good that is to be
achieved by and that, and if someone has to be made to
desist from something, he will <desist> once he has been
shown the harm that is by achieved by that. The purpose etc.
have <thus> been stated. <P> But there remains the follow-
ing <issue>: How will the listener <of the *śāstra*> believe
77.10 this? Or, if he does not believe <it>, how will he engage in
activity? <S> To this he says, "ascertained..." Even if there 23.19
actually is a general ascertainment of the purpose – even if
the purpose is not stated – if the trustworthiness of the sage
is ascertained – 'This *śāstra* has a purpose because it was cf. 23.19-20
stated by a trustworthy authority', nevertheless this <gen-
eral ascertainment> does not prompt to activity. For one
does not act simply <by knowing> that it has a purpose.
<P> How then? <S> On the assumption that, 'This has a
purpose desired by us'. And this specific purpose is ascer-
tained through <the sage's> statement only. Therefore, this
statement has a purpose. This same point is stated, "ascer- 23.19-20

taining the purpose etc..." What has to be supplied is: 'spe-
77.15 cifically'. And the ascertainment takes the form, 'This
highest good has the *śāstra* alone as its means', but not the
form, 'The purpose will necessarily come into being',
because, as in the case of drought etc. in agriculture, there is
the possibility even here of an impediment. Thus, this fact
that purpose prompts to activity <arises> insofar as it is the
end, but not insofar as it is the content of the activity. There-
fore, there is no contradiction to its being the means to the
desired <end>.

<P> 'If there is no ascertainment that the sage is a cf. 23.20
trustworthy authority', is there is no activity at all with
respect to his statements? If this is so, how can there even be
ascertainment of his being a trustworthy authority? <S>
Hence he says, "but because of doubt as to the matter if his 23.20
trustworthiness is not ascertained." What has to be supplied
is: 'insofar as it has to be effected by the *śāstra*'. <P> How
77.20 is there activity on the part of a prudent man while he is in
doubt? <S> Hence he says, "Surely...not..." The meaning 23.20-21; [77.20-
is: and even if there is no doubt as to the 'acquisition of 78.2]
grain' being what has to be effected by agriculture etc., nev-
ertheless there actually is doubt as to its occurring in the
future. In the same way too, prudent men act with reference
to this <doubt>. And just as in this <former> case the

absence of the <expected> result occurs one time in a hundred, whereas a myriad of <expected> results are patent, just so in this case also. For this doubt does not arise from an impingement (*āpāta*) on the sense-organs. <P> How then <does it arise>? <S> One who is compelled by a concern
78.1 that the invalidity of his means of knowledge is caused by his failure to ascertain the trustworthiness <of his authority>. But in reality, the knowledge <that> arises from the *sūtra* actually has the form of ascertaining the purpose etc.
<P> Even "in the absence of a statement of purpose etc.," 23.22
doubt is easy to understand; but the specific recollection will arise from the specific state of seeking. <S> Hence he
says, "And...not..." This is the point: for if someone acts 23.21-23; [78.3-12]
due to the statement of someone <else>, he relies upon the specific recollection just from his statement, but not independently. For it is not the case that a man afflicted with disease perversely acts upon anything, relying on himself —
78.5 'This may or may not produce the cessation of my disease'. <P> How then <does he act>? <S> From the statement of a doctor only — even if his trustworthiness has not been ascertained. But, otherwise, without understanding the statement of the purpose, one might even suspect futility: 'Is this <*śāstra*> without purpose like a book that investigates crow's teeth? Or does the goal have an impossible means,

just like relating that an elixir found on the north slope of Himālaya removes death. Or, again, does it have a purpose that is not approved — like a Southerner's teaching an inhabitant of *Āryavarta* the custom of marrying the daughter of one's maternal uncle? Or, again, even though there is another easier means to the purpose, even if it is approved and even possible, is this a difficult means, like teaching a thirsty man to dig a well near the shore of the Ganges?' And in view of these suppositions of futility, he does not act. Nor is it the case that, even if there is a statement of purpose, there is scope for these <suppositions>, because the undesirable result is the destruction of the normal practice of ordinary people. For no one who has these sorts of doubt ceases from the statement of a physician, just as if relying
on himself. "that...is useless" means 'is devoid of purpose'. 24.3
<P> The fact that the means has a performance which is
impossible is not established. <S> Hence he says, "To be 24.4-5
more explicit..." Thus there are two meanings of the word 'means of knowledge' (*pramāṇa*): that *pramāṇa* is 'that by means of which one knows' and *pramāṇa* is 'valid knowledge'. Between these, it is said with reference to the former,
"the knowledge of the true-nature of <the categories of> the 24.4-5
objects of knowledge etc. depends <in the first place> upon the knowledge of the true-nature of the means of knowl-

edge."

<P> Even if he sees that the sense-organs etc., which
are in fact not being understood <as means of knowledge>,
produce a demarcation of their proper content, how could he
speak thus? <S> Hence he says, "For...not..." The meaning 24.5-7
is: a means of knowledge, not being understood as being a
means of knowledge, demarcates its proper content, but
does not ascertain <it>. And in this <context> this is what is
intended to be said. <P> How, pray, does it not ascertain
<it>? For the sense-organ, while not being understood <as a
78.20 means of knowledge>, does not produce knowledge that is
actually indeterminate in form. <S> Hence he says, "to that 24.6
extent only..." The meaning is: even if it produces knowl-
edge that is actually determinate in form, nevertheless
because of the increasingly numerous apprehensions that
this same kind <of means of knowledge> is without an
object of knowledge and because one does not apprehend a
difference[31] doubt assaults this. <P> Is there then no ascer-
tainment in any respect at all? If this is the case, such a nor-
mal belief that 'This is simply water' etc., <and> likewise cf. 29.1
the opinion of a *pūrvapakṣin*, 'There is no ascertainment in
any respect', would be contradicted. <S> Hence, he says,

[31] The difference between a valid means of knowledge and an invalid means of knowledge: cf. NVT 24.6.

"but rather..." The meaning is: if the ascertainment of the 24.6-7
true-nature of the objects of knowledge, in some respect, is
79.1 the ultimate goal, then this <comes into being> solely by virtue of the ascertainment of the true-nature of the means of knowledge. But if it comes into being through another way, it is not ultimately real. "Being that which makes 24.6-7
something known" – being that which produces knowledge: that is to say, existence as delimited by producing knowledge. "Being invariant" – being that which produces non- 24.7
erroneous cognition; that is to say, existence as delimited by producing non-erroneous cognition. And the inherence of existence thus delimited by two limiting conditions, which is, as it were, differentiated because of the different limiting conditions, in one and the same object is not, as in the case of being artificial and of being impermanent, contradicted.
79.5 What has to be supplied is: 'by this fact of being invariant being understood'. <P> Therefore, to what end is the ascertainment of the validity as a means of knowledge used? <S> Hence, he says, "For this alone..." 24.7

The meaning is: for the means of knowledge is the [79.7-10]
instrumental cause of valid knowledge. Nor are there such specific universals as being the instrumental cause etc., because of the undesirable consequence of the overlapping of universals.[32] <P> What then <is it to be the instrumental

cause>? <S> To be the instrumental cause is nothing but 'to be the most important causal factor'.[33] But it is the specific action alone that has this as its differentiator. And in this instance, this <specific action> is that of valid knowledge; and valid knowledge is non-erroneous cognition. Hence, the
79.10 validity as a means of knowledge is nothing but invariance as characterized by producing non-erroneous knowledge. <P> If <this is> so, then the ascertainment of the <categories of> object of knowledge etc. actually presupposes the ascertainment of this <validity as a means of knowledge>.
<S> Hence he says, "And...this ..." The meaning is: for if 24.7
valid knowledge is not ascertained, then the state of being the instrumental cause of valid knowledge cannot be ascertained. <P> Therefore, let the state of being valid knowledge itself be ascertained; for this too does not have limiting conditions, such that if one does not ascertain the limiting condition, it would not in fact be ascertained. <S> Hence he
says, "To be more explicit..." By "knowledge" is meant 24.ff; 24.8
'valid knowledge'. By "validity as a means of knowledge" 24.8
he means 'the state of being valid knowledge'. "either 24.9
intrinsically..." The meaning is: either by its own nature or
79.15 by that through which one apprehends it. <P> He objects to

[32] A favorite concern of Udayana: see *Kiraṇāvalī* 23.2-3.
[33] Cf. A.1.4.42 *sādhakatamaṃ karaṇam*.

the former of these, "For surely...not..." The objection is 24.9-10
simply this: on the view that there is no difference between
an object and its attribute there is no awareness <of the
knowledge> itself. The heart <of the objection> is: and that
there is no awareness <of the knowledge> itself will be
demonstrated. On the view that there is a difference, "how 24.10
much less..." The meaning is: for if one apprehends a thing,
he would also apprehend its attribute; <this> could even be
conceived. But if he does not observe the object itself, how
can there even be talk of his grasping its attribute? And even
if sound, smell, and the like are apprehended even without
the apprehension of the ether, earth, etc., nevertheless <they
are> not <apprehended> as being attributes of them. <P>
He objects to 'or that through which one grasps it', "Nor 24.10-11
79.20 again..." The meaning is: for would this <other knowl- [79.20-80.4]
edge> be derived from internal perception or from an infer-
ential mark? How, pray, could either <kind of> knowledge
— alike whether it is produced from the internal organ or
from the inferential mark of 'being knownness' — appre-
hend what is different from a <mere> semblance of them?
But if this is so because of a difference in content, <then>,
because of the undesirable consequence that even the inval-
idity as means of knowledge is grasped intrinsically –
because in this case also the difference in content is real –

<and> because, as valid knowledge is common, its latent impression becomes manifest, even invalid knowledge is actually apprehended as valid knowledge. Hence: if it is claimed that the state of being an invalid means of knowledge depends solely upon an impediment like the state of being mother-of-pearl with respect to a mother-of-pearl onto which silverness is made to be attached; nevertheless,
80.1 even if it is understood that that which attaches has the state of being that which attaches, how is there not the undesirable consequence that the grasping of invalidity as a means of knowledge is intrinsic? But as regards the superimposition of the validity as a means of knowledge onto this also, how is there not a regress? And, without subduing the artificial nature, apprehension is not called 'apprehension' because it is overcome by doubt — like the sudden apprehension of a mendicant with regard to a pseudo-ascetic. Therefore, it is not the case that knowledge is actually apprehended. But if, by chance, it is apprehended, then <it is> only <apprehended as> knowledge; but not <as> a valid means of knowledge or a invalid means of knowledge.

80.5 <P> If it is not successful <to argue> 'from its own'
— "intrinsically," nor again, for the reason to be stated, 24.9
"extrinsically," yet this normal usage about the distinction 24.9
between a valid means and an invalid means of knowledge

is beyond doubt. Hence, let there be only the principle of self-awareness. For it is through that this <normal usage> would be successful. For we see in this no regress etc. whatever. <S> Hence he says, "Hence..." The meaning is: for 24.12; [80.8-15]
the principle of self-awareness is not, in the first place, established by a means of knowledge. Sometimes it might be adopted through the corroboration[34] of the normal usage of 'means of knowledge', if this resulted through that; but that is not the case. For just as a means of knowledge, by grasping its own self, also grasps its validity as a means of
80.10 knowledge, so too would a pseudo-means of knowledge grasp its being a pseudo-means of knowledge. Likewise, because there is false knowledge of anything, the undesirable consequence of non-activity has this state. Nor is there activity even in this case because of the imposition of the validity as a means of knowledge, because, if there is apprehension of the state of being an invalid means of knowledge, that exists intrinsically, through self-awareness, there is no possibility of superimposition; alternatively, because, there is no possibility of the principle of self-consciousness if there is no apprehension <of the validity as a means of knowledge>. If, because of the difference between object and attribute, even if there is grasping of the intrinsic nature,

[34] NA 7.13: ***sauṣṭhavāditi*** | *dārḍhyāt* |

there is no grasping of the property, namely of 'the invalidity as means of knowledge', then there would be no grasping, in turn, of its validity as means of knowledge. Therefore, even on the principle of self-awareness, there would be merely awareness of the intrinsic nature. But there is no awareness of the validity as a means of knowledge etc.

He criticizes the alternative 'or extrinsically', "Nor..." By "the domain of that..." is meant 'the domain of 24.13-15; 24.14
the domain of that' because there is a dropping of the intervening word.[35] That is to say: and in regard to perceptually derived knowledge of fire another knowledge of fire is only perceptually derived. And this has two kinds: that which arises from the same organ and that which arises from another organ. Likewise in regards to inference also, another inferential knowledge is produced from this inferential mark or from another inferential mark. And likewise in regards to verbally derived <knowledge> also, another <instance of> verbally derived knowledge arises from the statement of this <same> reliable authority or from the statement of another reliable authority. Hence the correspondence of things of the same kind is revealed. He reveals three inferences that have the form of agreement among

[35] *madhya(ma)padalopa*. This is treated in the *Vārttika śāka...* to A.2.1.60: see *Bhāṣāvṛtti ad loc.*

what is dissimilar – by the phrase "purposeful activity..." 24.13
that in which the logical mark is the effect, and by the
phrase "the domain of that..." that in which the logical 24.13
mark is not the cause nor the effect; and this is <only> a partial characterization. Even that which arises from the teaching of a reliable person is in fact correspondent knowledge. This same correspondence, when the validity as means of knowledge has to be ascertained, even if it is anomalous, nevertheless by ascertaining the 'suchness' of the object, it also ascertains that <knowledge> which prompts to action is successful; by virtue of this <consideration> alone, it is thus described.

81.1 <P> He objects, "And...all these..." <S> Having 24.14-15
thus established <the fact> that being valid knowledge is 'difficult to obtain', he applies <this> to the fact that the means of knowledge are means of knowledge, the ascertainment of which depends upon that, "And if..." <P> If there 24.16-17
is activity only through ascertainment of the validity as a means of knowledge, then this same universally accepted <activity> will render insignificant such dilemma's as 'from itself and the like'. But if activity is not hindered even without ascertaining this, then let the validity as a means of knowledge not be ascertained — what is our loss? <S>
81.5 Hence he says, "Therefore, then..." The idea is: and this 24.18-19

*śāstra* operates based on Vedic usage, but not on everyday <usage>. He applies <this> to the subject under consider-
ation, "Therefore..." <P> It is difficult to assert, "<the 24.19-20; 24.21
affix> *matup* is used to indicate 'invariable connection'", because both the means of knowledge and the object are not in fact invariable, and because <between these two> there is
no mutual inherence. <S> Hence he says, "and invariabil- 24.22
ity..." <P> Nor is there invariance, characterized by the relation of pervader and pervaded, between the means of knowledge and the objects of knowledge. <S> Hence he
says, "And this same..." This same non-disagreement – the 24.22-23
absence of disagreement – is the characteristic property of non-variation. One has to understand: 'but the fact of
81.10 demarcating a real object, which is what has to be characterized, has by its intrinsic nature non-variation, <and> that which is to be characterized and that which characterizes <it> have the same status, because they have the same basis. Even if, there being no difference in place and condition, a difference, in turn, in time is established by the facts, nevertheless, the explicit mention of this <difference in time> serves to make known that what is intended to be expressed here is a mere difference in time, in whatever way. To be more explicit, as regards a pillar at a distance there is no disagreement over apprehending a man, even at a different

time, as long as the perceiver is not near at hand. Alternatively <this cognition> must be believed until he is very close. In the same way, in the dream state there is no disagreement as to the cognition of an object, even if there is a
81.15 difference in time, until there is experience of the waking state. <P> Nor should one object as follows: if this is the case, what purpose is served by mentioning a difference in time? <S> Because, even if there is no difference in place and condition, in some cases one sees a disagreement owing even to the progress of time. As for example: because there is disagreement, due to a careful look, over the cognition of one's mistress by one who is love sick, which was produced by the impingement <of the sight of a pillar>, at a different time, even if there is a difference, there is apprehension of this <difference in time>. Therefore because of this <apprehension of a difference in time>, all the different accessory factors of the sense-organs, which occur in a temporal sequence <and> which cause very clear cognitions, are included. And even if the agreement and disagreement, which relate only to the mode, are characterized as having a
81.20 possible variation, nevertheless the explicit mention of the intrinsic nature serves to teach that non-disagreement has fixed contents, because there is non-disagreement of all knowledge with respect to an object.

<P> The logical reason, "because of successfulness 1.1
of activity," is anomalous.[36] <S> Hence he states its mean-
ing, "because it produces successful activity." Even if there 24.24
is impropriety in what was stated, 'because of successful activity', nevertheless the sixth case affix indicates a relationship, namely 'that of which the activity is successful'. And this <relationship> has actually been revealed: and this is simply the relationship of that which produces and that which is to be produced between the means of knowledge and activity. <P> It is, indeed, not the case that the invari-
82.1 able relationship between the validity as a means of knowledge and the fact of producing successful activity can be grasped by perception, because neither of these two is perceptible. For the validity as a means of knowledge has to be inferred from the fact that it produces successful activity; 'and this can only be inferred from positive and negative concomitance'. Nor, on the other hand, does the grasping of positive concomitance <arise> through inference, because, in some cases, one cannot establish the validity as a means of knowledge. Or, if one does establish it, what good does inference do? But if it is established by another inference, then there simply is simply a regress. <S> Hence he says,

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[36] *vyadhikaraṇa* (NVTP 81.22): literally 'has a different substrate'. That is, it does not have the same substrate as 'means of knowledge', as does 'because it produces successful activity'.

82.5 And thus because of a failure to include indifferent
cognitions as subjects <of an inference>, there is no 'partial
non-establishment'[37] <of the logical reason>. And as a neg-
ative <logical reason> always operates on the assumption
that there is no co-subject, hence the <the logical reason> is
neither 'common' nor 'variant'. Nor should it be objected
thus: <P> if there is no ascertainment of this same infer-
ence's being successful, how does one establish that the
means of knowledge are successful? Or, if it is ascertained,
how is the <the logical reason> only-negative? <S> For the
successfulness of inference has two forms: that of invariable
connection and that of producing valid knowledge. Between
these, as the demarcation of the proper content has to be
produced, <inference> depends solely upon the ascertain-
ment of the invariable relation, not on the ascertainment of
its being the instrumental cause of valid knowledge. There-
fore, the validity as a means of knowledge for the means of
knowledge – as characterized by being the end of the means
82.10 of knowledge — is effected solely through this <inference>
whose validity as a means of knowledge has not been ascer-
tained. Therefore, the whole <issue> is blameless.

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[37] *bhagāsiddhi* (NVTP 82.4) is apparently used by Udayana as a synonym of *savyābhicāra* (and *anekāntika*): cf. NS 1.2.3-4.

The following <objection> is also refuted by this <argument>: if there is no ascertainment of the validity as a means of knowledge, how is there also the non-ascertainment of the invalidity as a means of knowledge? For this <latter> is ascertained by ascertaining the validity as a means of knowledge. But if that is not ascertained, how is there even be ascertainment of a negative <logical reason>, because there is no ascertainment of the 'suchness' of a counter-subject? <S> Because there is establishment of the ascertainment of its proper domain though a true means of knowledge —which had not in fact been ascertained in terms of its intrinsic nature or its attributes. <P> That man has no doctrine at all who would be in error even about the non-ascertainment of the validity as a means of knowledge.
82.15 For if one adopts the validity as a means of knowledge, there is no error as to ascertaining this, because the adoption is based on the ascertainment. Nor <again could there be error> if he were not to adopt <the validity as a means of knowledge>, because the undesirable consequence is the dissolution of the normal conventions of assertion and denial in all discussion, since in all cases it is easy to grasp error devoid of a means of knowledge. And if the validity as a means of knowledge is not ascertained, then in some cases even doubt in the form of, 'This or not this', is difficult to

comprehend, because there is no specific recollection, and because all doubts presuppose that. Nor, in turn, is there impropriety in there being no <ascertainment of> the validity as a means of knowledge in all cases, because the denial of <their> being a means to grasping the validity as a means of knowledge is the same even with regard to the validity as a means of knowledge. Even if one assumes the validity as a means of knowledge etc. generated through a dilemma <and> appealing to those lacking judgement, there is no
82.20 establishing of this, which can scarcely bear scrutiny; because, if one does not admit the validity as a means of knowledge, there is also no establishing of generating a dilemma. Nor, again, does the ordinary usage of 'doubt' etc. not exist with respect to what is generated through a dilemma. For no one doubts whether there are horse-horns are not; nor does anyone have the erroneous knowledge of a man-horn. Therefore, the validity as a means of knowledge etc. and their ascertainment exist. But the means to them deserves consideration. And thus there actually is a positive logical reason. In view of this objection – 'How, then, is there inference based on only-negative concomitance' – the
83.1 following admission is the reply, <S> "Alternatively... 24.25-26
based on both positive and negative concomitance..." This is the idea: but the doctrine of 'negative-only concomitance'

is produced by the non-admission of positive concomitance. "inference..." is a partial characterization; and <what is said 24.26
about> "intrinsically" is also true for its opposite, because 24.26
there is establishment of the validity as a means of knowledge intrinsically and extrinsically.

<P> Because there is establishment of what has to be established just by this <formulation> alone, 'because it
produces successful activity', the phrase, "upon the appre- 1.1
hension of the object on the basis of <this> means of knowl-
83.5 edge," does not qualify 'successful' and is anomalous.[38]
<S> Hence he says, "Yet... produce activity." For the *śāstra* 24.25-25.2
is connected with the highest good by virtue of stating the validity as a means of knowledge etc., but not by its intrinsic nature. Therefore, just as the knowledge of the true-nature of <the categories of> means of knowledge etc., since it is what has to be established, is posited as the purpose, so too do the means of knowledge etc. have to be posited as the purpose, insofar as they also are the content. As for example in the statement,

Now we will explain *dharma*. VS 1.1.1

there is positing of *dharma* alone as being what has to be explained in the same system,[39] and there is no positing

[38] See footnote 36 *supra*.
[39] Cf. NVTP 76.6-7.

there of 'being the content of that' <as being what has to be
explained>. Therefore, entertaining this objection in confor-
mity with the thoughts of his hearers — <P> 'Since, due to
the non-positing of 'being the content' <as the purpose>,
the <categories of> means of knowledge <etc.> are not
83.10 stated by the *śāstra*' — <S> out of consideration for the
intention of Akṣapāda, he rescues the *Vārttika*; "Let this be 25.3-9
granted..."

The meaning is: for this *śāstra* operates according to [83.12-19]
the successive needs of students, because if there is a state-
ment of what is not required, the undesirable consequence is
that it does not merit serious attention. Nor does the need of
the student <take the form>: 'What will your worship say'?
But rather, 'From what source is the highest good attained?'
The reply to this is: 'From the knowledge of the true nature NS 1.1.1
<of the categories of> means of knowledge etc. there is
attainment of the highest good'. Thence <arises the ques-
tion>: 'How?' To this <question> in turn the answer is, 'The
second *sūtra*'. Thence <arises the question>, 'As for the
83.15 <categories of> means of knowledge etc., which ones <are
they>? How many <are they>? What are their characteris-
tics?' To this <question> the answer is, 'Listing, differentia-
tion, and characterization'.[40] Then <the question arises:>
'How?' To this <question the answer is given:> 'The second

book etc.' And this whole <matter> is well known by expe-
rience. Nor does this, in turn, require a statement <of expla-
nation>: 'Commentators exist in reference to one who does
not understand what is said; and therefore he speaks thus'.
Therefore, if a person, due to whatever delusion, does not
understand the fact that <the *śāstra*> states the means of
knowledge etc., even if that is established by experience, it
is to him that the commentator says, "since the *śāstra* states 6.4-5 (25.4-5)
human good."

83.20 <P> The stating of the means of knowledge etc. is
not established even by the statement of <human> good
without further qualification; for the good is not simply the
categories of means of knowledge etc. <S> But he will him-
self explain, "The means of knowledge are the categories of 6.7 (25.19)
it." <P> Even so, what is the purpose in saying 'This *śāstra* cf. 6.8
states <human> good'? Now if 'means of knowledge etc.'
alone is the meaning of the word 'the good', then why is it
said, "The good, in turn, is pleasure and the cessation of 6.13-14
what is harmful"? <S> Hence he says, "Even if..." <The 25.5-6
meaning is:> Even if by taking <it> word by word 'the cf. 6.9-11
*śāstra* in turn', 'the person in turn', 'the good in turn', the

[40] See the *Bhāṣya* to NS 1.1.3 (NB 179.20-24) for the three-fold method of Nyāya. Udayana includes 'differentiation' (*vibhāga*) with 'listing (*uddeśa*) and 'characterization' (*lakṣaṇa*) here, but does not mention 'examination' (*parīkṣā*).

explanation, ending with "by destroying them" is clearly 6.20
brilliant. And there is no doubt as to <its being> an explana-
83.25 tion with regard to the words, "Men are subject to 6.20-21
desire...," because there is no connection with the subject
84.1 under discussion. For the *śāstra* does not state the good
together with the means <of attaining it> to a man subject to
desire. And it is not the case that the <*śāstra* does> not
<state> the good to him, whereby the man free from desire
might by differentiation be apprehended. Nevertheless, that
there be no error as to <there being> an interruption in the
explanation, with respect to what is simply an intervening
summary, "Therefore this *śāstra* states human good," he 25.23
delimits the meaning of this, "and which ends with 'by 25.9-10
destroying them through undergoing...'."

84.5 <P> It is incoherent to say, "a collection character- 6.5
ized by arrangement," because they are synonymous. <S>
Hence he says, "arrangement..." <P> Now do these same 25.11
collections correspond either to the desire of the human
author or their own meanings? <S> Hence he says, "a single 25.12-13
recollection..." <P> Even if this and nothing more is the
characterization — 'A word is phonemes as delimited by
conveying a single meaning' — nevertheless how <does>
this same characterization belong to the Buddhists? <S>
This is said, "fused in a single recollection..." What has to 25.12

be supplied in the *Vārttika* is: 'a word is a collection'.[41]
<P> The *Vārttika* says, "A collection of words is a *sūtra*." 6.6
And this is inappropriate. For a *sūtra* is a specific sentence.
Nor is <a *sūtra*> merely a collection of words, even though
<this is> a feature which it shares in common with a sen-
tence, because the undesirable consequence is that even
such <a collection of words> as 'Cow, horse, elephant'
qualifies as a sentence. <S> Hence he says, "Likewise...re- 25.13-14
spective meanings." In the phrase, "we are to understand... 25.14
collection," what has to be supplied is, 'as being a *sūtra*'.
<P> The *Vārttika* says, "A collection of *sūtras* is a section." 6.6
Here also, because there is no cause for a difference among
subordinate collections, what follows <is to say>, 'The
*śāstra* itself, in the form of a collection of *sūtras*, is a sec-
tion'. <S> Hence he says, "And likewise, in some cases..." 25.14-15
Therefore one must reason as follows: by virtue of setting forth the teaching of the purpose, content, and relationship as their single subject-matter, the collection <consisting> of the first and second *sūtras* constitutes a section. In the same way <one is to account for> the section on the means of knowledge,[42] the section on the objects of knowledge,[43] the

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[41] But *Vārttika* 6.5 *padam punarvarṇasmūhaḥ*: 'a word, in turn, is a collection of phonemes'.
[42] NS 1.1.3-8.
[43] NS 1.1.9-22.

section on the prior elements of reasoning,[44] the section on the basis of reasoning,[45] the section on the intrinsic nature of reasoning,[46] <and> the section on the subsequent elements of reasoning.[47]

<P> The *Vārttika* says, "And[48] a collection of sec- 6.6
tions is a chapter." If the sections do not constitute single, subordinate sentence, this same <claim> is not established.
<S> Hence he says, "of sections..." That is to say: for these 25.15-16
sections form a single characterization of reasoning together with its accessories. A collection of these <sections> is a chapter. And in the next chapter there is a single character-
84.20 ization — the means of differentiating <true> reasoning from pseudo-reasoning. In the same <chapter>, there is a section on philosophical discourse,[49] a section on pseudo-reasons,[50] a section on deceit,[51] <and> a section on the inferential mark of the incapacity of persons;[52] thus in the first <book> the subject of the book is characterization. In the second <book> an examination of the means of knowledge; in the third an examination of the six-fold objects of

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[44] NS 1.1.23-25.
[45] NS 1.1.26-31.
[46] NS 1.1.32-39.
[47] NS 1.1.40-41.
[48] *ca* (NVTP 86.17) is not in the *Vārttika*.
[49] NS 1.2.1-3. This and the following groupings closely follows Vācaspati's *Nyāyasūtrasūcīnibandha*.
[50] NS 1.2.4-9.
[51] NS 1.2.10-17.
[52] NS 1.2.18-20.

knowledge as causes; in the fourth an examination of the six-fold objects of knowledge as effects; in the fifth a characterization of the special inferential mark <for inferring> the incapacity of persons. Likewise, we will show the agreements among sections and chapters in the second book etc.
at the appropriate places.[53] The same point is stated, "Like- 25.16
wise, one should understand...here and there." The meaning of 'here and there' is: 'among the chapters etc.' <P> And a
84.25 single method has not been revealed here, how <can it be
said> "one should understand...here and there"? <S>Hence 25.16
he says, "And...these..." 25.16-17

85.1 <P> Having posited that the *śāstra* is that which states human good together with the means to it, to what end is the demonstration of its intrinsic nature employed? <S>
Hence he says, "Having thus..." The idea is: relating the 25.18-19
purpose of this <*śāstra*> is easy to comprehend if one first states the intrinsic nature of the *śāstra*.

<P> Why, pray, when it is established by understanding <the first *sūtra*>, is it restated that <the categories of> means of knowledge etc. are sixteen? <S> Hence he states <the following> as an objection that deserves to be
dispelled by this, "Since..." By "a specific universal" is 25.19-2; 25.21
meant 'a specific similarity'. By "hence...its ...," is meant 25.22-23

[53] Literally 'right there' *tatraiva* (NVTP 84.23).

85.5 'the *śāstra*, which is a collection of words'. By "categories" 25.22
<are meant> the referents of the words which constitute the
collection — the means of knowledge etc. "Therefore, the 25.23
*śāstra*" – which has the form of sentences – "states human
good" – which has the form of sentential meanings. What
has to be supplied is: 'together with the means <of attaining
it>'. Superficially, <the issue is:> "How do they <the cate- 25.25
gories> conduce toward the highest good?" But ultimately,
if they are fictitious, then the highest good too is fictitious.
The idea is: Therefore, it is for this reason that effort is use-
less, because this <highest good> is not established through
effort. The idea is: superficially, <the issue is:> "because the 25.25-26
store" of the imagination "is infinite," they <the categories>
are infinite by their nature. But ultimately <the issue is:>
they are devoid of a nature altogether. <P> The statement of
two means of knowledge, "perception or inference," contra- 6.8-9 (26.1)
dicts Uddyotakara's own established doctrine. <S>
85.10 <Hence> He says, "the means of knowledge etc..." <He 26.2
says> "are not the content of comparison." The meaning is: 26.2
even if comparison, whose end is the demarcation of the
relation between a name and the thing it names, is used only
in respect of the means of knowledge of verbal testimony,
because a word, the conventional meaning of which is not
grasped, does not produce valid knowledge, and because

one usually comprehends conventional usage through com-
parison; nevertheless, these <categories of> means of
knowledge are not directly made the content by this. <P> If,
because it does not directly contribute to the subject at
under consideration, comparison is not mentioned, then, let
verbal testimony be mentioned. For this directly contrib-
utes. <S> Hence he says, "Even if..." The meaning is: by 26.2-4
"even in regard to this" there is realization of the content of 26.3
scripture. For that in regard to which scripture operates
depends either on perception or inference that has that alone
as its content. But these two, together with their bases, do cf. 26.3
not depend upon a means of knowledge that operates on
their respective contents. Hence, because their content is not
merged with the basis, these two "alone are revealed." "lack 26.4; 26.5
<mental> discipline." The meaning is: the specific method
is the *śāstra* or the *Nyāyaśāstra*; those who lack the knowl-
edge that is to be produced from this <specific method are
so termed>. <In the phrase,> "They do not distinguish 26.6
them," what has to be supplied is: 'from the imposed
nature'. By the explicit use of "etc." in "obedience etc." is 26.7
meant 'facility in hearing etc.' <P> There is no desire at all
to know on the part of one who, even though "in doubt," 26.9
does not desire liberation. <S> Hence, it is said, "to a 26.10
pupil..." By 'being a pupil' he alludes to the full comple- cf. 26.10-11

ment of desire for liberation etc.[54] <P> Even a man in error,
even if he undertakes philosophical discourse, if he does not
desire liberation, when his egotism vanishes, does not have
a desire to know; therefore, the undertaking of arguing and
captiousness serves no purpose. <S> Hence he says, "is 26.10
being instructed..." The meaning is: 'desiring liberation
even out of delusion'. The <grammatical> construction is:
'when his egotism vanishes due to arguing and captious- cf. 26.11
ness'. What has to be supplied to the sentence "has a desire 26.12
to know" is 'has to be taught', <occurs> later. <He says:>
"somehow..." The meaning is: in the way <set forth> in the 26.12
text of the first *sūtra*.

86.1 <P> Even if one who has no doubts is made to have
doubts, what is the purpose of this? <S> Hence he says,
"Even one who has no doubts..." What has to be supplied 26.13-14
is: 'likewise agents of knowledge who are eager to know'.
<P> If these same wayward students require the sense- cf. 6.11-13
organs etc. even for liberation etc., then how are they "those 6.12
who have to be taught"? <S> Hence he supplements the
*Vārttika*, "or other..." The meaning is: <an object> which is 26.15-16
conducive to directly experienced ends <and is> being
known by perception. <P> A supplement is needed in what
follows as well: 'those who are eager to know <an object>

[54] Cf. NVTP 72.5.

86.5 which actually is conducive to immediately experienced ends <and> which has to be inferred'. <S> He says, "what 26.16
follows in the same way." <P> Despite all this, to hold that those who are eager <to know> have to be taught only by this *śāstra* and by perception and inference is mutually contradictory. <S> Hence he says, "This is the idea..." To the 26.16-19
supplement, "But those who desire to know the means to the 26.18-19
highest human end," there is <another> supplement, 'through reasoning'. Thus, even though it is possible <to understand these two> respectively thus: 'Pleasure is directly experienced only — it is only the domain of a positive means of knowledge; the cessation of pain is only not immediately experienced — it is only the domain of a negative means of knowledge': nevertheless, <he says> "Now 6.13-14
86.10 the good is pleasure and the cessation of what is harmful"; hence, nothing further is meant; thus relating the relations among the specific means of knowledge alone is paramount. Nor is there, in the present context, a purpose served by this. With the idea – 'Nor is the minute description of what is the domain of assertion and denial used in order to produce ascertainment of the specific intended good' – he gives a different explanation, "Within this, in turn..." The meaning 26.20-21
is: by using the word 'this' in the phrase, 'this good is pleasure and the cessation of what is harmful', both in fact are cf. 26.20-21

realized as being the good. He dispels doubt respectively, "Not...conjointly." As for the phrase, "Pleasure is the 26.21-22; 26.22
immediately experienced <kind of good>," he makes clear
86.15 the meaning of the words 'immediately experienced' and 'not immediately experienced' through an example. The meaning of "flower garlands, sandalpaste...," is: of this 26.22
world. The meaning of "heaven etc." is: of the next world. 26.22
Since it was already stated elsewhere, he teaches, "Like- 26.22-23
wise..." The meaning is: the cessation of what is harmful, in turn, relates both to this world and to the next.

<P> This is not what is stated in the *Vārttika*. <S>
Hence he says, "because the word 'and' is omitted." The 26.23
meaning is: because of the omission of both 'ands'. The meaning of the *Vārttika* is: 'Therefore, pleasure is both immediately experienced and not immediately experienced; and similarly the cessation of what is harmful. Accordingly, this is a summary:[55] There is an immediately experienced
86.20 good: and this is pleasure and the cessation of what is harmful. Pleasure, in turn, relates to this world and to the next. The cessation of pain, in turn, relates both to this world and the next. Thus, the good, as characterized in terms of pleasure, is either immediately experienced or not immediately

[55] That is, a summary of Vācaspati's interpretation of Uddyotakara's argument.

experienced. <P> This is not to be achieved through this *śāstra*, because it should be achieved through flowers etc. <for the immediately experienced good> and through sacrifice etc. <for the not immediately experienced good>; and because this is not absolute. The cessation of what is harmful, in turn, which is not absolute, and which is differentiated into immediately experienced <good> and not immediately experienced <good>, is not to be achieved through this *śāstra*, because it is to be achieved by the elimination <on the one hand> of attached obstacles <for the immediately experienced good>, and of violence etc. <on the other hand for the not immediately experienced good>;
87.1 whereas because it cannot be achieved if these are not attached. <S> Hence, as he further differentiates the absolute cessation of what is harmful in order to ascertain it, he
<says>, "the cessation of what is harmful..." <P> As for the 26.23-24
statement, "If cessation...,"[56] if cessation is the prior absence of pain, how is that absolute? For 'to be absolute' means 'non-interruption at a later time'. And if prior absence were of this sort, there could be no 'prior' at all. But if cessation is destruction and this is absolute in every
87.5 case, on what grounds can one explain the absoluteness of

[56] The phrase, *nanu yadi nivṛttiriti* (NVTP 87.2), found in A only is not, it seems, in the *Vārttika* or *Tātparyaṭīkā*.

cessation? <S> Hence he says, "to be absolute...there is no 26.25-26
reappearance of that which has ceased" — of the kind that
has ceased.[57] What has to be supplied is: 'in this soul itself'.

<P> The absolute cessation of pain is nothing but
the elimination of pain in its twenty-one kinds; how then
does the *Vārttika* say, "through the removal..."? <S> Hence 6.16
he says, "And this..." It is "characterized by the cessation" 26.26; 6.26
— by the intrinsic nature of cessation. And in this context,
pain is meant by the word 'effect'; by the word 'cause' <are cf. 26.26
meant> the body, the sense-organs, the sense-objects, and
the cognitions. "What is inseparable <from them>" is plea- 26.26
87.10 sure, because it has the same cause as pain. <P> Now even
if the body etc. have ceased, why would there not be pain?
Let there be no pain; why would there not be pleasure? For
it is not the case that, if either one of them ceases absolutely,
the other does not exist. And by the same token, how is the
cessation of pleasure, which is inseparable <from it>,
accounted for? <S> Hence he says, "For not..." The mean- 26.26-27
ing is: an effect that lacks a cause would lose its status as an
effect; hence, if the body etc. do not exist, then pleasure
also, like pain, does not exist, because this also is the effect
of it. Or if it does exist, then it exists only if the body etc.
exist. And by the same reasoning, pain also would exist,

[57] *nivṛttasya* = *nivṛttajātīyasya* NVTP 87.6.

87.15 because its cause actually does exist. He applies the <sentence in the> *Vārttika* to the same matter, "The same point 26.27 (6.16)
is stated..." <P> By this same <argument>, the explanation <of the *Vārttika*> by the *Ṭīkā*, "Ignorance and desire are the 26.27-27.1
cause; activity is the effect; merit and demerit are inseparably connected,"[58] is dismissed, as it is contradicted by our experience that the body etc. are pain. <S> Hence he say, "secondary usages..." 26.27

<P> In the *sūtra* "smell etc...," there are evidently NS 1.1.12
five sense-organs. And in no other place are there six. <S> Hence he says, "is the sixth..." The point is: according to a 27.1
'technical rule'.[59] <P> The contents themselves, which cannot be established through reciprocal means, are settled as
87.20 five only, both in the differentiation <of sense organs in that NS 1.1.12
*sūtra*> and in the examination and not six. <S> Hence he NS 3.1.56-61
says, "Its..." <That is to say:> Even if cognitions, pleasure 27.1-2
and pain are also the content of the internal organ, nevertheless, the figurative usage of 'pain' <to it applies> insofar as only that is its content, which, becoming its content, produces pain. For he will say, "because the sense-objects are 27.5
what have to be made known." And it is not the case that a cognition when being cognized is the cause of pain. For he

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[58] This does not appear to be in the *Ṭīkā* to NS 1.1.1.
[59] *tantrayukti*: see ŚṬ 13.14-15.

will say, “whereas the cognitions directly...” But pleasure 27.5-6
and pain are by no means the cause of pain, because plea-
sure, even if it is that which originates <something> differ-
ent in kind, is that which originates passion only; but pain
87.25 <is not the cause of pain> because it originates <some-
thing> different in kind only.[60] But “desire, aversion, and 27.2
exertion” when actually being apprehended directly pro-
88.1 duce pain. To be more explicit: now one who desires libera-
tion, simply by thinking — ‘I desire, I dislike, I strive
towards what is other than the study of *Yoga*’ — experi-
ences pain, because he has ascertained that desire, aversion,
and exertion are what produce what is harmful. Someone
else, in turn, when he does not get what he desires, by think-
ing, ‘I am eager to eat, I am eager to drink’, experiences
pain. One who, having thought that what was actually bene-
ficial was harmful, taking an aversion, when his error comes
to an end, has pain <in the form>, ‘I dislike what is benefi-
cial; woe is to me’. Thus, as the error ceases for one who
88.5 exerts himself on what is in fact an undesirable object,
thinking it desirable, likewise for an idle man just by sup-
posing that exertion is pain; by this consideration alone,
these alone are stated as being the content of the internal

[60] Śrīkaṇṭha (ŚṬ 13.23-32) relates that this discussion stems from Praśa-stapāda's *Bhāṣya* (§101-§106).

organ.

<P> To one whose body is afflicted by old age, leprosy, etc., it is his body, just when he is actually cognizing it, that is the cause of pain; with respect to this <body> also there might be figurative usage of 'being pain' — simply in terms of its being the content. <S> Hence he says, "Even 27.2-3
if..." <In the phrase,> "<that> it is the cause of pain in a dif- 27.2
ferent way," what has to be supplied is 'unique'. The meaning is: but this <body> is not differentiated from the six <sense-organs> in terms of being the content. But it is differentiated <from them> because of its unique relationship
88.10 with the sense-organs; but not by its intrinsic nature, because its contents are infinite. In this regard even if Uddy-
otakara will say, "inseparability means 'invariable concomi- 154.18
tance'"; and <even if> the fact of their having a common instrumental cause, the fact of their having a common basis, and the fact of their being apprehended by the same <organ>[61] contribute toward establishing this <invariable concomitance>; nevertheless, it is not by this consideration alone that invariable concomitance is achieved. For, because, even if there is commonality of instrumental cause, if there is cessation of one of the two unique instrumental causes – if there is cessation of the other – there is the possi-

[61] See ŚṬ 14.13.

bility of the recurrence of the other one.[62] Hence entertaining this doubt — <P> Even if there is identity of the basis, and of the cause of apprehension, even in the absence of one's not being the cause, an invariable relation <arises>
88.15 through the actual existence of the other — <S> in order to establish <that> pleasure is inseparable from pain, he says that the inseparability itself is the cause of pain, "on a 27.6-7
means..." Hence, there is no contradiction between the *Vārttika* and the *Ṭīkā* on the second *sūtra*. There is "depen- 27.6
dence on a means" because it is the effect, and because there is no pleasure that is not an effect. And dependency is a cause of pain. As he says,

All that is subject to another is pain.[63]

And pleasure is 'transient' because it has an inherent-cause. cf. 27.6-7
This, in turn, is a cause of pain; for absence of what is
88.20 desired produces pain. But the explanation, 'there is transience when there is desire', is contradicted by the plural, "the causes of suffering"; hence these three causes are quite 27.7
independent.

By "desire" is meant 'wish'; and this includes both 27.7
pleasure and its causes. For there is no pleasure or the means to it for one who does not in fact desire pleasure and

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[62] See ŚṬ 14.15-9.
[63] Unknown provenance.

the means to pleasure. This, in turn, is easy to obtain and
difficult to obtain. Between these, desire that is hard to
obtain results only in suffering; but desire that is easy to
obtain relates to non-prohibited means and relates to prohib-
89.1 ited means. Between these, that which relates, in turn, to
prohibited means, by virtue of producing demerit — both by
its intrinsic nature and in terms of its effect — necessarily
results in pain. That <desire>, in turn, which relates to
means that are non-prohibited and are easy to obtain
<arises> whether there is bodily dexterity or not; between
these, if there is no <bodily dexterity> it is the cause of pain
only. If, on the other hand, there is dexterity of the body etc.,
<this desire> either encounters obstacles or lacks obstacles.
Between these, that which encounters obstacles produces
pain only; whereas that which lacks obstacles, in turn, has a
content which is mixed up with what is undesirable and the
89.5 reverse of this. Between these, the first necessarily is a
cause of pain; but the second is unsuccessful and successful.
Between these, the first is the cause of pain only. But the
second has a result that is delayed and a result that is not
delayed. Between these, the first necessarily is a cause of
pain. The second, in turn, is not free from dependency and
the opposite of this. Between these, the first is a cause of
pain only. But the second, because its content has no flavor

of evolution, produces pain only; or else, it actually <pro-
duces> another desire for one sunk in the objects them-
selves out of extreme delusion; in both cases, it is the source
of what is harmful. Thus, even desire, which is inseparable
from pleasure, is the cause of pain. Thus, even if desire,
aversion, delusion, and activity may properly be counted as
'pain', because, like the sense-organs etc., they cause pain
89.10 and what is inseparable from it <i.e. pleasure>; neverthe-
less, they are not realized or operate with regard to pain
except through the body, the sense-organs, etc.; but even in
the absence of fault and activity, the operation of the sense- cf. NS 1.1.2
organs etc. towards pain belongs only to the living liberated.

But as for the result of activity; even though merit
and demerit are the causes of pain and pleasure, neverthe-
less, because they are the central pillars of the dancing hall
of *saṃsāra*, which consists of the twenty-one different
kinds of pain, they are not enumerated here. For it is not the 6.17 ff.
case that the body, the sense-organs, their contents, cogni-
tions, pain and pleasure, operate directly[64] on another
rebirth in the future — as do merit and demerit.

[64] NA 11.3: ***āhatya iti*** | *mukhyavṛttyā*.

89.15 Since Uddyotakara, who intends this <interpretation> only, revealed <that> the extirpation of the twenty-one-fold pain in the form of effects <arises> through the sequence of extirpating merit and demerit, which are in the form of causes; hence, in the same way, Vācaspati introduces the <sentence in the> *Vārttika*, "whose varieties he 27.7-8
has stated..." And thus it is revealed: the rejection of activ- cf. 6.19-20; 27.
ity, which causes them, is the means to the cessation of 10-12
future merit and demerit, but enjoyment <is the means> to the cessation of <the merit and demerit that have> already appeared. Apprehensive of the objection — <P> Both of these are impossible, because if one rejects verbal, mental, and bodily activities one cannot live. <And they are no less impossible> Even when one dies, because the hard mortar of another body etc. is difficult to remove; and the 'enjoy- cf. 6.20
ment' <of merit and demerit> is impossible, because there is no fixed time for them to come to fruition, because they
89.20 are infinite and because they have infinite results. <That is to say:> Because even in the state of enjoyment, there is no cessation <of their> producing other infinite *karmas*. But if in some way or another through enjoyment and non-production the destroying of those that have <respectively> already come into being and those that have not yet come into being, then the undesirable consequence is that the

*śāstra* serves no purpose — because this is established from that alone — <S> he comes to the aid of the *Vārttika*, "doubt etc..." By the word "doubt etc." all fourteen <other 27.8-17; 27.8
categories> are encompassed as being accessories to *nyāya*. By the expression "highest reasoning" all four means of 27.8
90.1 knowledge are established as being made the bases of the bases <of *nyāya*>. "The path of reasoning" <means> that 27.8
reasoning is, as it were, a path, because it causes one to reach the land of the highest good. By "twelve-fold..." is 27.9; cf. NS.1.1.9
meant the objects of knowledge, the soul etc. Thus by this is revealed the scope and utility of the *śāstra*. By the phrase, "contemplating the true-nature'" <are demonstrated the 27.9
scope and utility> of study. Thus, then, there is activity towards the *śāstra* on the part of one who desires liberation through *nyāya* as previously related. Then <arises> the knowledge of its accessories. Then purification of the *nyāya*-way. Then, through this, the attaining of the twelve-
90.5 fold objects of knowledge; then study; then meditation. Then liberation from attachment to faults root and all. Then no action. Then no accumulation of future merit and demerit. In this way, the totality of future <merit and demerit> is suppressed.

That is to say: and even if activity will arise for each body etc., nevertheless because of the absence of its con-

comitant, the attachment to faults, that is not <true> activity because it is incapable of those effects.[65] cf. 6.20

He justifies 'enjoyment <of the merit and demerit> that have already come into being', by saying, "beginning- 27.10-12
less..." That is to say: even if, just as *karma*s are accumu- [90.9-18]
lated in a sequence of births that is endless, so are they also removed. For it is not the case that the beginninglessness of being is paramount in coming into being.[66] <P> For, if there is enjoyment, *karma* originates in the body, which is authorized <as its recipient>. And this <body>, which occurs amidst tens of thousands of bodies, is sometimes in some respects, in some cases only the same body. But there is no enjoyment at all where this body does not exist, because enjoyment has that as its seat. Therefore, *karma* is actually determinate through consideration of income and expenditure. For this same reason, its time for maturation is determinate too. And because there is enjoyment of it by an indefinite number of successive bodies, even the destroying <of it> is not hard to justify. <S> Nevertheless, because it has been established on the validity of scripture as a means of knowledge that there is also a simultaneity of bodies as the result of meditation, <this objection> is removed simply

[65] According to Abhayatilaka (NA 11.13), 'these' are 'merit and demerit'.
[66] So NA 11.13.

by admitting infinity and the non-determinateness of the time for maturation. The drinking of the ocean is an example of this <claim>: that which has to be enjoyed at different times is enjoyed by one possessed of <Yogic> power at one time. The creation of the *Daṇḍakāraṇya* is an example of this <claim>: that a man fully-endowed with a rich abundance of *Yoga* by mere desire creates, at one and the same time, many bodies that enjoy different results and that by their intrinsic nature are manifold. cf. 27.14 cf. 27.14

<P> In this matter, some people say: the cessation of pain is not by its intrinsic nature a human end, because that
90.20 involves limiting conditions. Pleasure exists only in the absence of pain; therefore, the absence of pain also is sought[67] after as if it were another means to happiness. But that is not in fact what a man wants. As it has been said:

> Gautama prefers be a jackal in the *Vṛndāvan* forest than to reach Vaiśeṣika liberation.[68]

91.1 <S> This is impossible, because there is also the possibility of a mistake; for since the pain of hunger etc. ceases only when the pleasure of eating etc. are present, hence the pleasure in eating etc. is sought solely to put an end to pain. <P> Why is it not supposed that, 'But this is not in fact what he

[67] Reading *mṛgyate* for *mṛyate* (90.20).
[68] Cf. NBh 594.20-21.

desires'? Because, in some cases, pleasure is sought, even in the absence of pain. <S> <This is> Not correct, because, in some cases, the cessation of pain is sought, even in the absence of pleasure. <P> The idea, after all, is: 'Pleasure alone will come into being when there is cessation of pain'. <S> <This is> Not correct, because it is possible that the idea here is also: 'The absence of pain will necessarily exist in the pleasure-state'. Therefore, even if there is pleasure upon the elimination of pain, and there is necessarily the elimination of pain when there is pleasure; nevertheless, their status as human ends are indeed mutually unrelated, because these two desires do not have mixed domains.

<P> But another[69] says: for the elimination of pain is in fact a human end, but <only> insofar as it is being experienced. For it is not the case that prudent men act for this end: 'There is cessation of pain in the state of stupor that is produced by poison etc.' Therefore, because the elimination of pain is not experienced in liberation, it is not a human end. Hence it has been said,

> Even the absence of pain, which cannot be experienced, is not sought as a human end; for the wise man is not seen to act <in order> to reach the state of being a fool etc.[70]

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[69] Maṇḍanamiśra, according to Śrīkaṇṭha ŚṬ 16.1.
[70] Cf. NBh 596.5-6.

<S> This too is impossible, because it is seen that some
91.15 men, who desire to eliminate the pain that is produced by the loss of a son etc., act in regard even to poison, a sword, a rope, etc. <P> Prudent men do not act thus. S> <This is> Not correct, because there is no contradiction in terms of being a human end. For it is not the case that, since prudent men, prevented by the hook of proscriptions in the *śāstra*s, do not act with regard to another man's wife, desire is not a human end in this case: but rather <since one realizes> that there is a slight pleasure and great harm <to be gained>, there is cessation <of action>. Similarly, since the *śāstra* forbids one to act in respect of poison etc., they do not act <out of this motivation:> 'A rather slight pain ceases; a very great one begins'. For this alone is prudence — that, even if <a thing> is a human end, there is realization of contradic-
91.20 tions between the *śāstra* and worldly usage, but not simply because it is not a human end, because to be a human end is based on nothing other than the fact of being desired in its intrinsic nature. It is for this reason alone that, when there is a contradiction between normal usage and the *śāstra*, prudent men, wracked with disease etc., are not seen to be abandoning their bodies through <such actions as> hurling themselves from a banyan tree at *Prayāga*, abstinence from food, etc. For no one acts with respect to the means to it

<the cessation of pain, thinking>, 'I will experience the cessation of pain', but rather, 'I will eliminate pain'. And yet, is the mere fact that the cessation of pain is being experienced what is intended, or the termination of its existence as the cessation of pain? If the former <is intended,> then let a wicked man rejoice — it is experienced only in the final
91.25 rebirth, because of the power of meditation. The absolute cessation of pain <whether> in the future <or> even currently taking place, is only experienced for a brief time. But
92.1 if the second <is intended>, the undesirable consequence is that the cessation of pain, which is caused by such things as attached obstacles, is not a human end, because it is not always being experienced. Or, if this is so, <it is not a human end> because of the undesirable consequence of the absence of its moving to another object, because cessation always has this condition. Therefore, just as the cessation of pain that is to produced from obstacles etc., even though it is not always being experienced, prompts a man, insofar as it is a human end; likewise it is the end of the *śāstra* also. Therefore, since both of these positions — that the cessation of pain is not a human end, and it is not a human end only insofar as it is not being experienced — are exceedingly
92.5 weak,[71] overlooking them, he objects to a third — <P> "Let 27.18-19

[71] *atinirbalam*: but ŚṬ 16.13 has *nirdalam*, J *nirdalanam*.

this be granted..." The following has been said:

> A man of discrimination would not undertake things that are bad, that have no end, whose results are equivalent to the expenditure, and which are impossible.[72]

He illuminates the <passage in the> *Vārttika* that presents the final view, "Even if..." That is to say: therefore, through 27.20ff; cf. 6.20ff
this familiar instance of eating food in which poison and honey are intermixed, the fact that liberation constitutes a result equal to the expenditure is refuted. For, just as in this instance what is harmful is plentiful, yet what is good is scanty, it is not so in the case of liberation also.

By this same <consideration> the following statement is refuted: just as the pleasure <found> in *saṃsāra*, which is marbled with pain, is not to be appropriated, why, similarly should not pain — insofar as it is marbled with pleasure — be appropriated? For those who seek pleasure are seen experiencing the pain involved in sacrifice etc.

> If a man must take up pain, what, could be said that has to be eliminated by him? What liberation can there be for one who lacks what has to be eliminated? Or by whom is it taught?[73]

That is to say: but he who fears another round of rebirth, filled with the very dense darkness of pain, even if the fireflies of pleasure are shining – for him this path, which is

[72] Cf. NBh 594.25-26.
[73] Unknown provenance.

easy to traverse, in that the darkness on it has been dis-
pelled, is taught. The same point is stated, "Therefore, let 27.24
this not..." <P> If this is so, this is not the end for all
<men>. Likewise, there is a contradiction with this <phrase
in the *maṅgala* verse>, "for the tranquility of the world." 6.1
<S> Hence he says, "even in those who lack discrimina- 27.25
tion..." The meaning is: now even if it was fully explained cf. 73.9
92.20 previously that, even if someone does not act, it <what he
did not act towards> is the end for all does not lapse; never-
theless, dull-witted men, who do not grasp what should be
eliminated as being what should be eliminated, must be
made to grasp <this> by a man of compassion. cf. 22.19

<P> Dispassion arises from the knowledge of the
true-nature <of the categories> through the *śāstra*, and there
is activity towards the *śāstra* because of dispassion; hence
<the charge of> mutual dependency that is difficult to deny.
<S> Hence he says, "to act with regard to the *śāstra*..." The 27.25-26
meaning is: in this context by 'dispassion' what is meant is
merely the aversion towards enjoyment on the part of one
93.1 who dreads pain, but not simply the absence of desire. He
dispels the concern as to two-foldness <of action>, insofar
as they have <respectively> as their ends the acquisition of
what is desired and the elimination of what is undesirable,
<by saying,> "single-formness and double-formness." <P> 27.26

Even if there is a difference among men, their activity takes two forms only; for no one acts in order to gain pain as he would to obtain pleasure. Nor, again, <does> anyone <act> in order to eliminate happiness as he would in order to elim-
inate pain. <S> Hence he says, "The difference between 28.1
men is due to desire and dispassion." <P> On what ground
93.5 is pleasure what is to be eliminated only? <S> Hence he
says, "one could obtain..." What is meant is: but the activity 28.1
of those who lack discrimination is two-fold. What has to be supplied is: 'by Uddyotakara'.

Simply in the course of summarizing the subject under discussion, in order as well to dispel the objection that there has been included an unexpected occurrence of what is not the subject under discussion, he announces what has
preceded and what will follow, "Having thus..." <In the 28.3-4
phrase,> "to explain a part of it", what has to be supplied is: 28.3-4
'in order to clarify the purport of what was stated'.
"Because...is not experienced in this world" — because it is 28.6
necessarily beyond the observation of such ordinary people
as us etc. "inappropriate" means 'lacking a valid means of 28.7
knowledge'. By "prohibited" is meant 'mutually contra- 28.7
93.10 dicted by the pervader'.[74] By "activity" is meant 'unflinch- 28.8
ing activity'. "How then? A means of knowledge." 'Is 28.8

[74] See ŚṬ 17.11-13.

thought to be' is continued. The meaning is: the cognition of
silver is a cognition in this way — 'This substance that has
white, shining color is silver'. The meaning of, "demar- 28.11
cates", is: it arises in the form of demarcation in dependence
on the object <just> mentioned. "and the cognition of 28.11
mother-of-pearl." The meaning is: the cognition that this
substance with a white, shining, color, is mother-of-pearl,
not silver. <P> If this is so, how do these two <cognitions>
stand in the relation of "what is to be cancelled and that 28.12
which cancels <it>"? <S> Hence he says, "However,..." 28.11-12
The meaning of, "because they <respectively> impose and 28.12
deny silver.", is: insofar as it is the intrinsic nature of imposition and denial.

93.15 Thus, then, by claiming, 'The delimiter is deduced by means of delimitation', it is shown that it is the universal and the particular of the delimitation itself that constitute delimitation and non-delimitation. Nor does one and the same cognition have a combination of contradictory attributes. For direct experience and recollection are, in terms of their nature, cognition. Between these, recollection is not valid knowledge at all. But as for direct experience, there is direct experience of the intrinsic nature and direct experience of what is not the intrinsic nature. This very difference is produced by its contents. And a single cognition

actually has numerous objects. And hence this same cogni-
tion, when described in terms of an object that it establishes
in its intrinsic nature, is valid knowledge; but when
described in terms of <an object> that it does not establish
93.20 in its intrinsic nature, it is not valid knowledge; therefore, to
be a means of knowledge is nothing but to be direct experi-
ence <of an object> delimited as it actually is; but, as to be
an invalid means of knowledge is <direct experience of an
object that> is delimited as it actually is not, even an invalid
means of knowledge demarcates the universal. The ground
is readied. <P> What purpose is served by all this? <S> He
says, now the specific cause of unsuccessful activity is
deduced in just this way. And the specific operation of this
is simply the erroneous demarcation of objects. And it is
ordinarily held that the assistance of this type of operation is
94.1 not a means of knowledge. And thus, even if there is doubt
as to successfulness and unsuccessfulness of activity, if that
which produces this is not a <valid> means of knowledge,
then that <activity> is simply unsuccessful. But if this is not
an invalid means of knowledge, then the activity, in turn,
that it produces is not unsuccessful; therefore, the negative
concomitance with respect to successful activity is fixed
due to an invalid means of knowledge. And the means of
knowledge that here leads one to grasp negative concomi-

tance between the two is the logical mark of 'the fact of having contradictory effects'. And the perception of the relevant effect, through which one grasps negative concomitance between them, must be ascertained. Therefore, the meaning of, "not from an invalid means of knowledge, 28.13
which varies from its object", is: the operation of whose knowledge varies from its object.

94.5 <P> The negative concomitance is established; yet cf. 28.14
what results from this? <S> Hence he says, "And like- 28.14-17
wise..." The meaning of, "'successfulness' is its invariance 28.16
from its object", is: the fact that it produces a direct experience that does not vary from its object. <P> In the phrase
"Its...", how, by omitting the non-successful <activity> 28.15 (7.12)
which is the subject under discussion as it follows immediately, is successful activity alone — even though it is not the subject under discussion insofar as it is remote — consid-
ered? <S> Hence he says, "But unsuccessful..." The mean- 28.16-17
ing is: that which precedes alone is properly called 'the subject under discussion', and not that which is stated immediately after. <P> To what end is restating what was
stated[75] employed? <S> Hence he says, "now..." The 28.18
meaning is: <it was stated> previously in order to explain,

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[75] Reading *anūditasya* with NVTP(P) 95.8 for *anuditasya* (NVTP. 94.8).

now in order to raise an objection. By way of refuting <the
charge that,> as the objection and its answer shine through
quite clearly, the summary and explanation are repetitive, he
says, "He objects..." 28.18

He revives the breathless objection, 'Because one
sees here and there activity even out of doubt', "Now, in the 28.19-22
first place it is not..." He concurs with the *Bhāṣya* in that
same meaning, "This same..." What has to be supplied is: 28.22 (1.1)
'stated by Pakṣilasvāmin'. <P> What is the upshot if this is
the case? <S> Hence he says, "Nor..." That is to say: "the 28.20-22; 28.22
ascertainment of the object", whose nature has been stated,
"together with the inference that it is a cause of the good." 28.21-22
The meaning of "without the ascertainment of the validity 28.23
as a means of knowledge" is: in which it is customary to
produce realization of the logical mark of 'being a cause of
the good'. And, since the fact that the ascertainment of the
validity as a means of knowledge has this form is nothing
but the accompaniment of the recollection of the pervasion
relation, he adds the source of this <recollection of the per-
vasion relation> also, "nor apprehension of the pervasion 28.24
relation, which is the instrumental cause of the inference
that <this object> is a cause of the good." "Without both of 28.25
these..." The meaning is: without the ascertainment of the
intrinsic nature and the inference as to being a cause of the

good; because, even if there is immediacy in explicitly men-
tioing 'the pervasion relationship', inference, which is in
fact the result of this, is suitable, because it preceded. By
way of clearing up this same subject in the *Vārttika*, he
makes clear, "This same point is stated..." <P> A concise 28.25
statement of the objection is: ascertainment and inference
<are> not <possible> without the ascertainment of the
validity as a means of knowledge and the apprehension of
the pervasion-relation, which is the source of inference. And
these two <do> not <exist> without activity. And <there is>
94.20 no activity without ascertainment and inference. And thus
activity is of two kinds: that which has a result in this world
and that which has a result in the next world. Between these,
that which has a result in the next world actually presup-
poses the ascertainment of the validity as a means of knowl-
edge. But that which has its result in this world, which
depends solely upon knowing what is the means to what one
desires, does not also require the ascertainment of the object
— how much less the knowledge of the intrinsic nature of
the means of knowledge; how much even less the ascertain-
ment of this? Even when the ascertainment of the true-
nature of the means of knowledge is actually prior to activ-
ity, even then this <ascertainment>, which arrives by dint of
its own cause, does not prompt towards activity. Otherwise,

if there is no ascertainment of absolute victory, a would-be-
victor, being merely an objector to the validity as a means of
94.25 knowledge, would not engage in philosophical discourse.

95.1 For it is not the case that absolute victory necessarily
<arises> from arguing or captiousness. <S> Therefore, tak-
ing to heart <the view> that is established by both discus-
sants — that there is activity even when there is no
ascertainment of the object, he begins the established view,
"to this we say..." In the phrase "immediately experienced 29.2-4; 29.3
ends", there is an exclusion of scripture, whose ends are not
immediately experienced, etc. because in them there is no
ascertainment of the connection of the result with the activ-
ity. In the phrase, "with which one is not fully familiar", 29.3
there is an exclusion of such things as the statements of
one's father etc. with which one is fully familiar. For they
are ascertained as being valid means of knowledge well
95.5 prior to activity. And it is intended to be said that the 'repeti- cf. 29.3
tion' is non-erroneous. Hence, there is ascertainment of this
<repetition> even with respect to its own self, even if there
is repetition, simply from the successfulness of the activity,
because there is no erroneous repetition.[76] And this <repeti-
tion>, which, whether it relates to the content or relates to
objects that are invariably connected with them, being a

[76] See ŚṬ 18.17-18.

means to ascertaining 'being of this kind', when it does not occur in its intrinsic nature, then there is ascertainment of the validity as a means of knowledge for what relates to that <content> simply because of the successfulness of activity; as, for example, for one who conceives, from the statement of his physician, that cessation of pain <is to be secured> among roots that are situated in unfamiliar places. But in cases where there actually is repetition of the intrinsic nature, yet the means to attaining the good that is found in this is not repeated,[77] in these cases that that <apprehension> by means of which one apprehends the means to this
95.10 has validity as a means of knowledge <is determined> from successfulness of activity. As, for example: for one who, having understood from the statement from one whose trustworthiness is conceived that 'Fire is suitable for cooking', is himself cooking. Even when there is a repetition as to what is a means to the good, but there is no repetition as to the intrinsic nature, even then that indeed which relates to the intrinsic nature has its validity as a means of knowledge determined from successfulness of activity. As, for example, <the cognition> that, 'Fire is indeed suitable for cooking etc.' for one who has ascertained it in respect to a forest fire, with which he was not familiar. There is always a prepon-

[77] Reading *anabhyastam* with NVTP(P) 99.6.

derance of success; but, in the reverse case, one who conceives of the feebleness of harm[78] acts. Even if there is ascertainment of the intrinsic nature and that it constitutes the means to the good, there is, as it were, doubt as to the result; he says, "Nor, to be sure..." 29.5-6

95.15 <In the phrase,> "Therefore these <prudent men> 29.6-8
who act, even when in doubt[79]...", what has to be supplied it: 'as to the intrinsic nature and the means to the good, as if in regard to the result'. The meaning of, "the means of 29.6
knowledge", is: by which one apprehends the intrinsic nature and by which one apprehends what is the means to the good. "The true-nature" is the state of being a means of 29.7
knowledge; that is to say, the state of being the cause of valid knowledge, which is not variant from the object. <In the phrase,> "by having ascertained", what has to be sup- 29.7
plied is: 'by means of ascertaining valid knowledge, which is not variant from its object'. <The phrase,> "another 29.7
<means of knowledge> that is 'of this kind'" — if it is just as successful — "with which they are fully familiar", is for the sake of summarizing the means of knowledge for an immediately experienced object. By, "even prior to the suc- 29.7
cess of the activity" is meant: 'prior indeed to successful-

[78] ŚṬ 18.31-33 has the reading *anarthasāmarthyam*, but the text is uncertain here.
[79] NVT 29.6 *sandihānās*, NVTP 95.15 *saṃśayānāḥ*.

ness of activity'. Therefore, this is the meaning: even if [95.19-24]
95.20 there is successfulness of activity with respect to things whose ends are immediately experienced, even if one is fully familiar with them, and, consequently, its validity as a means of knowledge can be ascertained in these cases; nevertheless, if the validity as a means of knowledge is ascertained even prior to the activity through a logical mark, namely 'being of this kind', there is no desire whatever to know at a subsequent on the part of one who knows this; moreover, because the activity of inference is caused by this.[80] But if one realizes <that something> produces successful activity, with no reference at all to the desire to know, then what is the damage? Let the validity as a means of knowledge be inferred through this <mark> also;[81] because, there is ratification of the merging of the means of knowledge also.[82]

96.1 <P> What is this 'being of this kind'? For, on the cf. 29.7
one hand, it does not mean 'belonging to the class of valid means of knowledge', because the undesirable consequence is that it is not different from the *sādhya*; nor, on the other hand, is it 'belonging to the kind which produces successful

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[80] See NA 13.20.
[81] See ŚṬ 19.8.
[82] See NVTPP 102.1-2: 'When it is desired to be known by another person, then, even in the absence of his own desire to know, its purpose is to inform another'.

activity'. For would this be a relationship with successful activity? Or would <this> be an invariant prior non-being, which is imposed on this? <S> Now the former is not <correct>, because of the statement, "prior even to activity." Nor 29.7
in turn is the latter <correct>, because it is impossible that this,[83] which is beyond the ken of the senses, can be known without a logical mark. And if there is a logical mark for
96.5 this, which is restricted solely to the validity as a means of knowledge, then let the validity as a means of knowledge itself be inferred through that; what purpose is served by inferring 'being of this kind'? <P> But what purpose is served by inferring this, if it is not restricted to the validity as a means of knowledge? Nor, again, is 'being of this kind' any property established simply through perception. But if this is <directly> perceptible, <this is not correct> because of the undesirable consequence that there is cognition in the case of a means of knowledge, even if its domain is not that with which one is fully familiar. Moreover, in this case also, there would be ascertainment of its validity as a means of knowledge prior even to activity, because the pervasion relationship also is known already. For it is not the case that he did not in any case infer the validity as a means of knowledge through <the logical mark of> 'being of this

[83] The prior absence of successful activity, ŚṬ 19.6-7.

kind'. In this case[84] there is no 'being of this kind' at all;
96.10 how, pray, could it be apprehended through perception? <S> <This is> Not correct, because of the undesirable consequence that, if the validity as a means of knowledge is being inferred with respect to things with which one is fully familiar through <the logical mark> of 'being of this kind', then <that with which one is not fully familiar> whose validity as a means of knowledge that is inferred through successfulness of activity is a pseudo-familiar instance, insofar as it is lacking a cause. Therefore, we do not view 'being of this kind' as excessive.[85]

<S> This is true. Nevertheless, because cognition is caused by its contents, all the limiting conditions on the cognitions, which are simply the limiting conditions on all the contents, the cognition that is being limited by all these limiting conditions is 'of this kind'; the state of that is
96.15 'being of this kind'. And since these limiting conditions cannot individually be named by a unique name, they are revealed by this circumlocution, 'being of this kind'. Hence, in this <expression> distributiveness has to be understood: 'Being of this kind and of that kind'. To be more explicit, direct experience, in the first place, depends upon the intrin-

[84] A cognition or means of knowledge concerning what is not familiar. ŚṬ 19.10-11.
[85] ŚṬ 19.14-15.

sic nature <of an object> and the mode <in which it is presented>. Later on he will make clear the following: thus direct experience being limited by the intrinsic nature of the object is in fact valid knowledge; hence, its being valid knowledge is directly experienced when this <object> is directly experienced according to this nature.[86] But direct experience relating to the mode <of presentation arises> in two ways; one is limited by the mode of its intrinsic nature, while one is <limited> by the mode of what is not its intrinsic nature. Hence there is doubt in some cases. Between
96.20 these, in order that the direct experience that is limited by the mode of its intrinsic nature be differentiated, the limiting conditions of the mode are specified. And they necessarily are simply the qualities etc. whose different intrinsic natures are ascertained, in that they are contradicted by the content of error. Thus, on the one hand, this state of being the knowledge whose content is what has to be characterized together with its characteristic feature is, in a general way, 'being of that kind' that resides in knowledge; hence, the method with respect to perception. But when knowledge is produced through a characteristic feature when the thing to be characterized is not perceptible, then that is inference;

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[86] ŚṬ 19.19-20: 'All means of knowledge have intrinsic validity as regards the mere object (*dharmimātra*)'.

the method of this will prove quite different. Thus, in respect to a substance <inference holds> universally: the cognition of earth in respect to what has odor etc.: specifically, the cognition of body, in regard to <a substance> that
96.25 has arms, legs, etc. With respect to qualities, <inference holds universally of> the knowledge of fragrance in the *ketakī* plant etc., <and specifically of> the knowledge of
97.1 white <color> in a conch-shell etc. But in regards to motion, that substance which is apprehended as being in motion through <the logical mark> of a non-wind that is stationary, is not perfected by a fierce gust, <and> is devoid of a crystal clear view of moving water, this <is> likewise <inferred>.[87] Thus among all these particulars, all those particulars, that are contradicted by variation, cannot be enumerated word by word. Hence, in the same way one must understand: 'being of this kind' is nothing but 'the state of direct experience of these and those contents, that are qualified by these and those limiting conditions'. Hence, 'being endowed with ten(s of) repetitions' is nothing but 'the repetition of the limiting condition', insofar as this kind of knowledge is
97.5 inseparable from its content. But when that object itself is repeated again and again, then 'being of this kind' is only 'being correspondent'. And it was previously shown that

[87] The example of motion is opaque.

correspondence arises from a means of knowledge that is
same or different in kind; hence, external perception is 80.19-21
established.

He establishes that scripture is a valid means of
knowledge through the same argument used for direct per-
ception, "And thus..." Here also, 'being of this kind' means 29.8-10
'having a reliable authority'. But it's 'being fully familiar'
is the establishment of the invariance as a means of knowl-
97.10 edge of 'being of this kind' in *mantras* and the *Āyurveda* by
repeated observations. As for the *mantras and the Āyurveda* cf. 29.8-9
not being fully familiar, the non-establishment of this will
be shown by Akṣapāda in the second book. One should Cf. NS 2.1.68
understand: and just as the validity as a means of knowledge
is ascertained among things that are not fully familiar
through the successfulness of the activity, so too is the
invalidity as means of knowledge <among things with
which one is not fully familiar> through a failure in the
activity. And just as, among those things with which one is
fully familiar, the validity as a means of knowledge is estab-
lished prior even to activity, insofar as <they are> 'being of
this kind', likewise the state of being an invalid means of
knowledge. And 'being of this kind' means 'contradiction
with a limiting condition'. 'Being fully familiar' is simply
the repetition of this <contradiction with a limiting condi-

tion>. As, for example, the cognition of two moons with respect to the moon; <or> the cognition of yellow <color> with respect to a conch-shell; <or> the cognition of pungency with regard to molasses, etc. Therefore, successfulness of activity has to be ascertained when <something's 'being of this kind'> is in doubt.

<P> Let this granted. <However:> "'Successful- 1.4
ness', on the other hand, is the right-connection between this <striving> and the result." He states the doctrine of some[88] <*ekadeśins*> on this point: <E> — 'But then how is it that the validity as a means of knowledge for the result-
knowledge itself must be ascertained?' — "Nor is..." The 29.10-12
meaning of <the phrase>, "But he does not also inquire[89] 29.13-14
into the quenching of his thirst", is: 'the knowledge of the quenching of thirst also'. <S> This same <doctrine> is impossible. For would the knowledge of the result not be examined — either because a result, whose condition is established, is made purposeless, insofar as it is incapable of efficacy, or because the knowledge of 'this and that kind' is free from doubts, insofar as it does not vary from its object in all circumstances? Now the first is not <correct>, because of the undesirable consequence that, if the result has an

[88] Trilocana is meant, according to Śrīkaṇṭha (ŚṬ 20.12).
[89] *parīkṣyate* (NVTP 97.18), *parīkṣate* (NVT 29.14).

established condition, in the same way even that which is made into its cause should not be examined, because it is rendered useless. <P> That which causes it is examined through rightly connecting it with each successive result. <S> Let this <same argument> hold thus with respect to the result also. For it is only with respect to a result that is established, when it has been examined <and> when there is establishment of its cause being such, that there might be a connection with each successive result. Nor, again, is the second <alternative correct>, because one very frequently sees the variation even of the result-knowledge in the state of dreaming etc. <P> The result-knowledge does not vary
98.1 for one in a normal state. <S> Therefore, on this reasoning, the knowledge of the result would already have been examined. With this idea –'To be more explicit, when there is establishment of the pervasion relationship, 'The result-knowledge of one in a normal state is invariant', precisely when one sees in this case that the knowledge is correspondent, it is just then that he ascertains the invariance' – he
says, "But we..." The fact that even this <result-knowl- 29.14
edge> is fully familiar is thus the apprehension of the logical mark which invariably occurs with the validity as a means of knowledge; yet 'being of this kind' is simply being the result-knowledge for one whose condition is nor-

mal. By this is explained the knowledge of desire, aversion, and effort.

<P> If <an instance of> knowledge has to be exemplified, how is it that its validity as a means of knowledge also must be effected? Likewise, how <is it that the validity of> even that which causes this or that <result must be established> by a continuous chain of familiar instances?
<S> Hence he says, "Nor..." The phrase, "of the result- 29.16-17; 29.16
knowledge", is a partial characterization. What has to understood is: when the validity as a means of knowledge has to be established through the logical mark of 'being of this kind', whatever thing is made the example — <there is a result-knowledge> of that.

<P> If this is the case, then the successfulness of the activity has no scope whatsoever; for that is not <an instance of> knowledge whose content is completely new.
And by the same token, how does Uddyotakara say that cf. 7.13-20
there is no beginning as between the apprehension of an object on the basis of a means of knowledge and successful-
ness of activity? <S> Hence he says, "And among these..." 29.19-20
In the phrase, "whose variance <from its object> is 29.20
doubted", what has to be supplied is: 'because there is no realization of 'being of this kind'.' Even if the result is not the content of the activity, nevertheless the relationship of

the activity, whether it relates to what causes it or else only to a sequence of these, with another result of this kind, or its relationship with a dissimilar result that is inextricably connected with that, must be understood to be successfulness of activity — either for oneself or for another man — for the result-knowledge.

98.15 With the idea — 'Thus, then, by establishing the [98.15-19] validity as a means of knowledge for verbal testimony, immediately after establishing the validity as a means of knowledge for the perception of such external objects as color etc., in order to establish <the validity as a means of knowledge for> both of these, the validity as a means of knowledge for the result-knowledge is established among cognitions of internal perception by the very same reasoning. By the very same reasoning, the establishment of the validity as a means of knowledge for an apprehension, even though it concerns desire, aversion, and effort, is hinted at; hence, what remains <for consideration> is internal cognition. And immediately after establishing the validity as a means of knowledge for inference, establishment will be made for this <internal cognition> by the same reasoning used for inference' — he says, "inference..." For the doubt 29.21-23
98.20 concerning variation is two-fold — in terms of cause and in terms of its intrinsic nature; and this <doubt> is dispelled

only by valid means of knowledge by which one apprehends the pervasion relationship and subject-attributeness.
Therefore, inferential knowledge has "all doubt concerning 29.22
its variation removed." <In the phrase,> "has its validity as 29.22
a means of knowledge" – of this <inference> which is such – "intrinsically only", what has to be supplied is: 'is ascertained'.[90]

<P> Even if there is no difference as to the validity as a means of knowledge, how <is the validity as a means of knowledge ascertained> for inference alone intrinsically,
but not for perception? <S> Hence he says, "to be 29.22-23
inferred..." For inferential knowledge, by simply delimiting the 'thusness' of its object, arises thus: 'This <mountain>
99.1 indeed has fire'. Moreover, this <inferential cognition> is ascertained as consisting essentially of ascertainment of each respective object, when internally perceived through internal perception. Nor is the fact that it consists essentially of ascertainment ascertained by one who does not internally perceive that direct experience has it objects non-erroneously. And thus this must necessarily be ascertained. And this is precisely its validity as a means of knowledge. What remains <for consideration> is: sometimes, even when there is internal perception of this kind, doubt as to its being erro-

[90] The *Ṭīkā* translation is slightly modified here.

neous assaults this. And this <doubt> does not exist simply "because <it> arises through an inferential mark." For there 29.23
is no scope for doubt, if its origination is swallowed up by
99.5 seeing the specific case. He says the same thing, "For there 29.23
is no..." <In the phrase,> "knowledge that is inferential in 29.23
form", what has to be supplied is: 'whose variation has been ascertained'. With the idea – 'But perceptually and verbally [99.6-10]
derived knowledge do not consist by their nature in excluding non-connection,[91] but rather, make manifest only contents that are common to imposition and non-imposition. Moreover, they are both directly experienced in precisely this way through internal perception also. But, as they are not <directly experienced> as consisting of ascertainment, there is no grasping of their validity as a means of knowledge intrinsically. But if, by chance, they arise in fact as consisting only of excluding non-connection and are internally perceived, and then only by their manifesting a restriction. But in the absence of this, by overcoming the fact of consisting by their nature of ascertainment because of iden-
99.10 tity, there only remains <a cognition> that is common, in the form of 'This or not this'' — he says that <this> is simply an absence of a restriction, "But knowledge through percep- 29.24-25
tion..."

[91] Cf. NVT 37.24-25.

For, if there is knowledge of that whose mark is smoke[92] etc. together with the smoke etc., even if there is invariance of an object also with an object,[93] and even if that knowledge arises from the object, in turn, which really is such, nevertheless <in this case> is there invariance or else the apprehension of this? A past <apprehension of invariance> is quite useless here, because both <cognitions>, which <arise> simultaneously from nothing but the impingement on the sense-organ, do not depend upon the time of the realization, in the sense that it reveals one and
99.15 the same knowledge; and because that which has not been
realized does not restrict. This same point is stated: "but 29.25
rather is established only as being an existent thing." What has to be supplied is: 'even of that which has invariance'. Therefore, the statement of some that, 'Concern by itself is dispelled by other cognitions', has been rejected. For concern is simply called 'doubt'. And, since this cannot actually be dispelled without ascertainment of the true-nature, a means of ascertaining the true-nature has to be pursued. Moreover, if that by which one grasps the intrinsic nature of knowledge is internal and if there is absence of another <knowledge> such as perception etc., inference alone is the

[92] Namely, fire, ŚṬ 21.12.
[93] Namely, fire and smoke, ŚṬ 21.13.

means. Hence he says, "'successfulness of activity'..."

99.20 <P> Let this be granted. <However:> If the validity as a means of knowledge for perceptual and verbal knowledge <is established> extrinsically, then how is there now <establishment of the validity as a means of knowledge> of internal perception only extrinsically? Moreover, according to this rule, 'the logical mark, only when ascertained, ascertains', the knowledge of a series of other logical marks introduces a regress. <S> Hence he says, "that resides in the 30.3-4
knowledge..." Here too the same reasoning <applies>. In just this way there is direct experience of its coming into being, depending only upon its own content, simply by excluding what is not of this nature. And, because from the very beginning the origination is swallowed up by apprehending the differences among specific contents, there is no scope for concern. And the specific <content> is merely the state of internal perception. For no one, even when he does not know, internally perceives, 'I know'. Nor, when there is a cognition in the form of mother-of-pearl, would it occur <that he would say> 'I am aware of silver'. This same point
99.25 is stated, "of this kind..." And this is an partial characteriza- 30.4-6
tion. That is to say: perception, in turn, both external and internal, whose content is the mere object, is in fact intrinsi-
100.1 cally a means of knowledge, because it is in no way possible

that even an error is without a basis. Taking to heart the rea-
soning previously stated, he extends <its application>, "by 30.5
this..." The meaning is: 'comparison is knowledge through
comparing'. <In the phrase,> "is explained...", what has to 30.6
be supplied is: 'by intrinsically ascertaining <it> as being a
valid means of knowledge'. The deep meaning is: for it is [100.3-7]
not the case that, if the validity as a means of knowledge for
the knowledge of the meaning of the extension statement
and of the knowledge of the similarity is ascertained,
knowledge derived through comparison is made fallacious.
And even if the validity as a means of knowledge for cogni-
tions of the <mere> object through inference, comparison,
100.5 and internal perception can actually be grasped extrinsically
also — for here too there are logical marks of 'being of this
kind', which arise from the knowledge of the similarity with
the logical mark etc. as is appropriate — nevertheless here
the apprehension of the validity as a means of knowledge
<arises> only intrinsically through internal perception[94] and
not of itself; hence this <apprehension of validity> was
revealed. But this must be established extrinsically only
with respect to one who is in error. Hence the ascertainment
'intrinsically only' <applies> neither to the exclusion of

[94] ŚṬ 21.29 ***koṣṭhagatyā**...mānasapratayakṣam*. He adds that none of these is itself self-aware. But according to Vardhamāna (NVTPP 119.11-12): ***koṣṭhagatyā** vastugatyārthaḥ* 'in reality'.

non-connection nor again to the exclusion of other-connec-
tion. <P> How then? <S> <It applies> To the exclusion of
absolute non-connection.

<P> Despite all this, on what grounds is there estab-
lishment of 'the validity as a means of knowledge for the cf. 30.8-9
sense-organs', which are the instrumental cause of knowl-
edge? For it is not the case that the correspondence with the
result alone is the validity as a means of knowledge for
them. <S> Hence he says, "And ...awareness..." <P> The 30.6-7
sense-organs etc., if they vary from their object, how could
they produce a cognition of an object that is invariant? Or, if
this is the case, then even a donkey could produce the cogni-
tion of fire that is invariant, because there is no difference.
<S> Hence he says, "Nor is it..." The meaning is: just as 30.8-9
wet-fuel, even though it varies from fire, by producing
smoke, which is invariant from fire, due to its connection
with fire, does not merit 'enjoining and calling into ques- cf. 30.9
tion'[95] because of the intrinsic nature of a cause; in the
same way, the sense-organs etc. too, even if they vary from
their object, augmented by a concomitant of that kind <i.e.
invariant from the object>, by virtue of connection with that
object could produce a knowledge that is invariant from that
object. With the idea — 'Therefore, this validity as a means [100.16-20]

[95] See ŚṬ 22.1-2.

of knowledge is not necessarily ascertained in every case, because there is no ascertainment in all cases of awareness, which is in fact the basis of that. And if, this being the case, there is a regress, there could be no movement from the content. Therefore, as for that awareness, that has necessarily to be known, insofar as it has a keen impetus, and with respect to whatever thing another person is either mistaken or has a desire to know, whether specifically or in general, in all such cases the validity as a means of knowledge has to be
100.20 ascertained by the means described; hence there is no regress' — summarizing the subject that was stated on the pretext of a summary, he says, "Therefore, because...out of 30.9-13
doubt as to the object..."

<P> For one who acts, even without ascertaining the object, is not able to act by inferring what constitutes the means to that <object>, because there is absence of his being 'one who seeks';[96] for there is no inference as to what constitutes a means to this without grasping the pervasion relationship. Nor is that[97] <pervasion relationship> in turn <possible> without activity; hence the state of mutual dependency is just of this sort. <S> Hence he says, "of the 30.13
object..." Even if one acts in this and that case even without

[96] An untranslatable pun on *artha* 'object' and *arthin* 'seeking an object'.
[97] Reading *asau* with M.

101.1 ascertaining what constitutes a means to what he desires — just as <he acts> without ascertaining the validity as a means of knowledge, nevertheless there is activity <on his part> by adopting what constitutes the means to what he desires — even if it 'is one-sided'. Nor, even if this <what constitutes the means> were not apprehended, would this doubt even occur otherwise. Hence, once again cognition has entered; hence <the charge of mutual dependency> is eliminated simply by adopting 'beginninglessness'. In the <phrase in the> *Vārttika*, "the apprehension of the 7.15
object...", even if the word 'object' only expresses what constitutes the means to what is desired — because this alone is the domain of activity and because it is what is being sought – nevertheless, because both the apprehension of a mere object and the apprehension of <its being quali-
101.5 fied by> that <property> which has to be inferred occur at different times and because they are desired,[98] he explains <it> just thus, "the apprehension of an object..." 30.17-18

<P> Could the fact that a means of knowledge has a purpose be answered if objected to, or if desired to be known could be made known? Now the first <alternative> is not <correct>. For no one would say that a means of knowledge lacks a purpose, because the establishment of all

[98] So ŚṬ 22.34-23.5.

human ends is based on this. But if one has no human end he would be crushed quite breathless. Nor again is the second <alternative correct>, because it is proper that this be made known immediately after reading the <first> *sūtra* — as is the case with doubt etc.[99] <S> Hence he says, "In this 30.20-31.3
101.10 matter the following..." The meaning is: this is not the desire to know the purpose of the means of knowledge. <P> When then <is it>? One who believes that 'reasoning in the highest sense', which has been made into the purpose of the *śāstra*, is a difficult means towards <the attainment of> the highest good, objects to the very undertaking of the *śāstra*, as there is an easier means to activity. <S> And this <the easier means> is begun in order that it be answered. "The 30.24
contemplation that ten <of the twelve objects of knowledge> are what is called 'pain'" serves to strengthen the desire for liberation. By "actual nature of the soul" is meant 30.24
'the state of being liberated from all limiting conditions'. The "contemplation" of this is 'meditation'. But by the 30.24
explicit mention of "etc.", those activities, which are the 30.24
means to this, are comprehended; namely 'abstentions and observances and postures and regulations of the breath... and fixed attention'.[100] By "Direct cognition of the true 30.25

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[99] ŚṬ 23.7-8.
[100] *Yogasūtra* 2.29, Woods translation.

101.15 nature of the soul" is meant 'meditation'. "Dispassion" is 30.25
subjugation in the truest sense. "Full actualization" means 30.25
'liberation from affliction together with its abode'. By this
*Yoga* together with its elements and accessories is revealed.
Having stated the objection, he rescues the <sentence in
the> *Bhāṣya*, "In this matter the following <consideration> 31.3 (1.1)
is of assistance." <P> Nevertheless, the fact that reasoning
is a difficult means is not refuted, because even an object
ascertained by reasoning depends upon activity; because
one who acted did not depend on reasoning. <S> Hence he
says, "This is what is meant..." <P> If both are equal, on 31.5-6
the basis of what distinction is the means of knowledge
alone made to be explained, but not activity also? <S>
101.20 Hence he says, "Further..." The meaning is: because activ- 31.6-8
ity — namely, 'hearing, pondering, meditating, and direct
apprehension' — is included under means of knowledge in
terms of their intrinsic nature and their results, the explana-
tion of these in fact explains activity. Nor is means of
knowledge explained by explaining activity. For neither the
means of knowledge nor its intrinsic nature is the result of
activity. <P> On the occasion of explaining the purpose of
the subject matter of the *śāstra*, on what grounds was it said,
"A means of knowledge is valid..."? For the subject matter 1.1
of the *śāstra* is not the means of knowledge, but rather rea-

soning. <S> Hence he says, "And the more general statement..." 31.8

102.1 Therefore by this <portion of the> commentary are rejected the <following> objections <to the *śāstra*>: that it has no purpose, that its purpose is impossible, that its purpose is not sanctioned, and that it is too difficult a means. <P> Therefore, what else remains <for consideration> on account of which <Uddyotakara states>, "restates worldly 7.25
conduct"? <S> Hence, simply by reminding <the reader> of the primary meaning, he introduces the <sentence in the> *Vārttika* <thus>, "what constitutes being a valid means of 31.8-9
knowledge..." Even if in this <other horn of the dilemma,> "an invalid means of knowledge" there is 'a discrepancy 31.11; cf. 31.13-14
between his words and thought' — for a means of knowledge is nothing but a means to negation or assertion; therefore the statement of one, even if he knows that it is a means to negation, 'I deny through an invalid means of knowl-
102.5 edge', is actually discrepant with his thought. Nevertheless, because of the possibility <of his making such a statement>, even out of delusion, even if his intention, which is such, remains unchanged, there is no loss whatsoever for us. In light of all this, the reply given is simply dismissal, "a dis- 31.13-14
crepancy between his words and thought." The meaning is: if one does not grasp its validity as a means of knowledge,

he cannot speak thus — 'through a valid means of knowl-
edge'. Therefore, if one thus says, 'through a valid means of
knowledge', the 'validity as a means of knowledge' neces-
sarily moves about in his thought. Moreover, the phrase,
"the validity of which as a valid means of knowledge has 31.13
not been grasped" is discordant with this thought. "Worldly 31.14
conduct" means 'uncontradicted normal way of life'.

102.10 <P> Granted that the <sentence in the> *Bhāṣya*,
"Now when the agent of knowledge...through a means of 1.2-3
knowledge...", is a restatement of worldly conduct; but how
is the statement "on the basis of <this> means of knowl- 1.1
edge" <a restatement of worldly conduct>? <S> Hence he
says, "by way of revealing its cause." The meaning is: for 31.18
worldly conduct is not being employed in its intrinsic
nature. <P> How then? <S> It is with this idea —'Insofar as
it <worldly usage> has necessarily to be admitted, the
means to this also has necessarily to be admitted' — that
this <worldly usage> together with its means indeed is
restated.

<P> Because in an upcoming <passage of the>
*Bhāṣya* 'What is to be eliminated etc.' is clear, lest you cf. 2.10-12
object that 'now the literal meaning is being explained',
102.15 <S> he says, "of this same..." The meaning is: the passage 31.19
composed of *vārttikas*, in the form of "cardinal entities", is 8.1

the "*Vārttika* passage" — 'of this'; of 'precisely the same 31.20
sort' is the "passage of the *Bhāṣya*" — composed of *bhāṣ-* 31.21
*yas* — 'of this'.[101] <P> As the relation between what is
principal and what secondary is desired to be known — in
order that one fix the priority and posteriority of <the cardi-
nal entities> that are being expressed – what scope is there
for a *śāstra* in the form of <merely> expressing <them>?
<S> Hence he says, "The word '*śāstra*'." <P> Thus, then, 31.21-22
inasmuch as 'what is to be eliminated etc.' are in the form of
the subject matter of the *śāstra*, they are not a distinct class.
Moreover, on what is the concern about the relation of prin-
cipal and subordinate based, insofar as they belong to the
same class? <S> Hence he says, "And hence..." <P> Let 31.22-23
the <sentence in the> *Vārttika*, "But how is the group of 8.5
102.20 four, means of knowledge etc., understood thus by this
<sentence>?", not be an unstated objection. <S> Hence he
says, "through this."[102] "because it is the basis for the estab- 31.25; 32.1
lishment of the others." The point is: establishment is under- [102.21-24]
standing and attainment. Between these, there is only
understanding of 'what has to be eliminated' and 'the
means'. But of 'what has to be attained', there is both
understanding and attainment. And even if there is nothing

[101] A somewhat convoluted rendition of a *samāsavigraha* (NVT 31.20).
[102] NVT *tatra* (32.25), NVTP *tena* (102.20).

but understanding of the 'eliminating' in the form of the
means of knowledge, nevertheless it was said "the others" – 32.3
than this – simply the means of knowledge. But because the
attainment of the eliminating <arises> through ignorance
only, what good is served in the knowledge of this? <S> But
because it arises from knowledge, this depends on a means
of knowledge. But in the group of four, 'agent of knowledge
etc.', the establishment of the agent of knowledge and the
102.25 objects of knowledge is simply understanding; and of valid
knowledge attainment also. This same point is stated: "and 32.3
because valid knowledge is the effect of this." <P> Because
103.1 the agent of knowledge etc. also are successful, why is
superiority ascribed to the means of knowledge on this
<grounds that it> "is valid"? <S> Hence he says, "<The 1.1; 32.1
affix> *matup* is used in the sense of 'pre-eminence'."

<P> Is there an alternation of these two groups of
four, so far as the attainment of the highest good is con-
cerned, or combination? Either <possibility> is impossible,
because they are the same. To be more explicit, the meaning
of 'agent of knowledge, object of knowledge, <and> valid
knowledge' is the same as 'what is to be eliminated <and>
103.5 what has to be attained'; the meaning of 'eliminating and
the means' is the same as 'means of knowledge'. Also,
because <the categories of> doubt etc. form the body of rea-

soning, insofar as they are the accessories of reasoning and
because this <reasoning> is a valid means of knowledge.
Therefore, because they are not different, there is no alterna-
tion —due merely to a difference in linguistic periphrasis.
Nor, again, is there combination; for this <kind of combina-
tion> is not to be effected either by '*taru*' or by '*vṛkṣa*', or
by both '*taru*' and '*vṛkṣa*'.[103] <S> Hence he says, "with a 32.4-5
difference in intended meaning." The meaning is: hence, [103.8-21]
due to this <thought>, 'Because this is impossible', he
intends a difference in instrumental causes. Hence this is the
meaning: even if the categories, which are only sixteen, are
included in both <groups of four>, nevertheless, just as the
103.10 means of knowledge has to be known in terms of being a
means of knowledge, so too <does it have to be known> in
terms of eliminating. Otherwise, another eliminating would
be resorted to; and the means of knowledge would be use-
less. And if its being a means of knowledge were not under-
stood, then its being eliminating would not result. And just
as doubt etc. have to be known by their intrinsic nature as
being accessories to the means of knowledge, so too <must
they be known> as being means <to eliminating>. Other-
wise, another means would be resorted to. And they would
serve no purpose. And if the fact that they are accessories is cf. NS.1.19

[103] Both words mean 'tree'.

not understood, then that they are a means <to that> would not result. And just as the ten, body etc., are to be known as being objects of knowledge, so too <must they be known> as being what has to be eliminated; otherwise, they would not be what has to be eliminated; and another thing that has to be eliminated would be resorted to. And if their being an object of knowledge were not understood, then their being

103.15 what has to be eliminated would not result. And, just as liberation has to be known as being an object of knowledge, so too <does it have to be known> as being what has to be attained. Otherwise, another thing that has to be attained would be resorted to. And hence it would not be what has to be attained. And if it were not known as being an object of knowledge, that it is what has to be attained would not result. And, just as the soul has to be understood as being an object of knowledge, so too <does it have to be known> as being the agent of knowledge. Otherwise, another agent of knowledge would be resorted to, and there would be a regress. And if its being an object of knowledge were not understood, then the fact that, insofar as its form has limiting conditions, it is what has to be eliminated, and the fact that it is what is to be appropriated, insofar as it its form is devoid of limiting conditions, would not result. And just as cognition <has to be known> as being cognition, so too a

kind[104] of it <has to be known> as being valid knowledge.
103.20 Otherwise, another valid knowledge would be resorted to,
or the means of knowledge <that produced it> would have
no result. And if it were not understood to be an object of
knowledge, that it is what has to be eliminated would not
result. The meaning is: therefore, intending to say, 'Let
these same <sixteen categories of> means of knowledge etc.
be known in both ways', he mentioned both sets of four. cf. 1.11-12

<P> Even the statement made by some – 'A human
goal is fully realized in the four – what has to be eliminated,
the eliminating, the means, and what has to be attained –
alone. As, for example, in the everyday world: a thorn has to
be eliminated; the eliminating is a sandal; but the means to
this is a shoe-maker etc.; the absence of pain is what has to
104.1 be attained. And <as an example> in the *śāstra*: disease is
what is to be eliminated; the eliminating is therapy; the
means to this is knowledge of its cause; <good> health is
what is to be attained. Hence, to what end, when <these>
four are what should be stated, is the description of the six-
teen categories employed?' — <S> This too is refuted,
because the statement <of these> as different in sixteen
ways is due to a desire to express a difference in meaning
for <this> same group of four. And Pakṣilasvāmin himself

[104] Cf. NA 18.4 ***buddhibhedo*** '*viparītānubhavaḥ*.

will reveal the appropriateness of the difference in intended
meaning word by word. And, indeed, by making this under-
stood, he refutes the doctrine of that man who objected to
<one of the groups of four's being> superfluous, "There- 32.5-7
fore..."

As for the phrase, "is explained part by part", the 32.11
meaning is: the purport of the activity <of explanation> is
with respect to the qualifier, but not that which has to be
qualified. This same point he makes clear subsequently,
"Because it... among these parts..." The meaning of, "why 32.11-12; 32.13
did he not say, 'because of a means of knowledge'?", is: for
if this were the case, the <sense of> the fifth case affix
would be quite free from doubt. <P> If one realizes the sub-
ject under consideration and the fifth case affix <when he
says> "It...", there is no concord of <grammatical> gen- 8.8
der.[105] <S> Hence he says, "It..." <P> Having explained 32.11
the objection – 'Having shown that the <affix> *tasi* is used
as a fifth case affix, the objection to and defence of this use
of *tasi* are incoherent without a fifth case affix' — <S> he
introduces <the following> "to express an overlapping of 32.14
grammatical number." <P> Granted that there is this merg-
ing — 'by two means of knowledge, by more than two cf. 8.11

[105] That is, *asya* does not agree with *iyam* (NV 8.8). Vācaspati indicates that *asya* refers to the whole form *pramāṇatas*, and not merely the (fifth case) affix *tasi* (NVT 32.11-12).

means of knowledge' — yet how <can there be such merg-
ing as> 'by one means of knowledge'? <S> Hence he says,
"where...of two..." The meaning is: it is in order to make 32.17-19
the <following> known: merging is merely identity of con-
tent, but not a collection of causes.[106] If this were the case,
there would be no difference in result. Nor, in turn, are the
constituents of the collection instrumental causes. If this
were the case, there would be no difference in their opera-
tion. "For this same reason ..." The meaning is: the expres- 32.19
sion 'alone', by excluding another 'most important causal
104.15 factor',[107] excludes its operation and its result; but it does
not reveal that its proper operation and effect are mutually
independent, because this is possible even when there is
merging.

"But from what is the meaning of 'instrumental 32.22
cause' understood?" The meaning is: from which of the two
— the base form or the affix? This is the idea: if the mean-
ing of 'instrumental cause' is conveyed by the third case
affix, what purpose is served by the affix *lyuṭ* that is added
to the base? But if <this sense is conveyed> by this <affix
*lyuṭ*> alone, what purpose is served by the third case affix?
There should be no objection that a *jñāpaka* is a *kāraka*.[108]

[106] ŚṬ 25.27 ff. has a the reading *karaṇānām*, 'the instrumental cause'.
[107] Cf. A.1.4.42 *sādhakatamaṃ karaṇam*.
[108] *lyuṭ* = *jñāpaka*, *tas* = *kāraka*.

<S> Hence he says, "'his end' – the apprehension of the 32.22-23 (8.13
object." <P> It is for this reason — 'Let causality and
instrumentality be understood' — that the overlapping of
<grammatical> case affixes is thus resorted to; as for <the
word> 'means of knowledge', instrumentality is understood
directly from the base form itself, <whereas> causality is
understood from the meaning; what purpose is served by an
overlapping of case? <S> Hence he says, "And thus..." <P> 32.23
Nor should it be objected: 'The identity between the means cf. 32.24
of knowledge and its result' can be ruled out even by instru-
mentality. Therefore, what purpose is served by the fifth
case affix <used> in order to state the cause, which is neces- cf. 32.23-24
sarily connected with that, and causality? <S> Because, if
the mere fact alone of 'being a causal factor' is success-
ful,[109] the meaning of <the affix> *tamap* is not significant;
and because there is a difference of opinion here. Having in
mind the meaning of the question, "From what?", he says, 32.22
"the base form of 'means of knowledge'..." Therefore by 32.25-26
thus establishing that it serves to restate, he answers <the
objection> that between the suffix *lyuṭ* and the third case
affix there is redundancy. <P> Nor is the fact that the repeti-
tion of a word serves to restate is established without
<recourse to> its having a purpose. <S> Hence he reveals

[109] ŚṬ 26.24 ff.

105.1 the purpose, "among the other *kārakas* of valid knowl- 32.25
edge..." That is to say: but in ordinary usage, because it
expresses number, one must realize that a case affix is
meaningful. <P> The objection to a merging <of
*pramāṇas*>, on the grounds that their content is restricted, is
simply incoherent, because in the case of a mountain etc.
restricted by fire etc., perception and inference merge. <S>
Hence he says, "'restricted' – 'different'..." The singular 33.1
number indicates the general property of being a content.
Because "perception, which arises due to the capacity on the 33.2
part of the object", hence "has objects as its domain." <P> 33.2-3
105.5 Is it then the case that 'being a cause' is itself a characteris-
tic of the content? <S> He denies this, "And this same 33.3-4
object..."[110] <P> What is the upshot if this is the case? <S>
Hence he says, "And yet, a universal...not..." 33.4

<P> And the individual of ordinary usage is also just
so. <S> Hence he says, "the individual..." The meaning is: 33.5
which does not extend in time and space <and> is capable
of examination. <P> Even if perception does not penetrate
to the form of the universal property, nevertheless even if
inference, in turn, were to penetrate to the individual, then
by this <consideration> alone there would be merging. <S>
105.10 Hence he says, "Nor is..." <P> Let inference be restricted 33.7

[110] *ca* in NVTP (105.5), not in NVT (33.2-3).

to universals only; for perception too will operate here; and the universal will also be that which brings about the form, because it exists; hence from this <argument> too there is establishment of merging. <S> Hence he says, "Nor..." <In 33.9-10
the phrase,> "can...be...", what has to be supplied is: 33.10-11
'which is ultimately real'. The idea is: because it is incapable of examination. <P> Is it then the case that because a universal does not exist, and because there is no possibility of apprehending its invariable relation with an individual, that inference simply has no content at all? <S> Hence he
says, "This same <universal>..." <P> Is it then the case that 33.10-11
inference is not a valid means of knowledge at all, because its domain is objects that are not ultimate<ly real>? Even if this is so, how does this, by describing one thing, make one
105.15 act towards another? And how is it not correspondent with it? And how is that, whose form is cancelled, normally referred to as 'a valid means of knowledge'? <S> Hence he
says, "Therefore..." 33.18-19

<P> There will be a merging of these two <individual and universal> with another means of knowledge. <S>
Hence he says, "And there is no..." <P> There is <the 33.21-23
means of knowledge of> verbal testimony etc. <S> Hence
he says, "a means of knowledge." <P> There is no inclusion 33.21-22
<of verbal testimony under the universal 'being a means of

knowledge'> at all, because its content is not the individual,
and because it is not invariably related to its content. <S>
Hence he says, "and if it is not included..."[111] <P> Even if 33.22
there is restriction as to the characteristic features of the
105.20 individual and the universal, there will be merging of these
two with regard to another content of perception and infer-
ence. For there is another content that possess them. <S>
<Hence> He says, "And there is no..." The meaning is: for 33.24-25
the ultimately real individual cannot possess them due to the
universal, which does not exist, because what exists and
what does not exist are not connected. With the idea —
'This same path is impenetrable' — he says, "And how 33.25
this..." <P> If in this <expression> "particular" there is the 33.25
object-*kāraka* and hence there is no other <particular> like
this at all. <S> Hence he says, "particular." What has to be 33.25
supplied is: 'a *Mīmāṃsaka*, who does not countenance
merging, says this'. Intending to state that the <sentence in
the> *Vārttika* that begins, "and an object that is already 8.23
known...", has a meaning in addition to <the sentence that
introduces it> in the *Vārttika*, "Because <the object> is 8.21-22
105.25 already known...", he says, "Let this be granted..." With 34.1
the idea — 'When an object is already known, another [105.25-106.6]
106.1 means of knowledge is not, on the one hand, employed for

[111] NVT 33.22 has *vā*, NVTP 105.19 *ca*.

understanding the object, since that <object> has already been established through another means of knowledge. Nor, on the other hand, <is it employed> for the accomplishing of the full panoply of each successive normal practice,[112] because that too is established by a continuous series of recollections which arise from the impressions that are produced by it <the original means of knowledge>. <P> Nor should it be objected thus: 'Let it be granted that either a continuous series of recollections or a continuous series of cognitions is what prompts normal practice; there is no difference at all', <S> because the undesirable consequence is that that which produces them is not a <valid> means of knowledge, insofar as they <the continuous series of cognitions> are not valid knowledge, insofar as they have to do only with objects that have <already> been revealed — as is
106.5 the case with recollection; and because of the undesirable consequence that they will for this very reason be recollection; and, insofar as a continuous series of recollections will necessarily exist, from this very fact because of the undesirable consequence of the hypothesis' being <too> ponderous, if there is an hypothesis of a continuous series of cognitions to establish normal practice' – he sums up that there is simply a 'grinding of what is ground', "that is 34.2 (cf. 8.23)

[112] This is unclear.

already known..."

<P> In <the phrase in> the *Vārttika*, "different 8.22
ways", if the fact that the difference of mode resides in the cause is intended, then, even if the difference of mode resides in the cause, no difference that resides in the content <and> which contributes to avoiding the <charge of> 'grinding what is ground', would have been shown. But if
106.10 the difference of mode which resides in the content only is revealed, then on what basis is there merging, insofar as <the first means of knowledge> makes known objects that are not already known? Nor, again, even if there is no difference in the content, does any difference in the mode of the result, due to the difference in means of knowledge, assist
the subject under discussion. <S> Hence he says, "This is 34.6-8
the idea..." That is to say: if there is 'grinding of what is ground', <a second means of knowledge> would either lack a result, or have the same result, or else have a result that is not desired, or else there would merely be a question — 'If the object is already known, how, pray, does the cause of the apprehension produce the apprehension?' — or else there is no possibility whatever of <its being> a cause. <S> Among these, he refutes the impossibility of a cause, <by saying>
"for...not..." The meaning is: for there would be no means 34.6-7; [106.14-17]
106.15 of knowledge for its invariable relation with its own cause.

And the knowledge of the content is not in contradiction
with the cause of valid knowledge, so that if this <knowl-
edge of the content> actually exists, the cause of the valid
knowledge would lack a cause. Therefore, upon reflection,
they would cease of themselves, if they were to reflect; and
this is not the case. He refutes 'merely a question', <by say-
ing> "Nor again..." Having generated <the objection> that 34.7-8
<a second means of knowledge> has a result that is not
desired, he refutes it, <by saying> "the agent of knowl- 34.8-9
edge." He <next> refutes <the objection that> it lacks a
result, "Therefore..." By 'the fact that it is produced by the 34.14-15; cf. 34.15
totality of causes that are present' is meant, 'the fact that it
is produced by the totality as qualified by causes that are
specific and are present now'. By this is shown that there is
106.20 direct experience. For the specific cause of recollection is
the impression, because the soul, internal organ, etc. are
common to other cognitions. And as this <impression>
arises over a long time, it is not present. But that accessory
<cause> which is present, also called 'awakening', is not
specific. But rather, the contact etc. of the four <means of
knowledge> is specific to direct experience. And this, when
present, arises afresh. What has to be supplied is: 'This type
of knowledge is uncontradicted'.

Having admitted that it has the same result, he

refutes the idea of an opponent, "which produce this..." The 34.15
meaning is: if <a second means of knowledge> is futile, [106.24-107.4]
106.25 insofar as the result is not different even in terms of the result of the first means of knowledge, then even the first means of knowledge, like the second, would be futile insofar as its result is not different from the second. <P> It is successful because it is independent. <S> Therefore, then,
107.1 even the second <means if knowledge> is in fact independent with respect to its proper result. The result of this is not indeed of the form of valid knowledge. <P> Nor is it appropriate to say, in turn, 'Because its domain is only what has <already> been apprehended — as is the case with recollection', <S> because, whereas the denial of its being correspondent direct experience is to be established, it has elapsed in time; and because there is establishing of what has been established, if there is not an additional end; and because it is the same as the thing to be established. And because it has as its limiting condition the absence of the instrumental cause of this, if the denial of ordinary usage <is the *sādhya*>, and because it is contradicted. And we will
state the instrumental cause of the ordinary usage of valid 110.14-15
knowledge. <P> Therefore, then, what is the meaning of <the sentence in> the *Vārttika*? <S> Hence he says,
107.5 "And...this same..." <P> The result also actually has a dif- 8.24-9.1; 34.16

ference in mode, in the form of 'immediate cognition and of cf. 34.17
non-immediate cognition'; why is this same <difference in
mode> not revealed by him? <S> Hence he says, "Even 34.16-17
if..." By the explicit mention of "etc.", the difference in 34.17
mode, even if it resides in the cause, in the form of a sense-organ, a logical mark, etc., is included. For the opponent has been objected to solely in order to refute a merging of different causes. <P> How is this to be made understood by this? By the same token, how, even through the difference between immediate cognition and non-immediate cognition, is an opponent to be persuaded of continuous <cognitions>? And yet the instruction of an opponent is the subject under
discussion. <S> This same point was stated, "because it 34.17
107.10 does not contribute to the subject under discussion..."

Assuming in his heart that the means of knowledge had thus been established, merging and restriction were examined. Now, the intrinsic nature of a means of knowl-
edge is being explained. He says, "the meaning of the case 34.22
affix." "'ascertainment'." As the question — <P> 'If ascer- 34.23
tainment were approved, this is not necessarily preceded by doubt' — might arise for one in doubt, <S> hence he says,
"ascertainment is produced..." The point is: and by the 34.22-23
same token, because the 'examination' — investigation — cf. 34.23
107.15 necessarily presupposes doubt, the question is appropriate

for one who later doubts. He states <that> misunderstanding is the cause of doubt, "Some ..." The *Mīmāṃsakas* <say 34.24
that>: for the means of knowledge is a specific instrumental cause. And 'the instrumental cause is the most important causal factor'.[113] And it is not the case that, when there is establishment of what has to be established <a second means of knowledge which> 'of this kind' is the most important causal factor; as is the case with an axe, when a tree has <already> been cut down. Therefore, just as the axe, when it is being employed, insofar as its object has not <already> been chopped down, is the means of cutting, so too are the sense-organs etc., when employed towards an object that is not <already> known, the means of knowledge.

107.20 He states another doctrine, "the correspondence 34.24
between the object..." Now the end of a means of knowledge is simply the apprehension of the object — because it is of the form of valid knowledge. For in regard to its object, nothing whatsoever is to be accomplished apart from valid knowledge by a <valid> means of knowledge. Even the acquisition <of the knowledge> is simply activity. Activity, in turn, is nothing but the apprehension of an object that is suitable for activity. Therefore, there is no end at all for a

[113] Cf. A.1.4.42 *sādhakatamaṃ karaṇam.*

means of knowledge apart from valid knowledge, of which he says, "This same perceptual knowledge is the end of a means of knowledge, because it is of the form of apprehension of the object."[114] The means of knowledge, in turn, is simply that which makes one ratify the object. That in fact makes one ratify the object, in turn, which makes the cogni-
107.25 tion of the object be determined in the sense of belonging to it. But that cognition which[115] is not determined as being such is not a cognition of anything. The cognition could not be determined by its object thus — 'Or of everything'. And how is the means of knowledge, indeed, that which produces cognition of a non-determined object? And it is not
108.1 the case that cognition is determined as 'belonging to it' through the instrumental causes of knowledge, the sense-organs, etc. For the cognition of 'blue' of what is blue is not <determined> merely because it was produced by the eye; because the undesirable consequence is that cognition of 'green' is like this. Rather, the cognition of 'blue' for what is blue <is determined> solely by the fact that it is in blue in form. Therefore, it is solely the form of the object that is found in a cognition which, by making one ratify the cognition as 'belonging to it', also makes one ratify the object in

[114] This is not in the *Ṭīkā* to NS 1.1.1.
[115] *yasyāṃ* would be the better reading, NVTP 107.25.

this way. And hence, because it is the cause of the ratification of the object, this alone is the 'means of knowledge', of which he said, "its correspondence to the object is the
108.5 means of knowledge, because there is establishment of the cognition of the object by dint of this."[116] That is to say: 'The establishment of the cognition of the object' means 'the ratification of the cognition of the object', and similarly 'the ratification of the object'. Nor is the relationship of instrumental cause and effect barred in respect of that whose nature is identical, because thus <if this were so> there is a contradiction for the state itself of being a cause. For this <relationship of instrumental cause and effect> is admitted to be either the relationship of operation and that which embodies the operation, or the relation of that which is made known and that which makes it known.[117] In the everyday world, one normally speaks <as follows>: for the axe, only when it is in contact with trees etc., is the instrumental cause through the operation of contact. Nor is the physical <thing> called 'contact' different from the axe that is in contact.[118] The relationship, in turn, between that
108.10 which is to be made known and that makes it known, is only observed when the knowledge is self-luminous and an

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[116] This is not in the *Ṭīkā* to NS 1.1.1.
[117] ŚṬ 29.24 supplies: 'With respect to that whose nature is the same'.
[118] But cf. NVTPP 154.2 *vigrahavān pramāṇasiddha ityarthaḥ.*

external thing – a tree – is being known as a '*śiṃśapā*'.[119] For the tree is nothing different from a *śiṃśapā*, nor the *śiṃśapā* from a tree. But in judgemental usage,[120] namely, 'Just as here there is a difference from difference, so too for the form and what possesses it', there is no difference. Thus the *Sautrāntikas* <hold>.

He states another doctrine: "of knowledge alone..." 34.25
For that alone is the means of knowledge whose operation is the illumination of the object. And illumination, in the form of consciousness, belongs only to that which has consciousness. Nor are the organs of sensation etc., even if they are the instrumental causes, thus <means of knowledge>
108.15 because their nature is inert. For no conscious being is without cognition. Therefore, knowledge and nothing else is the operation of experiencing, insofar as it involves a conscious entity. Moreover, it is a means of knowledge. And there is no difference at all between the operation and what embodies the operation — just as in the case of an axe being in contact. Thus the *Vaibhāṣikas* etc. <hold>, who propound the doctrine <that knowledge is> formless.

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[119] Another word for 'tree'.
[120] *vaikalpike vyavahāra* NVTP 108.1: NVTPP 154.5-6 *savikalpaka-janye*.

He states another doctrine, “knowledge...” The 34.25
“venerable” means ‘those venerable in the means of knowl- 34.25
edge’. By this <expression> he indicates the childishness of
the previous <ly mentioned philosophers>. Some explain
<the sentence>, “By explaining the question as to the state, 35.1
he explains the question as to what exemplifies the state”,
by supplying through ellipsis, ‘together with’.[121] But some
<say> that: the explanation of the question of the state has
to be understood: it is through this <the state> that what
exemplifies the state is explained. But others <say>: the
question as to what exemplifies the state is explained by
‘explaining the question of the state’ as its logical reason;
the question as to what exemplifies the state is explained in
order to explain the question as to the state; because this is
impossible without that. Those who know the tradition
<say>: this is a scribal error. By “variation” is meant ‘non- 35.3
correspondence’. “Invalid” means ‘having the wrong 35.3
object’. Hence, there is no identity with what has to be
established. <P> When two <things> are revealed thus, ‘A
pillar or a man’, one of them is actually realized; thus how is
there non-correspondence <of the perception>? And how is
there ‘invalidity’? <S> Hence he says, “Surely...not...” The 35.3-4

[121] The sentence, thus supplemented, would run: ‘The question as to what exemplifies the state is explained together with the explanation of the state’ (NVT 35.1).

meaning is: because <the other one> is not obtained, hence it is not employed in purposive actions; because of non-obtainment and because of non-employment it does not
109.1 exist. Even if apprehension is explained through the idea of direct experience, there is no undesirable consequence <as to its> being the cause of recollection, because recollection is not direct experience. Nevertheless, the word 'apprehension' is accepted as a synonym of 'knowledge' by the author of the *sūtra*,

> Cognition, apprehension, and knowledge are not different things. NS 1.1.15

<P> With this intention – 'And recollection too is knowl-
109.5 edge' – he says, "For that does not..." That is to say: as 35.5
regards an object of the past, there is a relationship of verbal testimony, logical mark, etc. with the object, insofar as they are the effects of that indirectly; but as for an object that is yet to come, this <relationship>, in turn, does not exist. Hence a objection is raised as to what makes <a future
object> known. The meaning of, "the impression also...", 35.9
is: the fact that this <impression> also is indirectly the effect of an object and that it directly makes the object known are
equivalent. The meaning of, "which is the cause of appre- 35.9
hension in the form of recollection...", is: the cause of knowledge in the form of recollection. <S> He rejects

<this>, "This is not so..."[122] 35.9-10

<P> There is disagreement on this very point, 'Recollection is not valid knowledge'. <S> Hence he says, "ordi- 35.10-11
nary usage..." By this he implies that the means of
109.10 knowledge is that by which one grasps the instrumental cause of the operation of the word 'valid knowledge'. To be more explicit, the fact that it is recollection only is not, in the first place, the instrumental cause of activity, because of the undesirable consequence that direct experience is not valid knowledge. Nor again is the fact of being knowledge etc., which inheres in this same object, the instrumental cause of this <activity>, so that recollection too would be valid knowledge, because of the undesirable consequence that error also is such. Nor again is there a specific universal, namely 'being valid knowledge', because the specific universal that resides in knowledge must be grasped by the internal organ only, and because 'being valid knowledge'
was indeed previously taught as having to be inferred. cf. 82.2
Moreover, if 'being valid knowledge' were a specific uni-
109.15 versal, then it would not inhere in erroneous knowledge, whether it has the absence of this or else has a universal in contradiction with this. Likewise, erroneous knowledge would not be a means of knowledge with respect to even the

[122] NVTP 109.8 *naivam*, NVT 35.9 *maivam*.

mere object. And thus, this would result as having no basis. And a universal, together with another universal, might enter one and the same particular, in the relation of higher and lower. Thus, is 'being direct experience' higher or is 'being valid knowledge'? If the first <alternative is adopted>, how is recollection valid knowledge? But if the second <alternative is adopted>, direct experience would not differ from valid knowledge. And thus, even error would be an honored guest. And if 'admitting of immediate cognition' is the higher <universal>, then inferential knowledge

109.20 etc., which do not admit of immediate cognition, would not be valid knowledge. But if it is lower, then erroneous knowledge would not admit of immediate cognition, because it is not valid knowledge. Therefore, being a means of knowledge is not a specific universal. <P> Being correspondent enters. <S> <This is> Not correct, because of the undesirable consequence that even in this <statement>, 'I recollect', one designates this as knowledge of the form, 'I know validly'. <P> This <designation> is quite acceptable. <S> <This is> Not correct, because worldly usage and non-usage cannot be restricted merely by the desire of those who are different from the lord. <P> By him alone, this expression 'means of knowledge' is restricted to correspondent knowledge only. <S> <This is> Not correct, because this[123]

also has to be inferred from worldly usage. <P> There actu-
109.25 ally is <such> a worldly usage. <S> <This is> Not correct, because great sages, who are versed in this, do not enumerate the result of recollection as a means of knowledge. <P> There is no enumeration <of this by them> because it is included in the <means of knowledge> previously stated. <S> <This is> Not correct, because it is impossible that perception be the result of what does not admit of immediate cognition, and because the logical mark, verbal testimony, etc. do not cause knowledge only in terms of existence.

110.1 Moreover, on what basis is recollection even correspondent <with its object>? For it is not the case that an object of one kind, when it is remembered, is of the same kind then; because its previous state comes to an end in the present. For if there is no cessation, there would be no priority at all. And recollection does not depend on this object only insofar as its prior state has ceased, because the cessation of its prior state is not directly perceived; and, because if an object is not directly perceived, there is no operation of recollection. Or, if there is operation, there is a contradiction with its being recollection. And another specific cause must
110.5 be ascertained, because there is no impression <of an object that> has not been directly experienced.[124] <P> On what

[123] Restriction on the part of the lord (ṢṬ 30.26-27).

grounds can this <be maintained>: Even though both recollection and direct experience have the same content, direct experience is correspondent, but not recollection? <S> Because this object, at the time of direct experience, had that state; but because it was not in that state at the time of recollection. <P> Previously, at any rate, it really was in that state; by virtue of that fact alone let the knowledge be correspondent. <S> <This is> Not correct, because of the undesirable consequence that a cognition of blackness is correspondent even with regard to <a pot> reddened by cooking. <P> The past cognition 'black' in regard to this really is correspondent. <S> This is true, because the content of that only at that moment was in that state. But the
110.10 object when being recollected is not then in that state. Therefore, recollection is not in fact correspondent. But it might correspond to the direct experience. Thus, because the direct experience is correspondent, recollection also, having the same content, is said to be 'correspondent'. For the same reason, if the direct experience is not correspondent with the object, recollection, even if is not erroneous, is simply non-correspondent. For example: if one has directly experienced a rope as a snake and runs away, his recollec-

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[124] Reading, with ŚṬ (31.3), *ananubhūtasaṃskārābhāvāt* (NVT 31.3-4); Thakur's *ananubhūtam* (NVTP 110.5) is hard to construe.

tion is just that. Therefore, the correspondence of recollection is like adorning something that is borrowed, and not genuine.[125] This same point, which is what is to be expressed by the word 'dependency', is wrongly assailed by some slack in etymology. Therefore, the ordinary world has ascertained on both scores that correspondence alone, determined solely by something other than recollection's being
110.15 direct experience, is the instrumental cause of the operation of the word 'valid knowledge'. With the idea – 'Even if <one were to hold>, 'If the case were otherwise, how does it use the word 'valid knowledge' here alone, and not elsewhere?', nevertheless, let recollection not be a means of knowledge with regard to the object too.' – he takes refuge in worldly usage itself, the argument for which was previously stated. The same point is stated, "and ordinary peo- 35.11
ple..." Thus, then, correspondent direct experience is valid knowledge. And what produces this is a means of knowledge; hence he answers that his own characterization is not flawed, by refuting the overextension <of characterization> which had been objected to.

110.20 <P> And this is not disallowed by a *Mīmāṃsaka* also, for he also cannot in this case produce as undesirable consequences overextension and underextension <of char-

[125] Apparently a *nyāya*.

acterization>. For it is not possible even for a *Mīmāṃsaka* to hold: 'Correspondent direct experience and yet not valid knowledge'. But in terms of this characterization, what is the basis of our disagreement? <S> Hence he says, "And... 35.13-14
making known a previously unknown object." And this is a partial characterization. The meaning is: among eternal enti- [110.23-111.4]
ties,[126] there is no such thing as 'being previously unknown'; because, if it is not <already known> in this rebirth, there is understanding in another birth; and because, if it is not <previously known> through direct perception, yet <it is previously known> through inference or teaching, because even among non-eternal <entities> one usually
110.25 apprehends only what has been apprehended. And, otherwise, recognition would be a fully honored guest. And hence by its intrinsic nature as well, 'being previously unknown' would produce great confusion. Even in terms of the mode, in regard to pillars etc. which are quite fre-
111.1 quently[127] directly perceived, no mode of quality, in which liberation from rebirth is grasped every instant, is cognized. Even though produced by *karma*, perishing very quickly, it <the mode> is not new each moment. And it is not the case that, by producing the very same cognition in this <*karma*>,

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[126] Possibly 'categories', namely the Vaiśeṣika categories of time, space, etc.
[127] ŚṬ 31.25 ff.

even though it maintains its condition for four or five instants, the sense-organs etc. look forward to with indifference the birth of future *karmas* etc. And hence, because there is apprehension in all other births, other cognitions <that arise> at a time later than this, whether they have continuity or are disrupted, would not be means of knowledge.

111.5 <P> He objects, "Nor is it..." The meaning is: even 35.14 [111.5-9]
if the intrinsic nature or the mode, being such, have this state, nevertheless only an object that is present glitters in a stream of perceptual cognitions. And it is not the case that, of those <times> that occur in a series, only one, single present time is the content, because of the undesirable consequence of a simultaneity of cognitions that have many agents of knowledge. And it is impossible for there to be recognition, because, even if there are many cognitions, there is no observation of their state at the same time. Therefore, an object in the present, that is not in fact observed through each previous cognition, is ascertained through each subsequent <cognition>; hence, here too <results> the state of an object's being previously unknown. <S> He refutes <this>, "minutest..." The deep meaning is: in the 35.15 [111.10-14]
111.10 first place, it is not the case that the instant by instant existence <of a thing> is, as the *Buddhists* hold, the coming forth of the intrinsic nature of the thing itself. Nor, again, as the

*Sāṅkhyas* hold, even though there is permanence of the intrinsic nature of a thing, is difference in evolution in fact accepted by the *Mīmāṃsakas*. Nor, again, is there any difference in properties, that is new at every instant, <and> which is also called 'occurring in the present'. Nor is it accepted by them. Nor is time the domain of perception, nor again is it by its intrinsic nature differentiated. Therefore, any difference in time is merely limiting conditions, which differentiate segments of time. Thus, the perception of difference in time is only perception of them.

111.15 Thus it was said, 'Therefore, there can, in fact, be no limiting conditions that are connected with such things as pillars etc., when they are being perceived'; both because the fact they are known will be refuted, and because there is no manifestation of them among cognitions that are continuous. But as for limiting conditions that are connected with things other than those that are being perceived, would they be connected with the cognitions of these, or otherwise? Now when pillars etc. are being cognized, some <of those limiting conditions> that are connected with what is different from these, of transient nature, do not necessarily partake of connection with the cognitions of them. <P> Sometimes they also do. <S> Just in those cases, the cognitions of them might be valid means of knowledge. <P> But

when the limiting conditions are not connected with the
111.20 same cognitions as those, then the cognitions that are continuous would actually be invalid means of knowledge. And limiting conditions of just such a kind, which are admitted as being the content of enquiry, being the domain of other cognitions, will be in contact with other cognitions. <S> Therefore, thus, they would not be cognitions that are continuous; hence one who set out for interest has lost his principal also.[128] <P> Nor, to be sure, when another object is being directly experienced, because of the elimination of that object, by another means of knowledge, by another sense-organ, or by the same one, can there possibly be a stream of cognitions whose content is the same one that is intended. This is in fact the desired meaning. <S> <This is> Not correct, because there is no means of knowledge for restricting the unexpected appearance of each new limiting condition, and because there is no observation of things that
111.25 do not occur unexpectedly, even by a different cognition. For this very reason, even for a thousand cognitions, 'This
112.1 is a pot, this is a pot.', we do not apprehend a difference, produced by the content. But if, for what is not being apprehended, one posits its being a content, the undesirable outcome is that everyone knows everything.

[128] Possibly a *nyāya*.

Therefore, the pillar etc. alone is present, in the form of the cessation of prior absence and the non-origination of absence through perishing.[129] Time, in turn, as delimited by this, is present. And it <time>, being of this kind, is in fact common to many cognitions. And it is not through this fact alone that there is the undesirable outcome of the simultane-
112.5 ity of cognitions, because there can be sequence in reference to subtle time.[130] And if there is no non-perception of subtle limiting conditions, hence <the sequence> is simply impossible because <that> is being inferred solely by the sequence of the effect. Nor, again, is there impossibility of recognition. For recognition is nothing but the linking up of a content with a previous cognition. And this is possible solely because of the sequence of cognitions. Therefore, even though there is perception of time and its limiting conditions, there is not in all cases contact with subtle limiting conditions, nor again is there cognition of them. This same point is stated, "minutest..." 35.15

By this <consideration> the following is refuted, cf. 32.22ff. "Because, if <valid knowledge is> established <by the first means of knowledge>, there is absence of <the second means of knowledge's> being 'the most important causal

[129] ŚṬ 32.19 ff. ***prāgabhāva*** / *pradhvaṃsābhāva*.
[130] *sūkṣmakāla*.

factor'." The meaning is: for a most important causal factor [112.9-16]
112.10 is not such in reference to another most important causal factor, but rather in reference to other *kārakas* of the principal action. Otherwise, when there is a collection of instrumental causes, then, because of the undesirable result of there being no instrumental cause, because they have no pre-eminence relative to each other, there could be no collection of instrumental causes in respect of anything. But even with respect to cognitions that are continuous, the means of knowledge actually has pre-eminence relative to the other *kārakas*. But as for the claim: 'When <a tree> has been chopped down, the axe is not a cause, because there is no purpose in characterizing cutting by it'. And yet it <the axe> does not possess an absence of other cuttings when <the tree is> cut down. Nor, even when <a thing> is known, is there no impossibility of another cognition, whereby here too there would be no instrumental cause, because there is
112.15 no result, because of the origination of continuous cognitions. Therefore, he who maintains that a means of knowledge makes known an object not previously known, for him continuous cognitions would result as not being valid knowledge. <P> He objects, "Nor..." The meaning is: only 35.15-17; [112.16-19]
that knowledge which produces activity and acquisition is valid knowledge for this reason alone — because it corre-

sponds to the means of knowledge. And the first <means of
knowledge> is such; hence it is in fact valid knowledge. Yet
the second and so forth do not cause activity or acquisition.
Hence, they do not have the form of valid knowledge.
Hence, even those things, in turn, that produce them are not
means of knowledge. Therefore this is precisely what is
approved. <S> He refutes <this>: "For...nothing..." The 35.17-18
meaning is: for it is not the case that apprehension, that does
112.20 not, in fact, make one act makes one acquire the object. Nor
again does it make one act by necessity alone; but, rather, in
terms of the form of the appearance of the object. And this is
common to all <cognitions>. This same point is stated,
"And...the revealing..." <P> Even so, because there is 35.18-20
acquisition of what is desired from the first only, what use
has a person for the second etc.? <S> Hence he says,
"man..." 35.19-20

<P> Let this granted. <However:> The differences
of opinion among discussants have not been refuted by
Uddyotakara. Nor does the reasoning <he provides>,
'Because a specific assertion has has its content the denial cf 15.20
of the rest', not <arise> from contradiction. For it is not the cf. 35.22-23
case that, when one <adopts the view that a means of
knowledge> is that which makes known a previously
112.25 unknown object, or correspondence, through which one rat-

ifies the object, or a capacity, which causes illumination of the self and the non-self, is its being the cause of cognition contradicted. <S> Hence he says, "apprehension..." The 35.22-23 (9.4)
meaning is: because the pervading property <adduced by Uddyotakara> is contradicted by what is not the pervading property <adduced by the *Mīmāṃsaka*>, the fact that that which makes known an object previously unknown actually
113.1 is the means of knowledge in this form is denied because of the situation.[131] He refutes both correspondence and capacity, "'cause'..." For what meaning is there in <saying>: the 35.24-25
form that makes one ratify the cognition of the object, in the sense of 'belonging to it', is the means of knowledge?[132] In the first place, it is not by virtue of <the form's> producing cognition as restricted by 'belonging to it' <that the form is the means of knowledge>, because the action is in contradiction with itself.[133] Nor, again is it by making known <the object that the form is a means of knowledge>, because it does not produce another cognition with regard to a cognition that becomes itself. Nor, again, is it by causing ascertainment <that the form is the means of knowledge>, because it is impossible to limit what has to be ascertained and what ascertains it, insofar as the form and that which

[131] See ŚṬ 33.12-13. To be the cause of apprehension includes continuous cognitions, wheras to be that which reveals a previously unknown object does not: hence it fails as a characterization.

possesses it are one and the same, and insofar as both dif-

[132] There there is a variant reading here. Is it <the form the means of knowledge> by producing a cognition limited as 'belonging to this' or rather by making known? Now the first <alternative> is not <correct>, because the action contradicts its own self. Nor, again, is the latter <correct>; what meaning is there even in saying, 'It makes known'? Is it by producing a cognition that this as its content, or rather by being by its own nature cognition? Now the first <alternative> is not <correct>, for cognition, which has a cognition that exists in itself as its content, is not produced by the form. Thus do the Buddhists claim. Or, even if there is this claim, this <cognition> would in fact be the result. And thus, there is no identity between the means of knowledge and its result. Nor, again, is the latter <alternative correct>, because the <following> limitation is impossible: 'The cognition, insofar as it has the same nature, is the result, the form the means of knowledge'. And what is more, does the form, in turn, limited only as 'belonging to this', bring about the limitation of the cognition as 'being such', or is it not actually so limited? Now the first <alternative> is not <correct>, because there is a regress as to limiting this, in turn, through <yet> another form <thus>: 'Granted that the nature itself is limited by its intrinsic nature, if there is limiting according to its intrinsic nature alone: How, pray, is the form limited either by the form or by the cognition alone?' Nor, again, is the second <alternative correct>, because of the undesirable consequence of over-extension in that what is not limited is which limits <thus>: because this form is produced in its own nature solely by the object, hence it does not depend on another limitation. <P> On this line of reasoning, even the cognition, which is not different from it <the form>, which, limited indeed by its own nature, is produced by the object alone, requires another limitation. <S> And the object itself would be the means of knowledge, because there is establishment of the limitation of the cognition of the object by virtue of that; hence, it is well established that the form is the means of knowledge. <P> Let this be granted. <However:> The cognition together with its form, whose own nature is limited, arises from the object only; however it is normally spoken of 'belonging to this' due to the form. Moreover, because the fact that cognition which is not ascertained as being such is a false predication. That which consists by its nature of the ascertainment of normal usage must be understood to be based only on difference from that. <S> This <objection> is not <correct>, because, if both differences are the domain of the same ascertainment, it is impossible that they be 'that which has to be ascertained and that which ascertains', because difference from a non-blue form which is not ascertained does not serve to ascertain, because there is no purposive activity through its intrinsic nature. Nor is there ascertainment of difference from the form of the first 'blue', because there is no ascertainment of all the particulars. For it is not the case that, even if one does not ascertain 'cowness', one ascertains 'brindled-ness' etc. But if there is ascertainment of all the particulars, one experiences the determination of the universal. Just as there is 'elevated' form and determination of a mere entity, even when there is no ascertainment of 'pillarness' etc. Therefore it is better <to hold>: 'Let the fact of 'being this form' be realized through the fact of 'being the cognition of that object', which is ascertained; and likewise, the form is what is to be made ratified, but the cognition of the object is what makes one ratify it'; hence the reverse has befallen.

feences are the domain of one and the same ascertainment. For the ascertainment of the form <occurs> thus: 'I cognize blue.' And indeed there is no further ascertainment of 'its belonging to this' beyond this. <P> The awareness of the form, 'This is blue' <comes> first, thereafter <comes> re-awareness of the cognition whose object is the object, 'I cognize blue'. <S> Then how, if the cognition is not in fact ascertained, is the form ascertained? And this is not possible, because there is no ascertainment of the particular when there is no ascertainment of its universal. <P> It is in fact ascertained, but not as 'belonging to this'. <S> But then what is this 'belonging to this' except the form of the object? <P> The fact of arising from this. <S> Thus, the
113.10 form, by bringing into being inferential knowledge, is the means of knowledge. <P> Indeed. <S> My good man! Therefore perception of a lowly person is stricken down, because the <object> is made to be ratified through the form, which makes one infer a distinct object. And, what is more, it is established in the world: 'If an action is intended to be expressed as being the effect of an instrumental cause, then that instrumental cause is what actually gives rise to it'. For it is not the case that, even if they do not produce cut-

[133] ŚṬ 33.16-17 *pratīter abhinno hyākāraḥ | kathamasau svātmānaṃ janayet.*

ting, the eyes etc. are normally spoken of as 'cutting',
114.1 merely by the fact of 'being that which produces ascertainment of this'. But, rather, even if they do not bring about ascertainment, the axe etc. alone are what produce <the cutting>. Therefore, let it be said here also in the ordinary way: 'Only that which produces valid knowledge, even if it does not produce ascertainment, is the means of knowledge'. But it is not the case that the form, as it does not produce this <valid knowledge>, is also that which produces ascertainment, and thus there is conformity with ordinary usage. But otherwise, by framing a meta-rule,[134] one would not have conveyed ordinary usage. And between that which is to be produced and that which produces it, there is not even a scent of identity.

114.5 By this <following argument> is refuted the claim that a capacity is the means of knowledge, because a capacity is grounded in what it is capable of. And what it is capable of is called its 'effect'. And illumination, because it exists in its own nature, is not its effect. The same point is stated, "the relation of cause and effect..." <P> If the means 35.25
of knowledge is established, what is to be achieved thus by the agent of knowledge etc.? For what is already established is not made to be established by what is established. And

[134] *paribhāṣā* NVTP 114.3.

that which is successful in one thing is not a cause (*kāraka*) in another. But if it is not established, how is it a means of knowledge? For there is no such thing as a non-established cause (*kāraka*) . Nor, again, is there an instrumental cause that is not a cause (*kāraka*). Nor is there a means of knowledge that is not an instrumental cause. <S> Hence he says,
114.10 "This is the meaning..." <In the phrase,> "of the axe... is 36.2; 36.5
made into the instrumental cause", what has to be supplied is: 'of the contact which is made into the operation'. The
meaning is: the specific modification is the bringing [114.10-12]
together of the accessory causes. By bringing the instrumental cause into operation or into existence for the sake of the end, the agent is 'successful' because nothing else has to be done. But the instrumental cause has no outcome — is unsuccessful — without the end.

<P> But how is the object of knowledge successful when the means of knowledge <is successful>? For, unlike the case of the agent of knowledge, the instrumental cause of valid knowledge is neither brought into being nor made
to operate by this also. <S> Hence he says, "But an object of 36.11-12
knowledge..." This is the idea: for in all cases, the object-
114.15 *kāraka* is established as being the content of the end of the instrumental cause and its operation. Between these, that it is the content of the end does not prompt it towards being

the object, because even a non-*kāraka*, insofar as it does not exist,[135] is the content of the end; as he says, "only..." But 36.11-12
because it is the content of the operation of the instrumental cause, it is the object; for it is not possible that it both be an object and that it not be the content of the operation of the instrumental cause. Therefore, because <it> is not the content of the operation of the instrumental cause, the operation by itself would not succeed: therefore, the very success of this <operation> constitutes <the object of knowledge's> being successful. This same point is stated, "even there...in 36.12-13
respect of its relation to the sense-organ alone..." That is to [114.19-23]
say: and it is not the case that the instrumental cause as well,
114.20 as the content of the operation of the agent, is by this fact alone successful, because it has an additional operation. Nor again is the instrumental cause as the content of the operation of the object <successful>. Nor again is it <successful> as the content of the end, because the object is not made to be operated on by the agent with reference to this. It is because the end depends for its account on the account of this <instrumental cause> that one posits that it, like the object, is 'successful'. Therefore, even if both the agent and the object are 'successful', the instrumental cause is by no means 'successful'. He <next> refutes, through two applica-

[135] ṢṬ 34.10-11.

tions <of reasoning> the error of 'being directly beneficial', which is produced from its being an inherent-cause and being a content, "Therefore this has been established..."[136] 36.13-17

115.1 Even if it is not the past cause etc. of what has to be inferred etc., nevertheless, the denial of the universal would depend also upon the mode of the particular; hence by this consideration alone, <the mode of the particular> is a familiar instance. "therefore, this alone is the cause of the result". 36.18
What has to be supplied is: 'directly'. The meaning of, "in a 36.19
certain sense", is: indirectly.[137] Therefore, having revealed, through this <consideration>, the characterization of the instrumental cause — that the <*kāraka*>, which is not successful when another *kāraka* <is successful>, is truly the cause constitutes its being the instrumental cause — he indicates this characterization of the instrumental cause also — that the instrumental cause is the domain of the operation of
115.5 the agent. It was been explained this same way by Vācaspati. And this will be made clear in the <sentence in the> *Vārttika*, "by the possession of which". <P> 'The orig- 10.4; cf. 9.8
ination of the means of knowledge would prove to have no instrumental cause', because the agent is successful when the instrumental cause <is successful>. Therefore, what

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[136] NVTP 114.24 has *tat*, NVTP 36.13 *tataḥ*.
[137] ŚṬ 34.28 ***anāhatyeti*** | *asākṣādityarthaḥ*.

concurs with what? <S> Hence he says, "not... without an 36.19
instrumental cause..." <P> One who thinks that *kāraka*-
expressions have as their cause etc. their connection with
the principal action which is established in real objects,
objects "If...". <S> One who thinks that *kāraka*-expres- 9.12-13 (36.21)
sions have their occurrence caused by their connection with
the principal action which is established in the mind,
answers, "<This is > Not correct... as does such an expres- 9.20
sion as 'a cook' etc." Thus the scattered purport of the *Vārt-*
*tika* is summarized in the *Ṭīkā*. The meaning of, "alike", is: 37.10
like that which, measured by a scale, is neither deficient nor
excessive. Therefore, in order that <the following> error not
arise — 'This profuse explanation has revealed that, with
respect to valid knowledge, the agent of knowledge and the
object of knowledge are not in fact causes' — he says,
under the guise of summarizing, "'it' – the means of knowl- 37.16-17 (9.24)
edge..." <In the phrase, > "And even if...produce cogni- 37.18
tion", what has to be supplied is: 'directly'. By "conviction" 37.19
is meant 'immediately clear idea'. The reason for this is, "as 37.19
having pre-eminence."

"He asks what is meant by 'the most important 37.20 (10.1)
causal factor'." The preeminence and non-preeminence of
the causes are not, to begin, produced by the result, because
this <one kind of preeminence> is the same with respect to

all <the causes>. Nor, again, are they produced by the operation, because the mere fact of embodying an operation that is different from the mutual operation is common to all. The essential point to be supplied is: <he speaks> with the idea that, 'But the fact that the operation corresponds to the cf. 37.24-25
result is indeed not specific'. Even if the preeminence is nothing but the exclusion of non-connection, nevertheless even if there is equality, the pre-eminence or non-pre-eminence of this alone are considered. <That is to say:> Having adopted the position — 'But mere difference is not pre-eminence' — he revealed exclusion of connection with another also 'by virtue of excluding both non-connection and connection with another'. And he will immediately establish
115.20 that matter. <P> Just as, when the agent etc. is present the result is not necessary, so too even if the instrumental cause is present, sometimes <the result> might not arise, because there is no difference so far as their being *kārakas*. And <this> is observed. For it is not the case that when an axe is present, there would in fact be cutting. <S> Hence he says, "For the agent of knowledge and the object of knowl- 37.25-26
edge..." The meaning is: in the phrase, "whose operations [115.22-116.1]
are absorbed", he intends that what embodies the operation 115.25
is a *kāraka*. Therefore, the axe too, simply by embodying the operation, is the instrumental cause. And there is only

exclusion of non-connection between the result and what is such <an instrument>, but not <exclusion of non-connection between the result> and the agent etc., even if they embody the operation, because the operation of the instrumental cause depends upon their operations for achievement. But the other does not have to be achieved by the
116.1 instrumental cause, which embodies the operation. This
same point is stated, "But...arises only when the means of 38.1
knowledge operates". Therefore, by this it is shown that <that *kāraka*>, which, embodying the operation, is invariant from the result, is 'the most important causal factor'.

Another alternative "by the possession of which". 38.1
By "by what is dependent" is meant: what has to be oper- 38.4
ated on by something else. The meaning of, "is relied 38.4
upon", is: 'it requires'. He reminds <us> that this same
thing was previously stated <by saying>, "and...depends 38.4-5
upon an agent..."[138] Entertaining the doubt – 'Even if there
116.5 is no variation at all in saying, 'The state of having to be operated on by the agent' constitutes 'being the instrumental cause', nevertheless let there be no variation with the object, even though it has to be operated on indirectly' – he produces ascertainment on the subject under discussion out of a wealth of possibilities. He prevents the next <statement

[138] NVTP 116.45 has *ca*, NVT 38.4 *hi*.

in the> *Vārttika* from being another alternative, "this... 38.7-8 (10.5?)
itself..." "another alternative..." Out of concern for <the 38.8-9
charge of> redundancy due to explaining the previous alter-
native, he justifies with difficulty the alternative adopted,
"by the previous...". <P> Independence for the object is 38.9
impossible; therefore, the denial of the particular is impossi-
ble. <S> Hence he says, "'lack of efficacy'..." "Another 38.10; 38.10-15
alternative...as is the case with contact". Here too, the char- (10.5)
acterization is: the instrumental case operates last in refer-
ence to the other *kārakas*. Another alternative,
116.10 "apprehension..." Here again the characterization is: <that 38.15
due to which there is an> immediate result is the instrumen-
tal cause. Because there is no conjoining of the alternatives,
"the <particle> '*ca*' has the sense of 'limitation'". The 38.17
meaning is: on this view, this alone is the pre-eminence.
Another alternative, "the specific..." Because he does not 38.18
apply a demonstration of what is specific among all instru-
mental causes, he corroborates the two means of knowledge
that are under consideration, "four..." Here, again, the char- 38.18-22
acterization is: the means of knowledge is that which
teaches the difference in kind that is intended to be
expressed by 'valid knowledge'. <P> Whereas the specific-
ness or aspecificness of the *kārakas* with respect to valid
116.15 knowledge are being described, how does the aspecificness

relating to the person enter in? <S> Hence he says, "all..." 38.22
Another alternative, "causes valid knowledge..." Here, 38.22-27
again, the characterization is: the means of knowledge is that which serves to differentiate the non-inherent cause of valid knowledge, in that it is the means to the difference in kind of the valid knowledge that is intended to be expressed.

> From its intrinsic nature; from the effect; subsequent to the agent; prior to the agent and effect; from the kind of valid knowledge; from the specific cause of valid knowledge — are characterizations of the means of knowledge.

116.20 is a summary verse.

Thus, as the normal usage of 'instrumental cause' is being ratified by these instrumental causes, if there also is the normal usage of this because of the collocation of the instrumental causes of the normal usage of 'object' etc., so be it — because this is what is being admitted. But by these instrumental causes, the normal usage of 'object' etc. is not admitted. But this <normal usage of 'object' etc. > does not exist at all. To be more explicit; in all cases the normal usage of 'object' <is being ratified> through the fact that it is the content of the operation of the instrumental cause and so forth; and the normal usage of 'instrumental cause' <is being ratified> through the fact that it is the content of the operation of the agent etc. And there is in fact a difference

among these instrumental causes. Therefore, there is no
116.25 overextension <of the characterization>.

117.1 "He explains...in terms of its purport..." The mean- 39.1
ing is: because there is unclarity in the sentence. One must
understand thus: and this being the case, even the etymol-
ogy "that which is sought" <given> subsequently has the 39.3
purport as paramount. "But why...?" The source of the 39.1-2
doubt is: for it is not the validity of the means of knowledge,
whose content is the means of knowledge, that in fact has to
be explained. "another purport..." Because the end — the 39.5-7
elimination of the <charge of > 'partial non-establishment'
— is somehow the same. <P> Therefore, because there is no
successfulness of activity, is this simply an invalid means of
117.5 knowledge? <S> Hence he says, "Nor..." <P> How, there- 39.6
fore, is its validity as a means of knowledge to be ascer-
tained? <S> Hence he says, "this too..." The literal meaning 39.6-7 [117.6-10]
is: now it is not the case that every object is in every respect to be neglected always by everyone, because the undesirable consequence is the futility of creative activity. Moreover, if one has ascertained the validity as a means of knowledge of a cognition that has this as its content through successfulness of activity, in the circumstance of <the thing's> not having to be neglected, the validity <of the cognition> as a means of knowledge is easy <for him> to

grasp, even in the circumstance of <the thing's> having to
be neglected, in that its being of this kind has been grasped.
Even where activity did not directly occur, even there the
fact that it does not correspond with <any> possible
obstructions etc., whether derived from perception, infer-
ence, or instruction, is its 'being of this kind' that has to be
ascertained.

<P> Since one is dull as to the cessation of the
doubt, <S> hence he says, "This is the idea..." The meaning 39.9-13
is: once one has grasped that it directly produces <appre-
hension of the object>[139], it must necessarily be shown that
it indirectly produces <apprehension of the object> in order
that there be no doubt as to its subsisting in a different sub-
strate. And this is impossible without relating that the means
of knowledge is what produces apprehension. <P> How is
this meaning grasped from the *Vārttika*? <S> Hence he
says, "The distinctive feature of a valid means of knowl- 39.14-15
edge..." <P> Despite all this, what is meant? <S> Hence he
says, "this is what is meant..." <P> This is your idea, but 39.15-16
not that of Uddyotakara. <S> Hence he says, "The same 39.17-18
point is stated..." <P> Therefore, this is another meaning-
less *sūtra*. For, the apprehension <of an object> and suc-
cessfulness of activity do not stand in the relationship of

[139] See NA 26.21.

what has to be taught and that which teaches it. <S> Hence
he says, "This is the meaning..." <P> How, pray, is <it> 39.18-19
objected that by explicitly mentioning 'object' the inclusion cf. 10.24-11.4
of everything is quite inappropriate? Because there is a
regress if this kind of objection <holds>. <S> Hence he
says, "an *ekadeśin*..." "The contradiction..." Even if libera- 39.20; 39.22
tion is not pleasure, pain, or their causes <and> for this very
reason, the inclusion of everything is impossible through the
word 'object' — insofar as it is being sought as being such,
117.20 nevertheless there is an obvious contradiction <involved> in
admitting this. This <contradiction> alone is meant. For if
this liberation also, through the manifestation of the *śāstra*,
is accepted as a thing to be eliminated in that it is being
pleasure, pain, or their causes, therefore the *śāstra*, in turn,
should not be undertaken — because it has an erroneous
purpose. But, even if the means of knowledge and the *śāstra*
are in a general way causes of pain, nevertheless, as they are
the content of the highest human end intended, they are to
be acquired as being the cause of this — disregarding the
fact that they are the causes of pain. Otherwise, there is this
same contradiction again. Now one of the two things to be
eliminated is eliminated through a means of knowledge; but
the means of knowledge, by being what has to eliminated
through another means of knowledge, provides scope for a

117.25 regress. And hence this same particular means of knowledge
must be eliminated through that same means of knowledge.
And this is impossible.

118.1 <P> How, if it is not what is to be eliminated, insofar
as that is impossible, is it what has to be acquired, insofar as
it is pleasure and its causes? <S> Hence he says,
"Nor...through them" The meaning is: therefore, in both 39.25-26; [118.2-4]
ways — because the action contradicts itself and insofar as
it a cause of the highest human end — the means of knowl-
edge is not a thing whose elimination is possible. And, if
this were the case, there would not, in fact, be non-elimina-
tion of this, because there is extirpation, as in the case with
pleasure, of that which is to be appropriated through a cause
that extirpates itself, even if its elimination is impossible
through human exertion. <P> Because of, 'continuation of
application from the heading rule', it is impossible, because
118.5 it is the first sentence.[140] <S> Hence he says, "successful- 40.1-2
ness of activity..." The meaning is: the necessary require-
ment is suitability; and here, because it is at issue, this
<suitability> relates to activity. The meaning is: for in this
section, the fact of producing successful activity is the
intended logical reason. And this <logical reason arises
from> only from an apprehension, which has its content

[140] Apparently, a *tantrayukti*.

objects in the form of pleasure, pain, or their causes. Hence,
the content designated by the word 'object' should be said
to be of this kind only; hence the necessary requirement is
nothing but the limitation of the specific section. By way of
revealing that, in the objection of the *ekadeśin*, there is an
addition of <yet> another logical reason together with the
previous logical reasons, he says, "Not only..." <In the 40.3-4
phrase,> "also...because of its impossibility...", what has to 40.4
118.10 be supplied is: 'because there is no establishment of a cause
for consciousness'. <P> If consciousness, when not being
made to be known, actually is a means of knowledge, how
is it not able to be known, or, if it is not this <a means of
knowledge>, how is there ordinary usage about its exist-
ence? <S> Hence he says, "Now, not..." 40.6-10

The meaning is: if one reveals a hypothetical argu- [118.12-17]
ment in the form of the undesirable consequence of a
regress, he reveals that a perceptual means of knowledge is
really internal in the case opposite to that.[141] But if the ordi-
nary usages of 'knowledge' are unknown and pass away, at
another time recollection alone, that has this as its content,
is the instrumental cause. And thus, there really is knowl-
edge of this due to its agreement with the desire to know —
in its universal form, because what is not known is not the

[141] See NA 27.13-15.

content of the ordinary usages of assertion and denial. And
118.15 hence, starting with what is established in its universal form, there is inquiry <as follows>: if a knowledge relating to knowledge were necessarily known, or if it were necessarily desired to be known, then there would be a regress in the form of a chain of knowledges; and this is contradicted by non-perception.[142] This same point is stated, "or 40.9
other..." By his saying, "passage in the *Bhāṣya*...", one 40.12-13
must realize that what he has taught is: not only a contradiction with the object, but also a contradiction with the passage.

By way of refuting a contradiction between the two sets of four, he says, "because of cause and effect..." <P> 40.13
118.20 Even if the word 'object' serves a purpose, <the two objections> that there is a contradiction and that there is a difference in substrate remain in this same state. <S> Hence he says, "sandalpaste...." By saying "'be counted' – 40.16; 40.17
restricted...", he refutes <the claim that> the 'object' can be enumerated by non-admission.[143] <P> But then, with what purpose in mind, is this, which by no means deserves introduction, introduced by Paskṣilasvāmin? <S> Hence he says, "it is alleged, as follows,..." The point of the phrase, "can- 40.18; 40.22

[142] That is because one does not perceive such a thing.
[143] That is. by not admitting that it can be.

not be the end of the means of knowledge", is: because a
means of knowledge is a real object. The whole story is:[144]
moreover, even if the knowledge of <the categories of>
means of knowledge etc. is possible, the *śāstra* that teaches
them should not be undertaken at all, because it is devoid of
118.25 an ultimately real purpose. <In the phrase,> "With regard to 40.22-23
this <dilemma>, this <sentence> is of help", what has to be
supplied is: 'the refutation set forth in the *Bhāṣya*'. For if cf. 1.6-7
119.1 one explains that the relation of cause and effect is fictitious
due to the differences among such things as 'blue' etc.,
which are common to all, he must acknowledge that 'blue'
etc. are in fact ultimately real. But if they are not ultimately
real, there would be no establishment of what he maintains.
And it is not the case that, if the relationship of cause and
effect is not ultimately real, 'blue' etc. can be ultimately
real, because of the undesirable consequence of eternality.
Therefore, if one admits that 'blue' etc. are ultimately real,
he must see that the relationship of cause and effect also, in
fact, is ultimately real. Nor does <he admit> either of them.
119.5 And hence here too the like <argument applies>. <P> But
the following <issue> remains <for consideration>: How
could one <cause> produce many, mutually contradictory

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[144] *nigarvaḥ* NVTP 118.25. See H. G. Narahari, "On the Word 'nigarva'".

effects? If <one were to answer>, 'Because this is its intrinsic nature', then, beginning from its origin it would produce <effects> without difference. <S> To this he says, "For, as 40.23-25
will be related..."

The meaning of, "not by their nature...", is: insofar 40.25
as they do not require such accessory causes as birth etc. <In the phrase,> "genera, places...", 'genus' means 'that which 40.25
limits the intrinsic nature'. The meaning of, "in no fixed 40.26
way", is: by virtue of the manifoldness of the ratification of the accessory causes. "the object of the means of knowl- 41.1
119.10 edge..." – is that characterized by pleasure or pain. By "not 41.1
determinate" is meant lacking the restriction that only pleasure comes from sandal-paste, and pain from a thorn. The meaning of, "Because it is caused by indeterminately...", is: 41.1
because it has as its cause such indeterminate accessory causes as sandalpaste etc. "sentient beings" serves to indi- 41.1
cate the manifoldness of the accessory causes. For this same reason, the example <given> is, "indeterminate times..." As 41.2
there is a partial characterization in saying, "indeterminate 41.2
times," one must realize that there is no determinacy of the accessory causes of place and condition also. This is what is meant: just as, when certain accessory causes — time, place, and condition — are present, clouds emit water, but when certain <other accessory cause> are present, these

119.15 same <clouds> absorb water; in the same way, when certain <accessory causes> are present, sandalpaste etc. produce pleasure, but when certain <other accessory causes are present> pain. "Servant" means 'a hired laborer under force 41.13
of compulsion'. <P> <In the phrase,> 'And when the means cf. 1.8
of knowledge is valid the agent of knowledge etc. are valid', it has been maintained that <by Pakṣilasvāmin> that they are known but not that they come into being. And this is not so, because there is ascertainment of the invariation of the others solely through their invariance from valid knowl-
edge. <S> Hence he says, "Even if..." <P> And the follow- 41.15-18
ing objection should not be raised: Vedic<ally derived> knowledge can only be invariant with its object, because, as it is said, 'It is knowledge that arises from the teaching of a reliable authority'. <S> For this is not possible if one has
119.20 not ascertained that the teaching of a trustworthy authority does produce an idea of an object that is simply invariant.
And it was in fact stated that the validity of the means of 79.9-10
knowledge is not actually different from the fact that it produces knowledge that is invariant. <P> All the same, in this
world, at any rate, this is so. <S> Hence he says, "whose 41.16
end is not immediately perceptible..."[145]

[145] NVTP 119.21 has here the better reading *adṛṣṭārthe* for NVT *adṛṣṭe* <*viṣaye*.>

With the idea – 'Even if it were actually conducive
to the subject under discussion to say, "the inherence of 11.18
this"[146] — the inherence of valid knowledge — constitutes
his being the agent of knowledge, nevertheless, Uddyo-
takara began with "independence", through a question and a 11.17
partial characterization, <with the idea that> the particular
also is grasped by the universal rule' – hence he explains
<this passage> in just this way, "which means '*kārakas*'..." 42.9-14
119.25 The inherence of them is nothing but the connection with
the operation 'that is being designated by the root or the cf. 42.10-11
verb affix as principal'. And by "principal" is meant nothing 42.10
more than non-dependence[147] on another *kāraka*. There-
120.1 fore, in such <a sentence as> 'He cooks.' etc., it is estab-
lished that the agent is only Devadatta etc., whose involvement in the operation of cooking etc. is in all respects not dependent. But in <such a sentence as>, 'He makes <someone> cook.' etc., even if there is understanding of an operation on the part of him who is to be prompted, the one involved in this <operation> is not the agent, because that <operation> is dependent on another <*kāraka*>. <P> What, indeed, is? <S> That which prompts

[146] Udayana here (NVT 119.22) takes *tatsamavāya* strangely (cf. NV 11.18).

[147] *tairaścīnya* is used idiosyncratically here: its base adjective, *tiraścīna*, normally means 'transverse, horizontal, across' (Monier-William, s.v.).

alone <is the agent>, because its operation is not dependent.
<P> Therefore, then, according to the rule:

> For <if being the agent holds true merely> in respect of its own operation, <then> being the agent holds true in respect of every *kāraka* without exception.[148]

there is the undesirable consequence of the destruction of
the ordinary usage of 'instrumental cause' etc. <S> Hence
he says, "since it is principal..." The idea is: the ordinary 42.13-14
usage of 'instrumental cause' etc. is not with respect to its
own operation, but rather with respect to the principal
action.

<P> And on what grounds is this in fact <main-
tained>: 'Even if there is no difference so far as its being
what has to be effected through the *kārakas*, [the normal
usage of instrumental cause etc.] is with reference to the
principal action'? <S> Hence he says, "subordinate..." The 42.13-14
meaning is: for there is employment in subordinate opera-
tions of the *kārakas* which operate in reference to some
action or other, but their action is not exclusively for the
sake of <the> subordinate operations. <P> Not every opera-
tion or principal action depends upon a person; how then
<can he say>, "the person..."? <S> Hence he says, "The 11.19; 42.14
expression 'person' is in reference to <the action> that is

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[148] Unknown provenance.

under discussion."[149] The grammarians have the same characterization. And this is impossible, because the mere employment of a word does not produce ratification, and because the cause of ratification is the characterization. <P> The characterization consists in the suitability of the expression. <S> <This is> Not correct, because this <suitability> itself is what is being examined. <P> The mere desire to express. <S> With the idea — '<This is> Not correct, because there is no ratification of even this <desire to express> without another instrumental cause' — he says,
"another characterization..." 'Person' continues <from 42.15
120.15 above>. With the idea – 'Moreover, in the phrase, "that he 42.15 (11.19)
prompts them," let there be no concern about analyzing <this compound> thus, 'the prompter of him'' – he says,
"'He' – the sentient being..." The meaning is: therefore the 42.15-16
analysis <of this compound> is either 'Hence he is both that and the prompter' or 'The fact of being a prompter is an attribute of him – the sentient being'. And thus the phrase,
"all the *kārakas*...", conveys many *kārakas* that are mutu- 42.16
ally different from themselves and others. Therefore, a potter is without fail the agent — even if he does not perform <an action whose end> is not immediately experienced.

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[149] NVTP has *prakṛtāpekṣam* (120.10-11), NVT *prakṛtakriyāpekṣam* (42.14-15).

While the characterization is fully realized by this consideration alone, by excluding the independence of the
120.20 others in respect to the prompting of a sentient being by this
statement, "that he is not prompted by the rest", he has also 11.19
excluded the fact that they prompt one another. It was stated that: the sentient being, in turn, only when making these
<*kārakas*> operate, is the agent. Moreover, it was revealed cf. 108.14 ff. (?)
that, as the effect depends upon the agent, in the same way it depends upon the other *kārakas*; therefore, due to the effect, which is pervaded by both, in the passing away of some one
there is passing away of the other. Hence, the characteriza- cf. 114.13 ff. (?)
tion is not overly extensive. <P> But there remains the issue: how does the ordinary usage of 'agent' apply in
regard to insentient beings? <S> To this he says, "but an 42.16-17
insentient being..." By "intrinsically" is meant 'in the pri- 42.17
mary sense'. One who says, "For the 'true-nature' means 42.18
'being pervaded by the means of knowledge' <or rather>
120.25 'being the content of the operation of the means of knowledge'", consents to the <following> characterization of the 'object': the object is the content of the operation of the instrumental cause. On this characterization, the subordi-
121.1 nate operation has to be grasped. The distinction is: and in the subject under discussion, the principal action is that of
valid knowledge. "'usability'..." By this it is also shown 42.19-20

that: one who reveals that 'the use' found in the *Vārttika* (11.21)
resides in the content must understand that the suitability also resides only in the content. The meaning is: therefore, the suitability, which resides in the content only, leads to use. And this is directed towards knowledge. Therefore, this is the meaning: either the use that resides in the object or else the knowledge of its suitability is what the group of four results in.

121.5 "the five..." That is to say: form, name, impression, 42.25
feeling, and discriminating knowledge. Among these, the words 'color, taste, smell, touch, and sound' is the aggregate of 'form'. Knowledge involving judgement is the aggregate of 'name'. Immediate cognition is the aggregate of 'impression'. Pleasure and pain are the aggregate of 'feeling'. Knowledge involving no judgement is the aggregate of 'dis-
criminating knowledge'. "Soul." 'Soul' is what is con- 42.26
scious. That which is different from this is 'non-soul'. As
they 'flow towards', they are the "inflows". The 'currents' 42.26
are the sense organs. The meaning is: by these currents, as it were, the soul is filled by merit and demerit. 'Concealing' is covering — the error of non-difference relating to soul and
121.10 non-soul. That is to say: for, by this the soul is covered up and is not omniscient. 'Dissociation' is wearing down or the performance of asceticism. The meaning is: the bondage —

namely, of merit and demerit — is withered away completely by this. 'Binding' is bondage — or merit and demerit. The meaning is: bound by these two, which are as it were an iron-foot-chain and a bridle-bit-ring, the soul is not independent. The meaning of 'liberation' is; the meaning is the cessation of all covering.[150] Restriction in all respects is not based on a valid means of knowledge.

<P> There is no non-existence according to the path cf. 43.5 ff
of the cessation of positive means of knowledge. <S>
Hence he says, "'this'..." <P> The fact that what exists and 43.5 (12.1)
what does not exist are identical, insofar as they are the con-
121.15 tent of the means of knowledge, <and> the fact that they are
the content of normal usages that do not differ is precisely
what is maintained; hence the doubt is weak.[151] <S> Hence
he says, "totally <devoid> of efficacy..." For the success- 43.9
fulness of purposive activity is a characteristic mark of what
exists. The meaning of the *Ṭīkā* is: if this exists, even if
what does not exist is acknowledged by you, even that
proves to be the content of the normal usages of 'what
exists'. The meaning of the section is: and by the sentence, [121.17-21]
"we...", is not admitted the efficacy of what does not exist; 43.11
but the normal usage of 'what exists' does not <arise>

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[150] Cf. *jīvājīvāsravabandhasaṃvaranirjarāmokṣāstattvam* | *Tattvārthādhigamasūtra* 1.4.

[151] *nirdala* (NVTP 121.15): *nirbala* seems more likely.

through efficacy, because even that whose efficacy is not
investigated is the content of the normal usage of 'what
exists'. But rather, <the normal usage of 'what exists'
arises> insofar as it is the content of the cognitions of
'exists' and 'does not exist'. For it is not possible that 'what
121.20 exists' be normally spoken of and not 'the content of the
cognition of 'exists''; or that 'what does not exist' be nor-
mally spoken of and not 'the content of the cognition of
'does not exist''.

<P> Let this be granted. <However:> The difference
among cognitions, as is the case with direct experience etc.,
is justified also by the difference among the means of
knowledge, as is the case with the difference among the
objects of knowledge. Hence, sometimes there might be this
cognition, 'Does not exist', only with respect to what is
other than what exists. Entertaining this doubt, he says,
"Now..." The meaning is: as regards something not can- 43.18 ff
celled – quite well known – an erroneous understanding
does not usher in any harm. <P> Let what is other than what
122.1 exists be denied. Nevertheless, what is the source for the
assertion of what does not exist? For it is not the case that, if
one denies 'blue', the assertion of 'yellow' is necessary. cf.43.26-44.4
<S> Hence he says, "For blue and yellow..." <P> Even if 43.26-44.1
perception, which is most fit at refuting all doubt, is opera-

tive, on what grounds is there scope for hypothetical reasoning? Hence, what good is there in the justification of this?
<S> Hence he says, "If anyone..." The meaning is: for there 44.4-5
really are some proponents, who, not seeing the force of the counter-subject, <and> having denied that it is known by
122.5 perception, generate doubt; it is to them — the *Sāṅkhyas*
etc. – that this mode applies. "This is to be explained as in 44.7
the previous case." The meaning is: through the inclusion of hypothetical reasoning <to determine> the suitability as between <two> equal <ly valid> cognitions. <P> If what does not exist <exists> and there is perception of this, there
is cause for many errors. <S> <Hence> He says, "And this 44.8
whole..."

<P> If the kinds of what does not exist do not contribute to the subject under discussion, then let it be said: 'They are not mentioned simply because they do not contribute'. But if they do contribute, then they must necessarily be mentioned. To what <purpose> does it contribute to
122.10 say: 'They are not mentioned because of their appearance as cf. 12.15
dependent'? <S> Hence he says, "a thing to be negated..." 44.10-11
The meaning is: for they must be mentioned for teaching's sake. And in reality this occurs solely from teaching what is absent and the locus. What need to belabor this meaning?
This same point is stated: "The meaning is:...are under- 44.11

stood; hence they are not stated". <P> If they are not stated
because they are taught simply by teaching the means,
therefore what purpose is served in relating this also, 'The
objects of knowledge etc. also are taught simply by teaching
the means of knowledge'? But if, already being known, they
are taught insofar as they 'honored' due to a specific pur-
pose, then, Goodness!, why are not the kinds of what does
122.15 not exist employed likewise? <S> Hence he says, "Alterna- 44.12-14
tively..."

<P> In the matter posited thus, "the plethora of what 12.15-16
does not exist, like the plethora of what exists, must be
understood also as being listed...", the logical reason,
"because it is included in the group of four", is partially 12.15
non-established and is contradicted. <S> Hence he says,
"the highest good." The meaning is: the meaning of the 44.14-15
*Vārttika* is: therefore, the logical reason is: 'non-inclusion in
the group of four' — in that that is the basis of the plethora
of what exists that does not contribute to the highest good.
The familiar instance is: 'the plethora of what exists is just
such' — in terms of being the basis of this; the *sādhya* is: 'is
not stated'. But 'it has to be understood as listed' <as> con- cf. 12.16
122.20 tributing to the highest good, because it is included in the
group of four, like the plethora of what exists that does con-
tribute. <P> For this very reason, thinking that the claim,

"must be understood also as being listed", is cancelled by 12.16
non-perception, he introduces the reply-passage, "But..." 44.15-18
By the 'non-perception of the cause' all the different kinds
of non-perception are indirectly characterized. "liberation 44.17
alone is consecrated" — is like a king in the sense of being
principal. This also is a partial characterization. One must
understand: 'object', in turn, is lack of a son, of an enemy, cf. NS.1.1.9
etc.; 'activity', in turn, is non-violence etc.; 'rebirth', in
turn, is the abandonment of previous bodies etc.; 'end', in
turn, is the different kinds of what does not exist, such as the
122.25 passing away of disease that had arisen. <Thinking that:>
Since doubt cannot be of the form of non-existence, because
it is of the form of knowledge, he passes over this <doubt>
123.1 and extends the application, "Thus...to purpose etc." To be 44.18
more explicit, with respect to the morning and evening
hymns and acts of worship,[152] atonement, etc. the end is
simply the cessation of what is harmful. There is also a certain familiar instance in the form of what does not exist, as
he will supply the condition of deep sleep as a familiar
instance for liberation. Established doctrine, in turn, is the
absence of soul etc. for others. And for us, for example,

Darkness is the absence of light VS 5.2.19

etc. The <established doctrine> of all is: liberation is the

[152] *sandhyāvandana*, Monier-Williams, s.v.

absence of pain. But <the categories of> members, hypo-
thetical reasoning, ascertainment, discussion, arguing, and
captiousness are only kinds of what exists. Pseudo-reasons
are of two kinds: for example, 'Sound is not eternal because
it is devoid of existence', <and Sound is not eternal>
'because it is visible', etc. <The categories of:> Deceit and
futile answer are only kinds of what exists. Among <the
subtypes of the category of> grounds for defeat, the variet-
ies of 'misunderstanding' are kinds of what exists. Those
that are not of the 'misunderstanding' kind are kinds of NS 1.2.19
what does not exist. This same point is stated, "Thus one 44.18
has analogically to apply this argument throughout..." <P>
In the *Bhāṣya* there is not even a mention of the kinds of
what does not exist. <S> Hence he says, "In this <sen- 44.20
tence>..." <P> It is impossible that both the statement and
the non-statement, which are mutually contradictory, be
true. Thus which one of these two is true? <S> Hence he
says, "But on the second interpretation, which is the true 44.21-22
one..." "the purport, with an exhaustive account, of the 44.23
*sūtra*.... The exhaustive account is, "on the basis of <this> 1.1
means of knowledge..." etc. The purport is: "And indeed 1.20-21
what exists will be concisely taught as being of sixteen
kinds." "The purport of this." "Now of these same..." 44.25; 2.1
belongs to the introductory <section of the> *Bhāṣya*, but not

to the text of the *sūtra*, because the purport is made clear by
this <phrase> itself, "who was eager to explain the meaning 44.24
of its parts."

|| The explanation of the introductory <section> of the *Bhāṣya* etc. <is complete> ||

<In the phrase,> "He states the intrinsic nature of a 45.3
*dvandva*", what has to be supplied is: 'in order that he state
its purport'. The *dvigu* and *avyayībhāva* <compounds> have
123.15 not been adduced, because they are ruled out merely due to
their usage. He rejects *bahuvrīhi*, *karmadhāraya*, and *tatpu-*
*ruṣa*, the employment of which is conceived, "a *bahu-* 45.4-5
*vrīhi*..." "Because it is impossible" means: because of the 45.4
impossibility of meaning. The phrase, "sixth-case affix <*tat-* 45.4
*puruṣa*> compound", serves indirectly to characterize a *tat-*
*puruṣa* <whose usage> is conceived. The meaning of, "for, 45.7
as...", is: 'for...' Therefore, one must understand the plural cf. 45.7
number even with respect to <the category of> doubt by
accepting the statement of the meaning. Here, also, the pur-
port is: doubts, which are produced by the misapprehension
of similarity and dissimilarity, <and> which are quite mutu-
ally independent, are what prompt reasoning. With respect
to familiar instance, in turn, in which there is scope for pro-
ducing different characterizations the dual alone <is
123.20 proper>.[153] The purpose of this, in turn, is the understand-

ing of <two> examples that are not mutually dependent. Likewise, even established doctrines are not mutually dependent as regards their respective ends. And this is cf. NS.1.1.27
taught by the term 'number', which means the same thing as 'plural'. But as for members, even if they are mutually required to convey a single sentential meaning, nevertheless the purpose of the plural is <as follows>: let <each> convey a meaning that one is not made to understand through them mutually. With respect to the pseudo-reasons, in turn, the purport of the plural is simply the teaching that there is mutual independence with respect to their respective operations. Likewise, with respect to deceit, futile answer, and
124.1 grounds for defeat also. The point is: but when there is no specific statement, then the analysis is <to be made> "in 1.5
accordance with the proper <grammatical> number" in a characterization <*sūtra*>, because the general feature alone is what prompts.

<P> Because a *kāraka* is of the nature of meaning, there is no purpose for this. <S> Hence he says, "The end of 45.12
a *kāraka* is the principal action..." <P> The word 'purpose' is nowhere seen to mean 'the principal action'. <S> Hence he says, "in reference to which..." <P> If by saying "no 45.12; 12.24
124.5 desire to express *kārakas*" and nothing more <the matter> is

[153] Since *dṛṣṭānta* is of two kinds: the same and different (ŚṬ 37.1-2).

well, then what purpose is there in <saying> 'No desire to express the principal action'? <S> Hence he says, "by 45.12-13
explicitly mentioning '*kāraka*'..."

<P> No desire to express *kārakas* would then be a characterization of the <use of the sixth case affix to indicate> 'the remainder', if being a *kāraka* were possible in that case, but that it is not the case. <S> Hence he says,
"Even if..." <P> "To this" – to the remainder use of the 45.13-15; 45.16
sixth case affix – "he objects". "the sixth case affix also has 45.16;
no purpose..." — lacks an end. "because one cannot justify 45.16
it if there is no difference" — because it is impossible that the meaning of the sixth case affix is <that of> relation. The
124.10 cause for there being an *ekadeśin* <is next stated>, "who 45.17
holds the doctrine of 'non-restriction'..." <P> In the statement, "because it is not independent, the <categories of the> 13.5
means of knowledge etc. are <also> understood", what agrees with what? <S> Hence he says, "of the state..." <P> 45.17-18
By the word 'true-nature' <the categories of> means of knowledge etc. and nothing else are expressed, and yet the 'true-nature' is not a distinct thing; hence there is a mutual contradiction. <S> Hence he illuminates to some degree the
*ekadeśin*, "Even if there is no difference..." The meaning is: 45.18 (13.8)
assume that <the categories of> means of knowledge etc. are known according to their intrinsic nature in a non-super-

imposed form; it is for this reason that the explicit mention of 'true-nature', even though it is not a distinct thing, is made. Thinking that familiar instance is <still> unestab-

124.15 lished, he explains <it> together with a justification, "'duality' and 'singularity'" 45.24

For if one thinks that the way of ordinary usage and the way of real objects have the same status,[154] he is not, in fact, able to deny what does not exist, because the way of ordinary usage of what does not exist is established by all discussants. With the idea – 'But he who thinks that there is an ordinary usage quite independent of real objects, his doctrine remains <unrefuted>' – he says, "in the section on Buddhism..." <In the phrase,> "It will be 46.1-2

shown", what has to be supplied is: 'by Uddyotakara'. 46.2

'The capacity 'which is intrinsic'' – with respect to cf. 46.5

the origination of correspondent knowledge – is simply the true-nature devoid of impositions – the sense organs etc.

124.20 which are devoid of the faults <of the capacity of> 'that of accessory causes'.

<P> What purpose is served by criticizing the highest good that is immediately experienced? For it is not the case that this is not established by that. <S> Hence he says, "This is what is meant ..." <In the phrase,> "admits only 46.9-12; 46.11

the not immediately experienced highest good", what has to

[154] *yogakṣema.*

be supplied is: 'as being the end of the *śāstra*'. The point is: otherwise, he would not teach the specific objects of knowledge, soul etc., because, even without the knowledge of NS.1.1.9
their true-nature, the immediately experienced highest good is established. "lacks a valid means of knowledge <for its 46.13
apprehension> because there is no experience <of it>." The
125.1 point is: how, even in the absence of this <experience> is there a means of knowledge that is to be inferred solely from the result of direct experience? 'Scripture and infer- cf.46.14-15
ence are accessory causes', insofar as they lead one to infer a subject etc. Thus there is scripture as to the establishment of the object 'soul':

> This is the soul.[155]
> From which sin is repelled.[156]
> Ageless, deathless.[157]
> This is 'Not this, Not that'.[158]

And inference occurs in the *sūtra*:

> Desire... NS 1.1.10

125.5 But as for the establishment of the logical mark of absence of rebirth, there is such scripture as:

> Being quite incorporeal.[159]

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[155] *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 4.4.3.
[156] *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 1.2.9.
[157] *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 4.4.25.
[158] *Bṛhadāraṇayaka Upaniṣad* 3.2.96.
[159] *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 8.12.1.

But the inference is the absence of activity. With respect to the absence of activity, in turn, <there is such scripture as>,

> But if a man were to take delight in his soul and was satisfied in his soul and was fully delighted with his soul, he has no duty to perform.[160]

125.10 etc. But the inference is the absence of fault. With respect to the absence of fault, in turn, <there is such scripture as>,

> Even taste, having seen what is beyond that, ceases.[161]

etc. But the inference is the absence of false knowledge. With respect to this, in turn, <there is such scripture as>,

> The fetter of the heart is severed, all doubts are cut off.[162]

etc. But the inference is the real existence of the knowledge of the true-nature. With respect to the knowledge of the true-nature of the soul, in turn, <there is such scripture as>,

125.15 > The soul, verily, must be seen.[163]

etc. But the inference is eminence in practicing the means
etc. But the explicit mention of "scripture and inference" is 46.14-15
a partial characterization. Perception also has to be understood; it must be analogically reasoned thus with respect to
the body etc. also. <In the phrase,> "the means of knowl- 46.15
edge for this matter is simply the inference," what has to be

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[160] *Bhagavadgītā* 3.17.
[161] *Bhagavadgītā* 2.49.
[162] *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* 2.2.8.
[163] *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 4.5.6.

supplied is: 'let him desire to teach one who does not know', because even such <statements in the> *Upaniṣads* such as,

> By knowing just that, one attains immortality.[164]

are valid means of knowledge, as well as the inference of a series. "Moreover, because they – the objects of knowledge 46.22 (13.24)
– are taught separately from the means of knowledge etc." in the first *sūtra*. In order that it be distinguished from the explanation of this, he introduces the reply-passage, "And 46.22-24
if..." In the phrase, "because...had been set forth by the 46.25-26 (13.26)
first *sūtra*", what has to be supplied is: 'by both the literal expression and the <sentential> meaning'. <P> Therefore, what was accomplished by Uddyotakara by such a commentary? <S> Hence he says, "then this..." 46.27

Now he explains the <sentence in the> *Bhāṣya* that (2.9)
is made into the content of the reply <passage> in the *Vārt-* (13.23-24)
*tika*, "Does the...?" <P> The meaning of the second *sūtra* is 47.1-2
not stated here; how then is this repeated there? <S> Hence
he says, "the highest good..." <P> And thus, one should not 47.3
entertain this doubt: the *Vārttika* is by no means a restatement of what has to be eliminated etc., because it has been brought forth as if it were established by Vācaspati; <S>

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[164] *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* 3.8.

because in some cases it is possible that there be a letter
126.1 absent even through the fault of a scribe. Because, if the
case were otherwise, it restates the meaning of the purport
of the *Bhāṣya*. But as for the statement, "he explains...", 47.6
what is explained, that is the meaning. Therefore even if
there is no explanation immediately after the restatement of
this <statement>, "And this same point is restated in the 2.9-10
second *sūtra*.", there is no defect. The meaning is: and for
this reason[165], but because it was already explained by <the
sentence> beginning, "the second *sūtra*...", this has not 47.4
been explained here.

126.5 <P> Is aversion simply what is not to be eliminated
or is it not a cause of activity? <S> Hence he says, "a partial 47.6
characterization." <P> The word "eliminating", because 2.10
there is co-mention of the word "absolute", operates in the 2.10
sense of 'liberation'; but how is this termed "the knowledge 14.3
of the true-nature"? <S> Hence he says, "for...is elimi- 47.7
nated..." The meaning is: the 'knowledge of the true-
nature' is meant to be expressed by that, by relying on the
etymological analysis of <*hāna* as> 'instrumental cause'. cf. 2.10
But according to the <etymological> analysis of <*hāna*> as
'the action', because of the co-mention of the word 'abso-
lute', liberation <is meant to be expressed>. Simply by dis-

[165] Reading *enaṃ* (NVTP(P) 239.2) for *evaṃ* (NVTP 126.3).

pelling doubt as to the etymological analysis of the word
'knowledge of the true-nature' he says, "'It' means 'the 47.7-8
means of knowledge'." By this is eliminated a contradiction
with the first sentence <of the *Bhāṣya*>. But as for the state-
ment that the word 'object (*artha*)', found in the *Bhāṣya*,
"cardinal entities" (*arthapada*), 'will have a different mean- 2.11; cf. 31.21
ing', he says the following, "the bases of human ends." The 47.9
meaning is: 'the purport is'. What has to be supplied is: 'of
the *Vārttika*'.

<P> Even if this is indeed maintained: by 'basis' is
meant 'the mode' or 'the state of being in such a mode'; and
hence because analytics is such, nevertheless, the 'state of
being such' would lack justification. <S> Hence he says,
"By 'basis' is meant 'operation'." Thus by this <interpreta- 47.15
tion> the meaning of the base of the word 'basis' that occurs
in the *Bhāṣya* is stated; but the meaning of the affix is 2.15
revealed by Pakṣilasvāmin himself, when he says, "is sepa- 2.18
rately established through the categories of doubt etc." This
is what is meant: for this analytics is distinguished from
another branch of science, insofar as it embodies the opera-
tion of explaining 'reasoning'. And this <reasoning> is
explained only through the explanation of the elements and
ancillary elements of doubt etc. Hence, though doubt etc.
are also the content of this <analytics>, without these it

would not be a branch of science at all insofar as it lacks a content. Or else, it would simply be another branch of science insofar as it has different contents. <P> To this very
point he objects, "And...not be objected..." <S> With the 47.16-17
idea – 'For it is not possible without this analytics to remove a blot of disbelief — 'Even though the other branches of science teach their respective subject matters, how <can>
126.20 this <be the case>?' — he refutes <this objection> "this 47.17
alone..."[166] He shows that the *Bhāṣya* has a different con-
tent than the *Vārttika*, "The *Bhāṣya* says 'And this'..." He 47.18-19
clarifies the weak[167] objection, "knowledge..." The contra- 47.20-21
diction in saying 'known and not-ascertained' is quite
impossible, because it is immediately denied that 'appre- cf. 47.21
hension' is a synonym of 'ascertainment'. Nor again would the content of the operation of the means of knowledge, having been apprehended, actually be ascertained. Hence, he reveals a different intention on the part of the objector,
127.1 "five elements..." The meaning is: just as perception or 47.26
scripture descends to what is unknown, so too <do they descend> to what is not doubted. But just as inference does not <so descend> to that which is unknown, so also does it <not descend> to what is not doubted. Therefore, the

[166] V has *etasyā eva* (NVTP 126.21); NVT 47.17 *tasyā eva*.
[167] *nirdalam* (NVTP 126.22), where *nirbalam* seems more appropriate.

method of this <inference> is quite different. "have the 48.6
same referent" means 'have one and the same referent'. The
point of, "you do not establish co-referentiality.", is: there is 48.7
no identity. With the idea – 'Correferentiality is merely the
relationship with a locus which is mutually the same. But it
127.5 is not identity.' – he explains the refutation, "both the uni- 48.8; 2.19-20
versal and the particular..." As for the phrase, 'operates on cf. 2.19
what is in doubt...', he reveals that its aim is suitability,
"what is not in doubt..." The purport is: and <an object> 48.10
does not merit doubt in two ways: when it is either com-
pletely unknown or is specifically ascertained; but the
<object> in the opposite condition to this, being doubted,
merits doubt. It is in respect to this that "reasoning oper- 2.19
ates". For this same reason, he illustrates <only> one kind,
which is principally negative, as a partial characterization,
"For...not..." 48.10-11

<P> As for the question, "But what is 'purpose'?", 14.22
the answer, "that prompted by which one acts...", is 14.22-23
<uttered out of> effrontery. <S> Hence he says, "this is 48.13-14
127.10 quite obvious..." <P> <The statement> "But our view is..." 14.24
is a revelation of what he himself allows, in order to indicate
his dissatisfaction with the doctrine of an *ekadeśin*, but we
do not understand the source of <his> dissatisfaction. <S>
Hence he reveals the source of this <dissatisfaction> only

after posing a question, "In this..." That is to say: "Since 48.14ff; 48.16
they" – duty etc. – "are all desired." The meaning is: and
thus desire, that has either duty etc. as its content, or the
means to them as its content, is what prompts to activity
even here. That is to say: and it is not the case that there is
inclusion of duty etc. as also being the content of this
<desire>, because of the undesirable consequence of the
inclusion of garlands, sandalpaste, etc.. "Liquor" means a 48.16
127.15 'drink'. <P> All the same, there is no loss to their having an
end. <S> Hence he says, "duty or liberation..." And this is a 48.17
partial characterization. What has to be understood is: both
desire and wealth do not prompt those who are devoid of
desire. Therefore, what is meant is this: for, among <the
four human ends of> duty etc., the mere fact that they are
duty etc. alone does not prompt toward action. <P> What,
pray, does? <S> The fact that they are being desired.
Because, otherwise, the undesirable consequence is that
there is in all respects activity on the part of everyone with-
out exception. <P> What flaw is there in what is literally
stated, whereby the explanation <given is>, "which are their 48.18-19
content, he alludes to the cognition which has them as its
content"? <S> Hence he says, "if they are both absent..." In 48.19
127.20 the phrase, "or if they are present..." the seventh case affix 48.19
is used. This <is stated> in order that one grasp the answer

<passage in the> *Vārttika*. He objects to the literal text,
"Nevertheless..." <P> Even if it is appropriate to have the 48.19-22
following doubt – 'As he makes the result-knowledge,
which makes one operate towards something else, here
operate solely towards the means to this, hence there is no
undesirable consequence of an overly extensive character-
ization' – nevertheless, since there is no activity whatsoever
towards ignorance, in that it is a a means to this', hence by
revealing this <result> knowledge, he raises a doubt, "From 48.22
the knowledge that <something> is a means to this <end>
..." "correferential..." – have the same content; the mean- 48.24
ing is: because the relationship of cause and effect is estab-
lished without contradicting agreement. <P> On this
reasoning, then, is the <sentence in the> *Vārttika* "by the 14.24
acquisition of pleasure and the elimination of pain...", sim-
127.25 ply incoherent? <S> Hence he says, "What is meant is 48.26-27
128.1 this..." He explains what was intended, "Therefore..." The 49.1-2
meaning is: that a thing is 'to be acquired' is the fact of its [128.1-5]
being desired, insofar as it is the content of activity; the fact
that a thing is 'aimed at' is its being desired by its intrinsic
nature. Since the knowledge of both these prompts to activ-
ity, they are both an end. But there is all this difference: that
the knowledge of what is to be acquired directly prompts
one to activity. And the very fact that this directly prompts is

what directly produces a desire that is capable of producing exertion. Only the first is called ‘activity’. But the knowl- cf. 1.3-4
edge of what is aimed at, by producing a desire that has this as its content, <is also called ‘activity’>, by virtue of producing the knowledge of the means to this <end>, which is such.

<P> One who fails to observe that the words 'reasoning' and 'examination' have the same meaning has an
objection. <S> He says, "Reasoning." The meaning of the 49.13
*Ṭīkā* is the introduction of the following objection: <P> as
regards the word 'investigation' having the meaning of
'enquiry'; sometimes 'its being dependent on an end' is
employed; but if this <word 'investigation'> means 'reasoning' and, by virtue of the etymological analysis of this, the
meaning is simply 'the means of knowledge' and this has no
'dependency on an end', then the whole <issue> is muddled. <P> Despite all this, the objection remains exactly the
same. <S> Hence he explains the reply, "perception etc..." 49.11-113
128.10 <P> If the examining — understanding — of an object cf. 49.12
through <the five> members is reasoning, then what is the
end of this <examining>? <S> Hence he says, "the logical 49.12
mark of an object..." <P> But if reasoning, which is another
name for examination, does not have as its content what has
to be inferred, on what grounds will there be understanding
of this? <S> Hence he says, "But...once examined..." <P> 49.12-13
But then, just as the logical mark is made known through
the <five> members, which are based on the means of
knowledge, why is what has to be inferred not likewise
<made known>? <S> Hence he says, "but not..." <P> Even 49.13
if there is no difference in terms of their being doubted,

whence is this <possible>? <S> Hence he says, "of this..." 49.13
The meaning <of the phrase,> "because it is not the basis of 49.13
examination", is: because it is impossible, without teaching
128.15 the logical mark, to teach what depends upon this directly.
"Then it is not through the means of knowledge..." The 49.14
idea is: and hence the examination – understanding – of the logical mark of the object – would not be the end of the means of knowledge; but if <it arose> through the means of knowledge only, then the members have no end. That is to say: by refuting the independence of the <five> members in respect of understanding the logical mark through <the sen-
tence> beginning, "not directly...", he rejects the fact that 49.15-16
understanding is not the end of the means of knowledge; and by making known that they serve subordinate operations, he rejects the fact that the members serve no purpose.

<P> An opponent destroys the reason even for this claim – 'Even though there is no difference in terms of their being means of knowledge, this alone <reasoning>, and nothing else, is what teaches a man in error'. <S> Hence he says in
128.20 this same way, "all..." The meaning is: therefore, this is the 49.17-18
meaning of the *Vārttika*: because this same <reasoning> by 15.4-5
its very nature assists all the means of knowledge that are such, hence it teaches a man in error; and hence it is com-
monly called "<reasoning> in the highest sense." 4.11-12; 15.4

<P> Being dependent is not simply being uncontra-
dicted, because even what is not dependent is not-contra-
dicted <and> even that which is contradicted is dependent;
for just this reason, these two things do not even have a
<relation of> invariable concomitance. Therefore, how can
he say, "'depends upon...' is meant that it does not contra- 15.5 (49.19)
dict"?[168] And this is by no means the subject under discus-
sion. <S> Hence he says, "five members..." The meaning 49.18-20
is: the basis and the end of reasoning in reality have the
128.25 same content, and, there being no contradiction this results
– not otherwise. Therefore, this same thing that was related
by Pakṣilasvāmin in terms of meaning is quite literally
explained by Uddyotakara. Even if the word 'fire' expresses
a specific kind of radiant heat — because one does not
experience the normal usage of 'fire' in the case of sunlight
129.1 etc.; nevertheless, sometimes it is employed also of radiant
heat alone. With the idea – 'Let there be no partial non-
establishment also by virtue of an atom with this meaning' –
he says, "Fire – a composite..." 50.1

<P> A contradiction with the means of knowledge is nothing but the delimiting of a contradicted object; and this is thus quite obvious through direct perception. Therefore,

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[168] NV 15.5 *āśritamiti pratyakṣāgamāvirodhi*. V (NVTP 128.23) has *āśritatvamityavirodhi*: NVT 49.19 *āśritatvaṃ na tadvirodhi iti*.

for what purpose is the question <asked>, "But what..."? 50.2
<S> Hence he says, "The...here." By "from this fact alone" 50.2ff; 50.2
is meant 'from the lack of the three forms alone'. In the
129.5 phrase, "this <is> pseudo-inference", what has to be sup- 50.3
plied is: 'should be normally termed'. That is to say: and
this is not, in fact, endowed with the three forms, because of
the undesirable consequence of establishing of what has to
be established. <P> To this he objects, "But..." <P> If the 50.3-4
full possession of the three forms by itself constitutes
invariable concomitance, then how is there co-existence
with an impediment? Because there is no co-existence in
this case. <S> Hence he says, "If there were an impedi- 50.5
ment..." The meaning is: the explanation of being variant [129.7-11]
<arises> through admitting subject-attributeness. Hence
such a doubt as, 'And there is no co-subject etc.', is not
without scope. The 'inclusion of all' is the apprehension of cf. 50.12
the *pakṣa* also, which possesses the *sādhana*, as having sim-
ilarity, according to the form 'Where this, there that'. And cf. 50.12
129.10 this <inclusion> is destroyed merely by this <consideration
alone>: where this *sādhya* does not occur, even there this
*sādhana* is admitted. And this mode of variation cannot be
prevented even with regard to the *pakṣa*. The meaning of [129.11-14]
the prior view is: there is no objecting to an impediment in
terms of independence, because there is absence of that in

respect to that which is devoid of subject-attributeness due to variation. And where there is co-existence of an impediment, there because these same two, whose independence is known, occur elsewhere, the inference proves fallacious; but the contradiction is successful by producing such things as variation etc.

129.15 <P> In the <sentence in the> *Vārttika* that literally
states, "The employment <of inference> in what is not the 15.10-11
domain of inference.", there is clearly the very non-subject-
attributeness maintained by the opponent, because it is pre-
cisely what is not the *pakṣa* that is not the domain of infer-
ence; hence, desiring to provide an explanation in another
way, he lays the groundwork <by saying>, "For it will be 50.16-18
stated..."[169] The <grammatical> construction is: "For it 50.16
will be stated in the section on inference" that "because of 50.17
over-extension" – 'because of over-pervasion'. <P> What
follows if this is so? <S> Hence he says, "And this..." Wet 50.18
fuel is the sole limiting condition, because there is <only>
one variation; teaching constitutes two limiting conditions,
because there are two variations. By the <phrase> begin-
ning, "this same", and ending, "does not exist", he reveals 50.20-21
the form of perception. <By the phrase,> "if it were to 50.21-22
129.20 exist..." <he reveals the form> of hypothetical reasoning.

[169] V has *vakṣyate* (NVTP 129.16): NVT 50.16 *vakṣyati*.

<By the phrase,> "does not exist" <he reveals the form> of 50.22
ascertainment, which is the end.

<P> When created radiant heat revolves in one's thought, there is no possibility at all of including all <instances as follows>: every created <fire> is without heat. And if this <created radiant heat> does not flash, all the less. For it is not the case that what does not flash in this, that
also is the content of this. <S> Hence he says, "in a general 50.24
way, 'Whatever is created...'" <P> In that form, this <form of created radiant heat> does actually revolve in thought, but in the specific form fire did not become the content of the apprehension of the pervasion relation. <S> Hence he
129.25 says, "but not specifically" — by knowing specifically — 50.25
"in the case of composite-fire" only. The meaning is: the
130.1 relationship is ascertained. <P> Even in the general form, what, pray, scope is to be ascribed to composite-fire, by virtue of which alone the pervasion relation might be ascertained with respect to earth etc. only.? <S> Hence he says,
"For...not..." The meaning is: for it is not the case that, 50.25-26; [130.2-6]
when the pervasion relationship is being grasped in its general form, there is any justification whatsoever for rejecting a composite-fire prior even to a directly perceptible impediment — because one does not experience <this impediment> elsewhere. Moreover, not only is that <impediment>

itself not experienced, but no such <things> as earth etc. are
130.5 in fact experienced; therefore, these also have to be rejected. And thus, the pervasion relationship must be grasped apprehension by apprehension. Whether there is doubt[170] or not as to variation in respect to <what is> not immediately experienced – either way, the undesirable consequence is the annihilation of all inference. With the idea – 'Let the opponent himself grasp the *pakṣa*' – he states a very simple
method, "Now...not..." The essence is: for, if there is no 51.3-4
exception to the pervasion relationship, there can be no scope for variation. <P> With the idea — 'Therefore, if there really is an exception to this <pervasion relationship>,
the logical reason is variant' — he objects: "through percep- 51.6-7
tion..." <That is to say:> Thus, does the exception to the pervasion relationship <arise> by not discounting 'subjectness' or <rather> if one discounts it? <S> Now between
130.10 these, he criticizes the first, "<This is> Not correct..." The 51.7-8
idea is: on what grounds comes <the claim>, 'There is an exception to the pervasion relationship, if there is no impediment to an inference that has taken place'? <P> But if erroneous perception does not produce an impediment to this, what else will? <P> If variation is possible with respect to the *pakṣa* also, that should not be produced; who incurs this

[170] Reading *āśaṅkā* (NVTP(P) 162.8) for *āśaṅkayā* (NVTP 130.6).

punishment? <S> Hence he says, "Otherwise..." The mean- 51.8-9
ing is: but there is no counter to a one who lacks this <real-
ization> in his heart:[171] variation cannot be grasped through
perception without disregarding subject-attributeness; for it
is not possible that an object, whose possession of the
*sādhya-dharma* is in doubt, is also ascertained through the
absence of that. <P> Since there will be variation by disre-
garding subject-attributeness through perception, he
objects, "through perception..." <S> He refutes <this>, 51.10-11; 51.12
"Therefore..." The meaning is: for, just as the cessation of [130.16-19]
the *sādhya* is nothing but the contrary operation of a *sādhya*,
so too the cessation of the *sādhana* is nothing but the opera-
tion of a contrary means of knowledge. Otherwise, if the
*sādhaka* does not cease to operate, even if there is operation
of a contrary means of knowledge, then the *sādhya*, which
depends upon this, also would not cease to operate; but
there is no loss to the 'subjectness' if this does not cease;
therefore, there is no scope for variation.

He presents the matter established in the *Vārttika*,
"This same point is stated..." <P> If indeed 'non-subject- 51.13-14 (15.11-12)
attributeness' or variation cannot be made to be eradicated
prior to the cessation of inference, nevertheless, this is, in

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171 ***śūnyahṛdayam*** | *yasya hṛdi nāyaṃ parāmarśaḥ tam...* NVTPP 264.10-11.

fact possible at a later time: hence these two alone exist; there is no need for 'having their content pre-empted'. cf. 15.11-12
Hence he says, "and... in this way..." A summary of the 51.14
established doctrine <on this matter> is: for there is no scope whatever for variation etc. as long as inference is not flawed by a contradiction with direct perception. Hence both of them,[172] together with their scope, depend upon a contradiction with perception. Therefore, if the inference is flawed, what use for these two? For a man already dead is not murdered.

130.25 <P> If one thus says, "Sound is not audible", how 15.12-13
could he maintain the non-existence of sound, whereby he does not maintain: 'What, pray, is in fact to be grasped by another sense-organ?' But if there is a contradiction here, then how is this <contradiction> not <applicable> to the
131.1 denial of the intrinsic nature? Therefore, the idea of the
opponent cannot be checked. <S> Hence he says, "For there 51.16-17
is no..." The meaning is: on the view that the ascertainment of what cannot be grasped through this <arises> because of the variation of operation of another sense-organ, the denial of the intrinsic nature is indeed maintained. This is actually a familiar instance for this. He lays the foundation in order to install <the image of> the *Vārttika* which is dislodged

[172] Presumably *pakṣadharmatva* and *vyābhicāra*: cf. NV 51.14.

due to the non-refutation of the strengthened previous view,
"For...involve a qualifier..." <The phrase,> "an affirmation 51.19
also applies to what is qualified", is a partial characteriza- 51.20
tion: one must also understand 'negation also applies to
what is qualified'. By "no...way" is <meant> 'there is no 51.20
apprehension from another means of knowledge'. A 'hat as cf. 51.21
131.5 qualified by redness' is enjoined. 'Clothing qualified by cf. 51.22
being old and possessing stains' is prohibited. 'Direct state- cf. 51.23
ment' is hearing the word 'audible' compounded with <the
negative particle> *nañ*. A 'sentence' is a collection of words cf. 51.23
established as being in the relation of qualifier and that
which is to be qualified, because these two are syntactically
connected. What is meant is this: the <negative particle>
*nañ* in a compound serves to negate the meaning of the last
word, because its force – its expressing meaning – is with
respect to this alone. Even on the view that <this is> not a
proper compound, as between that which qualifies and that
is to be qualified, which have the same syntactic status, the
<negative particle> *nañ* is connected with the qualifier only,
because its force – its suitability for syntactic connection –
is in respect of this alone. Thus, then, on either view,
because of the strength of conventional meaning, or else
because of the strength of the suitability of syntactic con-
131.10 nection, there is no connection of the <negative particle>

*nañ* with the word 'sound'.

<P> Let this be granted. <However:> Let the <negative particle> *nañ*, which occurs in the text, be connected with the word 'audible'; but the denial of 'sound' obtains
from the meaning. <S> Hence he says, "Nor, again..." The 51.24-25
meaning is: it is said – 'For that without which the literal meaning is not produced, that, being objected to by him, obtains from the meaning'. And that which produces <it> is by no means in contradiction. For only that which what does not produce <it is in contradiction>. He illuminates the contradiction only, "audibility..." <P> The account of negation 51.26
is justified through a locus, even if it fictitious, because this <negation> is void. Moreover, there is no contradiction between non-existence and locusness. <S> Hence he says,
"And...not..." It being thus established, he illuminates the 52.1
meaning of the *Vārttika*, "Nor is audibility..." The relation 52.1 (15.14-15)
between sound and the auditory organ is that of sound and the means of apprehending <it>.

<P> If there is a relation, how is it that Uddyotakara
<says>, 'function'? <S> Hence he says, "'function'..." <P> cf. 15.14; 52.6
It is not directly revealed in the *Veda* <that there is> impurity in a begging bowl made of a human skull. On the contrary, there is an exactly opposite scripture:

Indra indeed performed a mighty vow;

he himself fact took up a human skull.[173]

Hence, how is there a contradiction with scripture? <S>
Hence he says, "by *Manu* etc..." The meaning is: even if 52.7
with regard to this matter no scripture is directly known, nevertheless a very clear *smṛti*, which is based on this <a missing scripture>, is in fact the means of knowledge. But "Indra indeed..." is nothing but encomium, which serves the purpose of teaching the praiseworthiness of man's intellect etc., but it is not the means of knowledge for the purity of this <bowl>. <P> Even though he had directly known a scripture that had been taught, on what grounds can one
question <it>? <S> Hence he says, "neither...with us." The 52.9
meaning is: because other scriptures are not valid means of
knowledge in respect of "this real object", which is the 52.10
131.25 domain of means of knowledge other than verbal testimony.
<P> But whence <comes> the misapprehension of the purity of a <human-skull> begging bowl for this shameless
132.1 man? <S> Hence he says, "for...unexceptionable..." For it 52.13-14
is not solely from scripture that there is ascertainment of duty etc.; but also from unexceptionable normal usage. And this belongs to us also. And the objection should not be raised: universal normal usage is the means of knowledge. As, for example, the conduct of married women as regards

[173] Unknown provenance.

the injunction to marry a <young> girl.[174] Out of apprehension that <one will say> 'But this is a <mere> local <practice>', he produces an example, "the Southerners..." 52.14

132.5 <S> He states the source of the humor, "*śruti*, 52.16-19
*smṛti*..." The <grammatical> construction is: such rites as the *Āhnenaivuka* etc., which are based on sacred tradition, are like the *Agnihotra* because they are the unexceptionable practice of those who perform Vedic matters. <P> Then why is it not ascertained that this is in fact a cause of good? <S>
Hence he says, "not by any means..." The meaning is: even 52.19
if this is quite possible superficially, nevertheless it could not result in performance, insofar as it is blemished by the doubt that it lacks a basis. Hence, simply an inference as to
its basis is better. The meaning of, "not the basis on which 52.21
to infer a *Veda*"; is: a logical mark.[175] By way of refuting the <charge of> repetition because of the <earlier> sen-
132.10 tence, "What is meant by 'pure'?", he says, "Moreover..." 52.11; 52.23-24
"But if it is out of aversion for the *Veda*..." And the objec- 53.3-5
tion should not be raised: <P> with respect to as much as there is a dispute, just that much matter is a position. <S> But the purity of cow-dung etc. is admitted by both discussants; hence, just so much will be exemplified. <P> Since

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[174] *purandhrī*. This is not further explicated by Śrīkaṇṭha, Abhayatilaka, or Vardhamāna.
[175] NVT 52.21 *vedānumānamūlam*, NVTP 131.9 *vedānumāne mūlam*.

the purity of even this cannot be admitted if one does not
admit that scripture is a valid means of knowledge, he raises
the objection, "But..." The meaning is: the question is of an 53.6
idea of which there are many differing opinions. He states
the idea, "surely no..." <P> There is 'co-application of two 53.6-8; 15.22
inferences to one and the same thing' and <hence> there cf. 53.8
really is a contradiction: thus how <can he say>, "because 15.22
of the absence"?[176] <S> Hence he says, "This is the idea..." 53.8-11
132.15 For it is not the case that only that which <is cancelled> by
what occurred before is itself cancelled, because of the
undesirable consequence of non-restriction; hence he said,
"arises by virtue of that..." The meaning is: it depends on 53.9
this for the sake of its own establishment, for the sake of the
establishment of its own basis, and for the sake of the estab-
lishment of its own pervader. He gives an example of <an
inference> which is cancelled by that which establishes its
own pervader, "As, for example, when it is said..." The 53.10-11
phrase, "the form of knowledge and what is unreal", is dual. 53.11
He cites an example of <an inference> which is cancelled
by that which establishes the object, "Thus..." But as for 53.15-16
that <inference> which is cancelled by what establishes
itself one must also understand: cognitions that occur con-
tinuously one by one, even in the absence of the same agent

[176] NV 15.22 *asambhavāt*: NVT 53.8 *abhāvāt*.

of knowledge, are capable of synthesis because of the relation of cause and effect.

132.20 tion of cause and effect.

<P> With the idea – 'For the relationship of cause and effect is not thus established in the absence of the same agent of knowledge. Wherein, therefore, is the non-coapplication' — he says, "because of the absence of the co-appli- 53.17 (15.22)
cation..."? <S> Hence he says, "Therefore..." The meaning 53.16-17
is: the possibility of all forms is the 'capacity'. On the view of co-application, there must necessarily be, in the end, the rejecting of one form for the other. Otherwise, this same
133.1 object would consist either of both or of neither. Therefore, in reality there is no co-application of two contradictory <inferences> that are equally valid. And of two <inferences> that coapply, there is no real equal strength.

<P> Then why is there now no true-rivalness? <S>
Hence he says, "For...not..." The meaning is: thus then 53.17-19
there is, in reality, no true-rivalness; but rather, in the condition of their difference not being apprehended, the fact that they do not generate valid knowledge arises through their mutual antagonism; hence, that <mutual antagonism> itself
133.5 is explained by the sage as being a defect. He reveals this
same point through <the sentence in> the *Vārttika*, "But 53.18ff (15.21-23)
why...?" <P> Because we experience the co-application of two inferences, whose forms have been stated, even though

they fully possess positive and negative concomitance, the *Vārttika* as it stands is incoherent. <S> Hence he says, "here..." <That is to say:> There is no co-application even 53.20-21
of perception etc. also with <an inference> whose content is not contradicted. Hence, inference would be said to have no difference whatsoever from these <other means of knowledge>. Hence <this sentence in the *Vārttika*> is a partial characterization, by way of refuting that form.

<P> With the idea – 'Just as two inferences, in the [133.10-13]
condition of their difference not being grasped, are true rivals, so too let direct and inference be <true rivals>. Hence wherein is the relation of what has to be cancelled and that which cancels it? But if, it <the relationship> being grasped through difference, perception is approved as that which cancels inference, then let inference also be thus approved. Moreover, even two mutually unrelated inferences stand in the relation of what is to be cancelled and that which cancels it' — he states the intention of the objection, "percep- 53.24-26
tion...also..." He states the point of the refutation, "for 54.1
when two things have equal force..." The meaning is: for [133.14-24]
perception does not examine the variance and the invariance of inference;[177] but rather, it itself being invariant simply overthrows an inference <that is variant>; for example, by

[177] *anyathāsiddhyananyathāsiddhī* NVTP 133.14.

means of perception, which is invariant, <and> by which one apprehends hotness, an inference of non-hotness is overthrown, even though it is invariant prior to the cognition of that which cancels <it>, insofar as it does not have limiting conditions. Therefore, this <constitutes> the deficient and excessive strength of the two of them. But inference, even if it is in itself invariant, examines the variance of an inference that is a true rival. For <an inference> that is invariant cannot be cancelled indiscriminately by an entity. Therefore, this <constitutes> their having equal force. And it is not appropriate to say: let an <inference> which is variant be cancelled, in turn, by an <inference> which is invariant; because this <the former> is rejected as simply being
133.20 variant. And it should not be objected: <P> when perception is variant, then an inference must necessarily be variant; if both are invariant, the real object would meet an insupportable disaster. Hence this too is overcome by this same <consideration>; what purpose is served here by a cancelling-perception? <S> The difference is: because the variance of this <inference> has to be generated from the cancellation of perception. Therefore, so long as the invariance of perception is not ascertained, so long indeed thus does the non-arisal of ascertainment play the role of having the form of a true-rival. But how is an inference, at a time subsequent to

this, an obstructor? This same point is stated: "perception, 54.3-4
133.25 which is invariant..." The meaning is: it is impossible to produce ratification of <perception> in a mode different
134.1 from the mode that is revealed. That is to say: and the ratification of a different mode <arises> only through the mixing of contents – not also due to its being erroneous without an obstructor, because of the undesirable consequence of over-extension <of characterization> if this <its being erroneous without an obstructor> is so.

He conceives of the objection, "But...by compari- 54.5-10 (15.25)
son...', <by saying> "is like a cow..." <P> The "admis- 54.5; 54.10
sion" – "...no contradicted by comparison" – is simply an 54.10 (15.25)
error due to the tradition of city-dwellers. <S> Hence he cf. 54.6
says, "'There is no' is supplied from above." What has to be 54.10
134.5 supplied is: 'which occurs in the *Vārttika*-objection'. The
meaning of <the passage in> the *Vārttika*, supplemented by [134.5-8]
the *Ṭīkā* is: if comparison, which is generated from verbal testimony and perception, which are invariant, is either cancelled by or opposed to as a true-rival by inference, then perception and verbal testimony themselves, which are such, would be either non-cancelled or be opposed as true-rivals. And if this is the case, everything would prove muddled. Therefore, just as inference is dislodged by these two, so too <is inference dislodged> by comparison also – which

is the embodied result produced by them.

The result of the explanation of the <phrase>
"intrinsic nature of 'purpose'...", namely the objection to its 54.15-16
being out of order, is "is an element of the explanation of 54.17-18
'purpose'." The meaning of the explanation is: even if in the
<sentence in the> *Bhāṣya*, "both discussion and arguing 3.9
serve a purpose," 'purpose' is literally stated as being a element, nevertheless that which possesses the element must be understood. Therefore, this is the meaning of the *Bhāṣya*: 'purpose', to be sure, pervades discussion and arguing; but it is under consideration whether it pervades captiousness or not.

<P> As there is establishment of the fact that discussion and arguing have a purpose, this <fact of having a purpose> should be considered also for captiousness; but by what <passage in the> *Bhāṣya* is it taught that these two
actually have a purpose? <S> Hence he says, "the meaning 54.18
of the word 'this'..." The meaning is: for he will say, "It 5.5-6
<discussion> is separately mentioned for understanding's sake, since the employment of it when understood will[178] lead to the knowledge of the true-nature <of a thing>." And yet that this normal usage, which is characterized by differentiating a <true> reason from pseudo-reasons, is also a

[178] NB 5.6 *bhavati* V (and NVTP 134.15) *bhaviṣyati*.

subordinate purpose, insofar as it is unique, was intended here by Pakṣilasvāmin through the word 'this'. Hence this indeed was explained by Uddyotakara. <P> Nevertheless, it is appropriate to say: 'this' <means> reasoning, which must be differentiated; for pseudo-reasoning itself is not principal
in <such a> differentiation. <S> Hence he says, "But 54.21
because of its proximity, the term 'pseudo-reasoning'..."

134.20 Therefore, by this is revealed through differentiation the domain of enquiry. In order to reveal a doubt, which is in the form of an antecedent to examination, he states a difference of opinion among commentators as being the cause
of this, "a counter position..." He states the purpose of 54.23
examination, "Between these, if..." The prior-position is: 54.27-55.3
"Between these 'Some say..." The established doctrine is: 55.3-6
"establishment of his opponent..." The idea is: even if the 55.7-8 [134.22-
fact that captiousness has a purpose is established through 135.2]
'objecting to the view of one's opponent' as its purpose, because of the explicit statement,

> That in reference to which one acts is the purpose. NS 1.1.24

134.25 and if one were not to set forth objecting to one's opponent's view <as the purpose>, then one would not be cap-
135.1 tious at all. Nevertheless, this same <purpose> would not belong to the one who propounds nothing at all himself;

hence, activity is appropriate solely for one who states the establishment of his own position, even by <mere> process of elimination. <P> There is no <such> discussant who would not admit anything at all, because in the end he admits at least the meaning of <the negative particle> *nañ*. But if there is no admission of this, he could not even say this, 'I do not admit anything at all'. Therefore, what purpose is served by this production of what is not real? <S> cf. 55.7

Hence he says, "for a nihilist..." By 'nihilist' is meant a 55.11-13

135.5 *Mādhyamika* etc. The meaning is: for by him is not admitted the position of his opponent, nor again is the denial of the position of his opponent admitted. The same point is stated,

"he proceeds prompted <only by the desire> to deny his 55.12

opponent's position." To be more explicit: This world does cf. 55.11

not exist, because it is being cancelled. Nor again does it not exist, because it is being apprehended. Nor again is it of the form of what exists and what does not exist, because there is a contradiction <here>. Nor again is it not of the form of neither, simply because there is a contradiction <here> and because there is no apprehension <of such>. <P> For it is not the case that only what he apprehends is what he admits. If this is so, the outcome is: if the meaning of the statement of one's opponent when understood were to be admitted,

then <this constitutes> the grounds for defeat of 'acceptance NS.5.2.20

of doctrine', if it is not understood then <this constitutes>
the grounds of defeat of 'ignorance'. <S> Hence he says, NS.5.2.17
"By 'acknowledgment' is meant 'admission'." What has to 55.14-15
be supplied is: 'is intended to be expressed here'. <P> Nevertheless, because <the group of four> is only the content of his admission it is not a position, because this <the position> is what has to be made known. <S> Hence he says,
"Even if..." "because they are inextricably linked to 55.15-16; 55.15
that..."[179] — because they are inextricably linked to the admission. The meaning is: here the established doctrine is intended to be expressed by the word 'position', because it
is what has to be made known. <In the phrase,> "such 55.21
defects <of the logical reason> as being non-established and being contradicted,"[180] what has to be supplied is: 'are the content of establishing what has been stated by a discussant'.

There is overextension <of characterization as follows>: because even a non-familiar-instance, which lacks a means of establishing etc., is the content of perception. There is underextension <of characterization as follows>: because even that which is the content of verbal testimony etc., which is the domain of grasping the pervasion relation-

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[179] NVTP 135.12 *tvāt*: NVT 55.15 *tayā*.
[180] NVT 55.21 *°viruddhādidoṣo* NVTP 135.13 *°viruddhatvādidoṣo*.

ship, is a familiar instance. <P> Nevertheless, there is still
only overextension. <S> Hence he says, "And thus..." He 56.7-8
clarifies a confused <sentence in the> *Vārttika*, "which...in 56.10-14 (16.15)
various..." <P> But then why is there no contradiction at all
with the *sūtra* that characterizes <example>, to the extent NS.1.1.36
that this too is common to both perception and non-percep-
tion? <S> Hence he says, "But not ...an example." The 56.14-15
meaning is: that which is common is capable of being
explained also as being a specific content.

<P> Therefore is the *Bhāṣya* now actually dis-
lodged? <S> Hence he says, "Therefore..." <P> What other 56.15
135.20 <type of> reasoning is there than inference, whereby, even
though having said that it is the basis of inference, Pakṣilas- (3.21-22)
vāmin separately states that familiar instance is the basis of (3.22-23)
reasoning, and Uddyotakara concurs in the same way? <S>
Hence he says, "reasoning, which by its nature has five 56.17-18
members..." <P> Nevertheless, it is not appropriate that
familiar instance be the basis either through contact or
inherence, because a sentence is based on the ether. <S>
Hence it is said, "the basis..." <P> Nevertheless, <to hold> 56.18
that familiar instance is the basis of inference is incoherent,
because the logical mark is based on the subject, and
because the knowledge of this is based on the soul. <S>
Hence it is said, "He states that inference is the instrumental 56.19

cause."[181] <P> The literal text <of the *Vārttika*>, "previ- 16.17
135.25 ously perceived,"[182] causes much confusion. <S> Hence he
says, "familiar instance." This objection should not be 56.19-20
136.1 raised: <P> And if this is so, because it is the instrumental cause of inference, then there should also be separate statement of the *pakṣa*. <S> Because it is meaningless, due simply to the statement of the established doctrine. <P> There is no requirement at all for familiar instance in verbal testimony; because in such <scriptural statements as>,

> He who desires heaven should perform the *Agniṣṭoma*.[183]

etc. there is apprehension of the sentential meaning without
this altogether. <S> Hence he says, "the content of grasping 56.21-22
136.5 a relationship..." The idea is: this was stated with the intention of expressing what a familiar instance is solely in terms of being the content of grasping a relationship, but not as being the content of grasping the specific relationship in the form of pervasion. But as for the explanation of some, that even scripture requires a familiar instance, with the intention of an inference whose domain is the content of this, in regard to its validity as a means of knowledge, this has been
refuted by Uddyotakara, when he says, "and tells of an 16.17

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[181] NVTP 135.24 *anumānaṃ nimittatvam*: NVT 56.19 *anumānanimittatvam.*
[182] *pūrvapratyakṣam* (but cf. C): NVTP 135.24 *pūrvapratyakṣadṛṣṭam.*
[183] Cf. *Āpastamba Śrauta Sūtra* 10.2.1.

object which he had previously come to know to another person..."[184] Therefore he has disregarded this.

Thus, because, as between a matter and its acceptance the relationship of what is primary and what is secondary depends upon a desire to express, the established doctrine is either the acceptance of the matter or the matter

136.10 as being accepted. Therefore, there is no mutual contradiction among the *sūtra*, *Bhāṣya*, *Vārttika*, and *Ṭīkā*. He rejects the erroneous relationship of qualifier and what is to be qualified for the two words 'this' and 'thus', <by saying> "'this'." The meaning of, "but does not cause ratification for 56.26-57.1; 57.3-4
a specific person.", is: the word 'ratification' does not state a restriction of acceptance to a specific person. <P> How, therefore? <S> By rejecting a group of non-admissions, which is a restriction of its intrinsic nature. <P> Only the unique established doctrine is employed in order that a discussant etc. act; therefore, what good is served by the other <established doctrines>? <S> Hence he says, "Thus..."[185] 57.5
<P> Simply because an established doctrine shared by all

136.15 systems is not the content of a difference of opinion, hence for this very reason it is not the cause of the activity of a discussant etc. <S> Hence he says, "To be more explicit..." 57. 6ff

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[184] NV 16.17 *pūrvajñātaṃ cārthaṃ parasmāyācaṣṭa*: NVTP 136.7 *pūrvaṃ jñātaṃ cārthṃ parasmā ācaṣṭa.*
[185] NVTP 136.1 *tathā*: NVT 57.5 *tatra.*

The meaning is: even if the established doctrine shared by
all systems does not prompt the activity of a discussant etc.
by its intrinsic nature, nevertheless, it might be employed by
virtue of generating such established doctrines as unique
etc., and as being the basis of reasoning. By this same <con-
sideration> the end of the unique established doctrine is
manifested deceitfully. <In the phrase,> "And on what 57.9
would reasoning be based?", what has to be supplied is: 'if
there is no established doctrine shared by all systems'. He
states the purpose of the postulate established doctrine,
"Likewise..." The <grammatical> construction is: since the 57.9-11
*sādhana*-universal is pervaded by the *sādhya*-universal,
136.20 how could the specific *sādhya* be understood from the spe-
cific *sādhana*? This is the meaning: for it is through the pos- [135.20-26]
tulate established doctrine, either as result or content, that
the subject-attributeness would either have its result or have
its content. But in the absence of that, this is either lacking
in result or lacking in content; and thus, how could the per-
vasion relationship, in turn, which only relates to universals,
by introducing the mere universal, produce ratification in
respect of the <particular> subject? And how, without pro-
ducing ratification, could it be successful? And by the same
reasoning, inference itself would be destroyed. And hence
wherein is reasoning <possible>? Or wherein are discussion

etc. <possible>? Therefore, even postulate established doc-
136.25 trine must necessarily be explained as being the result and the content of the subject-attributeness, so that pervasion too, which is the accessory of this, would be valid.

<P> Having grasped the principal meaning, he objects, "Is it,..." <S> And by secondary meaning he rejects 57.13-15
137.1 <this>, "as it were, members." He states the secondary 57.15
meaning, "for just as..." <He cites> An example of action, 57.16-18
"Soma", because the word 'Soma' is the name of the object 57.22
<-*kāraka*>. And, out of a desire to express only the meaning of the root, there is separate mention <of it> from the word
'*kāraka*', but in reality even Soma is in fact a *kāraka*. <He cf. 57.21
cites> An example of a *kāraka*, "cow's milk", because the 57.22
conveying of water is obtained by another sentence. <He cites> An example of the meaning of a nominal base,
"whose...", because the word 'outcaste' (*vrātya*), has the 57.23
form of neither a verbal root nor an affix in terms of mean-
137.5 ing. <P> Nevertheless, "aggregation" has not been 57.24
explained. <S> Hence he says, "Thus, by this..."[186] <P> 57.24
With the intention – 'There are also causes of specific cognitions, even though they are not <in> a sentence' – he asks,
"What...?" <S> Simply by rejecting that the affix is princi- 57.24
pal he states the purpose of explicitly using the word 'affix',

[186] NVTP 137.5 *tadanena*: NVT 57.34 *tadevam*.

"And it is not the case...this..." In the course of refuting the 57.25-26
non-establishment of the qualifier, he says, "And the under- 57.27
standing..."

<P> But then why is it <the understanding of the final word> not simply direct experience? For the final word is by no means not directly experienced. If this were
137.10 the case, how could it even be remembered? <S> Hence he
says, "For...not..." <P> Nevertheless, there could be no 58.1
recollection of a word, even if it is of this kind, without
direct experience. <S> Hence he says, "but...can be." <P> 58.1-2
Therefore, let the direct experience of them alone be the cause of the understanding of the meaning. <S> Hence he
says, "Yet...they do not..." Hence by this <answer> it is 58.2
rejected that direct experience by itself is the cause of the conveying of the meaning. He <next> refutes <the claim that the cause of the understanding of the meaning is> the combination of direct experience and recollection,
"Nor...antecedent..." What has to be supplied is: 'but there 58.2-3
might be co-presence of recollection and direct experience'. And this must be understood by admitting recollection in the interval between the direct experience of the second to
137.15 last and the last phonemes. But if the direct experiences of the phonemes, which are produced without interruption, have no interval at all, then the co-presence of the second to

last and the last phonemes, whose states are <respectively> passing out of existence and not-passing out of existence, must indeed be objected to, and it must be refuted through the reasoning stated earlier. Hence, it was not raised as a separate objection by Vācaspati. <P> He objects to the combination in its intrinsic nature of the understanding <of the meaning>, which is not combined with its content because of the combination of causes, adopted by his opponent, "Nor...preceding..." <S> He rejects <this>, "their connec- 58.5; 58.7-8
tion..."

The meaning is: even if the arousing of an impres- [137.19-24]
sion is by no means different from the grasping of its acces-
137.20 sory, nevertheless, it is not the accessory of any cognition whatsoever, because of the undesirable consequence that, if there is arousing of all impressions at all times, then <there are at all times> all recollections. Nor again, if one remembers a specific convention <of meaning>, is the direct experience of the phoneme, which is part of the word, the accessory of that impression; because, if this were so, of the undesirable consequence of over-extension <of characterization>. Therefore, one has to admit <the following>: the synthesis itself, in terms of being a word, is the accessory of the impression, which causes the recollection of the usage. Moreover, the phonemes, which are made into the content

<of the word> through a complex cognition, even though it occurs at the same time,[187] must be synthesized piece by piece as a word, must be recollected as being connected with the meaning. Therefore, on what grounds is there scope for direct experience? But as for the operation, <which is> the origination of the direct experience of the final pho-
137.25 neme, <and> the coming into being of both the impression of this and the synthesis of <them> as a word — <all this occurs at the> same time. But the origination of both of them – this is simply the arousing of the impression of the conventional usage, which consists in the origination of the synthesis of the word – <and> the coming into being of the recollection of the relationship through the arousing of the
138.1 impression, <and> the passing away of the complex cognition — <all this occurs at> the same time. But the origination of the recollection of the relation, <and> the passing away of the complex cognition <and> the passing away of the combining as a word — <all this occurs> at the same time. And as this is not an unheard of hypothesis, he says, "It is precisely for this reason..." 58.9-10

<P> The complex cognition alone will consist by its nature of combining due to simultaneity, and it will produce
138.5 a recollection of the conventional usage that is such. But

[187] *ekapraghaṭṭakenāpīti | ekakālamityartha* ŚṬ 50.26.

even then one must admit that the antecedent recollection,
which pervades all the words, is the just same. <S> Hence
he says, "And thus..." The idea is: for that which has been 58.10 ff [138.6-12]
directly experienced is synthesized, but not at the very out-
set; and thus, even though there is the possibility of combin-
ing the antecedent phonemes into a word, since they have
been directly experienced, there is no possibility of synthe-
sizing the final word, since the final phoneme has not been
directly experienced. And it is not the case that between the
direct experience and the combining there is simultaneity,
because of their relationship of cause and effect. Therefore,
the combination as a word <arises> immediately after that.
It was well said, "if the direct experience <of a word[188]> is 58.10
not in fact the cause of conveying the meaning of a word;"
138.10 but it is the cause only of the origin of recollection, which is
the means to this. By the word "etc." in the <phrase>, 58.11
"ascertainment etc.", what is intended to be expressed is the
recollection of these. Because the sections etc. are included
in this same <place>, because of their specific suitability –
"because of the possibility of understanding the sentential 58.12-13
meaning from this alone" – but if there is no possibility, the
non-establishment is a defect of the characterization.

<P> It is in fact possible that even <phonemes>,

[188] NVT 58.10 *padānubhavo*, NVTP 138.9 *anubhavo* (but cf. J, A).

which are directly experienced in sequence, merge into a single recollection, but words are not also directly experienced sequentially. <S> Hence it is said, "uninterrupted..." 58.15
The meaning is: they are made the content through uninterrupted recollections; hence they are combined into a single recollection. And one should understand the uninterruptedness from the proximity of the recollections. <P> With the idea – 'Despite all of this, the characterization is simply unestablished. For it is not the case that the final word, even if it is such, is the cause of specific knowledge' – he says, "Let this be granted..." For if there is variation in each case, 58.17
there would be mutual assistance. And it is not the case that even the recollection of their meanings, as is the case with synthesizing a mass of words, varies with respect to this kind of origination of the understanding of the sentential meaning. <S> Hence he says, "This is what is meant..." 58.19-22
This is the idea: the word meanings alone, to begin, are not [138.19-140.2]
the means of knowledge for the sentential meaning, because of the undesirable consequence that one always understands it <the sentential meaning>. Nor, again, are they <the word meanings> themselves when remembered <the means of knowledge>, because of the undesirable consequence that <the word meanings> remembered in even a different way are such. Nor again are they alone <the word meanings>

when made to be recollected by the words <the means of knowledge>, because of the undesirable consequence that, as in the preceding case, there is understanding of the words, if one employs only the recollection of the word meanings. But how are they not the cause of this, when one employs the knowledge of the sentential meaning? <P> Nevertheless, what is the cause for deciding between the relationship of primary and secondary? <S> The words are the specific cause. <P> But their meanings are by no means the cause, insofar as they have the form of past, future, etc.; how are they the specific cause? <S> For this reason alone, recollection is not the operation of them <the word mean-
139.1 ings>, but rather of the words themselves made into the cause. Moreover, if one admits no variation in operation, then the admission that <word meanings>, which admit of variation in the state of non-operation, are not the cause produces great confusion.

In the phrase, "when synthesized...", he reveals that 58.24 (17.2)
<the charge of> overextension <of characterization is what>
must be refuted by the *Vārttika*, "if..." In order to reveal, 58.22
once again, its difference from success, he restates the
explanation[189] of 'establishment', "real..." <In the phrase,> 59.5

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[189] Reading *siddhivyākha* (NVTP(P) 314.5) for *siddhirvyākhyā* (NVTP 139.4)

139.5 "for the thesis statement...does not produce ascertainment", 59.8-9
what has to be supplied is: 'of that which is qualified'. By,
"because the reason statement etc. would be useless," is 59.8-9
meant: because of the undesirable consequence of useless-
ness. "The principle of being the cause" means the mode of 58.9
its activity. And it has been shown in the *Bhāṣya* that this,
"does not ...that is not known..." The 'violation' of this is 2.19-20; cf. 59.9
simply absence. <In the phrase,> "It should indeed explain 59.11
this", what has to be supplied is: 'as being principal'. The
meaning of, "And...of this specific reasoning", is: whose 59.12
content is the soul etc. Because it is an unusual figurative
usage, he states its purpose, "by using the expression 'ver- 59.14-15
bal testimony' in a figurative sense..." In the phrase, "by its 59.14
agreement on a matter", the third case affix has the sense of
instrumental cause. The cessation of doubt as to a contradic-
tion with verbal testimony is the 'assistance'. And the cf. 59.14
139.10 impression is firmly grounded, because it has the same con-
tent as does verbal testimony. The meaning of "and 59.15
becomes purposive" is: and it becomes known as purposive
– with the highest good as its purpose. <P> On what
grounds? <S> "the knowledge of matters <related by> ver- 59.15
bal testimony..." By, "because...it is commonly spoken 59.15
of", is meant: because it is perfectly well known. "Now this 59.21
<reason> statement which conveys inference" – if it should

convey the logical mark that is being realized, then it "must be assisted" – through the logical mark that is being realized – "by inference in that <the reason> is its content." The point is: but the logical mark, when being realized, is not its content.

139.15 <P> Just that logical mark, which when being seen is the content of the statement of the logical reason, is what brings inferential knowledge into being. <S> Hence he says, "And it is not the case that merely perceiving the logical 59.22
mark..." That is to say: only the inferential mark when being perceived. The meaning of, "But rather <perceiving 59.22
the logical mark> in conjunction with the recollection of the relation.", is: the inferential mark when being realized. This same point is stated; "Therefore, since the reason statement 59.23-24
does not convey inference..." The meaning is: the inferential mark that is the content of the second seeing is what conveys <inference>; a mark when being realized is not what conveys <inference>. With the idea – 'The explanation is not clear because of its close conformity to the text' – he says, "What is meant is this..." The meaning of, "And 60.3-7; 60.5
139.20 hence... that conveys this...", is: that conveys the content of this. The meaning is: now the realization of the logical mark [139.20-23]
<constitutes> inference. And this <realization> is the concomitant of the recollection of the pervasion relationship

with respect to inferential knowledge, while the second see-
ing of the mark, in turn, is the concomitant of the recollec-
tion of the pervasion relationship with respect to producing
the knowledge of the realization only; hence, both are infer-
ence because of their identity in terms of being concomi-
tants of the recollection of the <pervasion> relation. Hence,
also the inferential mark that is the content of this, and
hence also the statement of this, which is assisted by this.
<P> What is the result of this figurative usage? <S> Hence
he says, "And...thus..." 60.6-7

<P> While it ought to be said 'Because one reveals
again, on the basis of recollection, the content of percep- cf. 17.9-10
139.25 tion', why is the opposite stated? <S> Hence says, "in 60.8-10
regard to which..." The meaning is: even if the familiar
instance is the content of a prior perception, nevertheless at
the time of the <employment of an> example, it operates
only when merged with that recollection; with just such <an
idea> was it thus said. Not only is the fact of its having the
same content as perception the source of the figurative
140.1 usage, but also the fact of its having the same operation.
<Hence> He says, "'Because there is revealing once again' 60.9 (17.10)
– because there is recollecting once again." For even per-
ception – by overpowering error, causes one to recollect a
familiar instance as being the content of pervasion – "even cf. 60.10

the statement of this..."[190] He states yet another source,
"which is its basis." 60.10

<P> There is no mention at all of the word 'just as'
and its meaning in the application; then how does he say,
140.5 "'just as...so too'"? <S> Hence he says, "for, as the applica- 60.12-13 (17.13)
tion..." Even if there actually is inclusion of the specific 60.13-14
means of knowledge in the conclusion also, nevertheless
this <inclusion> is intended in the sense of kind, and there is
thus no means of knowledge different in kind from the
group of four; hence, in order at the very outset to justify the
'highest sense' by this explanation, he states the insertion of
all the <four> means of knowledge, "this same..." 60.21

<P> Because of the absence of their inherence in
their sources, their inherence will be figurative. <S> Hence
it is said, "or of the means of knowledge..." <P> Either 60.22-23
inclusion is fusion or else error is not possible. <S> Hence
he says, "'Fusion'..." With the idea – 'When the capacity is 60.23
140.10 present, it requires something else as its accessory, but the
need alone is not the capacity' – he says, "For capacity..." 60.24-25
The "property" is that of being a cause. <P> Hence by this 60.25
<consideration> is revealed the idea of one who asks, "But 17.16-17 (60.24)
what is capacity?" <S> He states the meaning of the answer,
"But in this context..." The meaning is: because between 60.25-26

[190] NVTP 140.3 *tadvacanamapi*: NVT 60.10 *tatsmārakaṃ vacanam.*

capacity and expectancy there is mutual pervasion, expectancy alone is, in this context, meant to be expressed by the word 'capacity'. Thus, by revealing collocation and capac-
ity, which are of this kind, he reveals their end, "Thus, 60.26-61.1
then..." <P> Even though their end is the same, because they are devoid of expectancy there is no single sententiality among sentences. As, for example,

> Let Bhaga distribute <boons> to you; let Pūṣan distribute <boons> to you, let Aryaman distribute <boons> to you.[191]

etc. <S> Hence it is said, "uncombined..." <P> Even if 60.26
there is expectancy, there is no single sententiality among sentences if there is no identity of end. As for example,

> I make for a you a very beautiful house; by a stream of ghee I render it favorable.[192]

etc. <S> Hence it is said, "the single purpose..." Therefore, 60.26
the characterization of single sententiality among sentences of Jaimini,

> Because there is a single meaning, a single sentence would have expectancy if it were divided.[193]

is approved by this. <P> If another person who is in error can be taught only by a sentence, then one who is in error either as regards the sentence or its meaning, by what means

[191] *Ṛgveda* 4.30.24.
[192] *Tattirīya Brāhmaṇa* 3.7.5.2.
[193] *Jaimīni Mīmāṃsā Sūtra* 1.2.46.9.

must he be taught? If <the answer is>, 'by another sentence', there is a regress. <S> Hence he says, "even if..." 61.4-7
The meaning is: this has a meaning which is not the domain of perception and verbal testimony, which are invariant. A "dilemma" is a specific restatement. Is its purpose an asser- 61.8
tion or a denial? And between these, only a denial <is appropriate> on the occasion of an objection. When he
<Uddyotakara> says, "The fact that they teach <something> 17.26
141.1 specific", he explained that it is the basis for the ratification cf. 17.25
of the true-nature; here the true-nature is what is specific. Its apprehension is the ratification. The fact of causing this is the fact of being the basis. <P> In this instance, what is spe-
cific? <S> Hence it is said, "an object as qualified by an 61.12
attribute." That is to say: for an object qualified by its *sādhana*-attribute is directly understood from a <five-membered> sentence; but <the object> qualified by the attribute of the *sādhya* <is understood> by means of that; having intended to state both of these, he spoke in a muddled way.

141.5 <P> Even if it is a distinct means of knowledge, hypothetical reasoning is actually comprehended by the word 'means of knowledge', because of the inclusion of the
particular through the universal; why then did he say, "nor is 4.15 (18.1)
it a distinct means of knowledge..."? <S> Hence he says,
"for...by the word 'means of knowledge'..." The idea is: 61.15

for it is obvious that there is no inclusion of anything and everything through a universal word for any and every cause. It is just for this reason that, as there is a doubt as to <hypothetical reasoning's> being a distinct means of knowledge, having stated that it is different from the specific <means of knowledge> that are subsumed <by the
word 'means of knowledge'>, 'object of knowledge' is cf. 61.16-17
explicitly mentioned as being a familiar instance. <In the
phrase,> "because it does not ascertain", what has to be sup- 61.18
plied is: 'independently'. The meaning of, "but, rather, in 61.22
terms of its being the cause of the differentiating of the <proper> domain for the means of knowledge.", is: because
141.10 <hypothetical reasoning> depends upon that means of knowledge, of which this <hypothetical reasoning> is the implementation in respect of its content. What is meant is this: for hypothetical reasoning might be a valid means of knowledge either in the form of valid knowledge — like seeing the logical mark, or not in the form of valid knowledge — like the sense-organs etc. Now the first <alternative> is not <correct>, because this is of the form of an unremovable imposition. Just for this reason, even the instrumental cause of this is not a valid means of knowledge, because it does not result in valid knowledge. Nor again is the second <alternative correct>: for, if there is

error as to what is pervaded by its proper content, its validity as a means of knowledge is in doubt. And it <hypothetical reasoning> does not have a restrictive connection with this. There is the <defect of> over-extension <of characterization> in <asserting> that what is not connected is what makes known. But the reverse of this has an intrinsic connection with this. Therefore, the activity of what is joined with this alone is the implementation of this. For we do not consider the fact that <a hypothetical reasoning> which does not result in error is successful in some respect an undesirable consequence.

<P> Therefore on this reasoning, even a valid means of knowledge by itself is not successful in any respect at all. And if this is the case, the validity as a means of knowledge[194] would result in nothing but a mass of undesirable consequences and errors. <S> This is so, because in all respects only <a valid means of knowledge> together with its implementation is the instrumental cause. But this distinction holds on the hypothesis of the relationship of implementation and what possesses it. He will say the same thing, "because in itself it is not a cause, insofar as it is dependent 62.4-5
in that it has the form of being an undesirable consequence."[195] The 'inappropriateness' of the undesirable con-

[194] Reading *prāmāṇyam* for *pramāṇyam* (NVTP 141.18).

sequence to be produced is its undesirableness in terms of contradicting a valid means of knowledge. The 'appropriateness' of what has to be established is its desirability in terms of not contradicting a valid means of knowledge.
Therefore, this is the meaning of the <sentence in the> *Vārt-* (18.4-5)
*tika*: if it were not so, then it would thus forfeit its appropriateness; and this would assume inappropriateness. Hence he
says, "by the particle '*iti*'..." Hence, there is no contradic- 61.24
tion between the <sentence in the> *Vārttika* and the explanation in the form of an undesirable consequence. But the
<passage in the> *Bhāṣya* concerning undesirable conse- cf. 4.16-22
quence is quite clear. <P> If <the appropriateness of the
141.25 *sādhanīya*> is ascertained <thus by hypothetical reasoning>, 'It is', actually prior to the operation of a means of knowledge, then hypothetical reasoning would in fact be a
means of knowledge. <S> Hence he says, "is possible..." 61.25-62.1
And here 'possibility' is merely non-contradiction, but it is not doubt, because even that of which a part is inappropriate
142.1 is the basis of doubt. And this alone is the 'approval': that it cf. 62.2 (18.5)
abides in conformity with the operative means of knowl-
edge. Thus he says, "What is meant is this..." The meaning 62.1 ff.
of "approving" is: not causing a contradiction — in the form 62.2

[195] NVTP 141.20 *prasaṅgarūpatayā*: NVT 62.5 *prasaṅgatayā*; NVTP 141.20 *sādhakatvād*: NVT 62.5 *sādhanatvād*.

of excluding an attribute that contradicts that. The meaning
of "assists" is: makes it operative. <P> Having a concern as 62.2-3
to an error – 'By virtue of its conformity with the means of
knowledge that has this as its content, even hypothetical
reasoning concerns this' — <S> he refutes <it>, "Nor..." 62.3-5
The meaning of "insofar as it is dependent" is: insofar as it 62.5
is dependent on error. Simply by revealing that its form is
142.5 that of imposition, he denies that is a valid means of knowl-
edge by means of its own proper content also, "For...is..." 62.5
The meaning of, "an undesirable consequence is not a logi- 62.5
cal reason", is: a logical reason that is being produced as an
undesirable consequence is not a logical mark because it is
unestablished. <P> For there is no rule: whatever exists is
seen. <S> Hence he says, "together with it." Therefore, a 62.7
means of knowledge is shown as having to be assisted by
hypothetical reasoning by means of its result, 'Is not'. A
means of knowledge which is approved by this operates
<and> produces its end. He states the end, "There is only 62.8
this..." Because of the difference of opinion as to the intrin-
sic nature of 'only-ness'[196], he explains this, "there is
no...here." 62.8-9

142.10 Therefore, by thus revealing that hypothetical rea-
soning <applies> even to perception which has as its con-

[196] *kaivalyam*: see ŚṬ 58.30-59.2.

tent what does not exist, he refutes the doctrine of the
Buddhists: that what does not exist has to be established
through an inference, whose logical mark is non-apprehen-
sion. <The doctrine that is> Pleasing <is>: because non- [142.11-16]
apprehension, in turn, lacks fixity, inasmuch as it has to be
established by another inference as it is of the nature of
negation, and because it does not serve to make known if it
is not established; but because there is no scope for infer-
ence if this is established on the basis of perception, because
even normal usage operates in accordance with judgements,
because it <inference> is established on the basis of percep-
tion alone. Otherwise, an inference, whose logical mark is
apprehension, would have to be resorted to even for the sake
of the normal usage of assertion. And thus again there is in
fact a regress. For not even a logical mark, if it is not in fact
142.15 normally employed, could bring inferential knowledge into
being. Therefore, just as is the case with the ordinary usage
of assertion, so too is the normal usage of negation estab-
lished solely by perception. But hypothetical reasoning is to
be applied by the examiners, as an accessory, with regard to
a man in error. He states a hypothetical reasoning that is an
accessory of scripture, "In the same way – heaven..." The 62.9ff
meaning is: in the phrase, "Let him...perform sacrifice", [142.17-20] 62.9
because it is conveyed by the same word and because <it is>

what is to be brought into being, let the meaning of the root be what has to be effected, or let it be heaven, because it is a human end; hence there is manifestation of hypothetical reasoning in respect of doubt. If the meaning of the root should be what has to be effected, then the instructor is the reliable authority, and the injunction is the means to what is desired, the sentence is what states this <means to what is desired>, and there would be no activity on the part of pru-
142.20 dent men. And all of this is established on the basis of a means of knowledge. He states a means of knowledge being
approved <by hypothetical reasoning>, "by the same 62.10
word..." The meaning is: for, if the effecting of a sacrifice has the result of <obtaining> heaven <and> the meaning of the root does not have this result, then there is no contradiction whatsoever between their having been conveyed by the same word and their having to be brought into existence. Therefore, as there is no contradiction between them, that the end is heaven is appropriate. And it is inappropriate that the root meaning is what has to be effected, as this is contradicted.

<P> On the basis of what distinction <does he main-
tain>: 'Hypothetical reasoning makes one discriminate what cf. 18.3-5
is appropriate and what is inappropriate in order to assist a means of knowledge, but it does not ascertain <the

142.25 object>'? <S> Hence he says, "And it is not the case that..." 62.12-14
The meaning of, "Incompletion of the action...", is: as for 62.13
'incompletion of the action', what is meant to be expressed
by the word "incompletion of the action" is only 'the exist-
ence of a pot' and 'the fact that <it> has to be effected
through the meaning of the root' — which are established
by the cognition; for neither the pot nor the meaning of the
143.1 root, insofar as it is what has to be effected, are the content
of a cognition of this kind. <P> What is the upshot if this is
so? <S> Hence he says, "that on the basis of which..." The 62.13-14
meaning is: that basis on which hypothetical reasoning –
which is endowed with a logical reason that yields an unde-
sirable consequence — whether as being suitable for an
equal cognition or as being pain, will be what establishes
the ascertainment of the proper and improper content – does
not exist at all. The meaning is: hence by this are revealed
both the non-establishment of the basis and the non-estab-
lishment of the means for what is being undesirably
attached; but the non-establishment of its intrinsic nature
was already revealed. Therefore, it is not a means of knowl-
edge, with respect to its own content, because it is an impo-
143.5 sition, and because it does not limit with respect to the
contrary of what is pervaded by its own content. But with
respect to its requiring a contrary, whose own content is

restricted and connected, it is not a means of knowledge because it is dependent. <P> Therefore, to what end is there employment of this? <S> Hence he says, "But for the sake 62.14-15
of ascertainment..."

<P> The *Mīmāṃsā* doctrine of non-difference <of hypothetical reasoning> from the *Veda*, contradicts the difference between hypothetical reasoning and the means of knowledge you maintain. <S> Hence he says, "a means of 62.19
knowledge..." <P> But then why will the meaning of the *Vārttika* not be exactly literal? <S> Hence he says, "is its 62.20
143.10 implementation..." The purport of this explanation, "as 62.25
qualified by a body", is: because the semen, blood, etc. of the bodily organs are the effects of such elements as food etc., and because cognition and feeling are the effects of these, there is no means of knowledge for another instrumental cause. As regards the *sādhya*, 'the fact that they have diverse instrumental causes', the logical reason, 'because it admits of difference', would be variant in the sense of its intrinsic nature, because even pots etc., which admit of difference by their intrinsic nature, do not have manifold instrumental causes; hence he explains <this> in the sense of mode, "The meaning is 'because it is manifold'." The 63.2
meaning is: because they come into being manifoldly.

143.15 <P> If one establishes the manifoldness of the

instrumental cause and nothing more, <this> is establishing what is established; for one does not establish merit and demerit by this <consideration> alone, 'There is some[197] manifold instrumental cause': but neither a positive nor a negative concomitance <of merit and demerit is used> in establishing a manifold instrumental cause, namely merit
and demerit. <S> Hence, he says, "Having stated the means 63.3
of knowledge..." The meaning is: if the instrumental cause [143.17-22]
is manifold, the undesirable consequence[198] is that rebirth cf. 18.12-13
is manifold; if the instrumental cause is not manifold, the undesirable result is that rebirth is not manifold. If sacrifices etc. alone are the instrumental cause, there is the undesirable consequence of an effect coming into existence from <an instrumental cause> which is destroyed without any
offspring. If the instrumental cause is fixed, the undesirable cf. 18.12
consequence is that the effect is eternal. If <the instrumental cause> is not 'of one substance', the undesirable conse-
143.20 quence is that it is common to prosperity. Even if <it is> of one common substance, the same fault <occurs>. The inference as to manifoldness, that operates by dint of the universal pervasion relationship <and> which is being assisted by these hypothetical reasonings that operate in dependence on

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[197] Reading *kiñcit* for *kiścit* (NVTP 143.15): see NVTP(P) 336.5.
[198] Reading *prasaṅgaḥ* for *grasaṅgaḥ* (NVTP 143.15).

subject-attributeness, by overpowering a particular contra-
diction effects the particular that is maintained.

<P> <Wondering> Why ascertainment is not in fact cf. 63.23
<their> end by its nature, whereby he asks the specific time,
"But when...?" <S> Hence he states the 'intention': "Let 63.23; 63.25
this be granted..." <P> Whereas the purpose of explicitly (18.16-17)
mentioning 'ascertainment' ought be stated, what is the pur-
144.1 port in the reoccurrence of hypothetical reasoning, whose
purpose has been ascertained? <S> Hence he says, "taken 63.25
together..." The meaning is: the invariable relation between
the two is what is meant to be expressed by 'taking
together'.

In the <phrase>, "both <discussants> state both 64.6
establishment and refutation corresponding to their respec-
tive established doctrines", 'for his own *sādhya* and one's
opponent's *sādhya*' <is to be supplied> respectively. <P>
Even if there really is no 'resultancy in ascertainment' in 5.4-5 (cf. 18.25)
every instance of arguing, because, even if in some case
there is no ascertainment, there is sundering of philosophi-
144.5 cal discourse due to human error, nevertheless when there is
'resultancy in ascertainment' it is not from this that discus-
sion can be differentiated from arguing, insofar as 'it results
in the ascertainment of one of the two positions'. Nor is
there pervasion of all discussion, because ascertainment is

the end of discussion; and because the end is that which
does not pervade the means. <S> Hence he says, "For...in a 64.14-15
discussion..." For its resulting in ascertainment is its
intended suitability. And this <suitability> is activity in ref-
erence to this <discussion>, insofar as two opponents in a
discussion are eager to know the true-nature. This same
point is stated: "because the requirement is that 'both dis- 64.15
cussants in a discussion desire to know the true-nature'."
144.10 Therefore, this is the meaning: in reference to the ascertain-
ment of the true-nature, the aggregate of establishing and
objecting statements of two <discussants> is 'discussion'.
And hence, there in neither underextension nor over-exten-
sion <of characterization>.

<P> But what sort of thing is arguing? <S> Hence
he says, "But in arguing..." In the phrase, "personal abili- 64.15-16; 64.15
ties", he states the aim. Therefore this is the meaning: let it
be assumed that there is ascertainment of the true-nature in
some cases,[199] even on the basis of arguing. Nevertheless,
that is not to be aimed at nor to be believed. The aim is noth-
ing but the declaring of one's own ability and an opponent's
lack of ability. The meaning of, "Therefore...because it 64.16-17
results in the ascertainment of some one <position>", is:
144.15 with the intention of resulting in ascertainment.

[199] Reading *kvacij* (NVTP(P) 341.3) for *kvacita* (NVTP 144.13).

<P> If both arguing and captiousness are different species of discussion, <then> how is there exclusive co-mention of the universal and particular, and how do two mutually contradictory things stand in the relation of universal and particular?[200] <S> Hence he says, "are differen- 64.21
tiated from..." He states yet another cause of difference, "discussion." What has to be supplied is: 'arguing and cap- 64.23
tiousness'. Previously, on the occasion of explaining discussion, the cause for the difference, the idea being a difference in aim, was stated; in reference to this <it is said>, "yet 64.27
another..." The meaning is: any two users of discussion and
144.20 arguing mutually differentiate discussion and arguing, which are differentiated through, in the one case, no desire for victory, and in the other, a desire for victory.

What has to be supplied is, 'In order that he object to the explanation of an *ekadeśin*, he explains it according to his doctrine'. "because there is variation in both directions." 65.9
Even if the invariable concomitance is not established even if one does not see the variance, because the separate mention <of arguing and captiousness from discussion> depends on human desire, and because, if there is no arising of their being 'what has to be objected to in a discussion', cf. 65.11 (5.8-9)

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[200] See ŚṬ 60.19-26 on *parisaṅkhyāsamabhivyavahāraḥ* (NVTP 144.16).

they are employed as the cause of a contradiction to the
145.1 apprehension of the true-nature, nevertheless because the
variance is obvious, this alone has been revealed. Therefore,
by this <phrase>, "They will have to be objected to in dis- 5.8-9
cussion," what has been taught is merely the purpose for
<their> separate mention. The meaning is: but their being
the cause, which was by no means intended,[201] was
imposed by an *ekadeśin* who is a self-styled logician.<P>
How can there even be the comprehension of this type of
purpose? For it is not possible to infer 'mere separate men-
tion' here. <S> Hence he says, "the general rule..." The 65.15
145.5 meaning is: by stating specifically what was stated in a gen-
eral way, Akṣapāda indicated a specific purpose. This same
<specific purpose> has been revealed by Pakṣilasvāmin.
<P> But then, if this alone was what Akṣapāda meant to say,
then why, pray, did he himself not reveal it in any part what-
soever of the *śāstra*? <S> Hence he says, "Precisely..." <P> 65.18
But then why was this inferred by Pakṣilasvāmin? <S>
Hence he says, "thus..." The meaning of, "Why even on 65.18-20; 65.21-22
this distinction...", is: what is the end served by teaching
this? <P> Later on he will teach that 'they have, in fact, to 19.15 ff
objected to in discussion'; but here he describes the fact that
'their purpose is to make known the difference in bases cf. 65.22 (19.21)

[201] Reading *avivakṣitam* for *avivarkṣitam* (NVTP 145.2).

among the branches of science'. How then is there no con-
145.10 tradiction? <S> Hence he says, "Discussion, arguing, and 65.22-23
captiousness..." He says that the *Vārttika* points to the very
same meaning, "For the same reason..." This is the mean- 65.23-24
ing: if discussion etc. are not intended to be expressed by
him by the word 'branch of science', how is it that, having
revealed the operation of discussion subsequently, he stated
all the grounds for defeat as being the operation of arguing
and captiousness? Therefore, just what he himself says, that
surely is the meaning he intends to express. Therefore, this
is a summary of the purport: now discussion etc., the differ-
ences of whose operation and end are as unknown as are
their intrinsic natures, cannot be settled by a rational being.
And there is no establishing the end from things that are not
145.15 settled. Therefore, even the differences in the operation and
end of those must, as is the case with their intrinsic nature,
be taught. For this same reason, Akapāda will reveal their
end also in the fourth <book>. NS.4.2.50-51

By "were employed..." is meant 'were conceived'. 65.25
"but there is" – is possible – "no <such> employment of 65.25-26
them..." <P> The intrinsic nature of an entity is not made
ratified by its characteristic property, but rather when rati-
fied is made known <by its characteristic property>. How,
then, is there 'dependency on a characteristic property'? cf. 20.5

<S> Hence he says, "A 'characteristic property' is that by which a thing is characterized." <P> If having to be 66.5

145.20 objected to in a discussion is conveyed solely by their separate mention, then how, if there is no separate mention of <the pseudo-reasons of> deficient, excessive, and non-established doctrine, does one understand that they have to be objected to in this <discussion>? But, on the other hand, if this is understood for them in some other way, then let the same mode hold good for pseudo-reasons also; there is no need for separate mention. <S> Hence he says, "And...of 66.14-16

the pseudo-reasons also..." This is the idea: for it is not the case that, simply because pseudo-reasons are separately mentioned, one understands that they have to be objected to in discussion. But, rather, because discussion is the <kind of> discourse for one eager to apprehend the true-nature, and if one does not generate pseudo-reasons, they must necessarily be generated by one who desires to understand the true-nature – because "they are in conflict with the appre- 66.15

145.25 hension of the true-nature." Otherwise, discussion would forfeit its status as discussion; and the non-production of pseudo-reasons is in conflict with the apprehension of the

146.1 true-nature. And this same <line of> reasoning has been specifically indicated by Akṣapāda through his separate mention <of them>. And this is the same for deficient etc.

And it being thus established, since even the question of Uddyotakara is not irrelevant, he says, "He asks about 66.17
them." <P> If arguing and captiousness appear for the sake of teaching the true-nature, what is the use of generating such <grounds for defeat as> non-comprehension etc.? But if these two do not have this purpose, then what good is served by their appearance? And if they have another purpose, these two should not be taught by this *śāstra*. <S>
Hence he says, "for an egotistical..."[202] The meaning is: 66.18-20
146.5 because this egotistical person has no fitness for apprehending the true-nature, the purpose in teaching the true-nature of these two is nothing other than the cutting down of his egotism; and this <cutting down> could not occur without producing such <grounds for defeat> as non-comprehension etc. Therefore, this <production of non-comprehension> must indeed be performed by one who desires to teach the true-nature.

<P> The thorough knowledge of <the categories of> deceit etc. is not directly employed for <the attainment of> the highest good, as <is the thorough knowledge of> the soul etc. Nor again, like a means of knowledge, <is it directly employed> by way of ratifying that <highest good>. Nor again <is it directly employed>, as is doubt etc.,

[202] V has *hi* NVTP 146.4, not found in NVT 66.18.

as being an element of reasoning. Nor is the thorough knowledge by itself the aim, because it is not a human end.
<S> Hence he says, "and the end of the thorough knowl- 66.22-23
edge <of them> is stated..."[203] The meaning is: the thorough knowledge of them is useful towards <the attainment of> the highest good, by virtue of purifying the accessories of the three philosophical discourses which are the means to apprehending[204] the true-nature. <P> Because the passage
<in the *Bhāṣya*>, "and its employment is in itself simple," is 5.12
patently obvious, the question as to the intrinsic nature of
this, "What is meant by...?", is incoherent. <S> Hence he 20.22-23
fills out <the explanation>, "by this <sentence in the> 67.1-5
*Bhāṣya*..."

With the idea – 'The statement in the *Bhāṣya* of another purpose <for the *śāstra*> does not contradict the
purpose stated by Akṣapāda, but, rather, really corresponds NS.1.1.1
with this' – he restates the end <stated in> the *sūtra*,
"Akṣapāda..." But the correspondence <arises> through 67.6
displaying the pervasion relationship. For it is not possible that <a thing be> both a human end and not have a means of knowledge as its cause. Therefore this is the meaning of the *Bhāṣya*: because every purpose for prudent men is based on

[203] NVTP 146.9 adds *ca*.
[204] Reading *pratipatty* for *pratipaty* (NVTP 146.9).

the means of knowledge, which must be taught by analytics, hence there is no concern whatsoever as to error with respect to the fact that the highest good, which is the highest human end, is based on them <the means of knowledge>, because of the undesirable consequence that there is forfeiture of its state as a human end if it is not based on them.
This same point is stated: "that...is indeed not..." <P> To 67.7-8
begin with, there is in fact normal usage of the means of knowledge in the other <branches of science>, because of the undesirable consequence that there is extirpation of the customary use of <the means of knowledge> in those <branches of science> other than this. But if the customary usage of means of knowledge really exists, <then> what in them has to be illumined by analytics? Because <it> has
146.20 been illumined by these same means of knowledge. <S>
Hence he says, "Even if..." The meaning is: there is ordi- 67.9-12
nary usage, as explained <by analytics>, there <in the other branches of science> of the means of knowledge etc.; the explanation of them is from this <analytics> only, but not from them.

<P> The dependence on the hearing of the author cf. 67.9
and the means of knowledge is the same even in analytics; hence, there is no difference <of it> from another branch of science. <S> Hence he says, "but...do not....the means of 67.10

knowledge." The meaning is: even if dependence on the
means of knowledge is the same — as, for example, they
<the other branches of science> depend upon what has to be
explained by them; it is not thus the case that this <analyt-
ics> has, in turn, to be explained by them. <P> Even if there
is identity as to their being dependent, where indeed does
one experience the mutual relationship of 'what has to be
depended upon' and 'what depends on it'? <S> Hence he
146.25 says, "As, for example..." With the intention — 'For per- 67.10-12 [146.25
ception etc. also depend upon another means of knowledge -147.2]
in order to ratify their own state of being valid means of
knowledge. Inference too <depends upon another means of
knowledge> for its own existence. Nevertheless, inference
operates on its proper domain in dependence only on per-
ception etc. But perception etc. <does not operate on its
147.1 proper domain> in dependence on inference, which is
<itself> dependent <on them>, but rather on <yet> another
inference which explains its own validity as means of
knowledge. But this <does> not <occur> right then, but
rather beforehand' – he says, "does not right then...the con- 67.11
tent of perception...", in order to refute the need of <some-
thing> similar in kind that has to be explained. By "the 67.11
content of perception" is meant 'the content in the form of
perception etc.' "that which assists the branches of science" 67.11-12 (21.7-8)

are the means of knowledge etc. Of this there is "explicit 67.11-12
mention" by the *Vārttika*, "the other branches of science 67.11-12; 21.6
teach a subject matter that has been illumined by the means
147.5 of knowledge."[205] What is meant is this: the explicit men-
tion of 'means of knowledge etc.' in the *Vārttika* is for the
sake of realizing the statement in the *Bhāṣya* that 'it <ana- cf. 5.14
lytics> is the illuminator of the branches of science'. But
not independently. Hence, there is no contradiction. Having
thus revealed 'requirement' in its intrinsic nature, the
requirement residing in the content is revealed by Pakṣilas-
vāmin, "the means..." In order to set out the grammatical 5.14
construction of the <sentence in the> *Vārttika* on this, he
explains <it> "Now..." 67.12-15

<P> Because the other branches of science are
means of knowledge, insofar as they consist of verbal testi-
mony, and this <validity as a means of knowledge> is not
needed in respect of what they themselves must convey;
147.10 what will analytics accomplish here? <S> Hence he says,
"For there is only..." The meaning is: a real means of 67.14-17
knowledge has no need for another means of knowledge
with respect to what it itself has to convey; but there is also
<not> no need for hypothetical reasoning which is its own

[205] NVTP adds *ādi* (147.4) and glosses *kurvanti* (NV 21.6) by *pratipādyante* (147.4).

implementation. And this <hypothetical reasoning> has to be grasped through analytics.

<P> But what would happen for one who does not require hypothetical reasoning? <S> Hence he says, "let 67.15-17
there be no..." By the explicit mention of "etc." one has to 67.17
realize such <statements> as,

> The couch of leaves is the sacrificial sponsor.[206]

etc. And that hypothetical reasoning does not appear unless there is doubt is also revealed in the summary. Even if
147.15 "examination" is nothing but the operation of the means of 67.17
knowledge accompanied by hypothetical reasoning, nevertheless here according to the maxim, 'cattle and bull', because the means of knowledge is expressed by its own word, what are meant to be expressed are purpose, the
desire to know, and hypothetical reasoning alone. By 'The cf. 67.17
introduction of...the means of knowledge'[207] is meant
'operation'. The "way" of this is non-contradiction. "once 67.17; 67.17
one has ascertained" – either from another means of knowledge or simply from the encomium – "the true-nature of its meaning" – either the true-nature of the word meaning or the true-nature of the sentence meaning. The meaning of,
"he should thus enter upon the Vedic science," is: in the 67.17

[206] Of unknown provenance.
[207] NVTP 147.16 *nirveśa*: NVT 67.17 *viniveśa*.

form of injunctions and prohibitions. And thus, in political science, for example, <such statements> as,

> Yama is king, or Kubera is king.[208]

<and> in agriculture,

> Land that is made to be ploughed in <the month> of *Māgha* yields a crop of gold.[209]

etc. are rendered fruitless without recourse to hypothetical reasoning. Therefore, since there is need for this <hypothetical reasoning> even here, he extends its scope, "This same 67.18
line..." Even in the statement, "what has to be supplied is 67.19-20
'as their domain'", what has to be supplied is: 'as being what has to be enjoined <and> as being what has to be prohibited'.

Now he states the requirement that resides in the operation, according to the doctrine of the *Bhāṣya*, "More- 67.20-21 (5.14)
over..." <The requirement relating to the operation is:> For substance, for example, <in the *Veda*>

> He makes an oblation with coagulated milk...etc.[210]

For quality, for example,

> He purchases *Soma* for a ruddy <cow> ...etc.[211]

For action, for example,

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[208] NB 2.2.62 (TNT 664.2).
[209] Unknown provenance.
[210] *Śābarabhāṣya* to JMS 2.2.13 (III.48.5).
[211] *Śābarabhāṣya* to JMS 3.3.11 (IV.214.2).

He threshes the rice grains...etc.[212]

Also in political science, for substance, for example,

The ruler, ministers, ... etc.[213]

For quality, for example,

Peace, hostility...etc.[214]

For action, for example,

Knowledge of weapons, elephant and horse <drawn> vehicles...etc.[215]

Also in agriculture, for substance, for example,

One should gather seed according to the proper season...etc.[216]

For quality, for example,

One should flood the land, one should parch the land...etc.[217]

For action, for example,

When desiring to lead to another place, one should address a tree... etc.[218]

Having revealed the content, he states a doubt,
"Therefore, should...?" And the cause of the doubt is the 67.21-68.1
co-mention of an injunction word with this word. For its own word, co-mentioned with an injunction word, which meets the requirement, is not the content of the injunction.

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[212] Cf. *Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa* 3.2.5.6.
[213] Cf. *Arthaśāstra* 6.1.1.
[214] Cf. *Manusmṛti* 7.109.
[215] Unknown provenance.
[216] Unknown provenance.
[217] Unknown provenance.
[218] Unknown provenance.

And the *Agnihotra*, which is just such, is the content of this <injunction>. Just by revealing the opponent's view – 'Hence, as regards the *sādhya* there is a doubt; should heaven, which is the content of such injunctions as the *Agni-hotra* etc., because the word is co-mentioned with an injunction word be like that which meets the requirement or
not?' – he states an undesirable consequence of it, "Between 67.22
these, if..." And it should not be objected: <P> 'Let that violence, which is to be produced in <the course of such sacrifices as> the *Śyena* etc., actually be a good, because it has been enjoined. What is the harm?' That is to say: for an injunction that serves to prompt by its own knowledge,
148.20 without as it were desire, is what gives rise to effort. And this effort, which has the 'to be effected element' as its content, cannot be accomplished. For the means is the content of effort, but not the end. Therefore, because they are the content of effort, the means <of accomplishing> and the implementation alone are enjoined, but not the *sādhya*, because it is not the content of this. For to be an injunction is not merely to be that-which makes known, but rather to be that which makes known the content of desire and effort. Therefore, it was well said: 'The harm to be effected in <the course of such sacrifices as> the *Śyena* etc., which is in fact harmful, would be a good if it were the content of the

injunction'. <S> He removes the objection: 'To what end,
148.25 therefore, is the co-mention of the *sādhya*-word – which merely reveals the means of knowledge for the established doctrine – used?', <by saying>, "But if,...the 'to be 67.23-26
effected' element..." The meaning is: for the fact of admitting what is desired cannot be understood unless one understands what is desired. And, if this itself is not operative, it does not prompt to activity. Hence, this is a restatement of what is desired, in order that this <admission of what is desired> be differentiated.

149.1 <P> By <saying> only this much, 'But if now this is cf 67.24-26
not enjoined?', is there harm?' <S> He denies this, "One 67.25
should harm..." <P> Let it be so. Nevertheless, what scope
is there for analytics? <S> Hence he says, "Thus in this 67.26
case..." He states another content, "Likewise..." As, for 67.26-68.1
example, the *Āmīkṣā*[219] is what prompts <to action>, because there is identity of taste etc., because of the insertion of this in the place of a milk oblation; the *Vājina* does not prompt, because it has an origination that is inevitable.
By the explicit mention of the word "etc." are subsumed 68.1
such things as the loss of the oblation, the distribution, the
149.5 remainder, etc. Since in the phrase, "all the branches of sci- 21.7-8

[219] Reading *āmīkṣā* for *ābhikhyā* (NVTP 149.3). See JMS 4.1.23 and *Śābarabhāṣya* (V.19-21).

ence", by the word 'branch of science' he characterizes their *dharmas*, hence, there is no contradiction between the explanation <in the *Vārttika*> and <that in> the *Bhāṣya*. <In the phrase,> "But Uddyotakara...", what has to be supplied 68.3
is: 'meaning to express that the *dharmas* are dependent on the branches of science'. "The undesirable consequence of 68.8
there being a mixture..." – of the end. The meaning is: moreover, this has an end only due to the end of another branch of science; but there is no unique end for this. In order to show that there is no mixture, he first states the unique end of these same <branches of science>, "the other 68.9-11
branches of science..." He <next> states the unique end of this <analytics>, "But in this..." With the idea – 'Let there 68.11-12
be no contradiction of the use <of the means on knowledge etc.> which have been taught by this <analytics> in the
149.10 other <sciences>' – he says, "even if means of knowledge 68.11-12
etc. are common..." By this the following is meant: that which even the ends of other branches of science attain to in analytics, that is itself the establishment of its heat. But as cf. 5.14
for the principal end of this, this is not mixed at all with the other branches of science, because it is impossible.

"discussion etc...." <This is> A *bahuvrīhi* <com- 68.14-16
pound> in which one understands what is not their quality, because discussion does not operate for the sake of defeat-

ing one's opponent. The connection is: for arguing etc. are the cause of pride etc., because they are a means to victory over one's opponent, as is the case with success in substance or body. He now states that this <argument> is thus contra-
149.15 dicted in the following way, "thus...arguing etc..." This is 68.18-19
the idea: now arguing and captiousness have no eligibility for one who has to be taught. But, rather, their eligibility is for the sake of safeguarding the apprehension of the true-nature for one who understands, and for the sake of teaching a very arrogant man. And the cutting down of the egotism of one's opponent is in fact contradictory to pride, conceit, etc., because these are specific faults; and because the cutting down of egotism is in the form of suppressing these <faults>. And it is not the case that <this> inference <arises> through the mere <fact> that they have to be expressed by words, which are means to the defeat of an opponent, because of the undesirable result that speech etc. also has horns.

148.20 <P> Let this be granted. <However:> Let their being the cause of pride, conceit, etc., not be established from 'their being a means of defeating the opponent' as the logical reason, but rather let it be established from positive and negative concomitance alone. <S> Hence he says, "and as 68.19-20
'being the cause[220] of pride, conceit, etc.' is a non-estab-

lished logical reason..." By saying, "yet when it is present, 21.25
those who know its true-nature cannot...",[221] he also suggests that the fact of being a means to defeating one's opponent is, in its literal form, indeed variant. Hence, even if conceit etc. are seen to belong even to those who know the true-nature of arguing etc., they <delusion etc.> are not caused by that <arguing etc.>, but rather they are actually caused by a strong false knowledge. Hence, the purpose of
149.25 the example of *Sanaka* etc. With the idea – 'And this is cf. 21.25
clear' – he says, "He summarizes..." 68.20-21

[220] NVTP 149.21 *hetu*: NVT 68.19 *nimitta*.
[221] NVTP 149.22 *sambhavanti*; NV 21.25 *bhavanti*.

## ERRATA IN THAKUR'S *Nyāyadarśana*

| | Error | Correction |
|---|---|---|
| Nyāyabhāṣya | | |
| 3.9 | parikṣyate | parīkṣyate |
| 4.12 | vādalajalpavitaṇḍā | vādajalpavitaṇḍāḥ |
| 4.12 | pravante | pravartante |
| 5.12 | pareṇapra yujyamāṇāyāḥ | pareṇa prayujyamāṇāyāḥ |
| Nyāyavārttika | | |
| 6.17 | duhkham | duḥkham |
| 7.17 | pravṛttisāmartham | pravṛttisāmarthyam |
| 7.21 | pravṛttorvā | pravṛttyorvā |
| 9.6 | °palabdhi hetutvāt | °palabdhihetutvāt |
| 9.8 | nendiyarthārtha° | nendriyārtha° |
| 10.10 | °śeṣayur° | °śeṣapur° |
| 11.13 | ca...pramāṇe | **ca...pramāṇe** |
| 11.14 | bhavanti | **bhavanti** |
| 11.18 | abhisaṃvadhyate | abhisaṃbadhyate |
| 12.2-3 | pratiṣiddhamānas | pratiṣiddhyamānas |
| 13.5 | pramāṇādiyo | pramāṇādayo |
| 13.6 | vadarāṇi | badarāṇi |
| 13.26 | vihitatvad | vihitatvād |
| 14.1 | catvāryartha° | **catvāryartha°** |
| 14.9-10 | antareṇa...syāt | **antareṇa...syāt** |
| 14.20-21 | sa...ucyate | **sa...ucyate** |
| 16.3 | kiṃ prayoja° | kiṃprayoja° |
| 16.10-11 | pratipadyate...pakṣaḥ | **pratipadyate...pakṣaḥ** |
| 16.11 | atha na pratipadyate | **atha na pratipadyate** |
| 16.16-17 | tasmin...syātām | **tasmin...syātām** |
| 17.1 | athāvayavayavāḥ | athāvayavāḥ |
| 17.3 | siddhiḥ parisamāpyata | **siddhiḥ parisamāpyata** |
| 20.18 | chala...paryanuyogaḥ | **chala...paryanuyogaḥ** |
| 20.19 | jātestu | **jātestu** |
| 20.19 | **ca** | ca |
| 20.22 | svayaṃ ca sukaraḥ prayoga | **svayaṃ ca sukaraḥ prayoga** |

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| 23.9 | abhisaṃbandhavākyam | **abhisaṃbandhavākyam** |
| 23.10 | tasya | **tasya** |
| 24.3 | jvahara° | jvarahara° |
| 25.23 | śāstraṃ...abhidhatte | **śāstraṃ...abhidhatte** |
| 26.3 | pratyakṣānumānādhigati° | **pratyakṣānumānādhigati°** |
| 26.7 | ādhyāmikī śaktiḥ | **ādhyāmikī śaktiḥ** |
| 26.7 | puruṣe° | **puruṣe°** |
| 26.15-16 | yadendriyādyapekṣante | **yadendriyādyapekṣante** |
| 26.16 | tadā pratyakṣeṇa | **tadā pratyakṣeṇa** |
| 26.20 | adṛṣṭaṃ | **adṛṣṭaṃ** |
| 27.3 | śarīraṃ duḥkhāyatanam | **śarīraṃ duḥkhā**yatanam |
| 27.5 | viṣayā | **viṣayā** |
| 27.5 | buddhayaśca | **buddhayaśca** |
| 28.1 | puruṣabhedo | **puruṣabhedo** |
| 28.2 | pravṛttir | **pravṛttir** |
| 28.2 | ekarūpaiva | **ekarūpai**va |
| 28.2 | pravṛttir | **pravṛttir** |
| 28.2 | dvirūpetyutkam | **dvirūpe**tyutkam |
| 28.13 | pravṛttiḥ | **pravṛttiḥ** |
| 28.15 | samarthā | **samarthā** |
| 28.25 | yadi...arthapratipattiḥ | **yadi...arthapratipattiḥ** |
| 28.26 | rvini° | vini° |
| 28.26 | pravṛtti...pratipadyate | **pravṛtti...pratipadyate** |
| 30.14 | anāditā° | **anāditā°** |
| 30.25-31.1 | anutpāde...pratyakṣeṇeti | **anutpāde...pratyakṣeṇeti** |
| 31.15 | lokavṛttam | **lokavṛttam** |
| 31.16-17 | sarvaḥ...pramāṇenā° | **sarvaḥ...pramāṇenā°** |
| 31.17 | °ārtham...upalabhata | **°ārtham...upalabhata** |
| 31.18 | vākyena | **vākyena** |
| 31.18 | °ānudyate | **°ānudyate** |
| 31.20 | pramāṇato 'rthapratipattāv° | **pramāṇato 'rthapratipattāv°** |
| 31.20 | etadvāttika° | etadvārttika° |
| 31.26 | pramāṇādicaturvarge | **pramāṇādicaturvarge** |
| 31.26-27 | pramāṇasya...darśanārtham | **pramāṇasya...darśanārtham** |
| 32.2-3 | pramāṇato 'rthapratipattau | **pramāṇato 'rthapratipattau** |
| 32.11 | tatrā° | **tatrā°** |
| 32.14 | °ābhidhānaṃ...ceti | **°ābhidhānaṃ...ceti** |
| 32.22 | artham | **artham** |
| 32.23 | sādhayatīti sādhakatamatvāt | **sādhayatī**ti **sādhakatamatvāt** |
| 34.4 | adhigatam...piṣṭaṃ | **adhigatam...piṣṭaṃ** |
| 34.5 | syād | **syād** |
| 34.6 | abhisandhi | abhisandhiḥ |
| 34.6 | prekṣāvantiḥ | prekṣāvanti |
| 35.11 | arthasabandhaḥ | arthasaṃbandhaḥ |
| 35.16 | aprāmāṇyamameva | aprāmāṇyameva |

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| 35.26 | upalabdhi...pramāṇatvam | **upalabdhi...pramāṇatvam** |
| 37.2 | °kriyāsādhane | **°kriyāsādhane** |
| 37.2-3 | °kriyā...pravartate | **°kriyā...pravartate** |
| 37.16 | upapannaṃ...janyata | **upapannaṃ...janyata** |
| 37.16-17 | tat...sādhanam | **tat...sādhanam** |
| 37.18 | °prasaṅga | °prasaṅgaḥ |
| 37.2 | yadvāneveti | **yadvāneveti** |
| 38.3 | sāvadhāraṇām | sāvadhāraṇam |
| 39.3 | tathābhāvo | **tathābhāvo** |
| 40.2 | °yogyatvamam° | yogyatvamayam° |
| 40.5 | anadhikārāt | **anadhikārāt** |
| 41.2 | tattva° | tattat° |
| 42.1 | parvakāla° | pūrvakāla° |
| 45.9 | yadeva hi...prayojanaṃ | **yadeva hi...prayojanaṃ** |
| 45.19 | tadbhāvapratiṣedha | **tadbhāvapratiṣedha** |
| 45.20 | pramāṇaprameyādimātramucyate | **pramāṇaprameyādimātramucyate** |
| 45.20 | tvarthāntaraṃ | **tvarthāntaraṃ** |
| 45.21 | pratiṣidhyate | **pratiṣidhyate** |
| 45.23 | dveka° | dvyeka° |
| 45.24 | saṃkhyevavivakṣāyāṃ | saṃkhyeyavivakṣāyāṃ |
| 45.26 | pramāṇadibhyo | pramāṇādibhyo |
| 46.26 | abhimatasu° | abhimatamu° |
| 47.10 | dvādaśavidaṃ | dvādaśavidhaṃ |
| 47.14 | satyam | **satyam** |
| 47.16 | teṣāṃ pṛthagvacanam | **teṣāṃ pṛthagvacanam** |
| 47.16 | tasyāḥ | **tasyāḥ** |
| 48.3 | copalabdhaścānirṇītaśceti | **copalabdhaścānirṇītaśceti** |
| 50.12 | paṇḍakam | ṣaṇḍakam |
| 50.19 | gurvantavasinoḥ | gurvantevasinoḥ |
| 51.22 | stātakaḥ | snātakaḥ |
| 52.12 | yadyātmana iti brūyāt | **yadyātmana iti brūyāt** |
| 52.16 | evametat | **evametat** |
| 53.1-2 | yadi...aśucīti | **yadi...aśucīti** |
| 53.11 | kiścin° | kiñcin° |
| 54.11 | pūrva...vidhānān° | **pūrva...vidhānān°** |
| 55.24 | nāyaṃ...parīkṣaka | **nāyaṃ...parīkṣaka** |
| 57.20 | °smṛtir | **°smṛtīr** |
| 59.13 | °pramāṇya° | °prāmāṇya° |
| 60.3 | ato heturityucyate | **ato heturityucyate** |
| 60.9 | smṛti...punarupadarśanāt | **smṛti...punarupadarśanāt** |
| 60.10 | udāharaṇaṃ pratyakṣam | **udāharaṇaṃ pratyakṣam** |
| 60.21 | paramo nyāyaḥ | **paramo nyāyaḥ** |
| 61.3 | viprati...pratipādakatvaṃ paścā° | **viprati...pratipādakatvaṃ** pañcā° |
| 64.4-5 | siddhānta-bhedānuvidhānena | **siddhānta-bhedānuvidhānena** |
| 67.1 | kimuktaṃ bhavati | **kimuktaṃ bhavati** |
| 67.19 | pramāṇaprakāśitaṃ | **pramāṇaprakāśitaṃ** |
| 68.6-7 | dukhaḥ- | duḥkha- |

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| 69.18 | tacchāline | tacchāline |
| 70.15 | kunibandhāḥ | kunibandhāḥ |
| 70.19 | kunibandhapaṅkamagnānāṃ | kunibandhapaṅkamagnānāṃ |
| 70.20 | samuddharaṇam | samuddharaṇam |
| 71.7 | nibandho | nibandho |
| 71.10 | svanibandhasya prayojanavattā° | svanibandhasya prayojanavattā° |
| 72.18-19 | yattu...saḥ | yattu...saḥ |
| 73.21 | evaṃvidhāḥ...vilīyante | evaṃvidhāḥ...vilīyante |
| 75.19-20 | śāstrasya...kartavye | śāstrasya...kartavye |
| 78.2 | prayojanādivākyābhāve 'pi | prayojanādivākyābhāve 'pi |
| 79.1 | bodhakatvaṃ | bodhakatvaṃ |
| 79.2 | avyabhicāritvaṃ | avyabhicāritvaṃ |
| 83.2 | anumānasyeti | anumānasyeti |
| 83.2 | svata | svata |
| 85.4 | yato 'syeti | yato 'syeti |
| 85.5 | tasmāt śāstraṃ | tasmāt śāstraṃ |
| 85.6 | puruṣaśreyo | puruṣaśreyo |
| 85.6 | abhidhatte | abhidhatte |
| 85.6 | kathaṃ...kalpanta | kathaṃ...kalpanta |
| 85.8 | °kośasyānantaprasaratvād | °kośasyānantaprasaratvād |
| 85.9 | pratyakṣānumāneti | pratyakṣānumāneti |
| 85.17 | eva darśite | eva darśite |
| 86.18 | naitān viviñcate | naitān viviñcate |
| 86.19 | saṃdighasyāpi | saṃdighasyāpi |
| 87.6 | nivṛttasya | nivṛttasya |
| 87.6 | punarutpādaḥ | punarutpādaḥ |
| 87.8 | nivṛttyā nivṛttisvarūpeṇa lakṣyate | nivṛttyā nivṛttisvarūpeṇa lakṣyate |
| 87.9 | kārya° | kārya° |
| 87.9 | kāraṇa° | kāraṇa° |
| 87.9 | anuṣaṅgi | anuṣaṅgi |
| 88.8 | anyathāsya duḥkahetubhāvo | anyathāsya duḥkahetubhāvo |
| 88.16 | sādhanapāratantryaṃ | sādhanapāratantryaṃ |
| 88.19 | kṣayitvam | kṣayitvam |
| 89.23 | saṃśayādī° | saṃśayādī° |
| 89.23 | paramanyāyetyanena | paramanyāyetyanena |
| 90.1 | nyāyamārgaḥ | nyāyamārgaḥ |
| 90.2 | dvādaśavidhe° | dvādaśavidhe° |
| 90.3 | tattvaparibhāvane° | tattvaparibhāvane° |
| 90.20 | mṛtyate | mṛgyate |
| 93.8 | tadavayavaṃ vivarītum | tadavayavaṃ vivarītum |
| 94.4 | nāpramāṇādarthavyabhicāriṇo | nāpramāṇādarthavyabhicāriṇo |
| 94.5 | arthavattvamarthāvyabhicāritvam | arthavattvamarthāvyabhicāritvam |
| 94.6 | tasyā | tasyā |
| 94.13 | arthaviniścaya | arthaviniścaya |
| 94.13 | śreyohetutānumānasahita | śreyohetutānumānasahita |

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| 94.14 | prāmāṇyāvadhāraṇaṃ | **prāmāṇyāvadhāraṇaṃ** |
| 94.14 | antareṇa | **antareṇa** |
| 95.17 | viniścityā° | **viniścityā°** |
| 95.19 | pravṛttisāmarthyāt prāgeva | **pravṛttisāmarthyāt prāgeva** |
| 98.7 | phalajñānasya | **phalajñānasya** |
| 98.11 | śaṅkitavyabhicāraṃ | **śaṅkitavyabhicāraṃ** |
| 98.21 | nirasta...śaṅkam | **nirasta...śaṅkam** |
| 98.21 | svata eva prāmāṇyaṃ | **svata eva prāmāṇyaṃ** |
| 99.4 | liṅgasamutthatvād | **liṅgasamutthatvād** |
| 101.12 | daśānāṃ duḥkhasaṃjñābhāvanaṃ | **daśānāṃ duḥkhasaṃjñābhāvanaṃ** |
| 101.13 | bhāvanaṃ | **bhāvanaṃ** |
| 101.13 | ādi° | **ādi°** |
| 101.14 | ātmatattvasākṣātkāra | **ātmatattvasākṣātkāra** |
| 101.15 | vairāgyaṃ | **vairāgyaṃ** |
| 101.15 | paripākaḥ | **paripākaḥ** |
| 101.23 | pramāṇamarthavad | **pramāṇamarthavad** |
| 102.2 | lokavṛttamanūdyate | **lokavṛttamanūdyate** |
| 102.3 | apramāṇene° | **apramāṇene°** |
| 102.16 | bhāṣyagato | **bhāṣyagato** |
| 102.8 | cāgṛhītaprāmāṇyene° | **cāgṛhītaprāmāṇyene°** |
| 102.8 | lokavṛttam | **lokavṛttam** |
| 104.6-7 | kasmāt...nābhihitam | **kasmāt...nābhihitam** |
| 105.4 | artha...pratyakṣaṃ | **artha...pratyakṣaṃ** |
| 105.4 | 'rthagocaram | **'rthagocaram** |
| 105.23 | viśeṣa | **viśeṣa** |
| 107.6 | ādi° | **ādi°** |
| 107.18 | tathā pramite | tathāpramite |
| 109.4 | sūtrayato° | **sūtragato°** |
| 110.5 | anubhūtaṃ saṃskā° | anubhūtasaṃskā° |
| 113.n1.3 | janayana | janayan |
| 113.n1.10 | niyamāntarapakṣe ta | niyamāntaramapekṣata |
| 114.10 | karaṇībhūtasya paraśoḥ | **karaṇībhūtasya paraśoḥ** |
| 115.2 | tasmāt | **tasmāt** |
| 115.5-6 | akaraṇā pramāṇotpattiḥ | **akaraṇā pramāṇotpattiḥ** |
| 115.12 | satyapi copalabdhisādhanatve | **satyapi copalabdhisādhanatve** |
| 115.21 | bhavetyevetyata | bhavatyevetyata |
| 116.3 | °āśrīyate | **°āśrīyate** |
| 116.9 | saṃyogavad | **saṃyogavad** |
| 116.11 | co 'vadhāraṇe | **co 'vadhāraṇe** |
| 116.16 | arthavati ca pramāṇe | **arthavati ca pramāṇe** |
| 116.16 | arthavanti bhavanti | **arthavanti bhavanti** |
| 118.25 | tatredamupatiṣṭhate | **tatredamupatiṣṭhate** |
| 119.10 | aniyata hetukatvāt | **aniyataprāṇabhṛdbhedahetukatvāt** |
| 119.19 | °pratipetti° | °pratipatti° |
| 119.23 | svātantryam | **svātantryam** |
| 120.14-15 | tatprayoktṛtvam | **tatprayoktṛtvam** |
| 120.19 | itarāprayojyatvam | **itarāprayojyatvam** |

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| 121.7 | jīvaś | **jīvaś** |
| 121.8 | 'jivaḥ | **'jivaḥ** |
| 121.8 | āsravāḥ | **āsravāḥ** |
| 122.5 | pūrvavad vyākhyeyam | **pūrvavad vyākhyeyam** |
| 123.12-13 | avayavārthaṃ vyācikhyāsune° | **avayavārthaṃ vyācikhyāsune°** |
| 124.10 | tasyā...gamyata | **tasyā...gamyata** |
| 124.18 | nivedayiṣyate | **nivedayiṣyate** |
| 124.19 | svarūpalakṣaṇā śaktir | **svarūpalakṣaṇā śaktir** |
| 125.17-18 | anumānamevātrārthe pramāṇam | **anumānamevātrārthe pramāṇam** |
| 125.20 | pṛthag...pramāṇādibhyaḥ | **I pṛthag...pramāṇādibhyaḥ** |
| 125.22 | vihitatvādādyena sūtreṇeti | **vihitatvādādyena sūtreṇeti** |
| 125.22 | tadiyatā | tadīyatā |
| 126.3 | evaṃ | enaṃ |
| 126.3 | dvitīyasūtra | **dvitīyasūtra** |
| 127.7 | nyāyaḥ pravartate | **nyāyaḥ pravartate** |
| 127.9 | kiṃ punaḥ prayojanam | **kiṃ punaḥ prayojanam** |
| 128.14 | parīkṣāṇāspadatvāl | **parīkṣāṇāspadatvāl** |
| 129.9 | sarvopasaṃhāraḥ | **sarvopasaṃhāraḥ** |
| 129.17 | atiprasaṅgād | **atiprasaṅgād** |
| 129.17 | anumānādhikāre | **anumānādhikāre** |
| 129.22 | na tarām | natarām |
| 131.24 | atra vastuni | **atra vastuni** |
| 132.9 | na vedānumāne mūlaṃ | **na vedānumāne mūlam** |
| 132.9 | kimuktaṃ bhavati śucītyanena | **kimuktaṃ bhavati śucītyanena** |
| 132.14 | abhāvād | **abhāvād** |
| 133.21 | ananyāsiddhau | ananyathāsiddhau |
| 134.3 | athopamānetyādi | **athopamānetyādi** |
| 134.3 | nopamānaviruddham | **nopamānaviruddham** |
| 134.4 | saṃpratipattir | **saṃpratipattir** |
| 134.9 | prayojanasvarūpe | **prayojanasvarūpe** |
| 134.15 | pṛthagupadiṣṭa...bhaviṣyatīti | **pṛthagupadiṣṭa...bhaviṣyatīti** |
| 135.6 | parapakṣa...pravartata | **parapakṣa...pravartata** |
| 135.13 | asiddhaviruddha[tv]ādidoṣo | **asiddhaviruddha[tv]ādidoṣo** |
| 135.24 | pūrvapratyakṣadṛṣṭam | **pūrvapratyakṣadṛṣṭam** |
| 136.6 | pramāṇye | prāmāṇye |
| 136.7 | pūrvaṃ...ācaṣṭa | **pūrvaṃ...ācaṣṭa** |
| 137.5 | samūho | **samūho** |
| 138.9 | yadā...kāraṇam | **yadā...kāraṇam** |
| 138.10 | avadhāraṇādī° | **avadhāraṇādī°** |
| 138.11 | tata...upapatteḥ | **tata...upapatteḥ** |
| 139.4 | siddhirvyā° | siddhivyā° |
| 139.5 | hetuvacanādivaiyarthyāt | **hetuvacanādivaiyarthyāt** |
| 139.6 | sādhanasya nyāyaḥ | **sādhanasya nyāyaḥ** |
| 139.6-7 | °ātipāto | **°ātipāto** |
| 139.7 | tameva vyutpādayet | **tameva vyutpādayet** |
| 139.7 | tasya ca nyāyaviśeṣasya | **tasya ca nyāyaviśeṣasya** |
| 139.9 | anugrahaḥ | **anugrahaḥ** |

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| 139.10 | saprayojanaśca bhavati | **saprayojanaśca bhavati** |
| 139.11-12 | tat khalu...pratipādakaṃ | **tat khalu...pratipādakaṃ** |
| 139.12-13 | tadā...numānena | **tadā...numānena** |
| 139.13 | anugrahītavyam | **anugrahītavyam** |
| 139.20 | evaṃ ca tatpratipādakasya | **evaṃ ca tatpratipādakasya** |
| 140.17 | ekaṃ prayojanam | **ekaṃ prayojanam** |
| 140.23 | vikalpaḥ | **vikalpaḥ** |
| 140.24 | viśeṣapratipādakatvam | **viśeṣapratipādakatvam** |
| 141.18 | pramāṇyaṃ | prāmāṇyaṃ |
| 142.2 | anujānan | **anujānan** |
| 142.4 | pāratantryeṇa | **pāratantryeṇa** |
| 142.17 | yajete° | **yajete°** |
| 143.15 | kiścit | kiñcit |
| 143.17 | vaicitryagrasaṅgaḥ | vaicitryaprasaṅgaḥ |
| 143.20 | emis | ebhis |
| 144.3 | svasiddhānta...cāhatur | **svasiddhānta...cāhatur** |
| 144.13 | kvacita | kvacij |
| 144.22-23 | ubhayathāpyanaikāntikatvād | **ubhayathāpyanaikāntikatvād** |
| 145.2 | avivarkṣitam | avivakṣitam |
| 145.24 | tattvapratipattivyāghātāt | **tattvapratipattivyāghātāt** |
| 146.9 | tattvapratipatyu° | tattvapratipattyu° |
| 147.3 | pratyakṣādiviṣaya | **pratyakṣādiviṣaya** |
| 147.15 | parīkṣā | **parīkṣā** |
| 147.16 | dvāraṃ | **dvāraṃ** |
| 147.18 | trayī | **trayī** |
| 147.18 | niveśanīyetyarthaḥ | **niveśanī**yetyarthaḥ |
| 149.3 | ābhikhyāyāḥ | āmīkṣāyāḥ |
| 149.4 | ādi° | **ādi°** |
| 149.9 | bhūditā° | bhūdityā° |

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